

"IMAGES OF ENCOUNTER": MAUD BODKIN'S JOURNAL  
AND HER PSYCHOLOGY OF LITERARY RESPONSE

by

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B. ED., Duquesne University, 1955

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
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From 1950 to 1956 Maud Bodkin kept a journal in which she recorded her comments on and observations about her extensive reading in many disciplines. Four themes which distinguish her critical theory are prominent in the journal. The first is the development of her understanding of the archetype. In Archetypal Patterns in Poetry (1934) Bodkin explores Carl Jung's hypothesis that there exist in the brain primordial images, or psychic residua, the result of ancestral experience. Believing that the study of archetypes would lead to increased self-knowledge and expression, she directs her attention to a psychological explanation of the formation of images and patterns in poetry. Rejecting the biological basis of Jung's hypothesis, she concentrates on the patterns underlying images not only in poetry but also in religion and philosophy. In Studies of Type-Images in Poetry, Religion, and Philosophy (1951) Bodkin examines the images themselves, distinguishing two aspects of the archetype: it is both a product of time and a creative energy helping determine the future. She moves toward the belief that the archetype's creative energy is concentrated on the possibility of encountering the Divine, "the reality beyond all images."

A second theme is the primacy of the encounter, a term which Bodkin derives from Martin Buber's I and Thou. In "Archetypes and the Christian Tradition" (1943), "Physical Agencies and the Divine Persuasion" (1945), and most fully in Studies of Type-Images, Bodkin sees images of God, divine birth, and wisdom as evidence that the eternal is encountered in the meeting of I and Thou. In her journal, Bodkin



uses encounter to describe her personal meeting with the particular ideas of poets, novelists, critics, psychologists, philosophers, and theologians, all of which bear on the problem of the meaning of human existence. For her, such encounter replaces psychoanalysis as a method of discovering truth. Communion with others is achieved as one communicates the results of one's search for "belief expressed in imagery awakening reponse."

The importance of the individual response to a work of art is the third prominent theme. Bodkin holds that the full meaning of a literary work can be apprehended only by pooling individual responses. Her belief in a shared collective response to literature is a major tenet of her theory in Archetypal Patterns. Later, in The Quest for Salvation in an Ancient and a Modern Play (1941), "Truth in Poetry" (1935), and "Physical Agencies," Bodkin makes use of Alfred North Whitehead's philosophy of organism and his concept of the divine persuasion as a philosophical basis for her theory.

Because Bodkin's tenuous hope that there is a divine persuasion influencing I-Thou encounters does not become certainty, the fourth theme involves Bodkin's struggle to express her individual perspective, the result of her meeting with the imaginative communication of truth.

My introduction traces these themes throughout all of Bodkin's published work and seven unpublished articles and two unpublished letters reproduced in an appendix. It also supplies biographical information. The text of the journal is presented together with notes and a textual apparatus explaining the editorial procedures used.

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## Preface

Maud Bodkin began keeping a journal in 1950, using a leather-bound book of 101 sheets. Only a few entries--excerpts from poems and short stories with some personal comments--were made before October of 1952, when she began writing in it more regularly. An entry dated October 13 says:

Now that I think I shall not complete my article begun for "Philosophy" nor write anything that requires the holding together of various facts and opinions, so as to satisfy academic minds, and expect rather, to solace my craving for expression in words only through the never to be read entries in this book, what purpose remains to me?<sup>1</sup>

At this time Bodkin was 77 years old, leading "a secluded lonely professional and domestic life" (see p. 2 following). Her Archetypal Patterns in Poetry had been published in 1934 to critical interest and acclaim, especially in America.<sup>2</sup> Studies of Type-Images in Poetry, Religion and Philosophy, just published in 1951, did not attract much attention. A review in Philosophy indicates the kind of reception the book received: "No reader could fail to respect the sincerity and magnanimity of these personal confessions, but the argument is too imprecise to call for discussion in these

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<sup>1</sup>Bodleian MS e 828, see pp. 4-5 following.

<sup>2</sup>Personal interview with Margot Adamson, 9 August 1977. Miss Adamson said that Bodkin was never as widely read and influential in criticism in England as she was in America.

pages."<sup>3</sup> While Simon O. Lesser praises Bodkin as "reverential in her approach to literature, humble in her desire to understand, [and] loving in her response to every shift and nuance of a writer's thought," he advises the reader to concentrate on the book's literary analyses rather than upon its religious argument, since he finds the book's impelling force to be "the desire to find some basis for belief in religious values and in some form of immortality."<sup>4</sup> Adamson writes: "Miss Bodkin was much more interested by her book on Type-Images than in the Archetypal Patterns--which she was apt to dismiss as, so to say, work that had been done; and was a little disappointed by its small public effect."<sup>5</sup>

It is clear why Bodkin was unhappy over the failure of Type-Images: in it she had carried further her examination of Carl Jung's theory of archetypes, developing her belief that the archetype had both a subjective and objective aspect. She rejected its subjective form--primordial images or inherited dispositions, the result of ancestral experience--in favor of its objective aspect: "images, handed down from one generation to another, and preserved in books and pictures."<sup>6</sup> She also distinguished between two directions of the archetype's objective form as both a product of time and a creative

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<sup>3</sup> M. H. Carré, rev. of Studies of Type-Images in Poetry, Religion, and Philosophy, by Maud Bodkin, Philosophy, 27 (1952), p. 285.

<sup>4</sup> Simon O. Lesser, "Homage to Maud Bodkin," rev. of Studies of Type-Images in Poetry, Religion, and Philosophy, by Maud Bodkin, Literature and Psychology, 8 (1950), p. 45.

<sup>5</sup> Letter received from Adamson, 28 July 1972.

<sup>6</sup> Maud Bodkin, Studies of Type-Images in Poetry, Religion, and Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 174.

energy looking towards the future.

But Type-Images was written primarily because Bodkin had come to see the archetype's creative energy concentrated upon the possibility of encountering the divine, "the reality beyond all images" (Type-Images, p. 2). It is a working out of Martin Buber's concept that the eternal is encountered in the meeting of I and Thou: "a being unbounded . . . not to be enclosed within any image or conceptual formula" (Type-Images, p. 1). Agreeing with Buber that I-Thou can be realized through encounter with men or with their written ideas, and accepting his statement that "relation to God is dependent on relation of service to man" (Type-Images, p. 28), Bodkin saw Type-Images as the result of her service: "thought from the whole range of research and philosophic reflection on the nature of man and society" (Type-Images, p. 29).

Because Bodkin envisioned Type-Images as her contribution to "that sorely needed rebirth of spiritual tradition" which she hoped would be the result of the "present confusion [and] decay of forms that once satisfied men's minds" (Type-Images, p. 58), it has a narrow scope: her responses to her chosen images of God, divine birth, and wisdom. It lacks the vitality and dynamic quality of Archetypal Patterns. There her search for basic patterns within widely diverging imagery encouraged creative thought. Her constant habit of correlating her findings with those achieved through other disciplines and other methods of literary criticism contributed to an atmosphere of freedom.

In Type-Images, however, Bodkin is primarily concerned with recording the answers she has found for the question of the meaning of life: "The best thing in this life has been not its pleasures and bodily comforts but the dim sense of meaning that through it all has been never completely, though sometimes nearly, lost" (Type-Images,



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p. 55). She expresses her "willingness to suffer again, on earth or elsewhere, whatever is required for atonement or fulfillment, if only sense of Divine meaning be not lost to us" (Type-Images, p. 56).

Instead of encouraging similar individual contributions however, the book was largely ignored. Her journal thus became a means of communication, containing her responses to works of philosophy, psychology, history, religion, biography, autobiography, and literature. It illustrates her restless need to meditate upon communicated instances of what she believed to be, influenced by A. N. Whitehead, workings of the divine persuasion. It also gives an indication of the steps by which she moved from Type-Images' intense preoccupation with faith to an implied agreement with agnosticism in her last published article, "Literature and the Individual Reader."<sup>7</sup>

Yet she soon began to think of publishing again. In addition to her last article, "Poetry and the Human Condition" was published in 1953 and "Knowledge and Faith" shortly after the journal's last entry, January 18, 1956. She wrote but never published "Mental Climate and Perspective and the Cosmic Stairway" and there are references to other projected articles, none of which are extant (see pages 4, 56, 68, and 69 following). Bodkin also contemplated publishing the journal itself, calling its entries "spontaneous free flowing meditations," subject to continual modification, which should have a question or theme to differentitate them (see pages 61 and 65 following). She did modify them, crossing out and inserting words and phrases and putting titles to some of the pages; however, there is no evidence that she ever approached a publisher. The journal remains a record of Bodkin's personal responses to communicated images of encounter.

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<sup>7</sup> Bodkin, "Literature and the Individual Reader," Literature and Psychology, 10 (1960), p. 45.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND DEDICATION

I would like to thank all of the students and teachers of literature who have helped form and have added to my interest in literary criticism. I especially want to thank H. John Bodkin for permission to use his aunt's journal and unpublished articles, and all of the individuals who have helped me in the preparation of this work, some of whom are Margot Adamson, Brenda Al-Azzawi, Richard Brain, Oxford University Press; Professor Don L. Cook, Indiana University and Chairman of the Center for Scholarly Editions; Professor John W. Crowley, Syracuse University; Berta Lesser, Helen Morris, Homerton College, Cambridge; Professor Herbert W. Passin, Columbia University; Professor Grover Smith, Duke University; Irene Swallow, Christine Wierzba, Franklin Lakes Library, Franklin Lakes, New Jersey; the trustees of Syracuse University, for a grant which enabled me to use the resources of the Bodleian Library, Oxford; and Professor Walter Sutton, Syracuse University, in whose classes I first met Maud Bodkin.

I also wish to acknowledge the late Mary Agnes Taylor and Winifred Harrison, without whose concern for their friend's memory this study could not have been undertaken. I owe my greatest debt to my husband, Tom, and to my children: Mary, Dan, Sharon, and Elizabeth, for their willing cooperation, constant support, and love. I dedicate this work to them.

Irene H. Montella

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"Images of Encounter": Maud Bodkin's Journal  
and Her Psychology of Literary Response

As a pioneer in the study of the literary archetype, Maud Bodkin has been a force in modern literary theory and criticism. Her own theory grew out of her life long interest in the source of poetic imagery and her desire to add to a psychological explanation for readers' response to that imagery. Trained as a psychologist, she studied the relation of dream imagery to poetic imagery and examined the former's source in the unconscious. Believing that the study of imagery could furnish the individual knowledge about himself, she became interested in the nature of response to the great images found in poetry. Like later critics who have explored the relationship between literature and psychology, Bodkin was influenced by I. A. Richards' Principles of Literary Criticism (1924). Although she considered Richards representative of "those who make large claims for poetry," she was dissatisfied with his phrase emotive belief as an expression of the truth derived from poetry, and came to find Carl Jung's psychological reality a more accurate, and adequate term.<sup>1</sup> Later, in "Truth in Poetry," she further

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<sup>1</sup> Maud Bodkin, Archetypal Patterns in Poetry (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), pp. 75, 78. All subsequent references in parentheses in the text are to this edition and will be identified with the letters AP.

refined Richards' conception of two kinds of language by means of A. N. Whitehead's philosophy of organism (see p. xliii following).

In her first and most influential book, Archetypal Patterns in Poetry (1934), she applied Jung's hypothesis that there exist in the brain primordial images, or psychic residua, the result of ancestral experience. Jung theorized that the special emotional significance of some poems, their power to express and thus relieve typical human emotions, exists because they stir response from archetypes beneath readers' conscious responses. While Jung's hypothesis provided a fruitful and dynamic explanation for poetry's appeal, Bodkin did not make it the exclusive basis for her theory. Rather, she viewed it as one explanation which, applied by any reader trained in Bodkin's method of directed passivity, could lead to a better understanding and therefore conscious control of one's unconscious drives. Bodkin found that the most important result of her study of archetypal patterns was her awareness of the relation of the individual to a larger life.

Exploring this relation, she became interested in Whitehead's theory of the divine persuasion and in Martin Buber's concept that true spiritual life consists in the encounter between the self and Thou. Extending her analysis to religion and philosophy in Studies of Type-Images in Poetry, Philosophy and Religion (1951), Bodkin focused on response to one type of imagery, that by which men have expressed their experience of the Divine. She viewed this imagery, which she called the archetype's objective aspect, as evidence of the I-Thou relationship.

Her journal, begun in 1950, is a continuation of her search for "terms, images or concepts" with which to express her "sense of life--its meaning, obligations, value."<sup>2</sup> Bodkin subordinates her earlier belief that understanding imagery is a source of self-knowledge and expression to an emphasis on imagery as a record of encounter. Her work illuminates the nature of imagery by calling attention both to its psychological basis and to its relation to man's search for meaning. While Bodkin's early work, culminating in Archetypal Patterns, is in the tradition of Richards, the rest of her criticism proceeds from her interest in "a larger life" and should be viewed in the context of her search for spiritual reality. Before an examination of her writings in order to trace the steps by which a psychologist came to make an important contribution to criticism, it will be useful to know something of her personal background.

Amy Maud Bodkin was born in Chelmsford, Essex, on March 30, 1875, one of seven children. Her mother's name was Eva Alice Copland;<sup>3</sup> her father, William Thomas Bodkin, originally from Ulster, was a physician. She was educated at home by masters, governesses, and her father.<sup>4</sup> Bodkin then went to the University of Aberystwyth, Wales, where in 1900 she qualified for the degree of B. A. with

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<sup>2</sup>Bodleian MS e 828, see pp. 70-71 following. All subsequent page references in the text not otherwise identified are to the journal.

<sup>3</sup>Contemporary Authors, Permanent Series.

<sup>4</sup>Letter received from Mary Agnes Taylor, 6 December 1973. See pp. 22-23 following.



First Class Honours in Philosophy and in 1902 earned her M. A.<sup>5</sup>

She lectured at Bedford College for Women in London, relieving her friend, Beatrice Edgell, University Reader in Psychology, for one year. They had both been students of John Brough at Abersythwyth.<sup>6</sup>

In 1903 Bodkin was hired as lecturer in psychology and logic, with some responsibility for "the supervision of school practice" at Homerton College in Cambridge, a training college for teachers. She received a year's grant in 1905 to visit America to study methods of teaching educational psychology.<sup>7</sup> In 1914 she retired from teaching, explaining:

I remained troubled by the difficulty of bringing psychology, as I understood it, into helpful relation with the work of the schools, and, influenced partly by declining health, decided on early retirement to devote myself to literature and philosophic studies.<sup>8</sup>

Very little additional information about this early period of her life is available. She did not have happy memories of her

<sup>5</sup>Letter received from R. W. Evans, Academic Secretary, University of Wales, Cardiff, 28 February 1972. Bodkin was also granted both these degrees from the University of London: "From 1836 to 1900 the University of London was just an Examining Board. Miss Bodkin never came to London (except to sit the examinations) but did all her work at Aberystwyth College" (Letter received from A. H. Wesenraft, Reference Librarian, University of London, 23 March 1972).

<sup>6</sup>Letter received from Taylor, July 1972. Bodkin dedicated Archetypal Patterns to her father, William, her brother, Herbert, and John Brough (Letter received from Taylor, 15 March 1972).

<sup>7</sup>Letter received from Helen Morris, English department head, Homerton College, 23 February 1972.

<sup>8</sup>Twentieth Century Authors, (First Supplement).

childhood years, remembering the atmosphere as "oppressive."<sup>9</sup> A friend of Bodkin's testifies: "I felt myself the lasting undertone of that unhappiness the one time I heard Miss Bodkin refer to her youth in Chelmsford."<sup>10</sup> Bodkin mentions being brought to church by her mother, who herself had an unhappy and "troubled hold upon the teaching and practices of her church,"<sup>11</sup> and also refers to "the fear which has always been a rather marked characteristic of B's [a reference to herself] attitude toward her father and toward the world with its social and practical demands" (RDF, p. 286). She recalls being often unhappy in college, "through shyness and diffidence in company with others. I knew what it was to feel the body a prison, and to long for some vision of a truth independent of all bodily and individual desire and frustration" (TI, p. 5).

One influence on her life at this time was the thought of William James. She read him as part of her training as a psychologist, but she also mentions turning over "the much-marked and many times re-read pages of my father's copy of The Varieties of Religious Experience."<sup>12</sup> Toward the end of her life Bodkin wrote:

<sup>9</sup> A. M. Bodkin, "The Representation in Dream and Fantasy of Instinctive and Repressing Forces," British Journal of Medical Psychology, 7 (1927), 278. All subsequent references in parentheses in the text to this article will be identified with the letters RDF. See p. 57 following.

<sup>10</sup> Letter received from Margot Adamson, 28 July 1972. See pp. 16, 18-19, 29-30, 45, and 53 following.

<sup>11</sup> Maud Bodkin, Studies of Type-Images in Poetry, Religion, and Philosophy, (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 5. All subsequent references in parentheses in the text are to this edition, which will be identified with the letters TI.

<sup>12</sup> Twentieth-Century Authors, (First Supplement).

There comes to my mind at this point the challenge of William James--encountered by me in the plastic period of adolescence and ever since present with me--the challenge to imaginative venturing undeterred by any warnings of scientific purists. . . . Let us rather, James urges [in The Will to Believe], follow any clue, accept in attitude and action any hypothesis, concerning a Divine Power or influence, that makes to us individually a genuine appeal--even though aware that our unproved faith may not appear valid to others.<sup>13</sup>

Bodkin also found Plato's thought congenial.<sup>14</sup> At a time when she was "in revolt against dogmatic assertion" (TI, p. 6), Bodkin liked the fact that Plato put his suggestions concerning the proper conduct of life in the form of myth, such as the vision of divine truth in Phaedrus. Bodkin read Albert Schweitzer's The Quest of the Historical Jesus (1906), which, together with her readings of Biblical criticism and theology, enabled her to reject her childhood conceptions of Jesus and see him as "an heroic human sufferer" (TI, p. 8). She joined the Fabian Society, "almost with the same feeling with which one might join the fellowship of a church," supporting the society's efforts because she felt obliged to help alleviate "the misery of the world" (TI, p. 9). However, Bodkin soon found that she did not have "the natural gifts for social investigation or propagandist work" (TI, p. 9). When her parents died, her inheritance enabled her to retire from teaching and devote herself to the life of thought.

Also retiring in 1914 was Mary Agnes Taylor, who had joined the

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<sup>13</sup>Bodkin, "Poetry and the Human Condition," The Hibbert Journal, 51 (1953), 349. All subsequent references in parentheses in the text to this article will be identified with the letters PHC.

<sup>14</sup>See p. 81 following.

Homerton staff in 1908 as "a mistress of method."<sup>15</sup> She writes of this period: "Very soon I felt a strange assurance that I was 'predestined' to meet Maud Bodkin and help her through life."<sup>16</sup> Together they lived in Highgate, North London, at first with Taylor's mother: "Maud then began her study referring to her intention of meditation and writing, while I pursued teaching and lecturing on education."<sup>17</sup> In London Taylor met and began to work with Winifred Harrison, who had a school of handicrafts where teachers were trained to earn a handwork diploma.<sup>18</sup> Bodkin did not stop teaching completely: she was an assistant in the department of psychology at Bedford College in 1921-22, and at some time before 1939 she taught a series of University Extension lectures, perhaps to the Workers' Education society in 1917.<sup>19</sup> She also continued to see some fellow Fabian society members.<sup>20</sup>

The only other information about her life in London, at the time when Archetypal Patterns and four articles were published, is these words in Taylor's letter of 6 February 1972: "During those Highgate years, i.e. until 1939, her health often failed. Early in

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<sup>15</sup> Letter received from Morris, 23 February 1972.

<sup>16</sup> Letter received from Taylor, 6 February 1972.

<sup>17</sup> Letter received from Taylor, 6 February 1972.

<sup>18</sup> Letter received from Winifred Harrison, 12 September 1974. See P. 74 following.

<sup>19</sup> Letter received from Taylor, 3 November 1972.

<sup>20</sup> Bodkin sometimes talked with Graham Wallas (1858-1932), (letter received from Taylor, 6 February 1972). She also spent a week-end with Sidney and Beatrice Webb; she and Taylor visited Bernard Shaw (1856-1950), (letter received from Taylor, 20 February 1972).



this period, for the purpose of her writing, she had some experience of Psycho Analysis [sic]." Bodkin writes that after studying the psychology of Freud and Jung, she underwent analysis "partly for its philosophic interest and partly with the hope that his [Jung's] teaching, applied with medical help to my own problems, might have some effect on those inhibitions that from childhood had hampered me in social contacts. No notable success in this respect was obtained from the analysis I underwent" (TI, p. 9).<sup>21</sup>

In 1939 Bodkin and Taylor moved to Welwyn Garden City, about thirty miles north of London, where they shared a house next door to Harrison. Taylor writes:

The second world war was almost immediately declared, and three children were billeted upon us. Then officers and their batsmen, and later teachers. All this necessitated a redistribution of household furnishing, and Maud's books, shelves, etc. were brought down to a ground floor, much less conducive to peace.<sup>22</sup>

Bodkin lived very quietly, rarely visiting London: the three women sometimes took vacations on the coast near Bournemouth.<sup>23</sup> In addition to Taylor, Harrison, and Margot Adamson, an author and translator who met Bodkin first about 1946 "at a small discussion-

<sup>21</sup>Bodkin mentions "the stresses of the transference" and says she discussed her dreams with Dr. H. F. Baynes (RDF, p. 275), who was Jung's assistant for a time and translated Jung's Psychological Types. He was one of the foremost practitioners of Jungian psychology in England (Barbara Hannah, Jung: his Life and Work [New York: Putnam, 1976], pp. 140-41).

<sup>22</sup>Letter received from Taylor, 20 February 1972.

<sup>23</sup>Letter received from Bodkin's nephew, H. John Bodkin, 24 October 1977. Also see p. 38 following.

group and subsequently because she said she 'liked talking with me,'"<sup>24</sup> Bodkin speaks of two other friends in the journal, a Mr. Carter and John Murphy.<sup>25</sup> Bodkin died in 1967 at the age of 92.

Her articles published before Archetypal Patterns indicate what influences helped form her critical theory. These early articles use the concept of the unconscious as a means of explaining imagery, both in poetry and in dreams. Bodkin believes that images in dreams are important for two reasons: they furnish the individual with more information about himself than can be gleaned from introspection. Also, the work of the creative individual, whether in literature, art, religion, or philosophy, depends upon the interaction of conscious purpose and technique with blind forces active in the unconscious, of which the individual knows little. These articles reveal Bodkin's optimism about the extent to which the workings of the unconscious can be made known to the individual through the study of imagery.

The first, "Subconscious Factors of Mental Process Considered in Relation to Thought" (1907), discusses "those subconscious, or unconscious mental modifications . . . wholly beyond the range of introspection" which lie between feeling and thought, and "the manner in which mental factors of different degrees of organisation

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<sup>24</sup>Letter received from Adamson, 8 April 1972.

<sup>25</sup>"Donald Carter was in the film industry and for a time, before he and his family left for Canada, an active figure in [Welwyn] Garden City" (Letter received from Adamson, 20 December 1977). See pp. 80, 90, and 96 following. John Murphy was a friend who often visited her during the last twenty years of her life, and who had known her from her years in London (Letter received from Murphy's niece, Brenda Al-Azzawi, 3 April 1972). See p. 6 following.



may be operative in inferential judgment without coming explicitly before the mind."<sup>26</sup> She finds that the psychical mechanism by which inferential judgments are made is similar to unreflective bodily reaction:

A system of connexions which may be said to be within the mind, rather than presented as an object to it, is stirred at the first apprehension of the case--the question or problem on which judgment is required--and judgment takes shape before the mind in accordance with these connexions which, still, while they operate remain dark to reflexion (SF, p. 368).

In trying to make subconscious grounds of inference explicit, Bodkin says that "principles shaped by universal experience and fixed by language may have been communicated to the individual and afterwards forgotten, while yet leaving their effect upon his mind in the shape of a tendency or disposition" (SF, p. 371).

Bodkin maintains that during argument one can grasp the distinction between what is being said and "the deeper felt meaning" behind the speech (SF, p. 371). She then distinguishes between implicit mental factors, those really conceptual in character but which produce little disturbance in consciousness, and subconscious mental factors, those below the level of conceptual thought. The latter are usually the ground and justification of judgment:

The individual feels, as he cannot conceive, the case in its concrete fulness, feels its influence through all the hidden structure of his mind as

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<sup>26</sup>A. M. Bodkin, "Subconscious Factors of Mental Process Considered in Relation to Thought," *Mind*, NS 16 (1907), 209-10. All subsequent references in parentheses in the text to this article will be identified with the letters SF. See p. 98 following.

moulded by his personal experience, and, feeling it, makes response by a judgment or volition behind which, as justification and source of necessity, lies the whole inarticulate self rather than any definite thought (SF, p. 381).

This early interest in "subconscious or unconscious mental modifications" (Bodkin uses the terms interchangeably) and in the distinction between what is said and "the deeper felt meaning" is one reason why Jung's hypothesis later appealed to her.

Bodkin published a review, "Howard's End, by E. M. Forster," in Homerton College's magazine.<sup>27</sup> The shaping idea of the novel is the collision of the world, illustrated by the Wilcox family's exclusion of "individual notions and relations, reflective self-consciousness, and individual appreciations of things," and the inner life of Margaret and Helen Schlegel, "who live as individuals, experimental, discriminating, eager in anything that promises to make real appeal to them, critical of whatever presents itself as mere matter of custom and repute, or takes over under catch-words" (HE, p. 119). Bodkin believes that while Forster's theme in his earlier novels is the superiority of the inner life, in Howard's End he realizes that the world's values are also important. Margaret, beginning to love the widowed Mr. Wilcox, hopes for a connection between the contrasting forces "of life with the sustaining mechanism of life" (HE, p. 120). A sentence in the review reveals an enduring part of Bodkin's thought: "We each see life at a different angle; and if a man can feel and reflect deeply enough, and find

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<sup>27</sup> Bodkin, "Howard's End, by E. M. Forster," The Homertonian, June, 1911, 118-22. All subsequent references in parentheses in the text to this article will be identified with the letters HE. See pp. 66-67 following.

himself an adequate medium to make his personal vision perceptible to others, there is perhaps nothing he can give us of more value and interest than that" (HE, p. 119). She recognizes that although individual response is not easily communicated, it is valuable to others.

"The Study of Psychology" gives a reading list of two dozen books together with a brief discussion of how the study of psychology will help individuals in three areas: "the problem of social intercourse, religious experience, or the management of their own minds."<sup>28</sup> Although she addresses the article to those who do not want to study psychology formally, her comments on her own life make it evident that these interests are also hers. Certainly several journal entries point out that social intercourse had never been easy for her.<sup>29</sup> As for religious experience, she believes that the study of psychology will illuminate religion as a force in human life "at a time when tradition and authority have lost most of their power, but the need for spiritual support and consolidation is as keen as it ever was" (P, p. 126). Even as a child, Bodkin says, she was aware of a need which the imagery and forms of religion offered by her mother's church did not meet (TI, p. 5). Those who desire "more effective self-knowledge and control" (P, p. 125) and "clearer understanding and more conscious utilisation of mental powers" (P, p. 126) will benefit from studying psychology.

Evidently by this time Bodkin had read Freud and Jung because

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<sup>28</sup>Bodkin, "The Study of Psychology," The Highway, April, 1920, 125. All subsequent references in parentheses in the text to this article will be identified with the letter P.

<sup>29</sup>See pp. 7, 19, and 24-25 following.

she acknowledges that "the study of mental disease and abberation can teach us much" while cautioning the reader against accepting "the wide-ranging generalisations some writers have based upon medical work which is a subject of dispute to experts" (P, p. 126). Yet she extolls the exciting new branch of psychoanalysis because it draws attention to "those blind and submerged forces of our nature that, wrought upon by forgotten experiences, sway our desires, colour our outlook, make us strong or helpless in action, with so little recognition on our part" (P, p. 126). This article indicates the movement of her thoughts: an intense desire for self-knowledge, an absorption in the problem of religious belief in the twentieth century, and interest in "blind and submerged forces." Psychoanalysis, claiming new access to the mind, would be a fascinating technique for Bodkin, who had accepted in her training as a psychologist William James's statement, "Introspective observation is what we have to rely on first and foremost and always."<sup>30</sup>

Pursuing this interest, in 1924 Bodkin published "The Relevance of Psycho-Analysis to Art Criticism."<sup>31</sup> She discusses the manner in which a knowledge of some of the techniques and philosophy of psychoanalysis aids the critic's understanding of images in pictorial art. Contending that it is essential that "the art work be considered in relation to the unique imaginative life from which

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<sup>30</sup>William James, The Principles of Psychology (1890; rpt. New York: Dover, 1950), 1, 185.

<sup>31</sup>Bodkin, "The Relevance of Psycho-Analysis [sic] to Art Criticism," British Journal of Medical Psychology, 15 (1924), 174-83. All subsequent references in parentheses in the text to this article will be identified with the letters RP.



it issued" (RP, p. 176), Bodkin contrasts the artist's consciously acquired technique with "the psycho-physical dispositions that determine his apprehension of beauty" (RP, p. 178). These dispositions, or "unconscious emotional factors" (RP, p. 180), are usually arranged subconsciously:

According to the course of the individual's aesthetic development, and the modes of interweaving of contemplative and active pleasures in the growth of his mind, the psycho-physical dispositions that determine his apprehension of beauty will come to be differently organised; though all this fashioning must be in the main unconscious, too intimately a part of the individual's idiosyncrasy to be recognized in language and compared by him with the experience of others (RP, pp. 178-79).

Because the critic must judge how well the artist has integrated his consciously acquired facility with his intuitively organized perceptions of beauty of form, a knowledge of psychoanalysts' conclusions should enlarge the scope of the critic's evaluation. Although all deal with the imaginative and emotional life, psychoanalysts come to "various and precarious conclusions" (RP, p. 183); the critic must choose among them, taking what he needs to help him understand imagery. To indicate the indirect influence of psychoanalysis on art criticism, Bodkin quotes an unidentified literary critic's description of the value of the spread of ideas: "They make a sensitive surface where there was nothing but a blind integument; they create dim centres of vision for what was before total darkness" (RP, p. 183).

What is most important in this article for an understanding of Bodkin's thought is the similarity she sees between the artist's imaginative product, which is the critic's subject matter,

and the product of fantasy, appearing in dreams or waking fantasy, which is the sphere of the psychoanalyst. The subconscious is the source of both. Images in dreams, whether of artist or critic, give some indication of how the individual's apprehension of beauty is formed, along with clues to his real desires and needs.

Her next paper, "The Representation in Dream and Fantasy of Instinctive and Repressing Forces," is also concerned with the interpretation of dream images and with the nature of fantasy. One of her purposes in this article is to integrate the findings of academic and medical psychologists, who differ in the emphasis they put upon the unconscious activity of psychophysical dispositions. As an academic psychologist who has undergone analysis, Bodkin interprets five of her dreams in order to understand their imagery. In one, she hurls a witch's vicious dog out of a window. In another, she manages to kill a large dog who attacks her on a railway platform. In a third, she and a friend kill a polar bear and struggle to heave it off a cliff. As they watch the body fall into the sea, what seems a human shape rises out of the water to receive it. Her mother is throwing live snakes into a cauldron upon a fire in another dream: "I was standing behind her, [and] was distressed for the snakes but [was] trying to protect myself from feeling too much sympathy for pain I could not help" (RDF, p. 277). She succeeds in rescuing one snake and escapes with it. In the last dream she finds herself alone in a strange landscape with nowhere to hide. Using various techniques (associating freely, holding her mind passive, and writing down dreams immediately upon awakening), Bodkin recovers old experiences, memories, reading, and fantasies which



partially explain her dream imagery.

For instance, in the dream in which she rescues a snake, she is running in the garden of her childhood home, the snake beside her, looking for a place where the snake will be safe, when suddenly it plunges into a river. Following a path alongside the river until it becomes flooded, Bodkin remembers waking, feeling herself struggling in the water. When asked to draw the snake she saw in her dream, Bodkin drew a snake in the water with its body curved like a whirlpool, reaching almost from the sea floor to the surface. Searching her memories of snakes, Bodkin recalls that admiration of their beauty and swift movement was prominent.

As she does in almost all of her work which involves psychoanalytic theory, Bodkin contrasts Freud's and Jung's opinions.<sup>32</sup> Freud and his school hold that an image in a dream stands for a single complex pressing forward towards representation of its object. The complex could become conscious were it not that consciousness rejects and suppresses it. Therefore the image enters through dream and, when analyzed, is found to represent a concrete idea. Bodkin calls this view "material symbolism" (RDF, p. 285).

Jung, on the other hand, holds that the symbol in a dream represents an emotional complex which seeks the fulfillment of expression by means of the image just because it cannot be brought before the mind completely. This dynamic emotional complex or tendency in the unconscious is continuously striving for expression. When the image is analyzed, the emotional tendency is identified.

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<sup>32</sup> See pp. 12-13 and 52 following.

For instance, in Freud's view a snake appearing in a dream always represents the phallus. To Jung, however, a snake represents sexuality, a "felt urge" which does not come into consciousness because it is "too concretely imbedded . . . in the life of the organism to be the object of consciousness at all, until by such means as the image-symbol it becomes so" (RDF, pp. 281-82).

Bodkin agrees with Jung: the image of the snake in her dream, felt both as the stirring of something earthy and as a messenger of death, luring the dreamer toward the deep water, shows the conflict between the restless sex impulse and the urge for peace. However, the fact that the rescued snake is associated with the garden and river she loved in her childhood suggests to Bodkin that "a considerable part of that libido which might have sought satisfaction in love relations was diverted to take the form of almost passionate delight in such happenings as the reappearance of flowers in their season" (RDF, p. 284). Bodkin notes that Jung's view of dream symbolism is similar to what the anthropologist Jane Harrison, Gilbert Murray, and F. M. Cornford found in the symbolism of ancient cults, dances, rites, and rituals: they express this same emotional urge that Jung finds expressed in dreams.

In explaining her agreement with Jung's theory of the functional symbolism of dreams, Bodkin alludes to his theory of archetypes. The figure of witch or devil, Jung holds, illustrates "an inherited tendency to a mode of apprehension which gives, from within, a special character and importance to an experienced situation similar to that which has recurred impressively in the history of the race" (RDF, p. 287). The archetypes are "psychological realities,"

universal modes of apprehension, the result of unconscious dispositions in the mind seeking expression: "Those dispositions whose interplay is obscurely represented in feeling throw up imagery symbolic of their nature, as though they indeed struggled toward recognition--toward fuller representation in imagination and thought" (RDF, p. 274).

Imagery in dreams is a clue to unconscious mental systems: in Jung's words, such dreams give "a subliminal picture of the psychological condition of the individual in his waking state" (RDF, p. 297), which includes both the more and the less conscious processes. The mind, in its undirected working, furnishes the individual with more accurate information about himself than is possible through introspection. The key to Jung's theory is that images appearing in dreams are expressions of actually existing states or tendencies, and not, as in Freud's view, single complexes pressing toward representation of their objects.

Bodkin believes that Freud's hypotheses concerning the relations of ego, id, and super-ego are insufficient as an explanation of the unconscious, noting that his theory was formed largely by his clinical experience with melancholia. By the test of her own experience, Bodkin also finds Freud's hypothesis concerning dream imagery inadequate on two counts. First, his insistence that erotic identification alone leaves permanent effects on the mind seems untrue. When the figures of witch or devil appear in her dreams, Bodkin finds that they represent powers felt to be alien and hostile to her values. She believes that the emergence of such figures and the reactions which generate them are forms of interaction between

the environment and the deeper workings of the mind just as able to leave permanent effects as is erotic identification.

Secondly, Freud, theorizes that man's ideals and his "higher nature" derive solely from his relation to the parent figure, while Bodkin believes, again partly on the basis of analysis of her dreams, that ideals may also derive from one's absorbing desire, such as, in her case, "creative intellectual adventure" (RDF, p. 298). She finds that one's ego instincts for power and self-assertion are part of that desire. Maintaining that such powerful aspirations cannot go unexpressed in dreams and fantasy, she believes that influential ideals are represented by images. Bodkin emphasizes that each individual's experience is unique. Only by communicating one's findings to others can more adequate information be gathered as to the significance of dream imagery: "The only deliverance from the idols of the Cave and of the Consulting [sic] room would seem to be through the examination and comparison of a wide range of material gathered by persons of varying bias and formulated in accordance with different hypotheses" (RDF, p. 275). The article ends characteristically with a plea that more work be done on the nature of fantasy with a blend of "daring intuition" and "cautious self-criticism" (RDF, p. 299).

It is significant that Bodkin's next article, "Literary Criticism and the Study of the Unconscious," an important step toward articulation of her critical theory, was published in a journal

devoted primarily to philosophic and religious ideas.<sup>33</sup> Describing her subject as "on the borderland common to students of literature, of psychology, and of philosophy," Bodkin asks what can be learned about the nature of poetry from a study of the unconscious (LC, p. 445)? Using Jung's theory of archetypes to explain the nature of the creative process, Bodkin finds "recurrent situations presenting a certain correspondence" (LC, p. 455) in imagery found in dreams and in themes used by poets, and reiterates that dreamer and poet alike must interpret this imagery, an invaluable source of self-knowledge:

In the dreams, or rather, should we say in those which the dreamer finds significant, his emotional life seems to have been unconsciously absorbed into certain images which, thus charged with energy, have worked within him and fallen into patterns that reveal, if he can interpret them, something of the underground current of his being (LC, p. 455).

Similarly, poetic creation depends upon how the poet integrates his conscious plan with "what emerges, still unformed, from the dark of unconsciousness. The self can never become completely an object of consciousness; still less the wider self, with its unformed resources, upon whose cooperation the fulfillment of purpose may have to wait in creative thinking" (LC, pp. 461-62). But whereas in her earlier articles self-knowledge is the end result of her study (to be aware of tendencies in the mind is to be "less at their mercy" [RDF, p. 290]), here she stresses her belief, like Jung's,

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<sup>33</sup> Bodkin, "Literary Criticism and the Study of the Unconscious," *The Monist*, 37 (1927), 445-68. All subsequent references in parentheses in the text to this article will be identified with the letters LC. With this article Bodkin begins to sign her name "Maud Bodkin." All previous articles except for "The Study of Psychology," signed "M. Bodkin," are signed "A. M. Bodkin."



that images are a "means of access to a reservoir of power. To those holding this view, the interaction of conscious and unconscious throughout the sphere of art becomes a problem of great significance and they have a clue with which to approach it" (LC, p. 457).

Bodkin does not make clear what form access to this power may take, though later, in Archetypal Patterns, she says that "the aspect of the world may change to the individual, as inner emotional patterns quicken or fade, bind or release the spirit" (AP, p. 122). Studying the imaginative product in literary and pictorial art, or in dreams and fantasy, not only results in clearer self-knowledge but also illuminates philosophic, scientific, and practical thought:

No creative thought, whether it issue in poem or scientific discovery, in practical achievement or philosopher's vision, is conscious and voluntary . . . . Always it must depend upon the operation of mental systems of whose growth and potentialities we can know little (LC, p. 461).

What emerges strongly in this article is the importance of the artist. He has command over his medium. The poet, whose medium is language, interprets his own images and gives them sensuous form so that others may experience them. He makes use of the image in "a form fitted to the needs of the time" (LC, p. 456). He does for those to whom poetry is important what a dream can do for the individual.

But what is even more striking in this essay is the importance Bodkin attaches to criticism. The poet combines a reflective attitude with a creative one in his craft, searching for the right word or phrase, rejecting one expression in favor of another, and



in general criticizing his work as he creates it. Bodkin believes that the critic, because he also deals with words, shares in this reflective attitude. In seeking to understand the poem, the critic finds "meanings lifted from the welter of unconscious experience, displayed, in terms of a sensuous medium, as objects for social contemplation" (LC, p. 468). Each critic's unique approach detaches meanings even further, and contributes to the poem's meaning. This "detaching meanings even further" relates to Bodkin's belief, expressed in "Subconscious Factors," that there is a difference between an original idea in the mind and its verbal expression:

No one has tried to give an account of an idea by which he lives and works without becoming aware of some sort of cleft between that inner reality and the formulation of it which, by the help of words, he throws on the screen of consciousness, as an object for himself and others (LC, p. 461).

The importance of language, together with the difficulty of precise communication, occupies a major place in Bodkin's theory both in these early articles and in her later work. This article helps to explain why Taylor used the word "meditation" to describe the life of thought Bodkin pursued when she retired from teaching. She wanted to study not psychology or literature alone, but also philosophy. It is reasonable to assume that Bodkin is speaking of herself when she writes:

The philosophic critic, who has not the gift of poetic creation yet knows, since language is his medium also, the joy of the discovery of the right word or phrase, that suddenly enriches his individual meaning with the racial experience, the triumphant recognitions, that have fashioned the word, and remained potent within it (LC, p. 467).

The critic, with "trained reflective sensibility" (LC, p. 467), approaches images or figures in literature such as Faust or Hamlet while trying to attain "reflective ideas concerning the forces within the human mind that these figures symbolize, and the ways in which they find expression in the literary medium" (LC, p. 468). To attain these ideas, Bodkin says individuals need to compare poems with other forms of creative expression: "with dream and myth, religious symbol and philosophic system" (LC, p. 468).

Early in her career, when discussing the grounds of inferential judgment, Bodkin said that the mind strives to justify its judgments by pulling operative connections into the foreground of consciousness, trying to "make explicit something of the felt necessity by which it is silently urged and determined" (SF, p. 374). But it is clear that after she read Freud and Jung and had undergone psychoanalysis, Jung's hypothesis concerning archetypes offered an explanation for this incommunicable subconscious. The new "science" of psychoanalysis complemented long-standing avenues of knowledge. Jung's hypothesis was also a means of coordinating findings in psychology, literature, religion, and anthropology. Openness to other disciplines characterizes Bodkin's beliefs. This desire for a synthesis of knowledge explains why Bodkin always presents her conclusions as temporary and tentative, a sounder scientific attitude than that of then contemporary absolutist or positivist psychologists and critics. Her first essay ends with these words: "The design of the present essay will have been accomplished if any advance has been made toward a clear formulation of the nature of these elements [inexplicit elements of intellectual consciousness]

the words and images which already express the emotional experience of the community, the poet arranges these so as to utilize to the full their evocative power" (APP, p. 189).

In his response to the poem, the reader participates in the poet's emotional experience. However, this participation is achieved only by disciplined reflection and persistent application of the mind to the material: "A profound response to great poetic themes can be secured only by living with such themes, dwelling and brooding upon them, choosing those moments when the mind seems spontaneously to open itself to their influence" (APP, p. 185). It is by means of recorded responses of careful readers that Bodkin tests Jung's hypothesis, thereby bringing together the results of both medical and academic psychologists and "the insight of more intuitive thinkers" (APP, p. 184).

Studying responses to tragic poetry, the art which expresses one's sense of life most completely because of its antiquity and its relation to religious ritual, Bodkin finds that the most obvious of the underlying emotional patterns in Hamlet and the Orestes trilogy is conflict between generations. Another, because of the historical significance of kingship which in the deeper levels of the mind is connected with the father, is an "emerging of the consciousness of self from out of a matrix of less differentiated awareness, which may be called collective or group-consciousness" (APP, p. 196). Still another is the element of mystery, of purgation and atonement, present at the end of tragedy. In religious terms, this mystery is awareness of an ultimate power. In psychological terms it is "the common nature lived and immediately

experienced by the members of a group or community" (APP, p. 199), which Jung calls the Collective Unconscious: "the life-energy that in its spontaneous movement toward expression generates alike the hero figures of myth and legend and the similar figures that, appearing in individual fantasy, may overwhelm the personal consciousness" (APP, p. 199).

Expressing these variant emotional patterns in psychological terms, Bodkin theorizes that tension occurs in the individual when tendencies of opposite character are excited by the same object or situation. Bodkin explains the nature of these tendencies by means of the concept of an ambivalent self, the conflict between a personal self, a limited ego, and the self of imaginative thought, "well-nigh limitless in sympathy and aspiration" (APP, p. 201). These contrasting self-images and the impulses sustaining them cause tension. Relief comes either in fantasy, where images spontaneously arise which the individual interprets, or in poetic imagination "either originally or receptively creative" (APP, p. 200). When reading tragic poetry, the reader identifies with the hero as an objectification of the self of imaginative aspiration. Yet when the hero dies, the reader satisfies the counter movement of feeling toward merging with a greater power. Thus the archetypal pattern corresponding to all tragedy Bodkin believes is "a certain organization of the tendencies of self-assertion and submission" (APP, p. 201).

When Bodkin wrote Archetypal Patterns in Poetry to examine and illustrate Jung's hypothesis further, she included this essay, unrevised, as its first chapter. Bodkin explains that although the



essay's "concise and technical manner" may discourage readers:

"My desire in leaving this essay as it stood, was at least to recognize certain relations whose importance I felt, though I could only inadequately suggest them--relations (e.g.) to anthropological work upon 'culture-patterns', or to philosophic studies of the different modes of experience as known, and as 'enjoyed', or lived" (AP, p. viii).

The first poem Bodkin discusses is Coleridge's "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner." It is clear from Bodkin's critical method in reading this poem that her theory is firmly grounded in her knowledge of psychology. Calling her method an "attempt to apply thought to feeling," Bodkin says she is not concerned with one's opinion, but with one's emotional response to the poem (AP, p. 318). She admits the difficulty of formulating this response in language, agreeing with Jung, who said that one cannot escape metaphor when speaking of psychical sequences (AP, p. 52). Many readings are necessary "to supply the range of connected material whose spontaneous return in unity to the mind will later bring the moment of poetic illumination" (AP, p. 140). This return of experience Bodkin says is the same as the "distanced vision" experienced in tragedy (AP, p. 149). In order to insure that the experience communicated by a poem is complete and of sufficient intensity, the reader should concentrate his attention upon one passage or image which has a special appeal.

Bodkin's method requires "complete concentration, or absorption within the communicated experience" (AP, p. 90) so that one can sort out "the tangles of obscure imagery" (AP, p. 29). Training, but



also "a gift of nature" (AP, p. 30) is necessary for one to read a poem and, as "the tension of the apprehensive act slackens" (AP, p. 38), to become aware of memories, dream fragments, past experiences, and past readings which relate to the poem's theme or images. The reader must cultivate "active docility of mind" (AP, p. 264) to separate "the tissue of inter-relations [which] vibrate unrecognized in the background of the mind, contributing again and again emotional significance to words or happenings that make connexion with them" (AP, p. 34). Thought directed to these responses must be "penetrated by feeling, docile and reverent toward its object, though loyal to its own standards" (AP, p. 321).

Bodkin defines the organic response she is analyzing as "a feeling of a more primitive character than pertains to ordinary adult consciousness" (AP, pp. 112-13); it is "the result in consciousness of relations felt though not explicitly recognized" (AP, p. 96[n.]). The factors in this response are "more massively intangible, more mutually incompatible" (AP, p. 243) than they appear when translated into speech. Yet, having no adequate terminology with which to express feeling, one must try to "adapt our static intellectual terms as best one may to the dynamic realities of feeling" (AP, p. 243). The reader, examining his response to see if any pattern is discernible, will become aware of the archetype, the emotional force Jung theorized craves sensuous form for its expression. Bodkin often reminds the reader that these emotional forces can be studied in dreams as well as in poetry: "Elements of organic response which remain latent and undiscoverable in our conscious apprehension we are now learning to

which alternates between extraversion and introversion of the libido. Both agree that it is an essential rhythm, but while Freud believes that the individual is somewhat aware of the process, Jung conceives of it as an unconscious activity which integrates the emotions, since each recurring rhythm is composed of elements of the former processes. What the poem communicates to Bodkin is "that the beauty of life is revealed amid the slime, that the glory of life is renewed after stagnation, that through the power of speech the values achieved by life are made immortal" (AP, p. 81).<sup>36</sup>

Another archetypal pattern Bodkin calls the Paradise-Hades or heaven-hell archetype. She finds it expressed in Coleridge's "Kubla Khan" in the image of the dome with the sunlit gardens above and the caverns below, in Milton's Paradise Lost in the mountains as the seat of blessedness and the murky abyss below, and in ancient Greek poems. As the rebirth pattern exists in time, opposites in transition (AP, p. 293), the heaven-hell archetype exists in a fixed, spatial relation most often imaged by mountains and caverns. She describes the strong association of cavern imagery with the depths of the mind, both in the emotions communicated through myth and legend, and in poetry. Analyzing imagery in Dante and Virgil, Bodkin finds that the characteristic pattern of emotion in this archetype is the imaginative enjoyment of beauty together with fear of its loss.

Bodkin is optimistic about the study of archetypes: "The belief in a victory to be gained by expression and contemplation

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<sup>36</sup>See pp. 11-15 following and "Basic Symbols," Bodleian TS d 887, pp. 11-16, appendix, pp. 296-301.

of the human spirit, God-in-man, the most fitting symbol for our age. She believes that Shelley did not borrow this Christ-like figure from Christianity, but rather expressed the image of the divine in man, a human development which includes Christianity. In this chapter Bodkin employs the synonyms of type-image, type-pattern, type-object, and type-figure for archetype to indicate her emphasis upon the cultural representation of the archetype and not its biological basis.

For Bodkin, the most important of the images of God is "the supreme poetry of the God-man found in the New Testament" (AP, p. 270); she traces the word-meanings and images of Christ in the gospels back to their deepest sources in experience. She associates Christ's reference to wheat buried in the earth and then springing up, a metaphor for the concept of eternal life attained through death, with Plutarch's description of Greek and Egyptian rites mourning a god's descent into Hades. Bodkin also relates Christ's words about being lifted up and drawing all things to himself to the ritualistic image of the uplifted serpent, the creature which best symbolizes immortality because it sheds its skin, and which is further significant because he is the focus of the attention of the group. Bodkin presents the image of Christ as a sacred object held up before all Christians as an example of what Émile Durkheim postulates in Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (Allen and Unwin, 1915) as the factor behind all religious symbols: focused on a common object, members of a group participate in a common emotion (AP, p. 278). Bodkin calls this emotion an energy "which the poet and religious philosopher name the Divine"

(AP, p. 279). Christ, the great image of the human in union with God, satisfies the tension between the transcendent and the conditioned and fleeting (AP, p. 288).

Bodkin has argued that "archetypal patterns, or images, are present within the experience communicated through poetry and may be discovered there by reflective analysis" (AP, 314). They are essential factors in the power poetry has to express the forces of our nature. They are related to religion because they reveal more about the great images of religious experience. Poetry and religion seek both to transcend the personal and to help us realize something of the deepest forces and demands of our nature. These patterns are also related to philosophy because they show the way poets express the universal character of experience. Bodkin quotes Whitehead's belief, stated in Science and the Modern World, that philosophers should study poets for their "concrete intuitions of the universe" (AP, p. 327).

Bodkin says that the most important result of her work is

awareness of the individual as having his reality in relation to a larger life, communicated to him under different conditions, in varying degrees. The patterns here illustrated . . . seem to converge upon this relation of the individual to a life within and beyond him. This life I have considered--in relation to Durkheim's hypothesis--as a power present within the community (AP, 328).

She finds over and over again in poetic imagery the influence of the parent upon the child in tension with a move toward freedom, a freedom Bodkin says is not explained adequately by Freud's doctrine that the ego should replace the super-ego (or parent imago) as one's regulator of behavior. Rather, Bodkin interprets this poetic

experience as

a re-ordering of the powers of the individual mind under a stimulus communicated from the social heritage. A form of control outgrown and become oppressive is replaced by a control objectified under a different symbol, transcending the individual, but deeply akin to him, sustaining and renewing within him the values which he most intimately accepts (AP, p. 329).

Because she believes that this interaction is central to both poetic and religious experience, Bodkin calls for the translation of the terms of mystic and poetic faith into terms a psychologist can use.

Bodkin's psychology of literary response, while based on Jung's theory, does not embrace Jung's speculation that archetypes are inherited in the structure of the brain. She concentrates on the reader's response, defining racial experience as "the 'social inheritance' of meanings stored in language which also comes to us from our ancestors, and wakens into activity the potentialities of our inherited nature" (AP, pp. 24-25), leaving aside the other definition: systems and tendencies inherited biologically. Nevertheless, occasionally Bodkin makes statements in which she seems to accept this latter meaning: she is aware, when reading Dante, of "the presence of a mind beyond my own mind" (AP, p. 45). She claims that a poet uses not only "memory material" but also "experience which was never personal" (AP, p. 22). While Bodkin's concept of the archetype underwent later development, she continues to use it as a means of explaining poetic response.

Her next published article, "Truth in Poetry," an expansion of references to poetic truth in her book, moves from an explanation of poetic response to a consideration of what criterion can be used



to determine truth in poetry and of the relation of that truth to religious truth.<sup>37</sup> If truth is available in poetry, how can one account for the vast diversity of opinion as to a certain poem's merit? In Principles of Literary Criticism, I. A. Richards denies that any general, applicable truth can be found: what poetry does is form attitudes, which in turn become values in the reader's mind. Bodkin objects to this opinion because, by isolating each reader's response, it makes communication impossible. She proposes a revision of Richards' doctrine of the scientific and emotive uses of language (Principles of Literary Criticism, Chapter 34), believing that science abstracts from sensory experience as does poetry. For example, the intuitions of Plato and Jesus, modes of abstraction pertaining to poetic or religious experience, are of as much value in determining our sense of existence as are Einstein's and Newton's quantitative intuitions: "Yet the manner in which I grasp these elements depends in the one case upon an emotional development of which the stages are obscure to me, lacking inherited means of definition, while to the notions of mathematical science there is a defined pathway of approach" (TP, p. 471).

What Bodkin proposes as a refinement of Richards' formulation is the concept of the individual perspective taken from Whitehead and George H. Mead. Their recognition that the world is composed of various interrelated perspectives provides an analogy for Bodkin's

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<sup>37</sup>Bodkin, "Truth in Poetry," Philosophy, 10 (1935), 467-72. All subsequent references in parentheses in the text to this article will be identified with the letters TP. See Archetypal Patterns, pp. 83-84, 323-24, for further discussion of truth in poetry.

belief that the meaning of a poem is found in the communication of deeply experienced responses: "For the notion of a perspective involves a common object appearing within the different visions, and by virtue of that common object, a relation potentially discoverable of the different visions one to another" (TP, p. 469). The use of the phrase "a common object" recalls the discussion in Archetypal Patterns of the significance of a common object in the religious emotion.<sup>38</sup> Belief derived from a poem is therefore not of merely private significance: "Through the co-ordinating of communicated perspectives the individual can pass from the relatively private truth which his more habitual attitudes determine, towards a truth more objective and universal" (TP, p. 471). Defining God's vision as the ideal of our socialized reason, Bodkin says that to try to comprehend others' perspectives is "paying homage to the all-embracing truth God sees" (TP, p. 472).

Two unpublished articles written after Archetypal Patterns supply further information about Bodkin's movement from a literary psychologist (AP, p. 163) and psychological critic (AP, p. 122) to a philosophic critic (LC, p. 468 and TP, p. 468). They illustrate beliefs which are permanent features of Bodkin's critical theory: affirmation of each individual's limited apprehension of reality, need to share others' perspectives, and conviction that searching for universal truth is an essential albeit unattainable goal. "A Note on Universals and the Contemporary Consciousness," post-1934, comments on a discussion of the relative importance in novels of

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<sup>38</sup> See pages 276-80.

communicating universals or of "catching the note of the contemporary consciousness" between Charles Morgan, who argues for the former, and Graham Greene, who says the use of contemporary idiom helps the reader.<sup>39</sup> Bodkin, defending the value of individual differences, says that as long as the writer delineates "the forces of the inner life" (NUC, p. 2), the use of modern idiom is "incidental, or even superfluous" (NUC, p. 5): "The forces that most strongly stimulate him to exact expression, the forces whose conflicts his work seeks to resolve are the same whose interplay may be felt within such different settings as the writings of Plato or of St. Paul" (NUC, p. 3). Critics who prefer modern to ancient poetry ignore the fact, says Bodkin, that beneath our twentieth century condition "lie the deeper conflicts that pertain to our common nature and state--those with which tragic poetry wrestled in the time alike of Shakespeare and of the Greeks" (NUC, p. 4).

"Truth Individual and Universal," post-1936, addresses the problem of what criterion of reality one should use in evaluating religious and moral truth.<sup>40</sup> Bodkin finds that the most important reason whether or not assent is given to any formulated theory is "the bent and resources" of the responding mind (TIU, p. 4). Summarizing Henri Bergson's definition of intuition in An Introduction

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<sup>39</sup>Bodleian TS d 887, pp. 130-34. All subsequent references in parentheses in the text to this article will be identified with the letters NUC. See appendix, pp. 277-79; also see Archetypal Patterns, pp. 297-98 for discussion of Morgan's The Fountain. See pp. 1-2, 21 following for references to Greene.

<sup>40</sup>Bodleian TS d 887, pp. 186-98. All subsequent references in parentheses in the text to this article will be identified with the letters TIU. See appendix, pp. 280-89.

to Metaphysics, a creative synthesis of the results of many partial apprehensions, Bodkin says that the mind is prepared for acceptance or non-acceptance: "Innumerable past impressions, glimpses and gropings have left the mind active and sensitive in certain directions" (TIU, p. 3). The thinker looks for statement and symbol which speak to him:

So far as the seeker of truth can discover formulae and imagery that sum up the results of his own experience and harmonize his own needs, he has attained a faith that goes far toward bringing him truth's gift of freedom--freedom from conflict and the self-stultification of professing the only half-believed (TIU, p. 4).<sup>41</sup>

Bodkin speaks of this freedom as a "release of power" (TIU, p. 4). Nevertheless, one cannot rest in this attainment of individual truth: one must "test and extend his own apprehension by entering imaginatively into others' experiences as they variously interpret them. Only by such participation can we push our individual truth a little way toward the unattainable goal of truth universal" (TIU, p. 7).

Next were published three short articles in The Adelphi which illustrate Bodkin's effort to make peace with herself over the coming world war.<sup>42</sup> Adamson writes that Bodkin had "an almost

<sup>41</sup> See quotation from John Macmurray, p. lix following.

<sup>42</sup> "A Symbol from a Play," The Adelphi, 14 (1938), pp. 218-21, is a discussion of J. B. Priestley's play "I Have Been Here Before." See pp. 55-56 following. "The Eumenides and Present-Day Consciousness," The Adelphi, 15 (1939), pp. 411-13, is an answer to an unfavorable review of T. S. Eliot's play The Family Reunion. "War and the Peace of the Spirit," The Adelphi, 16 (1940), pp. 461-63, was occasioned by Bodkin's desire to justify her commitment to pacifism while yet continuing to support the war effort by paying taxes. An unpublished article, "Pacifist Pledge," circa 1938, Bodleian TS d 887, pp. 135-38, was intended for The Adelphi. It contains Bodkin's alternative wording for a pledge to be taken by those in the constructive pacifist movement. See appendix, pp. 290-92.



excessive sense of the world's suffering,"<sup>43</sup> an opinion confirmed by several journal entries.<sup>44</sup> There are no references in these articles to a victory to be gained or to a source of power or to a means of finding truth; there is none of the cautious optimism of Archetypal Patterns. Instead the articles reveal both an intense sorrow and fear concerning the war, and a strong interest in Christianity. She uses its terms: salvation, expiation of others' sin, and a personal hope for a future ability to love England's enemies. The tone of these articles is prayerful; the treatment of literature is confined to a search for symbols or images of hope.

Together with "Truth in Poetry," these articles are the beginning of Bodkin's attempt to articulate the social function of the archetype. In the closing pages of Archetypal Patterns Bodkin says that the most important result of her work is awareness of relation to a larger life: "This life I have considered--in relation to Durkheim's hypothesis--as a power present within the community . . . . It is for the philosopher, comparing the results of workers in all fields, to determine how far we may pass beyond this formula" (AP, p. 328). Bodkin has moved from preoccupation with the effects the study of archetypes will have for the individual to the question of what social applications should be made from their study. Her next book, The Quest for Salvation in an Ancient and Modern Play, clearly portrays this phase of Bodkin's thought.

She finds an identical theme in Eliot's play, The Family

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<sup>43</sup>Letter received from Margot Adamson, 8 April 1972.

<sup>44</sup>See pp. 5-6, 16, and 23-24 following.



Reunion, and Aeschylus's Orestes trilogy: pursuit by the Furies of an individual sinner, his quest for salvation, and his final deliverance in which his pursuers are transformed.<sup>45</sup> The Furies haunt Orestes and Harry: Orestes is saved through Athena's prayers, and Harry through his acceptance of his aunt Agatha's explanation of the love affair between Harry's father and herself, given up because of Harry's imminent birth. Just as the Furies become the Eumenides in Aeschylus's play, they become kindly to Harry: "My business is not to run away, but to pursue / Not to avoid / being found, but to seek . . . Now they will lead me. I shall be safe with them" (QS, p. 32).

Translating mythical expression into psychological theory, Bodkin says that both playwrights use the Eumenides in their virulent, oppressive form to personify the emotional relations children exhibit in dreams toward their parents. Psychologists have discovered that children's dreams and fantasies often depict an emotional awareness of parents "not perhaps as they actually were, but in their incidence upon the child himself, as determining his poise of stability or insecurity, and consequent power or inability to make relations with others" (QS, p. 34).<sup>46</sup> Whitehead expresses this concept philosophically in Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effects (Cambridge, 1928), pp. 49-52, when he speaks of an "awareness of causal efficacy" as part of perception, not the type

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<sup>45</sup>Bodkin, The Quest for Salvation in an Ancient and a Modern Play, (London: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 5. All subsequent references in parentheses in the text are to this edition which will be identified with the letters QS.

<sup>46</sup>See Archetypal Patterns, pp. 257; 266-67.

of sense presentation "handy and definite in our consciousness" (QS, p. 34). Bodkin says that this awareness, very important in one's emotional life, is symbolized by the Eumenides in their redeeming aspect. As Harry comes to know the conflict he felt as a child for what it was, tension between his parents and his aunt, he transcends and transforms his relations to his family. Bodkin sees the power of Eliot's play concentrated in that moment of complete love and understanding experienced by Harry and Agatha.<sup>47</sup>

Bodkin believes that readers' responses to the transformation of the Furies, who embody "the energy of passion fixed in an evil relationship or custom" overcome through individual suffering (QS, appendix 2, p. 46), depend upon how important the problem of personal relationship is to them. What Eliot and Aeschylus are portraying is "the movement of the human spirit discovering, through stress of bitter experience, a way from one order of life to another, obeying a Divine voice calling from the unknown"

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<sup>47</sup>After writing this play, Eliot says he became aware of its defects: "I soon saw that I had given my attention to versification, at the expense of plot and character. . . . But the deepest flaw of all, was in a failure of adjustment between the Greek story and the modern situation" ("Poetry and Drama," On Poetry and Poets, [1943; rpt. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1965], pp. 89-90). At the end of the play, Eliot continues, the audience is in a divided frame of mind, not knowing "whether to consider the play the tragedy of the mother or the salvation of the son" (p. 90).

Another interesting gloss on the play is provided by Professor Grover Smith, who writes: "Early in 1948, I think it was, I attended the American premiere (off Broadway) of The Family Reunion. It was at the Cherry Lane Theatre. Backstage after the performance I found that the actors were trying to interpret their roles with the help of Miss Bodkin's little comparative study; they hadn't done very well!" (Letter of 18 March 1978).

(QS, p. 39). Bodkin speculates that this movement to a new order, on an individual level, might be the religious thinker's view of personal relationships: "In the field of religion, the focus of attention is the immeasurable fact of personal relationship--the I-Thou, the self in relation to other selves" (QS, p. 41).<sup>48</sup> On a universal level Eliot's call for a new order might mean England's acceptance of the commonwealth principle: "trust placed in the reason and good will of men" (QS, appendix 3, p. 52), replacing the Empire principle. She finds hope in one recorded experience of the personal relationship between an English magistrate in India and an Indian patriot.

In addition to the text of forty-three pages, there are three appendixes to Quest for Salvation totaling 10 pages. The first summarizes Aeschylus' trilogy, the Oresteia, and compares the family curse Aeschylus speaks of with Eliot's use of the repetition-compulsion complex. The third discusses what England can learn now from Athens' ancient achievement in its criminal justice system. Of most interest for tracing the development of Bodkin's thought is the second: "Experienced Causal Efficacy." In Process and Reality (Cambridge, 1929), pp. 251-52, Whitehead says that every one has a general sense of existing in an efficacious world; he has a primitive awareness of power both suffered and executed. This sense of individual things and persons either threatening or

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<sup>48</sup>In The Structure of Religious Experience, (London: Faber, 1936), John Macmurray argues that personal relationship is the central fact in the religious outlook on experience. Also see Bodkin's unpublished "The Boundaries of Science," a brief summary with questions for discussion of Macmurray's book with the same title (appendix, pp. 293-95).

supporting life, is the given, uncontrolled basis upon which character weaves itself. Whitehead's concept is related to Freud's theory expressed in The Ego and the Id that obstruction or stimulation of an individual's natural impulses, occurring mainly through parents, forms an individual's power-pattern. Bodkin finds that the philosophic outlook implicit in both these plays is that there is a fundamental difference between "an animal nature, wholly subject to mechanical necessities and instinctive needs, and an individual spirit capable of distinguishing and choosing among these needs" (QS, appendix 2, pp. 48-49). Bodkin calls this belief in the efficacy of our own and other spirits, (as opposed to bodies), faith. If this human faith fails, one place to seek help is in medical psychology. She finds Jung's method of psychoanalysis better than Freud's because of the importance Jung places upon the individual relation of doctor and patient. He believes, as Freud does not, that the transference between doctor and patient, necessary in the early stages of therapy, must be replaced by an individual relation if the patient is to conquer his childhood compulsions and deal with future relationships adequately.

It is significant that Bodkin stresses this aspect of Jung's thought because she goes on to mention two other avenues of help which also emphasize personal relationship. One is what Whitehead calls in Religion in the Making the "sacrament" involved in literary communication, when in her words, "Latent intuitions of our individual spirits are called forth by the vivid record of truth apprehended by men of past ages" (QS, appendix 2, p. 50). Another



is fellowship known with Divine wisdom as shown in the writings of poets and prophets. Both of these methods of re-discovering instinctive faith are implicit in the study of archetypes in what Bodkin will call in Type-Images their objective aspect: the images and words with which men have expressed response through the ages. She emphasizes ancestral experience in this sense, and not in the archetype's subjective aspect: physical configurations inherited in the brain. Bodkin will follow both these avenues in her future work and will specifically reject psychoanalysis as a fruitful method of re-discovering faith.<sup>49</sup> In her next three articles Bodkin moves away from the Jungian hypothesis in favor of the views of Whitehead and Martin Buber, who supply a philosophical and religious basis for what will be developed in Type-Images as the creative function of the archetype's objective aspect. Whereas in her earlier work Bodkin had analyzed response to poetry in the light of Jung's concept of the archetype, in these articles she explores response to images in poetry as evidence of the confrontation of the individual by a divine Thou, in Martin Buber's use of the term in I-Thou.<sup>50</sup> Impelled at least in part by her fear of imminent war, Bodkin's study of Buber's concept and Whitehead's theory of the Divine persuasion represents her search for meaning in life.

In "The Philosophic Novel," Bodkin asks how images in novels, which deal with human relationships, can illuminate philosophical thought which focuses on ultimate destiny: "The question suggests

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<sup>49</sup> See "Wisdom from History," p. 174 and p. lxii, n. 62, following.

<sup>50</sup> Bodkin probably read R. Gregor Smith's translation of I and Thou, published in 1937. See Letter B, p. 1, n. 1, appendix, pp. 325-29.



itself: may the novelist by ranging backward in time, to points of crisis in the history of human consciousness, offer images that vivify or complete the speculations of philosophers"?<sup>51</sup> In Archetypal Patterns Bodkin traces D. H. Lawrence's use of the rebirth archetype in four of his novels and also discusses Virginia Woolf and Emily Bronte. There Bodkin says that she believed that "the more deeply conceived novels of his time offer to the reader instruments for the discovery of his own truth" (AP, p. 299). Just as when reading poetry, the reader must "make of the books a complete experience, appropriating their patterns of meaning as communicated by every force of diction, rhythm, imagery, and association" (AP, p. 299). Yet Bodkin found no vision of truth in Lawrence and, in another context, says that she chose a verse translation of the Aeneid over one in prose "since prose can hardly suggest that emotional effect of the curse within the poem upon which the argument is based" (AP, [n.]p. 199).

For a novel to be regarded as art, Bodkin says "the course and setting of the story, beyond any intention of its actors, [must] echo back the meanings that struggle, half-articulate, within their speech" (PN, p. 13). Finding that both E. M. Forster's A Passage to India and L. H. Myers' The Pool of Vishnu deal with "the effort to achieve understanding relationship between persons" (PN, p. 14), Bodkin says that for her the image of the Marabar caves in Forster's novel is more relevant than the statue of Vishnu in Myers' because the caves express her sense of frustration in

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<sup>51</sup>Bodkin, "The Philosophic Novel," The Wind and the Rain, 2 (1942), p. 16. All subsequent references in parentheses in the text to this article will be identified with the letters PN.

relationship:

As in the blindness of sleep our own nature strives to ease us, throwing up picture-symbols of daylight distresses, so, it would seem from the concepts of philosophy and the images of literary art each of us may choose forms through which he may survey his own and the general human predicament, gaining by such distancing relief from the grinding immediacy of personal suffering (PN, pp. 15-16).

Bodkin finds support for this function of the image in Macmurray's belief that religion and philosophy must try to free men, conscious of their isolation in a hostile world, from the fear of death by showing them the means of new, deepened relationships with others, so that development of individual consciousness will not destroy social life.<sup>52</sup> She also agrees with Forster's concept of "creative self-knowledge": the novel might help human nature change "because individuals manage to look at themselves in a new way" (PN, p. 17). The reader is necessary to this concept of knowledge since he must hold together "intellectual question and imaginative picture till each combine [sic] with memories from his own life" (PN, p. 17). The novelist's imaginative vision clothes "in flesh of our flesh the abstract inference of the philosopher" (PN, p. 17).

In "Archetypes and Christian Tradition," Bodkin says that her contact with the image of Jesus, who combines the archetypes of hero, saint, and sage, is "an experience of salvation and of meaning in life and its vicissitudes."<sup>53</sup> Answering the question

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<sup>52</sup> Macmurray, Creative Society: a Study of the Relation of Christianity to Communism, (New York: Association Press, 1936).

<sup>53</sup> Bodkin, "Archetypes and the Christian Tradition," Theology 46 (1943), p. 178. All subsequent references in parentheses in the text to this article will be identified with the letters ACT. See Type-Images, pp. 174-75, for further discussion.

of whether or not response to Jesus is the result of ancestral experience, Bodkin says that Jung's hypothesis that racial experience contributes to our response may be true:

For those, however, who believe with Buber that the essential fact about man as a spiritual being is his continual confrontation by a divine Thou, it would be this spiritual relation above all that is operative, now more clearly through the dynamic image of Jesus Christ, as once more dimly through the images of ancient king and hero (ACT, p. 179).

Bodkin regards the despiritualization of modern life as loss of awareness of the eternal Thou: men have failed to make use of images of divine wisdom. Instead, the Nazis are using the ancient traditional image of God as dictator, what Buber calls the demonic Thou. Advocating the use of reason in choosing among images, Bodkin believes that archetypes such as Plato's myth of the souls following the gods' chariots and Dante's images of light and ascent can help supply the emotional forces needed to combat the Nazi movement.<sup>54</sup>

Bodkin discusses Plato's influence on Whitehead's concept of the Divine persuasion in "Physical Agencies and the Divine Persuasion."<sup>55</sup> In Adventures of Ideas (Cambridge, 1933), Chapter II, Whitehead says that the creative process is the establishment of a new order within a formless, undetermined flux within which "Persuasion" operates. Realization of this idea can occur only

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<sup>54</sup> See Type-Images, pp. 109-75, for full development of this thought.

<sup>55</sup> Bodkin, "Physical Agencies and the Divine Persuasion," Philosophy, 20 (1945), 148-61. All subsequent references in parentheses in the text to this article will be identified with the letters PA. Also see Type-Images, pp. 35-38, 177-80, for further discussion, and pp. 54-55 following.

when physical conditions--ideologies, social customs--are right. For example, although Plato spoke of human worth and man's potential divinity, it was only after the industrial revolution created mechanical devices that slavery was abolished. Noting Whitehead's belief that spiritual and physical agencies are only partly distinguishable in their operation, Bodkin says: "The teachings of saints and philosophers imply operation of psycho-physical forces, highly evolved brain-energies. The steam-engine and power-loom imply moments of intellectual insight, continuous functioning of ideas" (PA, p. 149).

Whitehead does distinguish between them, however, when he says that in the present "drop of experience," there are "what the antecedent world in fact contains," stubborn acts, and whatever "new forms of definiteness," persuasive ideas, are present (PA, p. 149). Repeating Whitehead's definition of evolution (in The Function of Reason, [Princeton, 1929], p. 21), as "some lowly diffused form of the operation of Reason," symbolized in the Bible by the opening verses of Genesis, Bodkin admits that Whitehead's meaning is difficult to grasp:

Imagery indeed fails us when, following at Whitehead's bidding the analogy of our conscious appetite, we try to conceive actual entities of an inorganic nexus, by "decision" among the possibilities offered to their mental poles, accomplishing transition from one type of inorganic society to another, or to the lowliest form of cell-life (PA, pp. 151-52).

Yet she believes that his theory of final causation helps in understanding such causation in our moral life: "The persuasive agency of ideas influencing social action, through the mental pole of the

high-grade occasions making up a personal life, has to be realized as limited by the 'massive habits' of nature, determining these occasions through their physical pole" (PA, p. 152).

Bringing Buber's thought into relation with Whitehead's, Bodkin believes that implicit in Whitehead's "primordial nature of God sustaining the ultimate harmonies" is Buber's Thou (PA, p. 154). She notes Buber's assertion in I and Thou that there must be a transition by which the human Thou, sharing with others relation to the Divine, is also considered an it, an object determined, limited by the past: "To this transition even my thought of myself is subject. Looking to the future, I assert my freedom to do what I see to be right; looking to the past I know myself as a creature with habits, dispositions strongly entrenched, hindering me from so acting" (PA, p. 154). Religious thinkers have always emphasized the function of prayer in reconciling these two modes of thought and being. Whitehead believes that scientists are concerned only with efficient causes, the I-it, whereas moral reformers deal with final causes, the I-Thou. The true relation between final and efficient causes helps sustain our intention toward the future without losing sight of the past: "Our wisdom in viewing both past and future is to maintain faith in the ultimate harmonies God's nature sustains, while we continue the scientific search for conditions of achievement" (PA, p. 155). Reconciling Whitehead's view of the relations of actual entities (their mutual independence) with Buber's assertion that true personal life consists of direct meeting of I-Thou, Bodkin says: "Within communication at its highest power, when through the expressive and creative sign a subject becomes aware of



a new intuition as both his own and another's, the I-Thou relation is realized" (PA, p. 158). Bodkin believes that a new type of order will emerge from personal consciousness thus heightened, an order constantly aware of moving toward a Thou, "the supreme limit of our own rationality, within whose vision all standpoints are included and brought to harmony" (PA, p. 158).

Bodkin thinks that the concept of the Divine persuasion is especially valuable for those who cannot find satisfaction in the teachings of the Christian church. One must look for images and formulae to which one can give full assent; she agrees with Macmurray, who says: "The peril of publicly assenting to what one cannot believe effectively and practically seems to me very great."<sup>56</sup> Whitehead's concept of persuasion, not subjective pressure but realization of discovered harmony, is a welcome alternative to the concept of God as omnipotent ruler. Bodkin finds it more adequate than the myth of the fall, "attributing evil to perversity of human free will" (PA, p. 160): "The self-centered destructive impulses known as sinful in ourselves, however penetrated and heightened by self-consciousness, resemble too fundamentally the predatory impulses of animals for us to ascribe their origin to human will" (PA, pp. 160-61).<sup>57</sup>

This article is important because in it Bodkin aligns Whitehead's thought with Buber's. Her meetings with images are examples of the I-Thou relationship, and in her view all such

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<sup>56</sup> Macmurray, quoted by J. H. Oldham, The Christian News-Letter, supplement to #192, October 6, 1943, p. 159.

<sup>57</sup> See pp. 24-25 and 48-49 following.

meetings are influenced by the Divine persuasion. Bodkin does not allude to any of Buber's other writings. His intuition provides a religious basis for Bodkin's developing concept of the archetype. Two unpublished letters also illustrate Bodkin's interest in Buber. In the first, addressed to the editor of Philosophy sometime after 1939, Bodkin discusses the psychological basis for Buber's concept of mutuality: "What is direct or unique in our knowledge of one another is that by each of us others are known as . . . partners in social intercourse."<sup>58</sup> She finds in a child's consciousness of other beings responsive to him, as distinct from his awareness of objects, the earliest appearance of mutuality. The child learns instinctively to smile and frown because he inherits "reminiscences of mutuality" (Letter A, p. 8).

The second, addressed to the editor of The Wind and the Rain, in 1945, concerns the relation between social and ultimate perspectives.<sup>59</sup> Because she believes with Emerson that we descend to meet, that we are "armed all over with subtle antagonisms," Bodkin says that she is always aware of "conflicting individualities groping . . . for safe, profitable conventions of speech and behaviour" (Letter B, p. 1).<sup>60</sup> Yet at the same time she accepts Buber's concept in I and Thou that all true life is meeting: "It

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<sup>58</sup> Bodleian TS d 887, p. 7. All subsequent references in parentheses to this letter in the text will be identified with the words Letter A. See appendix, pp. 322-24.

<sup>59</sup> Bodleian TS d 887, pp. 1-6. All subsequent references in parentheses in the text to this letter will be identified with the words Letter B. See appendix, pp. 325-29.

<sup>60</sup> Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Friendship," in The Selected Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Brooks Atkinson, (1940; rpt. Random House, 1950), p. 227.

is in the encounter of the I and Thou that spirit is born" (Letter B, pp. 1-2). Of her readings of Shakespeare, Milton, Paul, Plato, and others, Bodkin says: "Meeting these voices, something in me quickened and answered, so that I believed to encounter the Divine" (Letter B, p. 2). But if true meeting occurs in relationship, then "one cannot be content to hear immortal voices from the past, but must find comrades with whom to cooperate in present service" (Letter B, pp. 2-3), perhaps in organized religion or in political associations.<sup>61</sup> To the charge that it is vague to speak of encountering the Divine within human relationships, Bodkin answers that she is not attempting to state the nature of the Divine. Rather, she is illustrating faith "through action and suffering of the whole personality" (Letter B, p. 5). Encounter, or ultimate relationship, influences all of one's social perspectives.

In Archetypal Patterns Bodkin explained her conviction that the study of archetypes would lead to increased self-knowledge and expression. Whereas there her attention was confined to a psychological explanation of the formation of images and patterns in poetry, she gradually drew away from the Jungian hypothesis regarding the archetype's biological basis, calling this its subjective aspect. Instead, she became more interested in the patterns, which she came to believe are God-given, underlying images not only in poetry but also in religious dogma and philosophic

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<sup>61</sup>Taylor writes: "Maud would not accept any church formulation of religion. Her sympathy inclined rather to the thought of the Quakers if to any" (Letter of 20 February 1972). For Bodkin's interest in "present service" see pp. 6, 8, and 30 following.

formulations. Bodkin directs her analysis to the images themselves, the archetype's objective aspect, distinguishing between its two directions: "both a product of time, the shape in which it appears determined by past history, and also a creative energy, looking towards and helping to determine the future" (TI, p. 167). In Studies of Type-Images in Poetry, Religion and Philosophy, published in 1951, Bodkin concentrates on "the diversity of images and forms by which men recall and express their experience of the Divine" (TI, p. 1), seeing them as evidence of encounters of the I and Thou. The book is a record of her search for contact with "the reality beyond all images which it is the aim of religion to achieve" (TI, p. 2).<sup>62</sup>

Recognizing the incompleteness of each individual life, she looks for experiences "more fully developed than our own" (TI, p. 14), and for imagery created by "minds wiser than our own" (TI, p. 55).<sup>63</sup> Bodkin finds in Plato's concept of the Divine Reason, used by Whitehead in Process and Reality (Cambridge, 1929), in his doctrine of the gradual emergence of order over the ages, an embodiment of the archetype of a transcendent God. Images fashioned by poets, saints, and philosophers are partial visions of a "longed-

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<sup>62</sup>Bodkin also had written "Wisdom from History" (The Highway, 38 (1947), 173-74), in which she discusses how the study of history can train one's judgment, and two articles which were never published in the ten years between the publication of Quest and Type-Images. In "Basic Symbols," post-1947 (Bodleian TS d 887, pp. 11-16), Bodkin asserts that symbols to which men respond can be studied with more benefit in history and anthropology than through psychoanalysis. "A Thought on Mental Hearing," post-1949 (Bodleian TS d 887, pp. 184-85), notes how unimportant differences can obscure common will and meaning. See appendix, pp. 302-05.

<sup>63</sup>See pp. 63 and 98 following.

for vision of life's truth" (TI, p. 55): "By questioning our response to records of human feeling objectified in imagery, we may come to fuller understanding of our own nature in relation to the reality we encounter" (TI, p. 112). Bodkin sees this reality increasingly as a Thou and images as a means of relation to that power: "Both individually and socially our lives need the support of images, whether of more sensuous or conceptualized character, expressing our relations to unseen reality and to our fellow beings on earth" (TI, p. 22). Bodkin has come to see that the importance of archetypal images is in their application: they "extend and deepen the experience shared" (TI, p. 22). Nevertheless, examining history for images of divine intention, Bodkin admits only "a precarious faith" in a divine influence operating through collective acts (TI, p. 46).

In her discussion of images of divine birth, Bodkin finds in Yeats's "The Second Coming" "word-meanings with tremendous history and evocative power, conjoined within a distinctive and powerful rhythm" (TI, p. 67). She traces the meaning of the word cradle from the myth of Osiris through Orphic ritual and Persian fable, to the images with which Indian sages have spoken of divine entry into human life. She also examines the ancient idea of the kingdom of God in Aryan and Iranian religions and in the gospels, finding that the different interpretations of the person of Jesus correspond to growth and change of social and cultural factors.<sup>64</sup> Bodkin repeats she intends to relate these "type-patterns--similarities in the thought and literature of different ages and races of men--to the

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<sup>64</sup>See pp. 61-62 following.



most universal attitudes and conditions of life" (TI, p. 78).

Poetic faith consists in choosing among images and sharing imaginatively in their formation. Bodkin finds that the images of divine birth which she has surveyed all carry associations of suffering and death; yet the image is constantly renewed. She affirms the power of the archetype:

For no archetype, or shaping principle in thought and imagination can we, I think, claim more universality than this: that it shall appear from age to age, powerfully, creatively, in a few minds, awakening response in many (TI, p. 104).

Choosing archetypes of wisdom, Bodkin says that the thinker has the obligation to enter concrete situations "through the completest possible understanding and imaginative sympathy" (TI, p. 151), searching for wisdom relevant to contemporary situations. Referring to the impact of the recent world war on civilization, Bodkin says that our age needs a type or representative of saving wisdom comparable with the priest-prophet-hero of past ages: she chooses Wilson in 1918 and Churchill in 1940.<sup>65</sup> However, in novels, Bodkin believes that only "partial perspectives" can be found because the thought and belief of our time, unlike that of ancient times, is too complex and divided for complete archetypes of wisdom to emerge (TI, p. 171). While continuing to hold that analyzing response to type-images, or archetypes, will increase self-understanding, the impulse of Bodkin's belief is to equate poetic truth with religious truth and to see response to archetypes of God and divine birth and wisdom as response to the Divine.

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<sup>65</sup> See p. 80 following.

Bodkin says that Thomas Aquinas uses the word archetype, or prototypal form, to mean the divine essence, "an ideal that is for each man the divine intention" (TI, p. 177). She finds another expression of this insight in Jung's theory that for each being there is a self that is "the goal of life, because it is the most complete expression of that fateful combination we call individuality."<sup>66</sup> This self is what each of us would become were all our latent possibilities realized. These are expressions of individual goals, and in Whitehead's concept of the Divine persuasion Bodkin finds an explanation of "the social and universal aspects of the archetype of the fulfilled self" (TI, p. 178).

Bodkin believes, although precariously, that in the encounter with images from the past "there is cooperation of an influence, termed by the philosopher Whitehead, [in Adventures of Ideas] the Divine persuasion, and, by theologians, the Grace of God" (TI, p. 175). Always uneasy over her inability to accept the teachings of the Christian church, Bodkin expresses her position most fully in Type-Images:

I have argued that the individual today who cannot accept completely the teaching of the Christian church may yet in his encounter through literature with thinkers past and present, or in personal relation with present-day leaders and friends, so realize the archetypes of saving wisdom and of spiritual rebirth as to share in the religious life and fellowship that to others has been mediated by the Christian churches, or the great religions of the East (TI, p. 175).

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<sup>66</sup>Carl Jung, "The Relation Between the Ego and the Unconscious," Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, trans. W. G. and C. F. Baynes, (London: Ballière, 1928), pp. 265-68. See pp. 12-13 and 28 following.

Nevertheless, Bodkin's expression of faith is curiously tentative, if not negative:

Yet this much faith gives us: accepting in relation to our own lives what image-symbols to us best represent Divine birth into the human condition, Divine wisdom in human limitation, we cannot find our individual life lacking in meaning, or the world of our experience despiritualized (TI, p. 180).

The relative lack of critical interest in Type-Images as compared with Archetypal Patterns disappointed Bodkin because she regarded Type-Images as a contribution to her hoped-for synthesis of religious belief. Her book's failure to catalyze discussion convinced her that she should not publish any more. However, her desire to communicate the results of her thought did not abate. She began keeping a journal fairly regularly in October of 1952. It is best seen as a record, partial and of varying intensity, of Bodkin's attempts to relate the values expressed in literature to man's spiritual state.

Turning from her preoccupation with answers in Type-Images, Bodkin returns in her journal to her characteristic habit of testing and re-evaluating her beliefs. It represents a broader view than was evident in Type-Images. For instance, there she says she needs "imagery giving shape to the wonder at what may be beyond the confines of earthly life" (TI, p. 57) because she has always been impressed by the distinction between the "I, the knower, correlative of all the world as known, and the particular body and brain with its needs and habits, so unaccountably found to be the vital station of this knower, its medium of interaction with the world and other selves" (TI, p. 53). She asserts: "The faith that

makes possible conscious meeting with God in this life generates a hope for perfected meeting on the other side of death" (TI, p. 52). In the journal, however, immortality becomes only "a dubious hope" (p. 18). Whereas in Type-Images Bodkin professes "faith in the existence of God" (TI, p. 1), in the journal God becomes the "Power beyond," the unknown (p. 74).

The journal records the reasons Bodkin continues to find for her continuing assent to the insights of Buber, Whitehead, and Jung. There is renewed emphasis on the importance of individual perspectives of truth, an indication of Bodkin's strong desire to preserve each thinker's individuality while always striving for community. The journal is Bodkin's "record as clear and sincere as may be, of that perspective of truth granted to oneself" (p. 53), always in relation to truth absolute (p. 65). She is again searching in the journal for "a faith found possible" (p. 53), a faith in the Divine persuasion. She believes that it operates through words of speakers past and present (p. 51), and that it reaches every spirit, though in different forms (p. 68). She wants to serve (p. 7), to do what the Divine will persuades (p. 72), finding affirmation of her belief in G. Lowes Dickinson's Meaning of Good: "Every man lives according to his own lights but the relations to other beings in which he becomes involved point to a harmony or union" (p. 7). Believing with Whitehead that the divine nature both acts upon and receives reaction from the world, Bodkin says:

I want to believe that the trivial worries or deprivations in this life I find myself leading can be used to make more real and conscious my relation to God; or if I dare to believe that the Divine nature, in Whitehead's phrase, receives from the world of men their

Bodkin says that Thomas Aquinas uses the word archetype, or prototypal form, to mean the divine essence, "an ideal that is for each man the divine intention" (TI, p. 177). She finds another expression of this insight in Jung's theory that for each being there is a self that is "the goal of life, because it is the most complete expression of that fateful combination we call individuality."<sup>66</sup> This self is what each of us would become were all our latent possibilities realized. These are expressions of individual goals, and in Whitehead's concept of the Divine persuasion Bodkin finds an explanation of "the social and universal aspects of the archetype of the fulfilled self" (TI, p. 178).

Bodkin believes, although precariously, that in the encounter with images from the past "there is cooperation of an influence, termed by the philosopher Whitehead, [in Adventures of Ideas] the Divine persuasion, and, by theologians, the Grace of God" (TI, p. 175). Always uneasy over her inability to accept the teachings of the Christian church, Bodkin expresses her position most fully in Type-Images:

I have argued that the individual today who cannot accept completely the teaching of the Christian church may yet in his encounter through literature with thinkers past and present, or in personal relation with present-day leaders and friends, so realize the archetypes of saving wisdom and of spiritual rebirth as to share in the religious life and fellowship that to others has been mediated by the Christian churches, or the great religions of the East (TI, p. 175).

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reaction to His grace, His persuasion, then in some sense God is glad of our response, our acceptance and use of suffering, so far as may be, to strengthen or to purify (pp. 51-52).

Here, as in Type-Images, Bodkin confesses that sometimes the evidence of the workings of the Divine persuasion is "troublingly obscure" (p. 93); yet she maintains "a difficult faith in a Power of Good that cannot, or does not, permit evil beyond his creatures' power to withstand or endure" (p. 6).

In her journal, Bodkin continues her interest in religious images, the most important of which is the figure of Jesus. Contemplation of Jesus helps her when she begins to lose faith (p. 50). Bodkin calls the study of its sources and creation "a task of the whole Christian era" (p. 61), and discusses Schweitzer's The Quest of the Historical Jesus as well as three novels set in the years immediately following Jesus's death.<sup>67</sup> It seems important for Bodkin to present her beliefs against the backdrop of historical Christianity. She says that she has always tried "to shape and express for myself what little of the Christian heritage I can believe" (p. 5). She hopes that the Christian faith will be "broadened, enriched, purged of its arrogant exclusiveness" (p. 76). What she wants is "Christianity without dogma though not without communion" (p. 69). While she admires Bede Griffiths' ardor of conversion in The Golden String, she thinks that his assertion that the church is a new humanity, transcending civilization, is "an

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<sup>67</sup> See pp. 14-15, 63, 67, and 100 following, and Type-Images, pp. 8-9. Bodkin said in "The Philosophic Novel" (p. 16), that novelists, by "ranging backward in time, to points of crisis in the history of human consciousness," can create images which complement philosophic thought.

aberration from true growth" (p. 84).

Journal entries also show that Bodkin was interested in autobiographies and fiction whose major theme is a conversion experience.<sup>68</sup> She illustrates from Karl Stern's The Pillar of Fire the tremendous difference it makes in one's life whether or not one believes that Jesus was God (p. 19). This answer in turn determines whether one accepts the gospel stories as truth or symbol (pp. 68-69 ).<sup>69</sup> If one cannot accept the story of Christ's resurrection as true, as she can not, Bodkin nevertheless believes that the story is valuable as an expression "of a pattern related to the actual--related so as to admit of modification in accordance with changes or diversities of individual outlook upon the actual" (p. 40). Thus she can believe in "the Thou addressed in prayer, who dies to the predatory cruel world and rises again in love" (p. 40).

Throughout the journal, stating that she cannot accept any hypothesis that attributes evil to God, Bodkin tries to find a reason for suffering (p.40 ). It gives insight and fortitude (p. 24) it strengthens and purifies (pp. 51-52). The growth in the love of God that Sarah experiences in Greene's The End of the Affair is the same emotion that Celia undergoes in Eliot's The Cocktail Party. Bodkin believes that both authors intend to show that God allows

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<sup>68</sup> See pp. 9, 19, 21, 45 (The Cocktail Party), and 82 following.

<sup>69</sup> Bodkin sees them as symbols of God's presence and guidance fashioned by men seeking God (p. 69). The Gospel stories are unique because they have "affinities to epic and tragic poetry, to history, to philosophy and theology" ("Literature and the Individual Reader," p. 46). See pp. lxxviii-lxxix following.

suffering to bring men to Him (p.21 ). Holding that the Divine persuasion operates through "daily demands and trials" (p.51 ) as well as through words, Bodkin applies this concept of the value of suffering to her own life. She says she wants to believe that the pain of a "secluded lonely professional and domestic life" is a preparation for the search for God (p. 21).

It is apparent from Bodkin's published works as well as the journal that many parts of her life were difficult for her, especially personal relationships. She writes: "I have known union in the thought or emotion of others more surely and happily through books than ever through the bodies" (p. 7 ). All her life she felt as if "a psychic 'glass wall'" separated her from others (p. 42); she still remembers that a Miss Tremain regretted Bodkin's "painful diffidence" (pp. 24-25 ). She is always aware of "barriers which arrest communication when individuals try to meet in the cut and thrust of ordinary talk" (p. 19). Adamson writes that although Bodkin "was eager to question 'why one thought so' she was not nearly so apt to enlarge on why she disagreed or her own reasoning . . . . She had a nervous manner of utterance (like someone who had been almost morbidly shy); and at the same time, a rocklike hold on her own views."<sup>70</sup> Bodkin says she fears days of gloom and chill (p. 6 ) and characterizes herself as "somewhat incapable and overanxious in daily life" (p. 5 ). She is ashamed of the weakness that makes her "silent before another's petulant injustice and overbearing truculence" (p. 90). She suffers "dejection from

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<sup>70</sup>Letter of 8 April 1972.



another's vexation" (p.13 ) and "oppression from a resentful manner" (p.86 ). The "unbearable oppression" (p. 13) and "aching loneliness" (p. 90) make Bodkin wish for "some friend to whom [she] might speak freely" (p.22).

While Bodkin does not say in the phrases just mentioned to whom she is referring, she says about Taylor:

When Agnes complains so bitterly of the labour involved in the household fires and is only angry at the attempt on my part to help, I think the painful oppression that seems to make me incapable either of rest or any work of my own, is an effect like Mr. Harrison's [a soldier not otherwise identified] fainting, because I am helpless and alone. I seek relief in the doing of what is possible to me of the household labours, but no effort of mine can prevent the ill temper and complaining that chiefly makes life burdensome to me. Such trivial misery it seems, yet that infinite understanding and compassion would meet and sustain one suffering even from such trivial-seeming causes (p. 22).

Adamson says that Taylor "is herself a person as fixed in her opinions and obstinate of will as any I have ever known."<sup>71</sup> The household in Welwyn Garden City was run exactly as Taylor wanted it. Her dominance was also confirmed in a conversation with Irene Swallow, a friend of Harrison's.<sup>72</sup> (After Bodkin's death, Taylor moved in with Harrison). H. John Bodkin says that once, when his aunt was ill and temporarily in a nursing home, she told him of her impatience and irritation with Taylor's control of her life.<sup>73</sup> These facts, although unimportant in themselves, might explain

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<sup>71</sup>Letter of 28 July 1972.

<sup>72</sup>Personal interview of 10 August 1977.

<sup>73</sup>Personal interview of 9 August 1977.

some of the puzzling allusions to unhappiness in the journal.<sup>74</sup> At the same time, Adamson says that Taylor felt for Bodkin "something near mental adoration."<sup>75</sup> Indeed, Taylor writes: "I want to do all I can toward the recognition of Maud's wonderful achievement."<sup>76</sup>

So Bodkin looked for relationships in literature, believing that images and relationships in poems, novels, and plays quickened awareness of the self in all of one's relationships (p. 29). The journal shows that Bodkin looked for figures in literature which imaged loneliness (p. 90), and for those which were portrayed as having achieved the I-Thou relationship. The uneducated soldier in Alexander Baron's "Young Beethoven" had such a realization moments before his death in his intense response to Beethoven's music (pp. 48-49). She looks to novels for "presented interactions of persons" (p. 17) and "images of encounter" (p. 100) which objectify her recalled experience. She searches for "communication under concrete images of another's vision and interpretation of life" (p. 72).

Such personal relationships imaged in literature are for Bodkin encounters with the Divine. She finds in Esther Warner's Trial by Sasswood an illustration of her own belief that the "religious dimension of living exists in relationship" (p. 91).

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<sup>74</sup>They do not, however, shed any light on Bodkin's reference to "those painful longings, never in bodily intimacy, such as found some tormented expression in my record of 1904-19" (p. 8).

<sup>75</sup>Letter of 28 July 1972.

<sup>76</sup>Letter of 6 May 1972.

She writes that she is dissatisfied with her earlier reference to Alan Paton's Cry the Beloved Country because now she is more aware of the beauty of the relation between the old pastor and his son: "Is it . . . the spirit in me, the 'I' that can question and criticize the apathetic reluctant heart--that is quickened to will more depth and meaning into the few personal relations possible to me" (p. 28)?<sup>77</sup> She compares D. H. Lawrence's statement that the novel leads one's sympathetic consciousness "into new places, away from things gone dead" (p. 27) with her own view of the novel as an instrument for discovering truth: "When I so experience a novel as to relate it consciously to my own life and outlook, is my spirit seeking to transcend the limitations of its past and its heredity" (p. 28)?<sup>78</sup> In a series of questions about the function of the novel similar to those she asks later in "Literature and the Individual Reader," she wonders if reading a novel is like prayer in that it stimulates self-criticism as does psychoanalysis (p. 28)?<sup>79</sup> She is certain that reading a novel enlarges her individual perspective: she comes closer to "truth universal" (p. 54) while yet realizing that that can be known only to God (p. 57).<sup>80</sup>

It is not only the novel but also criticism of the novel that reveals truth: "Criticism, in the form of a reflective estimate

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<sup>77</sup> Bodkin found beauty in the image of the white man who died for the cause of justice in South Africa, driven by his recognition of "faith in human brotherhood and its denial in the established social order" (Type-Images, p. 164).

<sup>78</sup> See Archetypal Patterns, pp. 289-307, and Type-Images, pp. 159-60.

<sup>79</sup> See pp. lxxviii-lxxix following.

<sup>80</sup> See "Truth Individual and Universal," p. 7, appendix, pp. 280-89.

of the novel as a presentation of life, serves that need [to increase understanding of the human environment] for me sometimes as well or better than the novel itself" (p. 94). The journal's references to thirty-four novels and very few poems are an indication that Bodkin found novels to be more concerned with contemporary culture. Accepting their limitations which she noted in Type-Images--they give only "partial perspectives" (TI, p. 171) and lack "that element of incantation" (TI, p. 159)--she yet reads them for "reflections of that inner experience of one's own that so craves expression" (p. 89). She speaks of the havoc that results when impressions remain unexpressed, thereby obstructing self-communication (p. 49). In the journal she wants to examine her "individual truth" (p. 58), intending to make "a clear and sincere" record (p. 53).

Although Bodkin discusses some of Jung's insights in the journal, there are few references to the archetype.<sup>81</sup> She does refer to the archetype of the Divine (p. 40), and says that the power of the archetypal image is that it brings "ancient memories within the human tradition" (p. 60). There is one reference which recalls Bodkin's early interest in the archetype's occurrence in dream: she approves of Victor White's theory in God and the Unconscious that images produced in dream and fantasy help mold character and behavior, transforming energy (p. 39). Buber is mentioned only once in the journal (p. 71), but his intuition of the I-Thou relationship permeates the entire work. The journal

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<sup>81</sup> See pp. 18, 29 and 84 following.

Bodkin published three more articles, one during the six years in which she kept the journal. All deal with Bodkin's beliefs that greater understanding of the self and of the relation of the self to some larger power is provided by a study of those poetic and religious images which relate to the basic conditions of life. Bodkin's tenuous hope that there is a divine persuasion influencing I-Thou encounters does not become certainty. Instead, she implies her agreement with agnosticism while yet emphasizing her personal need to come closer to a solution of "the problem of the ultimate nature of man" (LIR, p. 47). In "Poetry and the Human Condition" she asks: "Is there for us some further renewal, of which all those rebirths we have known in time, of nature and of our own life, are in some manner the pattern and symbol" (p.348)?<sup>82</sup> Science, with its insistence on "verification in sensory experience" cannot answer this question (PHC, p. 348). Bodkin, though, with William James, ventures belief that there may be in the universe a divine power. If religious institutions no longer inspire faith, poetry might. She has found that the poetry she has studied in relation to Jung's hypothesis is related directly to the conditions of human existence. Poetic images help the reader to be "less vulnerable to life's vicissitudes" by relating him to greater, far-reaching powers (PHC, p. 353).

"Knowledge and Faith" contrasts the kind of knowledge faith gives with that provided by science, described by Tennyson in "In

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<sup>82</sup> See p. 25 following.



Memoriam" as "the things we see."<sup>83</sup> Faith's ideal of knowledge is not publicly verifiable because each religious and philosophic writer communicates his own faith in relation to some higher power. The scientist cannot speak of his inner history:

Desiring so to fashion his conclusions that they may be verified in sense, or in an intellectual impersonal form of experience, the scientist must ignore the individual history that can be communicated only through symbolic imagery to those whose personal experience is adequately similar. He must speak in terms of sensible objects and of the measuring, calculating intellect (KF, p. 137).

Because different knowledge is the goal of each, the speech used to describe one's inner history is different from the speech of science.<sup>84</sup> Gilbert Ryle's argument in The Concept of Mind against the verifiability of one's inner history by another makes Bodkin question the adequacy of the religious images with which one expresses one's inner history. Successful communication is possible only when a form of speech which refers to objects only is recognized, "while its intention is to communicate an experience transcending the dichotomy of subject and object" (KF, p. 140). Bodkin hopes that "a springboard toward transcendence," in Karl Jaspers' words, will be found in this type of symbolic consciousness

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<sup>83</sup>Bodkin, "Knowledge and Faith," Philosophy, 31 (1956), pp. 131-41. All subsequent references in parentheses in the text to this article will be identified with the letters KF. Also see pp. 75, 85-90, and 93 following.

<sup>84</sup>Compare Bodkin's statement with the following: "A statement may be used for the sake of the reference, true or false, which it causes. This is the scientific use of language. But it may also be used for the sake of the effect in emotion and attitude produced by the reference it occasions. This is the emotive use of language" (I. A. Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism, 2nd ed. [1924; rpt. Harcourt, Brace, 1961], p. 267).

and intention (KF, p. 140).<sup>85</sup>

"Literature and the Individual Reader" addresses the "relation between values felt and individual needs as these are understood in the light of present-day psychological studies" (LIR, pp. 39-40). Response to poetry is important because in this manner one verifies, in one's own experience, Jung's hypothesis:

At such times there is relief from personal aims and anxieties, and consciousness seems enlarged to contain more of the universal. The responsive reader or listener may divine and share something of the creative ecstasy of the poet (LIR, p. 44).

Bodkin believes that individual feeling is controlled by a spiritual energy which she calls archetypal because it is governed by the very conditions of human existence: "Disaster and death are felt as incidents in a life that is self-renewing, and implies all that we mean by the devilish and the Divine" (LIR, p. 44). Bodkin then analyzes her personal response to the gospels; implying that she is an agnostic, she concludes that response to this unique literature depends upon whether or not the question of God's existence is a live issue:

To some of us it appears as an irresistible insight that the "I" that knows and judges, in however limited a fashion is distinct from the body with which it is so inexplicably united; and this strange quality of the knower and the known within ourselves serves as basis for the question whether, in the universe we know as material, there exists, in some mysterious

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<sup>85</sup> Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), German philosopher who lay the groundwork for the modern philosophy of existence. See pp. 1, 69, 72, and 86 following.

relation, an unknown greater "I", whom we may address as Thou, to whom ultimately, as spiritual beings we are akin (LIR, p. 47).<sup>86</sup>

Bodkin sees the rebirth pattern not only in Jesus' death and resurrection but also in Shakespearean tragedy, where the imaged death is always "an apotheosis, or a passing to some new kind of existence . . . [and] release, escape" (LIR, p. 48). Since she believes that the question of how response to a novel differs from response to poetry needs study, Bodkin asks a number of questions: does the novel's "cumulative effect of homely detail" replace poetry's "word-music" (LIR, pp. 49-50)? Are differences in what people want of a novel responsible for differences of opinion regarding its quality? Is one of these differences "the degree in which a reader desires to know himself or others truly" (LR, p. 50)? Using Kenneth Burke's concept of strategies, Bodkin speculates that one compares "imaged strategies of interaction" in the novel with one's own motivation in life, trying to obtain "relief and fuller understanding" (LIR, p. 50).<sup>87</sup>

This issue of Literature and Psychology also contains a letter from Bodkin commenting on a previous article on Browning's

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<sup>86</sup>Bodkin's reference to "a live issue" might be to William James's thought: "A live hypothesis is one which appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed . . . . The maximum of liveness in a hypothesis means willingness to act irrevocably. Practically that means belief" (William James, "The Will to Believe," in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy [1897; rpt. New York: Dover, 1956], pp. 2-3).

<sup>87</sup>Kenneth Burke (1897- ) discusses his concept of strategies as methods of encompassing situations in poetry, or symbolic action, in Permanence and Change (1935) and The Philosophy of Literary Form (1941).

"Childe Roland."<sup>88</sup> To balance the motif of retribution for wrongdoing in the poem, Bodkin offers another: a challenge to death's horror. Browning may have cast a child as hero because his unconscious intention was to present an initiation which contains the rebirth pattern. Her point, she says, is that critics who apply a psychological interpretation to poetry should beware of exclusiveness. The ideal critic should not think of one ingredient in the "poem's essence, or 'whole motivation,'" in Burke's phrase, but should examine the "inter-relations among the various ingredients" (Letter C, p. 37).

One unpublished article postdates the journal: "Mental Climate and Perspective and the Cosmic Stairway," post-1959.<sup>89</sup> In it Bodkin discusses the metaphors implicit in Mircea Eliade's discussion of religious symbolism in Images and Symbols and that symbolism's relation to Jung's concept of deep analysis. She analyzes various writers' uses of words which indicate changing visual perspectives--position, viewpoint, outlook--in metaphors with which they describe the life of the mind. One type of sense-experience connected with perspective change is upward and downward movement. Bodkin discusses Eliade's "symbolism of the centre," the sacred place surrounded by the unknown with a tree,

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<sup>88</sup> Literature and Psychology, 10 (1960), p. 37. All subsequent references in parentheses in the text to this letter will be identified with the words Letter C.

<sup>89</sup> Bodleian TS d 887, pp. 112-29. All subsequent references in parentheses in the text to this article will be identified with the letters MC. See appendix, pp. 306-21. Also see pp. 70, 95-98, and 100 following.

pillar or mountain as the means of movement among three cosmic regions. To scientific criticism of Eliade's generalizations about the nature of religious symbolism, Bodkin counters: "Do we believe--even with a tentative and difficult faith--that in the universe beyond us, the self encounters some reality akin and responsive to that which in the self is most profound, most real" (MC, p. 121)? Interested in what foundation can be found for Eliade's symbolism in sense-experience, Bodkin remembers standing on a hill and the resultant changes in perspective and distortion of images, and tries to remember her earliest experiences of height and depth. She relates these memories and the natural cycles of growth and decay, light and dark, to Jung's researches in human psychology known as deep analysis:

When an examination is undertaken of a series of the dreams and phantasies of an individual seeking a redirection of his life, it appears that images are produced that illumine the conflicting trends that have tormented the ego, and help the individual to arrive at a new centre of personality where these trends can become reconciled and a wider, less distorted vision of the world become possible (MC, p. 124).

Noting the similarity between Jung's "deep centre" and James's "higher power," Bodkin finds the rebirth pattern in these attempts to describe experience.<sup>90</sup> She urges the reader to enter imaginatively others' different outlooks for two reasons: by reflecting on experiences which extend one's own, one has an idea of "the divine vision, infinitely penetrating, infinitely comprehensive, having the use of all our perspectives" (MC, p. 127). Also, an

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<sup>90</sup> See pp. 8, 13, and 78 following.



enlarged individual perspective, one's mental climate, enables one to escape "the social climate of thought" by which Bodkin feels all are partially determined.

Because of her interest in the creative imagination and in the poet's superior ability, Bodkin can be seen in the tradition of the English Romantics and Emerson. She suggests a correlation between her concept of the archetype as developed in Type-Images and Wordsworth's belief in "Ode on Intimations of Immortality" (also expressed by Plato) in "the human spirit's prior vision and fall at birth from heavenly places" (TI, p. 104). Her early belief that archetypes are a source of power corresponds with Emerson's statement that the poet has access to "a great public power on which he can draw, by unlocking, at all risks, his human doors, and suffering the ethereal tides to roll and circulate through him."<sup>91</sup> Her use of the theory and techniques of psychoanalysis place her with, among other psychoanalytic and myth critics, Kenneth Burke, Northrop Frye, and Simon O. Lesser. However, Bodkin's distinctive contribution as a critic stems from her early investigations into the source of imagery, using Jung's hypothesis regarding archetypes. From the beginning of her work, it was the imagery--its relation to dreams and the unconscious, its antiquity, and its presence in many cultures--which interested her. In her early articles before Archetypal Patterns, the problem of how the conscious mind uses the products of the unconscious was her focus:

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<sup>91</sup> Ralph Waldo Emerson, "The Poet," in The Selected Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Brooks Atkinson (1940; rpt. New York: Random House, 1950), p. 332.

If with Jung we believe that the archaic images appear in dream and phantasy with a prospective significance . . . then there is opportunity for conscious purpose to ally itself with all there may be of promise in these unconscious products. Whether to be used for the ends of art or of practical life, they are means of access to a reservoir of power (LC, pp. 456-57).

Her early work on the question of the relationship between the artist's conscious technique and unconscious powers concentrated on the author's psychology. Here she followed Freud, Jung, and other explorers of the mind who initially examined art from the viewpoint of the motive for artistic creation. However, as she investigated further the connection between poetic and dream imagery, she became interested in the similarity between the artist and the reader-critic: each seeks to identify, express, and thereby control the emotional dispositions which in some degree govern behavior (see p. xxix f.). Although she recognized the poet's superior ability to use language, Bodkin's critical approach began to emphasize the necessary role of the reader-critic as a participant in the artist's creative activity in attaining a complete sense of artistic works (see AP, p. 246). In "Truth in Poetry" she writes:

It seems possible, in terms of an organization of attitudes through imaginative activity, to reach better understanding of the varying results of criticism than when we speak in terms of a revelation of truth. Whatever psychological knowledge we possess concerning the conditioning of emotional attitudes through the course of a life history can be brought into play to help us, as we read a critic's work, to grasp the nature of his individual standpoint, or perspective. We may seek for the time to share this perspective imaginatively, then detach ourselves for the comparison of our own individual experience and that of others (p. 469).

The meaning of a work is to be found in "the communication of coordinated perspectives" (TP, p. 471).

In this emphasis on the reader's psychology, Bodkin's viewpoint anticipates some of the tenets of the recent school of reader response criticism. Its members share her beliefs that unconscious processes are the source of literature's appeal, that criticism has both a social and subjective function, and that work done in all disciplines will aid the critic. Stanley Fish, who describes his method as analyzing "the developing responses of the reader in relation to the words as they succeed one another in time," is interested in "what goes on below the level of self-conscious response."<sup>92</sup> David Bleich comments that "certain feelings sensed earlier in the life of an individual as valuable but not very accessible to him, are released under the influence of literary involvement and applied to present-life conditions."<sup>93</sup> His view of the communal function of the interpretation of literature ("the truth value of interpretation is negotiated by the responding community and does not inhere in the interpretation")<sup>94</sup> is at one with Bodkin's. Although Norman Holland's theory that

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<sup>92</sup> Stanley E. Fish, Self-Consuming Artifacts: the Experience of Seventeenth-Century Literature, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972, pp. 387-88, 392. However, Fish's statement in his description of his idealized, informed reader that he advocates "the attendant suppressing, insofar as that is possible, of what is personal and idiosyncratic and 1970ish in . . . response" (p. 407) is at variance with Bodkin's complete openness to whatever response a work arouses.

<sup>93</sup> David Bleich, "Psychological Bases of Learning from Literature," College English, 33 (1971), 45.

<sup>94</sup> Bleich, "Pedagogical Directions in Subjective Criticism," College English, 37 (1976), 457.

literature "transforms unconscious fantasies towards significance" is solidly within the Freudian framework which Bodkin rejects, Holland shares with her a consciousness of the limits of language: "Our language is poor in terms for emotions . . . . What is needed is . . . more study of the ways people feel as they read various works embodying various types of fantasy and defense."<sup>95</sup> Holland also calls for the incorporation of results gained by workers in other fields, especially "early 20th century physics, mid-century biology, the philosophical statements that have accompanied them, . . . [and] . . . the social (human) sciences since the late 19th century." Among these social sciences Holland singles out psychoanalysis, cultural anthropology, linguistics, "and, in particular, the nearly-a-century of powerful research by psychologists of perception ('transactional psychology'), all leading to an overwhelming demonstration that 'perception is a constructive act.'"<sup>96</sup>

Bodkin also shares with "the critics of consciousness" (Marcel Raymond, Albert Béguin, Georges Poulet, Jean-Pierre Richard, Jean Starobinski, Jean Rousset, and Maurice Blanchot) a "desire to attribute new importance to words and human expression," believing with them that because authors are especially able to use speech and manipulate language, literature is "the supreme

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<sup>95</sup> Norman Holland, The Dynamics of Literary Response (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 139, 281, 307.

<sup>96</sup> Holland, "The New Paradigm: Subjective or Transactive?", New Literary History, 7 (1976), 335.

incarnation of human consciousness."<sup>97</sup> However, she is more concerned than any of these critics with the social bond furnished by literature and its function as a repository of cultural values and a basis for communal life. From her earliest years, Bodkin was searching for a stay against chaos and isolation which before this century had been provided by religion.

It is Bodkin's early work that can be seen in relation to later subjective criticism. As she became absorbed with "the reality beyond all images" (TI, p. 2), her critical perspective shifted towards a preoccupation with imagery as a record of encounters with the Divine. The optimism which made her equate increased understanding of one's unconscious dispositions with victory over one's self (AP, p. 34), and access to a reservoir of power (LC, p. 457), waned. While she continued to believe that understanding images in both dreams and poetry would enlarge one's knowledge of one's self, increasingly in her work this knowledge is put to the service of relief from fear of life's uncertainties: "The individual will experience emotional satisfaction and assurance, only when, passing perhaps through conflict and disillusion, he has achieved a sincere relation to the values he can assimilate from amongst those which social institutions and tradition offer" (AP, p. 280).

Bodkin places great emphasis on religious experience. Drawing upon Durkheim's theory that religious emotion is in its earliest

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<sup>97</sup> Sarah N. Lawall, Critics of Consciousness: the Existential Structures of Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 2, 268.



manifestation the collective force behind the group, Bodkin implies a connection between poetic truth and religious truth. Her concentration in Type-Images upon only three images indicates that evidence of poets' and philosophers' encounters with the Divine, expressed in images, became more important to her than their source in the unconscious. She came to believe that the search for truth was part of her duty to God.

It is Bodkin's constant desire to relate her experience to the universal experience of mankind. She uses Whitehead's concept of the Divine persuasion and Buber's intuition of encounter, finding that the Divine persuasion operates between the I and Thou, "the conditioned incarnate spirit and deity" (p. 27). Because for her encounter occurs between herself and ideas, Bodkin says that in response to images from the past "something quickened and answered so that I believed to encounter the Divine" (Letter B, p. 2). When an image from a poem speaks to us, Bodkin says, "it seems that something is born to us, divine, uncontaminated, as if it came from another world, a hope and pledge of union between that world and ours" (TI, p. 98). This emphasis upon encounter, through which one realizes the archetype of divine wisdom (TI, p. 175), replaces psychoanalysis as a way of finding truth. Union with others is thus achieved in each one's search for "belief expressed in imagery awakening response" (TI, p. 104).

In the journal Bodkin quotes J. S. Smart's observation that poets are satisfied with fragmentary glimpses of reality but philosophers "seek to survey all things and co-ordinate them"

(p.32 ). It seems that Bodkin takes on the philosopher's role in her writing. She wants to "feel and think down to the roots of life" (PN, p. 15). Admitting, with the intellectual honesty which characterizes all of her work, that her belief in the Divine persuasion is difficult to maintain, her need to find evidence of it led to all the encounters with ideas recorded in her journal. In the autobiographical sketch she wrote during the time she was keeping the journal, she says: "My father had little sympathy with my mother's outlook [on religion] and spent his leisure mainly in reading contemporary and recent works of philosophy. Though I did not at the time make much response consciously to the expressed views of either of my parents, I have thought lately, turning the much-marked and many times re-read pages of my father's copy of William James's The Varieties of Religious Experience, that my life's quest has been, perhaps, a continuation of his."<sup>98</sup>

Bodkin had originally undergone psychoanalysis to learn more about the sources of her behavior. She said later that the most important gain she had received from her experience was "a fuller sense of the unexplored wealth of the heritage communicated through language and custom, influencing unawares all our conscious individual thought and action" (TI, p. 9). All of her subsequent work was directed toward exploring the nature of this "influencing unawares": it led her to concentrate on one type of imagery, that concerned with a higher power. The original and suggestive work she had done in Archetypal Patterns was subsumed in Type-Images to her desire to

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<sup>98</sup> Twentieth Century Authors, (First Supplement).

find those images which expressed life's meaning. Type-Images and the journal illustrate Bodkin's conviction that "the divine source of our being is encountered by us through no single unique revelation, but individually by different modes of approach" (TI, p. 58). Through these modes, ranging from literature and psychology to religion, philosophy, and all the resources of her personal experience, she searched for truth: "truths recognized in such large indefinable wholes as the course of human life in all its obscure complexity" (p. 32). Bodkin's absorbing interest was to provide some illumination of this "obscure complexity." Her entry in Twentieth Century Authors (First Supplement) reads in part: "Miss Bodkin has neither sought nor received widespread recognition of her work." Nevertheless, Bodkin's imaginative and creative psychology of literary response, with its wealth of insights and sensitivity to cultural values, has greatly increased the range of human knowledge which criticism provides.

## The Text of the Journal

How would the God of our faith look on such a relation? Is that common character of life and human relationship that one recognizes in these passages a universal we can term (as Helen Wodehouse terms 'the good' we reverence) concrete?<sup>1</sup>

Oct. 18, 1950. When looking on late flowers and yellowing leaves, and light with shadow making beauty spring between them and the beholder's eyes, one's mind ranges over beauty past and distant all the world over, is this beauty--this distinctive form of beauty --also a concrete universal?

'Philosophic truth . . . is an inexhaustible stream that flows from the history of philosophy . . . yet flows only when the primal source is captured for new realizations in the present. [. . .] The word 'Philosophy' has become a symbol of our gratitude of continued dialogue with this tradition'.<sup>2</sup> (From The Perennial Scope of Philosophy by Karl Jaspers, translated R. Manheim, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950).

Oct. 1951. 'When--perhaps I was fourteen by that time I took Miss Marjorie Bowen's The Viper of Milan from the library shelf, the future for better or worse really struck. From that moment I began to write. [. . .] Why did it creep in and colour and explain the terrible living world of the stone stairs and the never quiet dormitory? . . . Visconti, with his beauty, his patience and his genius for evil, I had watched him pass by many a time in his black Sunday suit smelling of mothballs. . . . Human nature is not black and white but black and grey. I read all that in The Viper of Milan and I looked round and I saw that it was so' (pp. 15, 16).<sup>3</sup> (The Lost Childhood and Other Essays by Graham Greene, Eyre and Spottiswoode).

'In ancient shadows and twilights / Where childhood had shaped,  
 / The world's great sorrows were born / and its heroes were made, /  
 In the lost boyhood of Judas / Christ was betrayed'.<sup>4</sup> 'She had given  
 me my pattern--religion later might explain it to me in other terms,  
 but the pattern was already there--perfect evil walking the world  
 where perfect good can never walk again. . .'.<sup>5</sup>

Dec. 1951. 'The Way'. 'Friend, I have lost the way. / The way  
leads on. / Is there another way? / The way is one. / I must retrace the  
 track. / It's lost and gone. / Back, I must travel back! / None goes  
there, none. / Then I'll make here my place. / (The road runs on). /  
 Stand still and set my face. / (The road leaps on). / Stay here, for ever  
 stay. / None stays here, none. / I cannot find the way. / The way leads  
on. / Oh places I have passed! / That journey's done. / And what will come  
 at last? / The road leads on'. The Labryinth, Edwin Muir, (Faber, 1949).<sup>6</sup>

Oct. 8, 1952. Shall I, now that I feel sure I shall write for  
 publication no more, write now and then a little here of passages from  
 past or present reading that comfort me in loneliness and difficulty?  
 'O Father, if you knew all this / You cannot know, then you would  
 know too, Father, / and only then, if God can pardon me. . . . I  
 think / I have been speaking to you of some matters / There was no  
 need to speak of, have I not? / You do not know how clearly those  
 things stood / Within my mind, which I have spoken of / Nor how  
 they strove for utterance'. (From 'A Last Confession', [D. G.]  
 Rossetti).<sup>7</sup> Torn from its context this passage stands for my need  
 expressed in my published books in the future perhaps to be alleviated  
 here. "How oft do they their silver bowers leave / To come to succour  
 us who succour want, / . . . Against foule feendes to aide us militant".  
 Mr. Rowell uses these lines of any memories that 'serve us well'. I



incline to use them especially of remembered passages from our literary heritage.<sup>8</sup>

Oct. 9. I am interested in what Basil Willey has written (NS and N, July 26) about The Notebooks of Matthew Arnold. What they represent, he says, 'is (W. quotes Mr. Eliot on stoicism) "the form and substratum of a number of versions of cheering oneself up". The question they really answer is, "Who prop, thou ask'st, in these bad days my mind?"' We can see Arnold as 'a man in whom constitutional lassitude and melancholy are being fought down from day to day, and mastered by deep spiritual convictions and an overriding sense of obligation. He chooses passages that 'speak to his condition' such as 'Be not weary in well-doing' (Galatians).<sup>9</sup> As Arnold wrote this trite exhortation did he recall some setting of the words? What I must write is not often exhortation--perhaps oftener something that expresses my situation as I feel it. From [G.] Lowes Dickinson's Justice and Liberty I take words that describe the nature of man felt in history and contemporary life both distant and close: 'What with one arm he attacked with the other he defended (I have thought it as What with one hand he built with the other he destroyed) and the inheritance of the brute . . . drags at his heels and hangs about his neck'.<sup>10</sup> This exhortation I have thought as coming from Augustine: 'Love God and thy friend in God and thine enemy for His sake'.<sup>11</sup> I think it in relation to my awareness of the ambivalence of emotion or sentiment. When kindness is mixed in devouring jealousy or the impulse to hurt and destroy, friend and enemy may be the same, to be held in the love that is religious only.

Oct. 10. Yesterday and the day before, perhaps again today, the lines from James Thomson: 'Speak not of comfort where no comfort is, / Speak not at all: Can words make foul things fair?',<sup>12</sup> This seems a word of guidance in reference to another's feeling. For mine comes rather such a word as that known in childhood: 'Count your blessings' or the comparison with concentration camps or 'solitary confinement'. I am already beginning to feel relief in making of this beautifully bound book a confidant. I have just finished writing the biographical sketch asked for by the Wilson Company and the line from the Medea comes to me: 'Let it lie with the old lost labours', the epitaph familiar to me for almost all my efforts.<sup>13</sup> Whether or not they are to be wholly 'lost' one never knows.

Oct. 13. In his recorded broadcast this morning, dealing with 'Cinerama', Alistair Cooke said--as nearly as I can recollect it--'I wonder what will be the effect in the future upon what Edmund Burke said was the safeguard of democracy, that "dignity of reflection when the event is over"'.<sup>14</sup> He had painted a terrifying picture of the experience of being transported, in the theatre, to the very presence of a distant or past event, so that a demagogue, for instance, may have his full effect upon the nervous system. But for me that closing sentence's quotation gives a name to something that in my private life I value. In this notebook, for instance, I am seeking words that shall help me to exercise that full dignity of reflection upon those minute past events that characterise the inner life. Now that I think I shall not complete my article begun for Philosophy nor write anything that requires the holding together of various facts and opinions, so as to satisfy academic minds, and expect, rather,

to solace my craving for expression in words only through the never to be read entries in this book, what purpose remains to me? Perhaps that which Plato thought should characterise the life of a philosopher--the preparation for death.<sup>15</sup> How can one prepare for death and for what may come after when one has no knowledge what, if anything, that 'after' may be? No knowledge, yet I have my part in our Christian heritage, and have tried to shape and express for myself the little it is possible for me to believe.

Oct. 15. 'Whether therefore ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God' (1 Cor. x. 31). Together with this there comes often to my mind the memory of reading of one who confessed to saying a prayer to God for a right choice in making some small purchase out of his scanty funds for living. So I, being somewhat incapable and overanxious in common matters of daily life, grope for the right thing to do in small occasions. All that Paul urged on his converts I accept as part of the religious heritage I share, though it cannot mean to me what it meant to them--and yet the context of Paul's precepts is like that of my thought. Paul decides the problem of eating with those of a different outlook by the criterion of 'giving no offence', 'seeking others' profit'. (It is with this in view that I try to solve my problems of day to day living). In his exhortation to the Colossians, Ch. iii, as he tries to show them what it means to 'put on the new man', 'risen in Christ', he offers the precept, 'be ye thankful' and 'Whatsoever ye do in word or deed do all in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God'.<sup>16</sup> Thankfulness, I believe comes easily to me. Now when the trees stand ruddy or golden in the misty sun-

shine, every glance at them passes easily to the thought of a power, a spirit that makes beauty in the world. It brings a contrast with days of gloom and chill, so feared by me; and yet even then, something can be found for thankfulness. There may come the thought from 'Solitary Confinement' of the little space of sky alone allowed the prisoner.<sup>17</sup> Can the horrors others have to endure enhance one's thankfulness? It seems in a way they do? Rather, perhaps, they come to shame one into a more resolute endurance, and as a challenge to maintain difficult faith in a Power of Good that cannot, or does not, permit evil beyond his creatures' power to withstand or endure. Although the main thought of so secluded an individual as I will necessarily be of the 'profit', the 'no offence', of those I live with, yet my 'preparation for death' must include my attitude to affairs of the world beyond me to the political situation. My support, for what it is worth, goes to the Labour party, the N.S. & N.,<sup>18</sup> the U.D.C.. Reading this morning a U.D.C. pamphlet about the Japanese Peace Treaty, with its insistence on the Treaty's evil effect, making impossible friendly relations with the New China, and demanding that the Treaty be denounced, I wondered am I right in remaining a subscribing member of the U.D.C.?<sup>19</sup> I cannot pretend to judge to what point the British Government should go in conforming to the U.S.A.--what course makes the horror of extended war likelier. I retain membership as fellowship with men whose struggle for right this union represented; and if the action of America, as of our Government conforming to America, should be as fatally wrong as the writer of this pamphlet, or as John Murphy believes, I am no worse off than those Christians of the early centuries moving to national

disaster with the Emperors of Rome.<sup>20</sup>

Oct. 22. In the letter that the Frontier would not publish, I wrote of the novels of Ann Bridge as illustrating what Sir Geoffrey Victor said of the acceptance of 'the Christian dynamic' by those who cannot accept the Christian metaphysic.<sup>21</sup> That dynamic is understood as love and the novels of which I spoke, Frontier Passage in particular,<sup>22</sup> seem to me to show the nature of the love that redeems, selfless concern, with respect, as Kant presents it, and humility to try to understand.<sup>23</sup> I have been wondering how far such love is real in me. I recollected the passage from [G.] Lowes Dickinson's Meaning of Good: 'It may very well be that one who passes through life without allowing the fruition of love, yet with his gaze always set upon it, in and through many other connections, may yet come closer to the end of his seeking than one who having known love has sunk to rest in it . . .'.<sup>24</sup> I take L. D. to be saying the same thing as in that passage about loving all in God. That Divine Persuasion that is my idea of God is a persuasion toward such harmony as L. D. describes toward the end of his dialogue. Every man, L. D. observes, has to live 'according to his opportunities and capacities', but the relations to other beings in which he becomes involved point, he believes, to a 'consummation' which is love as a harmony, or perfect union, of each with all.<sup>25</sup> When I ask myself am I seeking, and through what connections, such a harmony? I think first, of relations within ancient or contemporary literature. I have known union in the thought and emotion of others more surely and happily through books than ever through the bodies, yet I have tried to serve, and been grateful for service, tried also to respect and understand. If, L. D. concludes,



there is ever to be such realization of the Good as may fulfill the promise in human life, the meaning we seem to discern in it, there must be 'immortality', some personal life beyond death. 'It is' (says Joad, summing up, I think, adequately, [The Hibbert Journal, October, 1952] however inadequate I find his literary personality) 'to the experience of Value, in its traditional forms of Truth, Goodness and Beauty (here as media for our 'intercourse' with God, his revelation of Himself to man on earth) that I should look for an intimation of what the concept of immortality may hold'.<sup>26</sup> Those painful longings never //. . .// in bodily intimacy, such as found some tormented expression in my record of 1904-19, should be diverted, partially, into some form of wider services. Conscience reproaches me for halfheartedness in using the opportunities offered by an income exceeding my individual requirements. That ideal harmony, to service of which I recognize the Divine Power persuading me, can appear as entering, for instance, into the appeal for support received this morning from the Family Welfare Association.<sup>27</sup> As I write my cheque, I can deem myself ministering, in accordance with my individual infirmities to the sick and afflicted, fulfilling in some faint degree what I discern as God's will. But is God also a Power that gives, beyond insight, aid? William James has written of a 'wider self' or 'spiritual environment', from which help comes and of those who have such experience distinctly enough to know, to feel certain of God.<sup>28</sup> Since the help that has come to me comes through fellow beings, past and present, sharers of this mortal life, it cannot bring me certainty of God. No prayer of mine brings it; I can only give response or welcome to what comes spontaneously. So to me that talk

is inaccurate that deprecates reliance on 'one's own strength'. The nearest I can come to what seems demanded is a kind of willed receptiveness: 'What so ever things are lovely think on those things'.

Nov. 17. Is there some human quality strong in some natures, rudimentary in others, that can find expression either in the love of mountains or in the need for a life of entire devotion to God? Reading The Last Crevasse by Roger Frison-Roche, I felt the analogy between the growth of the mountain passion and that other growth that The Fruit in the Seed hints at while the author describes, in what to me is a very uninspired fashion, the events of her life. Early in the account of the first big climb of the beginner whom her guide is initiating comes the record of a feeling of helplessness before the great apparently vertical inaccessible mountain wall; Brigitte is afraid both of the mountain and of Zian. She was weary and 'everything was cold and cruel. . . . Her loneliness was absolute, the landscape round was nothing but ice and rock, bold peaks range after range . . . as far as the horizon' (p. 39).<sup>29</sup> But as in the actual rock climbing she discovers the powers of her body in contact with the rock-surfaces: 'soon nothing mattered to her but the climbing--how to force her way up' (p. 42);<sup>30</sup> fear and fright are felt no longer. When the summit is reached 'she was at one' with the vast landscape around her. It seemed that for the first time in her life she was satisfied utterly wanting nothing beyond this new sense of freedom and of wonder and the bond to her companion through whom she had attained it'.<sup>31</sup> In their other greater climb after much bewilderment and danger and hardship, the world of men below her seemed quite unreal to Brigitte.<sup>32</sup> That unreality of

the life of men preoccupied in worldly business and pleasure as contrasted with divine immensity must appear in any record of the search for God. Margaret Leigh writes of her love, before she surrendered to God, of silence and solitude and of the sea--of being 'alone in a boat between sea and sky' where she has 'no age, no sex, no cares, no passions'.<sup>33</sup> Her love of wild nature, felt during her lonely life in a cottage on a cliff, kept alive 'a kind of special awareness', a 'door into that supernatural world so deeply longed for, of which I seemed to possess but to have mislaid the key. At the back of my mind was the sense of eternity, symbolized by the boundless sea and everlasting hills, in comparison with which our human strife and suffering are as nothing'.<sup>34</sup>

Nov. 18. To communion at first, M. Leigh writes she felt 'un-reasoning repugnance' or at least some 'sense of compulsion . . . although some hours later I was conscious of grace' (p. 123),<sup>35</sup> and after Confirmation, thought of only as 'another hurdle to be taken', when returning in the evening 'I was aware of a secret steady influx of grace' (p. 126).<sup>36</sup> Do I think of such alternations on the analogy of those alternations of fear and compulsion by the will with joy and freedom in mountain climbing?

If, as H. S. Shelton urges (The Hibbert Journal, April, 1951), there remains to us who cannot accept any infallibility only the sublime teaching of Jesus, and I will add the hope of there being a God represented by that teaching as our highest conception of truth, goodness, beauty, then in our view that God is revealed to some in the glory of the mountains as to others in the sacraments of the Church there is a true analogy between the alternations experienced

by both kinds of lovers.<sup>37</sup>

Nov. 19. The thought is still with me of mountain climbing as an image of the journey of life, alternations of weariness and fear with energy renewal as characterising both. The visible immensity of height and abyss through memory penetrates one's awareness of the narrowly limited present. Looking out on the thinned rosebushes shaken by the northeast wind, I imagine presence to the great blasts moving cloud masses on the heights. So while I continue domestic economies or try to smooth trivial clashes of individuality, I am aware of such tasks practiced by women cavedwellers, or by statesmen on a scale affecting millions. 'All service counts the same with God'.

Apart from the issue of the climbing in a difficult marriage, the description of the bond forged between guide and climber by the vicissitudes of the journey seems to have that general validity which Keppler, in the letters I have been rereading, desires to exhibit in the symbol.<sup>38</sup> So in the quest for salvation a bond is forged between the individual seeker and some actual helper or outstanding figure within the religious heritage. Among the many mentioned by M. Leigh, St. John of the Cross stands out perhaps.<sup>39</sup>

Nov. 21. Thinking of a research such as the student in Michigan might pursue into the image-pattern of the 'hero-transgressor-learner' as presented in 'The Ancient Mariner', and invited by a suggestion of a twofold interpretation of the Mariner's sin, I want to make clear to myself where such interpretation might lead. The mariner's sin, 'in deference to . . . the well organized school of Freud' may be related to infantile rebellion against the decrees of a father-God.<sup>40</sup>

Nov. 22. That daemon who in the poem loved and avenged the bird may, in that 'midregion of our racial as well as literary inheritance' towards which [John] L. Lowes says we harbour the primal will to believe, bear close relation to the divine father who marks the sparrow's fall, and the albatross of the mariner's penance may have hanged like the millstone of God's wrath about the neck of the offender against a little one under the divine protection.<sup>41</sup>

Nov. 24. The other aspect of the mariner's sin is the violation of loving kindness. The albatross had eaten food with his assassin; he had 'loved the man that shot him with his bow'.<sup>42</sup> The protective tenderness excited and violated by the act sets up by its own strength the torment of remorse. I have been reading again in Jung's Psychology of the Unconscious his account of the sublimation of the erotic impulse by Christianity.<sup>43</sup> The death of the Redeemer in which his followers could participate by the sacrificial death of 'the old man', 'the carnal self', could create a 'new way of love' (Ib., p. 79) permitting that force the mariner outraged of loving kindness to attain a new reality within the group [of] spiritually united brothers. 'Who to his conscious sin', says Jung (Ib., p. 82) consciously places in opposition religion (or here I might say reverent love of loving creatures) does something the greatness of which cannot be denied.<sup>44</sup>

Nov. 25. As I listened just now to 'Scenes from Tobias and the Angel' arranged for 'Senior English' on the Wireless, Coleridge's phrase was in my mind: 'transfer from our inward nature . . . a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for those shadows of imagination . . . poetic faith'.<sup>45</sup>



Nov. 26. Looking through relevant passages in L. Lowes's discussion of Coleridge's poem I find reference to 'immemorial projections of elemental human questionings and intuitions' (p. 240),<sup>46</sup> 'associations that had long been gathering' about a figure of legend (p. 250),<sup>47</sup> 'immemorial traditional convictions of the race' (p. 296).<sup>48</sup> 'We unceasingly say as we read "that is true to life"' (p. 299).<sup>49</sup> So, as I listened to the story of Tobias as James Bridie tells it, there rose in my mind the immemorial conviction or intuition of a Power that can accompany through its earthly vicissitudes a spirit incarcerated in a mortal frame and psyche alternately shrinking and overbold, helplessly terrified before emergencies, incautiously self-congratulatory after.<sup>50</sup> A prudent 'super ego', an 'introjection' of racial wisdom, one may call it, or one may believe there is a further reality beyond it.

What was vivid in my mind as I listened yesterday was the experience of dejection and discouragement communicated to me from another's vexation. So unbearable the oppression seems I reach out for help, calling to the fellowship of those who have borne worse things and to the Power that sustained them: that 'wider self', as William James called it, 'from which saving experiences flow in'.<sup>51</sup>

Jung talks of the double benefit offered by Christianity to those suffering from inner conflict: 'one is kept conscious' of the mutually opposing tendencies, and one is cured by transferring the burden.<sup>52</sup> Jung at the time of writing terms this transference a delusion made efficacious only through 'the powerful institution of the 'Christian community' or church (Psychology of the Unconscious, pp. 76-77).<sup>53</sup> Yet, as a psychologist, he has no right to assert that beyond this community there is nothing continuous or akin. In N. Mitchison's

book I value the vivid illustration of the operation of Christian fellowship. Of Beric after his utter discomfort and public humiliation: 'He had been . . . sorry for himself, wrapped up in himself like a snail in its stupid shell. Now he had looked out and seen the others' (p. 33).<sup>54</sup> 'What could he make a church out of' questions the little slave girl whom the freedwoman, Eunice, has been comforting, and speaking of her brother sold away to Spain 'where there's no church--unless he was able to make one'. Eunice replies, 'What I've been trying to give you all this time . . . poor folk's feeling for each other' (p. 61).<sup>55</sup> All the images and symbols are of that, the shared suffering, the shared endurance and acceptance, the shared hope; but the story does not try to tell whether there is further spiritual reality behind that sacred figure of the sufferer who told of the coming Kingdom.

Part of those associations or convictions aroused by the sling of the Mariner would be the idea of the Kingdom, the new way of love created in the name of the God who 'for us men and for our salvation . . .',<sup>56</sup> The 'truths of experience',<sup>57</sup> of which Lowes has spoken, 'the inexorable law of life',<sup>58</sup> concerning remorse and repentance, the falling away of the oppression and the continued suffering felt and accepted as penance: all this sequence expressed in the poem has lost through the poem's phantastic character 'all didactic value' (p. 300).<sup>59</sup>

Does 'didactic' here imply arousing resistance as imposed upon the hearer? The moral 'wrought', as Charles Lamb said, 'into the body and soul, the matter and tendency, of a poem' is not imposed; it

takes its being from the interaction of the phantastic story with the 'inward nature' and communicated associations of the reader and is for that reason more, not less, persuasive.<sup>60</sup>

When I am partly relieved of my half guilty sense of isolation by watching the birds drinking at the birdbath, the memory of the lonely Mariner's relief through the blessing of the water snakes does help me toward a condition in which I am sure of sustaining the burden of duty, the relationships that are dependent on the vicissitudes of inward growth.

Dec. 1. I have been trying to find what will best substantiate for me that picture N. Mitchison gives of the fellowship among the slaves of a store's household in Rome in the time of Nero. What best meets my desire is the article 'What Happened at Pentecost' by C. A. Anderson Scott (The Spirit, 1921). The writer suggests the primary result was the Fellowship ( Koinonia) some degree of which, an attitude in common of expectant faith was indeed the condition of the Coming.<sup>61</sup> Passages of critical importance are Acts ii. 42 translated to show the 'adherence' to 'the Fellowship'<sup>62</sup> as 'a new name for a new thing, community of spirit issuing in community of life' (p. 134).<sup>63</sup> Another is Paul's reference in Corinthians to the calling to 'the Fellowship of Christ', i.e. the Fellowship 'belonging to and named after Him',<sup>64</sup> and the passage, Phil. ii. 1, translated: 'If the Spirit has really created a Fellowship, if affection and tenderness are really its atmosphere, fulfil ye my joy' by showing it in word and deed (p. 139).<sup>65</sup>

The other passage whose interpretation by Scott specially interests me is that in Philemon where Paul prays that Philemon's 'faith-fellow-

At 'the breaking of bread' Manasses and Josias 'learnt how in the love feast all those eating together could be sure of the temporary experience of the kingdom and got from it enough faith to go on in a world that seemed utterly against them' (p. 49). Again it is as trust springs between two meeting that each knows 'the teaching of Jesus was not in vain' (Ib.).<sup>72</sup>

Jan. 5, 1953. 'Queer how good it made you feel, to be asked to help and to have the knowledge to do it. Exercise of power? No, hardly. But the same thing that made you a doctor'. This, from N. Mitchison's Lobsters on the Agenda, came to me as related to my problem of the imaginative communication of truth.<sup>73</sup> There is a flash of sympathy, a recognition: she has felt and wondered as I have, but found, not 'words' merely but a presented interaction of persons from which a reader may abstract, or rather feel, without abstracting, a pattern common to his own and the writer's experience; and there is the flash of communion that for a moment banishes the loneliness of individual experience.

This is a much humbler instance of communication than that of which Bridges was thinking when he wrote of astonishing the intellect with a new aspect of truth--are those the right words?<sup>74</sup> But the essential in the lesser and greater instance is the same. One's recalled experience is newly objectified. My pleasure in responding to Keppler's request for help with his thesis is illumined, at least comes more definitely into consciousness as recalled by the imagined satisfaction of Kate Snow at helping effectively Roddy MacRimmon in his predicament.<sup>75</sup> An 'exercise of power' the satisfying experience certainly is, but much more than that. It is an expression of the

individual's distinctive power and seems some sort of justification of his life and being, as in the eyes of God who desires--so it seems all men must believe--the harmony of helpfulness among his creatures.

Jan. 6. I am troubled that I have not found a conclusion for my article on imaginative communication.<sup>76</sup> I want to relate what I have said of the attribution of life to the brook, the attempt to penetrate the trails that are springs of action in other beings--all this to the truth felt in tragedy and other comprehensive portrayals of life. A world is portrayed by the tragic poet that has in it principles or springs of action which give it meaning in relation to the archetypal questings of humanity.

Jan. 9. Reading this morning (in an article by [J.] Stewart-Wallace, 'Vedanta and the West', The Hibbert Journal) how phenomena, Maya, can happily be treated 'as real for the purposes of our finite lives',<sup>77</sup> I was reminded of Margot's poem: X, the man for whom the requiem mass is celebrated, has been taken 'to creation's centre-point: / To know invincibly / Not whatso seems or may be / But what is'.<sup>78</sup> This is to state as certainty what for me is but a dubious hope or aspiration, and for Vedanta takes its place as a remote goal of long discipline. The content of more wide ranging intuition is in the lives that describe the phenomena of the man, wine, incense, water, bread, 'fussy actions', 'inaudible words', as instances of the things that are our only 'means to know, to see, to live with'.<sup>79</sup> That discipline by which according to Vedanta, the spirit may be freed is, turning from the world, subduing the little, jealous, grasping Ego,<sup>80</sup> in 'meditation and one-pointed concentration of body, mind and will', to seek after the Divine.<sup>81</sup> In the



prayer of the Catholic spirit the boy ringing the bell to bring us to our knees bends 'our human incapacity' to conceive 'the gap we have no means to bridge . . . crossed by the Creator-in-the-creature'.<sup>82</sup> As the light of the revelation 'flashes crucially / Invisible and still',<sup>83</sup> we pray for X, 'offering to God' our incorporation with his humanity,<sup>84</sup> so that for him and for ourselves alike the prayer goes up for enlightenment, for that divine calling into 'the Centre', 'the moment of eternity', such as came 'once, in a confusion of more and less', to the patriarchs of old.<sup>85</sup> My thought concerning the whole poem is how the imaginative communication of an individual truth, or faith, through poetry, ordered words, transcends those barriers which arrest communication when individuals try to meet in the cut and thrust of ordinary talk.

I think here of that complaint which to me was the most interesting passage in Karl Stern's The Pillar of Fire.<sup>86</sup> He writes of how the differing answers to the 'question whether Jesus of Nazareth was God incarnate . . . cuts into human ties'. When he tells his Jewish friends he has become a Christian 'a common world falls asunder';<sup>87</sup> [he] recalls how in one instance the polite exclamation 'Oh!' 'contained a cosmic abyss'.<sup>88</sup> Not perhaps an abyss but certainly a barrier intervenes between all Catholics and non-Catholics. All that Karl Stern has written to explain and justify his belief seems somehow to evade the real wide stretching range of difference in outlook between those who do and those who cannot conceive Jesus of Nazareth as God incarnate.

Jan. 10. Reading in [S.] Brandon's article 'Myth and the Gospel' (The Hibbert Journal, January) how among the early Christians,

the devotee was ritually identified with the Savior in his death and resurrection by means of the sacrament of baptism,<sup>89</sup> I recalled N. Mitchison's story of the baptising of Argas, the descent into the flooded river, icy cold though too quick running to freeze: three times as the water 'went over his head and tear-hot face he felt the cold and darkness of death'. Only the name of Jesus was with him [as he was] under the water and struggling back into lantern light and friendship.<sup>90</sup>

From Betty Miller's study of Robert Browning--finished today--I note her comment, for me relevant to my questioning concerning the relation of the creative to the other aspects of a self; 'confronted with the "loud, sound, normal hearty presence all so assertive and so whole, all bristling with prompt responses and expected opinions and usual views", it is impossible not to wonder, with Henry James, what conceivable lodgement on such premises the rich proud genius one adored could ever have contrived'.<sup>91</sup>

Jan. 11. I spoke, above, of the 'creative' self but 'apprehending' might be the better term for what I intend. The article by [W.] Inge on Russian Theology criticises [N.] Berdyaeff for suggesting that personality creates values. The ultimate values, says Inge, 'can be apprehended and lost, but never created by us'.<sup>92</sup> In their apprehension, or revelation, we cannot separate the apprehending from the spiritual reality apprehended but must keep in view the two poles of the experience, the encounter. The 'rich, proud genius' adored by Henry James in Browning is a vision of reality ordered in relation to the ultimate values handed on to an individual self that in turn orders and shapes it, in some degree distorting it through

characters that belong to the assertive ego in whom genius has its lodgment, though so little perhaps that the critic wonders at the purity of the communicated vision when he relates it to the wilful or conventional self of social intercourse.

Jan. 14. 'Man has places in his heart which do not yet exist, and into them enters suffering in order that they may have existence' (Léon Bloy). The End of the Affair, viewed as an imagined action equivalent to this saying, must have for me an interest I hardly recognized while reading.<sup>93</sup> In Sarah's diary there was a suggestion of that theme when she wonders, 'Was it really you I loved all the time?'<sup>94</sup> 'You might have killed us with happiness, but you let us be with you in pain'.<sup>95</sup> She sees the anger and jealousy of her lover, equally with his love working for the separation that left nothing but the 'love of you'.<sup>96</sup> It is the same thought that T. S. Eliot presents making Celia's self-abandonment in a trivial frustrating love precursor to the self abandonment of the love of God.<sup>97</sup> One could look back on the long frustration of a secluded lonely professional and domestic life as in its pain a preparation--not perhaps for the love but for the search, the longing, after God. One could think, in Léon Bloy's terms, that there has come into existence a realized desire where once at the beginning was only an unrealized 'place'.

Jan. 20. 'Where then, alas, may I complain myself?' / 'To God, the widow's champion and defence'. I have been searching for the context of this quotation--one of the familiar visitants of my mind in distress. I have just found it in Richard II: the loyal Gaunt refusing vengeance for his brother's death at the hands of his king,

the dead man's wife pleading for that vengeance in vain.<sup>98</sup> My individual context is the need for some friend to whom I might speak freely and with that the thought: if there were that divine compassion of which [F.] Powicke speaks: 'Is it possible that the human experience which we call history, at the moment, nay, as the very condition of its being, meet an infinite understanding, and come to rest in a divine compassion?'--if one could believe this, 'potently', not merely entertain it as a hypothesis and wish fulfilment, one might not then need such writing as this.<sup>99</sup> One could instead complain oneself to God in prayer.

When Mr. Neal Harrison spoke of his power to bear as a soldier on active service horrors far greater than those that in the passivity of a theatre or doctor's surgery would so affect his body as to cause fainting, I thought: is it comradeship--being one of an active group, or 'body' of men--that makes the difference? When Agnes complains so bitterly of the labour involved in the household fires and is only angry at the attempt on my part to help, I think the painful oppression that seems to make me incapable either of rest or any work of my own, is an effect like Mr. Harrison's fainting, because I am helpless and alone.<sup>100</sup> I seek relief in the doing of what is possible to me of the household labours, but no effort of mine can prevent the ill temper and complaining that chiefly make life burdensome to me. Such trivial misery it seems, yet that infinite understanding and compassion would meet and sustain one suffering even from such trivial-seeming causes.

Jan. 21. 'The thing on the blind side of the heart': that phrase comes to me in relation to what I wrote of yesterday. If that hope of which in my book I have written were indeed to be fulfilled,

and after death one might have some glimpse of the truth of one's individual life as in God's vision exists, then each of us might see something of what lies now 'on the blind side of the heart'.<sup>101</sup> I might see what now I cannot realize of a love that is hidden from me by my own reactions of nervous anxiety and distress at the impact of ill temper, and a sense of repellant ugliness. According to the beauty I feel in kindness and courtesy and generous understanding and respect for others, so keen and alienating my sense is of the ugliness of the opposites of these things. If one beset by habits of possessiveness and jealousy in love, and of contempt for modes of thought and feeling different from her own, and of letting loose the impulse to hurt when things go wrong, could see all these habits in their ugliness, and in the damage they do in human relationships, the effort could begin to clear them out of the way. But recourse to violent anger and self-justification whenever the blindness is challenged seems to me like that recourse to drink Paul Gallico presents his young airman as having whenever there came a clash between the attitudes, blind to so much, of his guarded boyhood and the terrible realities of the new life into which he had been plunged.<sup>102</sup> If the blindness and the habit of persistence in it is inevitable while life lasts, yet, in spite of it, the mutual forbearance in long association and the concern imperfect as it may be for the other's welfare, must in each of us have value, be worthy the name of love.

Jan. 24. Criticizing Martin Johnson (Philosophy // . . . //), H. D. Lewis suggests that he exaggerates the difference between art and science which consists in the requiring by art of 'a creative response which must differ from one individual to another'.<sup>103</sup> It is seeming to me just now that one can hardly exaggerate the significance of that



individual response. I recall T. S. Eliot speaking of an encounter with a poem that is like a falling in love.<sup>104</sup> It was so just now in the re-encountering of the poem by N. Mitchison, 'This is the Hour'.<sup>105</sup> As I reread it, the poem seems to take hold on both submerged and recent memories drawing them into synthesis with itself. Thus the lines, magic for me, 'allow the fleeting Thin hours to sweep his heart', draw up through the use there of the word 'thin', a memory, I think from Hassan,<sup>106</sup> of the 'thin shriek' of the tortured, the bracing of oneself to realize a little of the horror of human suffering now and in the past, and with it the thought of the experienced thinness, relative emptiness, of hours or days of one's own life, and acceptance of this as part, potentially, of the suffering that may turn to insight and fortitude, or that individuality Keats designated as the goal of suffering.<sup>107</sup>

But Lewis might be taken to mean is this such a great difference? Has not science also its aspect as requiring an individual creative response? 'Only if we know the truth about the world', says Julian Huxley in his Foreword to Konrad Lorenz' King Solomon's Ring, 'whether the world of physics . . . or of mind and behaviour, shall we be able to see what is our own true place in that world'. Such truths must be assimilated before we can reestablish 'our unity with nature while at the same time maintaining our transcendence over nature'.<sup>108</sup> As I read what Konrad tells of the different creatures he studied, his records, like the words of the poem, draw my own memories to meet them. 'Not only physical strength, but also personal courage, energy, and even the self-assurance of every individual bird are decisive in the maintenance of the pecking order'.<sup>109</sup> I remember long ago I

resented Miss Tremain's expression of regret at my 'painful diffidence'.<sup>110</sup> Now I can admit to myself such diffidence as unfitting me for that social struggle from which at college I faintheartedly retired.<sup>111</sup> That truth 'of mind and behaviour' realized between me and the scientist helps me to recognize my individual place in the social world. Less personally I recognize the parallels Konrad draws between men and animals--e.g. the inhibitions present in the victor among wolves and jackdaws, but not among roedeer and doves and peacocks, in regard to the defeated member of the species making the submissive gesture of vulnerability.<sup>112</sup> Any religious ideas of man's relation to good and evil in the universe must be subtly modified by assimilations of such thinking in evolutionary terms as Konrad offers. For me his observations confirm once again what I have deeply felt.

Jan. 25. Today I think I see a way through in my article to speak of that ideal of truth that goes beyond the scientist's ideal of statement universally valid.<sup>113</sup> If those who cannot accept as true the statements of any creed--true in the sense of uniquely revealed by God, beyond proof by human reason--could accept as true of human experience that pattern Keats experienced in the reading of King Lear, that would be something worth achieving through discourse.<sup>114</sup>

Jan. 26. Does not the above, on the face of it, seem foolish? As against [F.] Northrop, there seems some significance in my insistence that great poetry presents imaginatively a view of the human situation, which is beyond human power of investigation.<sup>115</sup> Yet such a view, presented as King Lear presents it with a note of triumph even in the power to survey or express the evil, is far removed from the confidence of the Christian Seinverständnis (see Brandon on

Bultmann, The Hibbert Journal, January).<sup>116</sup> Yet if it is true, as Brandon says Bultmann was 'led on to recognize, that to the first believers conviction came . . . through the experiences of the resurrection',<sup>117</sup> is not this equivalent to the assertion that they and we accept Christ Jesus as God and Saviour because we see his death and life continued in us, as in that fellowship we 'prove on our pulses', triumph over pain and death?<sup>118</sup> Is this not the essential tragic pattern? Can we not also term it the 'existential interpretation' of the Christian myth?

Jan. 30. In [C.] Joad's Recovery of Belief, I am glad of his seeming candour in confession. With his admission of difficulty in religious faith and sympathies, [he tells] how he must 'still speak in terms of plausible hypothesis' rather than of 'certain conviction' and 'confess to moments of disbelief, days of doubt and periods of absolute indifference' (p. 22).<sup>119</sup>

Feb. 4. I am interested in Joad's thought as one attempts to express the relation between the spiritual and physical order. 'Mind', says Joad, 'is brought into being in consequence' of a soul (or spirit, or Reason?) being incarnated, brought into contact with the natural temporal order (p. 203).<sup>120</sup> Joad describes the mind as 'a bundle of ideas',<sup>121</sup> while Whitehead, more adequately, speaks of a society of occasions, or actual entities with physical and mental poles, derivative relations and forward references to ideal oneness, or 'forms of definiteness', effective through their status in the primordial nature of God.<sup>122</sup> Joad, referring to Plato, indicates that he uses 'reason' to mean 'the whole personality . . . transfigured by the nature of its quest' (p. 19), that of the Forms, or ideals, beauty,

goodness, truth.<sup>123</sup> When he speaks of the soul as 'a region normally inaccessible to consciousness' (p. 203),<sup>124</sup> I relate this to the saying that 'Man has spirit, only in that he is addressed by God'.<sup>125</sup> Only as I am aware of an ideal order transcending the instinctive animal order, am I conscious of the soul (Ib.); and it is as 'addressed by God' the knower 'enlarged and enriched by the nature of that upon which his cognition is directed' (p. 101), that the knowing mind transcends the brain, in which also the knower is immanent (p. 194).<sup>126</sup>

In Paul Gallico's The Lonely, as in novels of Ann Bridge, I seem to find illustration of the saying of D. H. Lawrence about the novel leading our sympathetic consciousness 'into new places' and away 'from things gone dead',<sup>127</sup> and my own view of the novel as to the reader an 'instrument for the discovery of his own truth' (Archetypal Patterns, p. 299).<sup>128</sup> The protagonist of Gallico's novel, after distress and vacillation, achieves new knowledge and a decision, 'clear vision', of 'the power and the terror of love', the love that had come alive between himself and the girl who had gone away with him when he knew only an idea of love accepted from a hard careless man.<sup>129</sup> The truth he believed he had found was that to refuse what further fulfillment was possible of this new 'physical and spiritual relationship', 'would be something evil and a sin', even though with this fulfillment must go acceptance of a burden of guilt from the bringing to certain others of hurt and pain.<sup>130</sup> My own faith is that such an individual, or 'personal' decision may be an act of obedience to the divine persuasion which operates between the I and Thou, the conditioned, incarnate spirit or Deity. To Charlotte Bronte, writing



Jane Eyre, it seemed that obedience to God must mean obedience to the moral law concerning marriage and adultery as formulated by the Anglican church.<sup>131</sup> For many minds today that belief has 'gone dead', as compared with a sincere, though venturesome, valuation of new possibilities of human relation.

Feb. 25. Thinking of the novel leading consciousness into new places brings the thought must the mind so led be equipped beforehand with the impulse to be led? Is the impulse to question and criticize one's experience a contribution that the spirit makes over and beyond what emotional and conative equipment is supplied by inherited brain and environment? When I so experience a novel as to relate it consciously to my own life and outlook is my spirit seeking to transcend the limitations of its past and its heredity? Looking just now at my own inadequate reference to Cry the Beloved Country I thought how a closer reading made me feel more keenly the beauty of the relation of the old pastor to the companion of his painful quest and to the father and the young son of the murdered man.<sup>132</sup> Is it, can I say, the spirit in me--the 'I' that can question and criticize the apathetic reluctant 'heart'--that is quickened to will more depth and meaning into the few personal relations possible to me?

March 4. A subject I should like to pursue further is 'delayed' or inhibited awareness. The presence of this is suggested by such dream analysis as Jung and his followers practise, e.g. the dream of the two-edged sword by Mr. Weekes' patient.<sup>133</sup> Does the analyst, through 'the unconscious', stimulate the patient's self-criticism? May a novel perform the same function? Or can it happen through prayer? Would there be a notable difference in the moral effect of



the 'good' and of the inferior novel through the differing operation of the diffused symbolism on the unconscious (c.f. Henn, // . . . //)?<sup>134</sup>

Can one use a poem or play, deeply experienced, as a means of quickening one's own true, though partially obstructed awareness, of oneself in all one's relationships? Is this the 'burning through' of which Keats writes?<sup>135</sup>

March 11. The 'diffused symbolism' of The Midnight Diary (Michael Burn) has had a certain effect on me, together with the continual slight pain in my head. The protagonist, Irene Mannheim, reviewing her own shadowed frustrated life, finds it not necessitated merely but as she 'would have wished', <sup>136</sup> in so far as she has tried to 'do kindness', where she could, and has come to believe in something not to be put with dogma above these in their uncertainty, yet concerned with New Testament teaching and with that care for individuals which Nazis and Communists alike repudiate.<sup>137</sup> As one's powers and interests decline, in the surrender to old age, some comfort, or meaning, like this remains.

March 18. Coming today upon [W.] Empson's statement concerning conscience in Macbeth that Macbeth's overpowering sense of the evil of his deeds seems to rise 'from the unconsciousness or his political imagination', 'a region distant from explicit religion'--has sent me back to my own attempts to express intimations coming to us from our literary heritage that suggest answers to archetypal questionings and help us to sustain us in living worthily.<sup>138</sup>

March 22. From the talk yesterday with Margot Adamson--at first obstructed, laborious, and later desultory--there yet returns to me something of real communication. She accepted as an indication of

'the unicorn' she had been pursuing my statement about the contrast between the superficial and the deeper vision; and what just now came back to me, the reference to the phrase 'more or less' as a key word, a term enriched by its use in her Requiem poem, should, I think, have meant something to her.

On the Wireless just now the speaker, William Clark, came through to me as he urged that we, private persons, had amoral duty to study and judge the political happenings of which our papers tell us, from the standpoint of those desiring that international cooperation, human brotherhood should replace national interest and international jungle-law.<sup>139</sup> That 'more or less' of which Margot's poem says we, after death, shall 'fearfully know the balance' is a phrase that applies as one thinks of the little possible to the private person who cares that his political representative should work sincerely toward world order and human brotherhood, but is daunted by his helplessness in face of issues so complicated and obscure.<sup>140</sup> Have I, through cowardice and sloth done less than I could have done in this as in other matters toward contributing my mite to the total of public conscience, human good will?

March 24. It came to me this morning that I would like to write, perhaps discourse rather, under the title The Life of Words in Poetry. Actually at the moment I was thinking not of poetry but of 'the mental word', 'cooperation', naming an ideal of relationship between nations, far, alas! from reality, but the more shining for its remoteness--that word applied, making 'more not less' of the routine of domestic activities. I thought, then, of the phrase 'more or less' enriched by Margot's poem and, presently, of the phrase 'flashes of comprehension'

as a key word in J. M. Cohen's discussion of Browning's poetry (Men and Books series, Longmans, Green and Company, 1952).<sup>141</sup> 'Organization',<sup>142</sup> 'intellectual',<sup>143</sup> 'large scale poetic',<sup>144</sup> are other terms used by him to indicate qualities neglected, he considers, by contemporary critics. On that favorite word of mine, 'idiom', a suggestive observation is Cohen's comment on 'Love in a Life', that 'it contains hardly any of those archaisms and inversions that trouble our contemporary ear' (p. 104).<sup>145</sup> The quotation from K. Raine on 'subjective universality' that the poet must 'participate in the unconscious and half-conscious imaginings of the community', is suggestive in regard to that question of the idiom which a writer must use to gain access to a particular class of readers.<sup>146</sup> The sentence that caught me just now--'Recessive rather than dominant, he remains nevertheless an ancestor' (p. 190), of Browning's influence on contemporary poetry, is an apt example of the enrichment of literary speech through scientific discovery.<sup>147</sup> A quotation from the Pope's monologue illustrating that voice given to doubt in Browning's work, offers me a passage to stand with Tennyson's cry returning to me so often:<sup>148</sup> 'I put no such dreadful questions to myself / Within whose circle of experience burns / I must outlive a thing ere know it dead . . .'.<sup>149</sup> We believe of God, the Pope reflects, that he 'undertook to make and made the world / Devised and did effect man, body and soul, / Ordained salvation for them both and yet . . . . Well, is the thing we see salvation?'<sup>150</sup>

March 29. The discussion by John S. Smart of 'fortune' in his study of 'Tragedy', Essays and Studies by Members of the English Association, Oxford, vol. VIII, 1922), offers me another instance of the life

of words in poetry. Smart exhibits examples of Shakespeare's use of the word and comments that Shakespeare perceived that the ideas of Fate and of Responsibility have each in them 'something of truth: that both correspond to indubitable realities of life' (p. 13).<sup>151</sup> (It is such realities that my study of truths concentrated in poetry concerned with--truths recognized in such large indefinable wholes as the course of human life in all its obscure complexity.) The word 'fortune', as singled out from collected passages of Shakespeare's plays, lifts into prominence 'something arbitrary and irrational in human experience' (p. 12)<sup>152</sup> as other passages illustrate the idea of firmness to endure 'Fortune's buffets',<sup>153</sup> and alertness to seize the gifts, the opportunities she offers.<sup>154</sup> There is truth, relevant I think to my study, in Smart's observation that poets 'are more often satisfied with fragmentary and vivid glimpses of reality; but the philosophers seek to survey all things and coordinate them' (p. 16).<sup>155</sup> His example is Hegel justifying tragedy as illustrating the one principle of responsibility.

For an illustration of tragedy in fiction Smart suggests Trollope's Mr. Crawley offering Crawley's talk to his daughter about the classic stories of blind giants' great power reduced to impotence. Impotence 'with the memory of former strength and former aspirations is so essentially tragic'.<sup>156</sup> Crawley is a tragic figure in his suffering because he is 'instinct with life and energy' (p. 28).<sup>157</sup> So far the 'significance of human life' comes to contemplation, as it must in true tragedy.<sup>158</sup> Inadequate I feel Smart's illustrations and conclusion: yet there is value in his recourse at the end of his study to the tragic poet's 'power to suggest something illimitable' (p. 36).<sup>159</sup>



April 3. It is in my mind to illustrate the life of words in poetry by the wide-open word 'take'--wide-open to all influences from the many contexts in which it can appear. Dictionary definition begins with 'lay hold of', noting that this may be literal or figurative. I might start from the phrase 'give and take' in its casual use: 'give and take in family life'; 'gentlemen must learn to give and take'. Regarding the phrase more seriously one discerns a relationship between terms of infinite significance. Here one might let in that old meaning 'draw to oneself', captivate, 'take my fancy': 'no fairy takes' of the holy Christmas season, in Hamlet, and 'fair daffodils that take the winds of March in beauty'.<sup>160</sup> Then there may be emphasis on the more serious or disastrous aspect of what is received or taken: the stoic attitude 'We can take it', (cf. Bonamy Dobrée Clark lectures for 1953 on 'great impersonal themes' in English poetry),<sup>161</sup> the phrase 'taken the knock' in [J.] Galsworthy's Man of Property,<sup>162</sup> the change from the lighter to the darker meaning in Rossetti's 'A Last Confession': 'Take it', I said, and held it out to her--the little knife with hilt of horn and pearl, the parting gift--'Take it and keep it for my sake', I said (p. 33). Then later, 'Take it', I said to her the second time, 'Take it and keep it'.<sup>163</sup> 'And then came a fire . . . For she took the knife / Deep in her heart, even as I bade her then, / And fell . . .'.<sup>164</sup> Does there not breathe from the word here all the terrible significance of the taking or failing to take what is offered within human relationship--the blaming or the curse that comes of taking or failing to take what another has to give? Should one add a reference to the solemn words of the communion service, Take, eat, this is my body that is given for you? With Saxon 'take' I could



compare Latin 'appropriate', dictionary definition, take to oneself, yet note the different character of the words: the one open to every influence of content the other relatively hard-shelled, unbending: dignified in a proper context but easily made to seem a little pompous and ridiculous. 'Jesus took unto him the twelve disciples' (Luke xviii. 31); to appropriate a person, a disciple, could be an act only mildly resented, mocked at.

Reading today The Old Wives' Tale I have felt with pleasure the maturity of Bennett's writing. 'At the level of "our daily life in time" (E. M. Forster's phrase) The Old Wives' Tale, it seems to me, (says Walter Allen in Arnold Bennett, Home and Van Thal, Ltd., 1948) is in all essentials unassailable' (p. 65).<sup>165</sup> Bennett, says W. A., 'already preoccupied with the theme of age, with the fact that young girls grow old', found this theme 'vitalised . . . into a compulsive image' by the spectacle in the restaurant of the funny old woman waited on by an exceptionally beautiful girl' (p. 63).<sup>166</sup> Allen cites instances bringing out the contrast of youth and age: 'the monumental matron' whose face is creased by years of joy and disillusion and the slim girl, 'so fresh, so virginal, so ignorant with all the pathos of an unsuspecting victim about to be sacrificed to the Minotaur of Time'.<sup>167</sup> The novel, Allen suggests, using the theme and contrast that 'belong to the oldest material of lyric poetry' is in 'final effect' poetic (p. 66).<sup>168</sup> Of 'the tone of facetious irony' that is oftener employed here than in the earlier serious novels, Allen suggests it may be due to a half apologetic sense that the characters through whom he is working out his high theme are provincial, absurd (p. 40).<sup>169</sup> The novel, Allen says, transcribing 'faithfully', 'surely', 'the

rhythm of ordinary normal life', is 'a triumph of style, when style is understood as 'a unifying agent' between the writer and his subject-matter.<sup>170</sup> 'It is Bennett's achievement . . . that his style can range without discordance and incongruity from the farcial, the trivial and the grotesque to the most gravely serious' (p. 43).<sup>171</sup>

April 11. From Reginald Pound's Arnold Bennett only one note: Bennett speaks of the 'effect' of The Old Wives' Tale as 'pretty stiff--when you begin to think things over. It isn't in many books that you can see people growing old'.<sup>172</sup>

From [O.] Barfield's Poetic Diction (Faber, 1928), first the quotation from Santayana: 'the volume and intensity of some appreciations, especially when nothing of the kind has preceded, makes them authoritative over our subsequent judgments'. 'Tomes of aesthetic criticism', says Barfield, 'hang on a few moments of real delight and intuition' (p. 28).<sup>173</sup> From Emerson (Nature, 'Language'), Barfield quotes man 'is placed in the centre of beings and a ray of relation passes from every other being to him'. These relations, as between the awakening of natural life in spring and the release of the human spirit, are apprehended first as one 'immediate reality' and later as a communion between distinct realities inner and outer.<sup>174</sup>

As an instance of the sentence that startles and haunts, 'making' or enriching meaning,<sup>175</sup> Barfield gives the two lines from a love-sonnet by E. L. Davison: 'I stood before thee, calling twice or thrice / The ruin of thy soft, bewildering name'.<sup>176</sup> Partly it was this passage, Barfield says, 'which first interested me in the word's (ruin's) poetic history'. Of 'ruin' the soul, in Maupassant's sense, is inseparable from motion, 'swift, natural movement'.<sup>177</sup> Of Horace's lines, Si fractus illabatur orbis Impavidum ferient ruinae, Barfield says

'the world is still falling when the stanza ends'.<sup>178</sup> He quotes Chaucer in The Knight's Tale making Saturn boast 'Mine is the ruin of the high halls / the falling of the towers and of the walls'.<sup>179</sup> He quotes Milton preserving the old content in 'the terrific phrase', 'Hell saw Heaven ruining from Heaven'.<sup>180</sup> Of the significance of 'ruin' in that line that is Barfield's starting point I should suggest the lover is amazed, bewildered, to find other interests and values falling from him shattered as he calls the name of his lady. One must show how, as Maupassant says, the soul of the word 'appears at the contact of other words'. It is here the words 'soft', 'bewildering', that give to 'ruin' its soul of meaning. The lover wonders that so gentle a thing as the name of his lady should as he calls upon it cause other values to fall from him as it were shattered, made worthless.

April 16. An instance of that life of words in poetry that has been in my thought lately, is the horrible substitution, by the writer in The Hibbert Journal, of 'hot' for 'proud' in Housman's line. 'Proud and angry' are so fundamentally the right words to qualify that 'dust' that is the mortal spirit's intimate opposite.<sup>181</sup> 'Proud', beside, is a word on which the stress of the line falls rightly. 'Hot' beside dragging 'dust' back onto a sunbaked road cannot, rightly, bear such stress. Can it ever? I recall the lines from 'The Immortal Hour', but first might note the soul's dusty answer 'when hot for certainties'. Here there is stress, yet a kind of quick panting stress, on the little short vowelled word. In the lines, 'to touch, The Whiteness of Your hand with his hot lips', stress of meaning is on the word that here surprises. It is not Midir but

Eochaidh who is 'fevered with a secret trouble and contrasts that heat or human pain and longing with the hand coldly white like the mountain in its white remoteness above the hot plain.<sup>182</sup> One other homely word gaining magic in poetry is the 'dressed' of Housman's perfect comment on the business of dressing as viewed by one reluctantly wakening, and again appearing charged with more tragic association: 'My friends are up and dressed and dying; and I will dress and die'.<sup>183</sup>

April 25. Bruce Marshall's story--The Fair Bride--of the priest who, seeing the triviality in the outlook of his colleagues and in part moved by common cowardice, joins the opponents of Franco, should be of interest. Yet I disliked it as I read. Something in the squalor and cruelty depicted came to me as a truth that must be faced. A sentence arrested me: 'The old world had done so much to the militia men that they could not be astonished for long that the new world was doing even worse things'.<sup>184</sup> Accepting the remorseless continuance day after day of things from which one prays involuntarily to be delivered--accepting these stoically as the militia--one suffers less. In the image of the priest in the midst of horror coming to mediate the divine compassion there is a glimpse of beauty; 'He knelt down with the blessing on his lips before he looked. Christ whose hands had been torn . . . understood'.<sup>185</sup>

April 26. I seem to be tired of the effort to make some kind of consistent theory regarding the contradictory elements of our experience. [G.] Stout, in his God and Nature (Cambridge University Press, 1952) after quoting James on 'the conception of the Eternal Mind struggling to penetrate an alien and obstructive physical barrier',



rejects this, affirming that 'matter is eternally and completely controlled by mind' (p. 241).<sup>186</sup> Whatever theoretic contradiction may be entailed by the obstruction hypothesis, this hypothesis is for me essential in view of the horrors that must not be attributed to God, if God is to be regarded as good, in some sense intelligible to us.

May 26. Taking account of values of rest and change, I am yet inclined to rate the cost of a holiday as somewhat high for these values. Still there are sudden recurrences of places I like in Bournemouth. Perhaps my most vivid experience was the reading of Hemingway's [The] Old Man and the Sea. I enjoyed the bareness of the speech used, the force and simplicity of the words. What stands out in that bareness is the inevitability of struggle and of pain suffered and unflinched. One relates, as one reads, the image of the conflict between the old man and his world to the more obscured conflict in the world of one's individual experience. The attitude of the old man toward the creatures of the sea has the compassion, and thoughtfulness that makes it intimate, while yet his cruelty that belongs to his vocation as a fisherman teaches or illustrates the lesson that Hemingway, I imagine, has learnt thoroughly though with reluctance. The old man 'liked to think about all the things he was involved in'. He loved the fish, his brother: 'If you love him it is not a sin to kill him. Or is it more?' But there are enough problems without sin. Also I have no understanding of it'. He killed the fish, he thought, not only to live but 'for pride' and 'because I am a fisherman'.<sup>187</sup> For these values in the final struggle, feeling faint, he knows 'I am not good for many more turns'. Then



'Yes you are', he told himself; 'you're good forever', and speaks to his failing hands and head: 'Pull, hands. Hold up, legs. Last for me, head'.<sup>188</sup> Earlier in the long struggle, when the stars came out the old man thinks they are his friends. 'The fish is my friend too', he said aloud. 'But I must kill him. I am glad we do not have to try to kill the stars'.<sup>189</sup>

May 27. I value in the tale that sense of oneness with the creatures that theology seems, in a way, to ignore. That 'ideal condition' of man, in harmony with God and the natural environment, the 'Eden-archetype' of which I was reading this morning in Victor White's God and the Unconscious (Harvill Press, 1952) is incongruous with the awareness Hemingway's tale illustrates of the natural environment's inevitable conflict, and the outrage it inflicts on human tenderness.<sup>190</sup> How far, I wonder, does this incongruity I feel between religious images theologically interpreted and present-day experience affect their value for us? In Victor White's chapter on 'The Dying God', I appreciate his insistence that images associated with 'the dying God' produced in dream and phantasy by modern men do play a part in moulding character and behaviour, transforming energy (p. 222).<sup>191</sup> I like what V. W. says of his own reaction as a boy to a popularization of results of Frazer's researches: 'The Christian Scriptures and the Catholic rites to which I was accustomed gained a quality and a sense of which my pastors and catechism had told me nothing; a sense of solidarity with creation, with the processes of nature, with the cycles of the seasons', as well as with 'humanity as a whole' (p. 223).<sup>192</sup> The difference V. W. asserts between the Christian and pagan belief is in the historical and final character

predicated of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ by the Christian believer. If one does not and cannot accept this, the Gospel story is left as one expression amongst others of a pattern related to the actual--so related as to admit of modification in accordance with changes or diversities of individual outlook upon the actual. When there is poignant awareness of incompatibility, conflict between the cruel order of nature and the harmony, the loving kindness, between sentient beings that belongs to the archetype of the Divine, then that archetype must find expression in imagery that distinguishes deity as the ground of the universe from deity as giver of Grace, the Helper and Friend of man, the Thou addressed in prayer, who dies to the predatory cruel world and rises again in love.

May 29. John Strachey's The Frontiers interests me as expressing 'a suggestion--in dialogue form--of the fundamental objection which I had formed (in 1941) to the totalitarian outlook in general and to the communist view of world development in particular'. 'It was I who had the conversation with Portella Valladares at the meeting of the Spanish Cortes' (Preface, 1951).<sup>193</sup> The story 'the Abbé' gives of this meeting in his conversation with Nordenac (Laval) is critical to the discussion. His feeling at the time was that 'the Spanish government could not win';<sup>194</sup> that Valladares should have refused the offer of Franco to support him, after electoral defeat, by arms, refused it 'in all simplicity, because he thought that it was wrong', seemed 'one of the strangest events in the history of our times'. 'Of course Valladares had no conception of the consequences of his actions. . . . He did what he did in blind integrity'.<sup>195</sup> In further

conversation the Abbé says of Marx: 'Without him one cannot even be wrong; one cannot enter the discussion. But with him one can still be very wrong. He is the beginning'.<sup>196</sup> Of religion the Abbé says: 'I do not know if it is opium and . . . whether, if it is, I disapprove of opium'.<sup>197</sup> Quoting Marx further: 'Religion is the sign of the hard-pressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, as it is the soul of soulless circumstance' and he wrote this 'a German undergraduate in the eighteen forties'.<sup>198</sup> But the point we have reached is: do we any longer need 'the Valladares type of conduct'?<sup>199</sup> His answer is that we still need 'the old rules and standards' because we cannot 'place much confidence' in our forecasts of consequences. We can therefore 'give a certain independent weight to our historically established code of conduct', 'distilled out of the whole experience of the race', to those actions that 'feel right' though we do not give 'uncritical allegiance'.<sup>200</sup> Thus, moved by what seemed to him the irrational hopeless resistance of British bombers to Hitler, the Abbé refuses collaboration and perishes, seeing no conceivable gain yet holding 'that does not mean there will be no gain'.<sup>201</sup>

June 6. In Edward Thompson's [An] End of the Hours I find this passage: 'Within himself he grew ever more conscious of a withdrawal of strength and zest--The thrift of our great mother, calling back / Her forces'.<sup>202</sup> Yesterday I was very conscious of such a feeling; the talk and the writing I used to enjoy seems now too many vain words. Such domestic duties as preserve for one a measure of independence and a pottering in the garden that preserves some contact with living things seems the best occupation for the days of these last

conversation the Abbé says of Marx: 'Without him one cannot even be wrong; one cannot enter the discussion. But with him one can still be very wrong. He is the beginning'.<sup>196</sup> Of religion the Abbé says: 'I do not know if it is opium and . . . whether, if it is, I disapprove of opium'.<sup>197</sup> Quoting Marx further: 'Religion is the sign of the hard-pressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, as it is the soul of soulless circumstance' and he wrote this 'a German undergraduate in the eighteen forties'.<sup>198</sup> But the point we have reached is: do we any longer need 'the Valladares type of conduct'?<sup>199</sup> His answer is that we still need 'the old rules and standards' because we cannot 'place much confidence' in our forecasts of consequences. We can therefore 'give a certain independent weight to our historically established code of conduct', 'distilled out of the whole experience of the race', to those actions that 'feel right' though we do not give 'uncritical allegiance'.<sup>200</sup> Thus, moved by what seemed to him the irrational hopeless resistance of British bombers to Hitler, the Abbé refuses collaboration and perishes, seeing no conceivable gain yet holding 'that does not mean there will be no gain'.<sup>201</sup>

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years. I recalled a verse that Thompson quotes--'A body for my needs that so / I may not all unclothed go, / A vital instrument whereby / I still may commune with the sky, / When death has loosed the plaited strands / And left me feeling for the lands'.<sup>203</sup>

The body, even in its stiffening and decay, remains an instrument for communing with other material or incarnate things. I, separated by some sort of psychic 'glass wall' from other persons, find some relief from frustration in contact: little alyssum seedlings, little growing asters and stocks that I try to free from smothering seeding forgetmenots. (At night their images returned to me with obtrusive vividness).

I liked the definition I found quoted in today's Statesman from E. L. Allen's Existentialism from Within: 'Existentialism is an attempt at philosophising from the standpoint of the actor instead of, as has been customary, from that of the spectator'.<sup>204</sup> I have been spectator so much more than actor; that perhaps throws the emphasis now on even such trivial action as I have referred to--decision for or against one or another plant life. Thompson's book--which on the whole I found dull--describes the effort of one who 'had been caught up into the full tide of a great missionary age' and now disillusioned, tries to come to terms with a surly world and with troubled ghosts within his own mind. His dying friend's belief is in a God who strives to spread abroad love and pity through all worlds, and who believes that Christianity must return to its basis: 'If religious people are wise they'll concentrate on proving the Love of God credible in a world such as we know it is'.<sup>205</sup> That seems to me true. As I potter in the garden the weeds springing so fiercely, even the plants we favour ramping,



rushing to their business of propagation, overpowering weakly neighbors, seem all a type of 'the world as we know it is' in which there is scant place for love and pity.

I heard L. P. Hartley on the Wireless yesterday talking on the modern novel. He contrasted it with the older type: Richardson, Dickens, where the author had no sympathy for the villains of his tale. Now the favoured note is compassion for the wicked no less than for the good. Darwin and Freud, Flaubert and Henry James have cooperated to make us care for truthful portrayal of evil in its causation and so of the evildoer as victim equally with those he harms.<sup>206</sup>

June 24. 'I can read it like a thirsty man drinking' (J. D. Scott in New Statesman and Nation).<sup>207</sup> That saying I took as expression of the indefinable character in a narrative that makes it strong and its every detail significant to a reader. Something of that character I found in E. Bowen's To the North (1932) and at first what interested me most was to discover what in its texture, in the 'diffused symbolism' or in particular analogies employed, specially appealed to me. As diffused symbolism I reckoned the attraction attributed throughout to 'the North' as cold and solitary negation of warm human life and emotion. In the man that attraction, much mixed with other modes of feeling, yet is recognized in his response to the uncaringness, the aloofness of the woman: 'some elusiveness underlying her generosity, something she still withheld unawares, renewed the hunter in him, restoring to love what compliance might have destroyed; its mobility'.<sup>208</sup> Yet the 'exaltation at all times latent in her regard and, so great a part of her passion, likely to spring out at any time, alarmed, irked

and often fatigued him. He had still the sense, as after that first night in Paris, of having been overshot' (pp. 244-5).<sup>209</sup> Another description of the man's feeling I took as a particular instance of an analogy--developed maybe at too great length--that yet appealed to me: With Emmeline on the terrace outside Sacré Coeur, Maurice is oppressed by a 'kind of suction' from his idea of a church.<sup>210</sup> 'The edge of his mind was restless with superstition; like natives before the solid advance of imperial forces, aspiration, feeling, all sense of the immaterial had retreated in him before reason to some craggyhinterland where, having made no terms with the conqueror, they were submitted to no control and remained a menace. Like savages coming to town on a fair day to skip and chaffer, travestying their character in strange antics, creating by their very presence a saturnalia in which the conqueror may unbend, feeling crept out in him from some unmapped region. His brain held his smallish, overclear view of life in its rigid circle' (p. 204).<sup>211</sup>

The value of this for me seems connected with some dim memory of medieval saints in England oppressed by phantastic images based on incursions of savages from the marches of Wales; also I recall a sonnet telling of fears inherited from infancy--fear of the 'somewhat wont to pass along the plashy marge of my noble consciousness'. Would such childish terrors be in any fashion a 'sense of the immaterial'? In its place the developed image has value since the man's attraction to the woman is, in part, like hers, attraction to something new and beyond the limits of overaccustomed life. His feeling for her has crept out from an uncharted region. His rigid conscious self is afraid. 'She had, he saw, stepped in Paris clear of the every-day of conduct with

its guarantees and necessities, into the region of the immoderate, where we are more than ourselves. Here are no guarantees. Tragedy is the precedent: 'Tragedy confounding life in its masterful disproportion' (p. 248).<sup>212</sup> In the woman the element for which the North is a symbol is described by the above passage in one of its forms. The North, like the elation of tragedy, of tragic surrender 'confounds life'--as [J.] Buchan's Sick Heart River, for one example, brings out powerfully.<sup>213</sup>

It was this character of Emmeline's passion for the man, pure in her, it seems to me, from any self-seeking, that made the epithet 'selfish' applied to her by Margot seem to me so surprising, so shocking--a falsification of a truth pervading our whole literary tradition. Meditating on this I turned to Goethe's Faust and to Croce's finding in the prison scene the clue to the meaning of the whole: 'the birth of a soul where formerly there was only instinct and sense':<sup>214</sup> this birth traced through that first 'moral recognition of herself'<sup>215</sup> in the scene at the well, where recognizing sin she yet 'distinguishes from it the love whose goodness she cannot doubt' (Archetypal Patterns in Poetry, p. 209).<sup>216</sup> Surely it is the selflessness of such instinctive surrender, with its sense of fatality: 'I could not speak and my eyes failed. . . . I knew nothing / Looking into the heart of light, the silence'--that makes the surrender an image, a possible foretaste of surrender to the Divine.<sup>217</sup>

The passage in The Waste Land directs me to Celia in The Cocktail Party: Celia who first in the experience of Peter passed from being 'a name in a society column' to a giver of strange tranquillity: 'moments in which we seemed to share some perception,/Some feeling,

some indefinable experience /In which we were both unaware of ourselves',<sup>219</sup> 'my first experience of reality'.<sup>220</sup> The Celia shown trying to persuade Edward to break with his wife for her sake seems inadequate as compared with Emmeline's consent to be esteemed 'ruined',<sup>221</sup>--even though Celia confesses to having 'lived in a present / Where time was meaningless'.<sup>222</sup> In that dream Edward for Celia was 'a projection' of something aspired to:<sup>223</sup> also she seemed to be both giving and receiving 'so much': 'the giving and the taking seemed so right: not in terms of the calculation /Of what was good for the persons we had been / But for the new person us'.<sup>224</sup> As to the treasure sought and never found, 'Why do I feel guilty at not having found it?',<sup>225</sup> 'I think I really had a vision of something' for which 'I could do without everything / Put up with anything'.<sup>226</sup> Like Gretchen and like Celia, Emmeline looking back on her ecstasy feels it must have had meaning, pointed to some reality: Recalling her happiness that like the sun changed everything--'All that can't have been for nothing; it can't just have been a deception. I still think there must have been meant to have been something more' (p. 320).<sup>227</sup>

June 28. Today, made impatient as I listened to the moderator of the International Congregational Council saying on the Wireless that Christians are like men who see in a society of the blind, challenged 'they know', I question is that assurance experienced by a few like that mistaken assurance described by E. Bowen--Emmeline's 'deep and innocent presumption that they were each for the other?'<sup>228</sup> That difficult faith sustained, with intermittances, by the will that there is in the world some divine meaning might be the common element in all these motions of the spirit. The passionate surrender to a



man of a Gretchen or a Celia can pass into an equally assured and passionate surrender to God, while perhaps the torn and doubtful reaching out of another nature may pass into a relation to the Divine similar in blind but persistent groping.

Before I let go of E. Bowen's novel I want to note passages that most vividly suggest the symbolism of 'the North': 'ice and unbreathed air, lights whose reflections since childhood had brightened or chilled her sky, touching to life at all points a sense of unshared beauty--reclaimed her for its clear solitude'.<sup>229</sup> That passage looks back to the early morning when the 'idea of pleasure as isolated, arctic, regarding its own heart only, became desolating [ . . . ] as a garden whose flowers were ice. Those north lights colouring the cold flowers became her enemies; her heart warming or weakening she felt at war with herself inside this cold zone of solitude. She desired lowness and fallibility, longing to break the mirror and touch the earth' (p. 145).<sup>230</sup>

My other chosen passage looks back to Emmeline's exaltation in the plane on the way to Paris when 'she watched trees or fields in the blue June haze take on that immaterial loveliness, that foreign and clear intensity, one expects of the sky' (p. 184).<sup>231</sup> At the end: 'Like a shout from the top of a bank, like a loud chord struck on the dark, she saw "To the North" written black on white, with a long black immovably flying arrow. Something gave way. An immense idea of departure--expresses getting steam up and crashing from termini, liners clearing the docks, the shadows of planes rising, caravans winding out into the first dip of the desert--possessed her spirit, now launched like the long arrow. The traveller solitary with his uncer-



tainties, with apprehensions he cannot communicate, seeing the strands of the known snap like paper ribbons, is sustained and more than himself on a great impetus; the faint pain of parting sets free the heart. . . . Like earth shrinking and sinking, irrelevant, under the rising wings of a plane, love with its unseen plan, its constrictions and urgencies, dropped to a depth below Emmeline, who now looked down unmoved at the shadowy map of her pain' (p. 326).<sup>232</sup>

July 12. A Sunday reading from William Law has set my thought in motion. He wrote of the contrast between that Kingdom of God for which we pray and the world we know, and declared its evil all due to the perversity of man alienated from God.<sup>233</sup> I thought he and those who repeat such sayings are as blind to what their senses could show them of the subhuman world as were those who in medieval times took blindly their idea of it from Aristotle. When one recognizes fully as evil the blind callousness of nature, what effect must that have on one's total outlook? For one thing, the recognition distinguishes two senses of evil as blind or seeing: seeing when the creature has attained an idea of self, can conceive the I-Thou relation, and so choose to act in accordance with or ignoring it.

In Alexander Baron's tragic short story, 'Old Beethoven', I recognize a poignant image of the birth of a soul, though the I-Thou relation, if it enters, is implicit only. The young soldier, who was haunted by the memory of Beethoven's 'lovely bloody music' whose voice grew 'awake with pain' at the thought<sup>234</sup>--amidst all the distressful squalor of trenches--of all these many tunes and instruments making 'one big tune',<sup>235</sup> 'thundering away' inside the head of one man who was deaf and could not hear it. That young soldier standing upright 'look-

ing out over the parapet as if beyond the dismal plain was appearing all the bright beauty of the world he had never seen' and never would<sup>236</sup> --glimpsed, it seems to me, the Kingdom of God that is a new life on what we must call a 'higher plane' where a harmony known intuitively in music or other form of art must be realized deliberately and laboriously in the sphere of personal relations.

Again, that thought of blind good and evil in the subhuman world seems to illumine such a story as E. Bowen's To the North. If the animal world is not created as good but only influenced by the Power that speaks to man as the Divine Persuasion, that selflessness tender or passionate that appears in the natural expression of sex and motherhood would be blind images of the concern for another self that becomes possible to self-conscious man. It would be a first working of the Divine Persuasion where morality is still unborn.

July 15. A sentence from The Human Kind has returned to me as significant: it is concerning a doctor 'forcing' his patient 'to define and clarify what experience had taught him instead of letting it gather like a fog inside his head'.<sup>237</sup> Experience, Baron indicates, had shown this soldier 'who had an advanced education but no schooling in life' and who had 'an over-simplified belief in human perfectibility', 'how close man still is to the other animals'.<sup>238</sup> What interests me is the suggestion concerning havoc to be made in a man's life by impressions unexpressed, obstructing the individual's self-communications. I think one does normally talk with oneself, assimilating day to day happenings in terms of one's established beliefs, and if received impressions contradictory to these assert themselves within such self-communing confusion and distress may supervene. Some such conflict I feel when

an invigorated impression of the distribution of power in the actual world asserts itself against my faith in the reality of the Divine Persuasion. Should one say--I think with Berdyaef--that God has no power in human affairs? There should be some other term than 'power' for that persuasion?<sup>239</sup> Aware of the conflict, the image returns to me of the suffering Son of Man. Through the ages that image has revealed power of a kind, though different from the power of force or cunning.

July 20. I am thankful when for a little while I can escape from the half-aliveness of domestic labours and respond to some wider thought. Reading Aldous Huxley on the 'unknown modes of being' Wordsworth realized too little, and of which 'our immediate intuitions of things make us so disquieteningly aware', I renew my own sense of formidibleness in the half tamed life of the trees around us.<sup>240</sup> It seems that the satisfaction I feel in pruning roses has relation to this sense of an alien power. That great shoot of the rose climbing the arch which with all its young vitality yet submits to be bent around its dead-wood support ministers, I imagine, a kind of comfort to my sense of weak and aged isolation within an almost unknowable uncontrollable world. Another kind of comfort came to me this morning from the reading of Empson's review of Basil Davidson's Daybreak in China. Empson's cautious judgments on his own and Davidson's formulations of experience and attempts at communication, are so congenial to me that I felt here is a reality of which I, in my isolation, am still a part, a reality that continues when I cease.<sup>241</sup>

Aug. 3. If one can look on each individual life as a possible way of entering into relation with God, then for some such as me, for

whom belief in Christian dogma is impossible, Grace--or the Divine persuasion operates through words uttered by speakers past or present, or through daily demands and trials--whatever one can use as means. An instance of such means, I think, is the passage in The Cocktail Party where Reilly tells of the good way--'You will not know how good / Till you come to the end',<sup>242</sup>--the way that is tolerant of oneself and others 'Giving and taking, in the usual actions / What there is to give and take',<sup>243</sup> avoiding the desolation of the 'phantasmal world', of 'excessive expectation', 'shuffling memories and desires'.<sup>244</sup> I can take the thought here presented to help me in using trials, exasperations, as they occur, as means, something, as in the monastic life, to offer to God.

Aug. 5. I know that I have met before, as counselled or as proclaimed by Christian believers, that 'offering' to God of pains or distresses. With my different outlook can it mean anything? In The Sign of Jonas, among the good things said by his confessor, Thomas Merton [is told] 'under duress' that he must remember 'to profit by all the crosses Jesus sends' and 'realize what pleasure it gives Jesus when He sees that we recognize the action of His love, doing good to us in all these trials' (p. 100).<sup>245</sup> If I discount as unimportant a revulsion in me from the childish terms here used, this is perhaps the kind of offering I want to make to God. I want to believe that the trivial worries or deprivations in this life I find myself leading can be used to make more real and conscious my relation to God; and if I dare to believe that the Divine nature, in Whitehead's phrase, receives from the world of men their reaction to His grace, His persuasion, then in some sense God is glad of our response, our acceptance and use of



desire of one such as I to communicate to others the faith found possible would be parallel to this fire of love described by Merton.<sup>251</sup> A parallel need there must be to purify from self seeking the efforts involved in elaborating that communication and to make it a record as clear and sincere as may be, of that perspective of truth granted to oneself.

Aug. 15. The warm appreciation by Margot Adamson of the passages of reflection I read yesterday has let loose in me a stronger need to write, and thoughts rising that seem ready to be developed in sentences.<sup>252</sup> The eagerness of their appearing pushing one another on almost continuously last night and today while I try to attend to domestic necessities has called up an image from Undine of the opening of the sealed well, and the rising of the figure of the sanctified and banished water spirit.<sup>253</sup> There is something that excites wonder and a sort of terror in the uncontrollable rising of imprisoned accidentally liberated water to find its level--water that one uses so confidently, water so lowly and so serviceable, when it rises no longer either serviceable or lowly, fulfilling its own necessity in utter disregard of human needs and restraints, can be a symbol of untamed human instinct and passion. My loosened thought has not that terrifying power yet excites in me a little of the same quality of wonder.

Aug. 23. I have been thinking of the relation with words that one feels so specially when one is writing, or planning to write, under a certain pressure of excitement. The words and speech forms that come to you then are so alive, or you feel their life and potentialities in a distinctive new way. You interact with them and feel a curious sort of intimacy of companionship. Wordsworth has a phrase about words as underhelpers of the soul. He is thinking of inarticulate people, but



the contrast he has in mind is perhaps with those like himself to whom words are more than underhelpers.<sup>254</sup> They are helpers alive and eager rising up willingly from the region where they sleep to offer the full treasury of their meaning in the focal light where the conscious individual spirit is struggling for expression.

Listening just now to some Spanish music, I had a thought concerning all those individual words that grow round other centres of consciousness. My own musical sense, being, I think, deficient and never having been trained, leaves me with little power to appreciate the structure of music to which I listen. Yet, as I come to enjoy more and more music that I hear on the Wireless while I pursue necessary tasks, I begin to recognize more clearly differences of 'idiom' in the work of different composers. I have no words to describe these differences, yet I feel that hearing them, enjoying their distinctive qualities, I am in some degree being let into the individual worlds in which those composers live. It is nearly the same thing as one obtains in reading a novel, or a series of personal records or essays. You enter in some degree the individual world of the writer. You enlarge your individual perspective to include something from the perspective of another spirit and come nearer, a little, toward truth universal.

Aug. 26. The thought of the 'new way of love' to be achieved through 'the death', or the 'contracting' of the self, is in my mind as a focus or growing point of thought.<sup>255</sup> Is it true that this 'new way' has, during the ages since Paul taught it, achieved new developments? Has the idea of it a history closely related to the history Whitehead traces of the idea of the individual soul?<sup>256</sup> One series of changes seems dependent on the realization of closer relation between

body and mind, so that many new ways have been devised of ministering to the bodies of our brethren. Also the conception of who our brethren are had to be extended overcoming obstacles through 'physical agencies', institutions and habits. Now it seems development of the idea is made possible through attention directed to analysis of the self that is to be contracted, together with a breaking up of old habits and institutions.

Priestley's play seems to me an instance of a contracting of the self in its relation to others, made more possible through the weakening of the marriage institution. So far as the marriage institution, thought of as binding for life, in its power over the individual leads to effort at restraint of wayward impulses of attraction, greater determination to understand one's partner and make the most of every possibility that can be discerned for living together in harmony: so far it is valuable. But so far as in the mind of a wronged partner whom the institution has already failed reaction to that failure is dominated by jealousy, so far the opportunity and the need appears for a little death, a contracting of self-feeling that will leave the injured party free to do as little harm as may be to the total situation.

In plays and novels of today we find this situation depicted. I choose Priestley's and [S.] Ervine's plays I Have Been Here Before and Jane Clegg to illustrate this situation and the triumph over jealousy and / or the tradition of jealousy. In Jane Clegg the woman does not so much triumph over as ignore the tradition, so ignobly urged on her by her husband's mother.<sup>257</sup> In her concentration upon doing the best for her children, and her weary companionable understanding of the husband she has ceased to love, she does the best she can apparently

without acute feeling. Priestley's play better illustrates a kind of rebirth through triumph over a selfish possessive love, inflated by the tradition such love has established.<sup>258</sup> In Othello we find the tradition in full force making tragedy. Did Shakespeare, one wonders, as his genius worked in him, feel, beyond his sympathy with Othello, as a noble spirit betrayed, a complexity about the credulity and violence of Othello that influenced the dialogue he wrote, though his thought did not attempt its analysis?<sup>259</sup>

Sept. 4. Today I have thought in my proposed individual record should be some entries that are, as de la Mare says, my 'utmost blessing to some 'fair thing' in my world.<sup>260</sup> I should 'praise' that thing with my own memories both of my encounters with its actuality and those communicated experiences of others that have meant most to me. Of 'light' there is dawn from my window, and early morning light on the garden at home and among the mountains. There is the pleasure of the days' slowly lengthening bringing praise of spring and, with this, memories of winter and spring rituals. There are days of sunshine in early spring with memory of Bunyan's 'sunshine days' that threw giant Despair into comas.<sup>261</sup> Of shiny light, almost feared by me, there is the record of Akhnaton's hymn and for all lights the poets for me are Dante and Milton and T. S. Eliot.<sup>262</sup> It is in my mind also that a post-script on my discussion of history should contain something about Gibbon--the way he made 'a past brought into harmony with the present' (F. H. Bradley).<sup>263</sup>

Sept. 5. Yesterday while I was thinking in some trouble and perplexity about the problem of Christianity, 'the Kingdom', and the British Commonwealth or Empire, there flashed to my mind so vividly an image of the town of my birthplace, [and] a particular bit of the

London Road, between our old home in Chelmsford and the home of our grandparents, that I was impelled to stop thinking and follow the road up to the gate and to our grandfather's garden with its remembered bed of dahlias and the earth path round the orchard trees beside which little sweet violets grew. I knew that all that is changed now. The bit of road that ran beside a field and hawthorn hedge is now lined by houses and made up for a very different kind of traffic, but last night I dreamed of it, just as it used to be, as I had seen it in that flashing image, and in my dream I was glad, saluting gratefully the bit of hedge, still in its old place. Today that image keeps returning. Why? It seems to come as something stable, unchanged, comforting, amid perplexing thoughts. It remains while I live as part of me and is somehow linked with this thought of mine of the individuality of the outlook of each of us: how it is our past life at a particular place and time that inevitably at least in part determines how much or little our visions of the universe shall include, and from what angle that little is seen. The image and the dream, with its backward turning impetus, seems another warning that however I may try to enlarge and clarify my individual truth I must never come near identifying it with that universal truth that can be known to none but God only.

Sept. 9. Can I write something about the two forces, piety toward the past--one own individual ancestral past--and loyalty to new insights, new calls, new comrades? Recalling my own remembered setting of place and persons I am conscious mainly of the reaction against what seemed the futility, the unreality of my mother's and something overbearing in the attitude of my father, mixed with pity and regret.

Sept. 15. Reading in Wells's [The] Outline of History a reference to 'that steady development of life towards a common consciousness and a



common will which we have hitherto been tracing in this book',<sup>264</sup> I feel the contrast with the attitude of Mind at the End of its Tether (Heineman, 1945). He has come to see everything 'driving anyhow to anywhere at a steadily increasing velocity'.<sup>265</sup> 'A harsh queerness is coming over things'.<sup>266</sup> He sees 'thousands of mean perverted malicious, heedless and cruel individuals . . . resolute to frustrate the kindlier purposes of man'.<sup>267</sup> An 'Antagonist', a 'new harsh implacable hostility to our universe, our All' has become for him an 'invincible reality'.<sup>268</sup> The world is 'like a convoy lost in darkness on an unknown rocky coast, with quarrelling pirates in the chartroom and savages clambering up the sides of the ships to plunder and do evil as the whim may take them'.<sup>269</sup> He now 'sees the world as a jaded world devoid of recuperative power'. 'In the face of our universal inadequacy, that optimism (of the past) has given place to a stoical cynicism'.<sup>270</sup>

Sept. 16. From John Holloway's The Victorian Sage: His Message and Methods (Macmillan, 1953) first returns to me in reflection the quotation about getting 'sustenance out of that complex, fragmentary, doubt-provoking knowledge which we call truth'.<sup>271</sup> My aim in this writing is such sustenance. The description, laborious rather than fortunate, applies to that individual truth I am exploring, the ill defined outcome of my experience, of which the examination should nourish--make possible--some kind of grounds even in these declining days. From Carlyle comes the quotation, 'To know; to get into the truth of anything is ever a mystic act'.<sup>272</sup> It is this kind of knowing I am attempting in regard to my own experienced relations with realities I have encountered in my life's course. It is such knowing as this that



J. H. says is intended by Newman's phrase 'Real Assent'. Such assent is 'directed towards assertion based on the whole trend of our experience'. 'Their meaning is too rich to be sharply limited, always liable to be unfolded further' existing largely 'in vivid particular images' (p. 7).<sup>273</sup>

The examination of George Eliot's novels brings out characters I have experienced in my familiarity with them: 'It is these more or less ugly, stupid, inconsistent people whose movements of goodness you should be able to admire'.<sup>274</sup> Do the images that stay from the novels help one to do this, if indeed one desires to do so? I do so desire: contemptuous references to 'Tom, Dick and Harry' as though concern about them, any pleasure in contact with them, were resented, do outrage me, but even such outrage can be subdued by remembering 'movements of goodness' where this 'ugly' trait is present. J. H. notes George Eliot's 'preoccupation with those whose life is obscure and frustrated'.<sup>275</sup> Maggie Tulliver expresses, it seems, G. E.'s own attitude when she says, 'It makes the mind very free when we give up wishing and only think of bearing what is laid upon us'.<sup>276</sup> Again, it is the sense of the destruction of values that is effected by a complaining resentful temper that makes this insistence on resignation, patience, so welcome to me; and my awareness of how necessary is restraint from the preaching of it where one feels its lack.

I find in what J. H. writes about G. E., and in her own words, a certain confirmation of what I felt in writing of my childhood's setting as an expression of backward gazing piety in my life. 'The staple of (her) books lies in slowly ripening, intermittent half-conscious things' such as Dorothea's slow realization of the actual nature of her husband in contrast to her false idea of him. She sees these things like

seasonal changes in their gradualness and necessity.<sup>277</sup> She herself speaks of her 'consciousness that certain conservative prepossessions have mingled themselves for me with the influences of our midland scenery' while 'all signs of permanence . . . raise a tender attachment'.<sup>278</sup> The quest of this loved scenery seems related to the conception of human character found in her novels: people weak rather than wicked, stupid in the sense of a blindness to consequences of action, a blindness which the reader recognizing, says J. H., is instructed.<sup>279</sup>

Sept. 19. 'Some kind of "moral discovery"' Conrad wrote, 'should be the object of every tale'. 'It is in the creation of the work of art', says Arnold Kettle, 'that the discovery was made' (in Introduction to the English Novel, II, 1953, Hutchinson University Library).<sup>280</sup> For me the discovery may be the nature, the power of the archetypal image for which 'treasure' gold or 'silver as treasure' can be the name; or perhaps 'silver mine as a place of hidden treasure', 'mountains even as guarding the treasure.' These different images, bringing each its ancient memories within the human tradition exalt each other within the whole work and are shown working their magic upon the figures in the tale.<sup>281</sup>

Sept. 21. I have been hearing a dramatic presentation to schools of the origin of fossils. The question in my mind is as to the effect on a child's outlook of being led to imagine an object--a strong trilobite that he can see and handle--having continued for hundreds of millions of years--a number, a time he is invited to imagine as taking years to count. An attempt is made at dramatic presentation of an observer's experience under the sea in Cambrian times. A child

taught to use his imagination thus, knowing it as a venture, questioning it for evidence, may well be led to imagine and question similarly stories of the life of Jesus. He may ask just such questions as Schweitzer asks, since the questioning attitude is one. Surely a teacher of religion should adjust his method to the method of the student of science and history. If like the speaker in 'Lift up your Hearts'--the Rev. John March--he quotes the supposed promise to Noah as if it were a word for faith to rely on today, he will make religion an old wives' tale to the youth as his thought develops.

Sept. 24. Yesterday was full of the revulsion against the falsity of inventing dated entries for my meditations, as though for a possible reader it mattered at what point in the year these meditations occurred! Little essays they seem to be, and should have some kind of title and some theme or question, not a date, to differentiate them. They must be subject to continual modification till they come, if they ever do, to be printed. The theme in my mind today which would be a title for the first essay, and an indication of the character of the whole, is 'Truth individual'. One aim in the writing I proposed a few weeks ago was the discovery and articulation of that individual truth embedded in my own experience, and, as an aim that this included, discovery of the truth communicated to me through reading and living with certain writings of others.

Just now I am trying to grasp something communicated by Schweitzer and Otto<sup>282</sup> and George Tyrrell, some vision of 'the historical Jesus' or of 'the Christ of eschatology'. The search or the creation of the figure of Jesus is for me a need and a fascination, I think of it as a task, an aim, continuous through the whole Christian era; for me culminating in what I receive from these and other writers near my own time, and what

my own mind, operating in accordance with its past and its resources, can make of this communication, as a truth to live by.

For me the interest of critical history is in its attempt to recreate--that is too ambitious a word; to imagine as we study the documents what thoughts, what 'real occasions' are behind them, as creating or defining them. Powicke's phrases come--here from History, Freedom and Religion.<sup>283</sup> Also F. H. Bradley's. Bradley writes of a 'confused and unsystematized world of consciousness' to which 'the critical intelligence awakens'. The world as it exists in the uncritical mind consists 'of our individual experiences blended into one substance inextricably with the (communicated) experiences of others' (p. 26). The 'awakening is the sundering of its material from itself' and the demanding from it 'the same oneness, that intelligible unity which, as the world of an intelligence, it is to have and virtually has. The new object, which now for the critical mind is the sole and increasing reality, is the reorganization of the old world; it is true only because it is recreated, and can be recreated only because connected into a rational system' (p. 27).<sup>284</sup> This, it seems to me, is a useful account of that criterion which we each individually apply to the testimony of others, received orally or through reading. This is the 'basis' from which we 'order our world'. What 'we have ground to connect with that we will receive because of its connexion'.<sup>285</sup>

(As I read just now Tyrrell's account of the Christ of eschatology, that secret or mystery that was 'the main determinant of His action and utterance', his messianic consciousness, I had a momentary glimpse of something in my own experience that might serve as such a connexion as may transform from mere testimony into truth for me the gospel story.<sup>286</sup>



There is a sense--is it common to us all unless it becomes atrophied?--of a reality--we may call it the Kingdom of God or the will or intention of God--that gives meaning and purpose to the world of everyday experience. It is this reality of which I can believe the historical Jesus had a revelation, an overpowering consciousness that gives him authority, makes him what Schweitzer calls 'an imperious ruler' [The Quest of the Historical Jesus (Adam and Charles Black, First edition, 1910, trans. Wolfgang Gomerig)]. 'It was because He was so in His inmost being that He could think of Himself as the Son of Man. That was only the temporally conditioned expression of the fact that He was an authoritative ruler': 'to those who obey Him . . . He will reveal Himself in the toils, the conflicts, the sufferings which they shall pass through in His fellowship' [p. 401]].<sup>287</sup>

In Bradley's discussion of the enlargement or extension of our belief through present-day testimony, he speaks of 'an identification of our own with another's consciousness' (pp. 30-31).<sup>288</sup> The canon the quoted observer brings is 'practically the same as that which we ourselves should have brought'.<sup>289</sup> (Here he does not consider the humbler attitude which relies on observers with greater discriminating and organizing power than mine or that other attitude of the individual who having been confused by contradictory judgments, or disillusioned by over-confident ones subsequently discredited, maintains a cynical, carelessly skeptical pose toward all but his own individually grounded conclusions.) 'The interest of history is in the recalling of a course of events which are not, which neither exist nor will exist but which have existed' (p. 36),<sup>290</sup> and these events are the recorded 'deeds and sufferings of men' (p. 35), (Powicke's 'real occasions'),<sup>291</sup> 'If it is ourselves that we seek in the perished (and is there anything else which we can



seek) . . . then, where we encounter an alien element which we cannot recognize as akin to ourselves, that interest fails, the hope and the purpose which inspired us dies, and the endeavor is thwarted'. The seeking ourselves is one way in which Bradley expresses the recognition, 'the exhibition of the oneness of humanity in all its stages and under all its varieties, which he indicates is one way of expressing 'the interest of history'. 'The remembrance of our childhood and our youth is the sweetest of pleasures, for it gives us the feeling of ourselves, as the self of ourself and yet as another' (p. 39), (still in relation to the recognition of our humanity in long past lives.)<sup>292</sup> 'It is a hope doomed only to disappointment, when the present expects in the mind of the past to find the views and beliefs of the present' since 'the consciousness of the earlier stage of humanity is never the consciousness of a later development' (p. 40) and it is for the present later epoch that the history of today exists.<sup>293</sup>

Paley's Evidences, 1794, appear to be still in Bradley's mind. Paley protested against a 'prejudication' which Bradley declares is inevitable in the historian, 'the writer who consciously orders and creates from the known foundation of that which for him is the truth' (p. 20).<sup>294</sup> '"Testimony is a phenomenon," says Paley, "and the truth of the fact solves the phenomenon"' (p. 50).<sup>295</sup> If we cannot find in our 'known foundation' adequate 'guarantee' for the 'averred facts', then, says Bradley, these 'unrationalized recorded events' remain for history 'external and unassimilated':<sup>296</sup> 'it is no disgrace to be ignorant where the problem is recognized and the effort is made' (p. 51).<sup>297</sup> Of the phrase Baur, whom he highly respects, the phrase lying 'without the sphere of historical investigation', he suggests he meant to imply that such an event was 'not a fact for critical

history at all though it may be an object for a higher form of knowledge' (i.e. individual intuition?)<sup>298</sup> 'Every phenomenon has a possible solution' in the sense of being conceivably shown 'as the result of known historical conditions',<sup>299</sup> though we may also be right in regarding it as a 'new birth of an individual soul', 'creations' rather than 'natural growths' (p. 52).<sup>300</sup>

Sept. 28. If I cannot offer for publication, as I had hoped to do, spontaneous free flowing written meditation, I must still write in this book for the relief of writing without that inhibiting sense of the indifferent scornful critic glancing over the result. I have just been looking at a reference (Feb. 1926) to the 'energies' of words when, in a mind 'exhilarated and healed by thought', words present themselves with 'the annotation ghosts that haunt them' rightly liberated, and the whole course of thought is in 'congruence with the charges of feeling that racial experience has accumulated'. Those moments of experience are too precious to be forgone whether their outcome be ever given to the world or not.

afternoon. Is what I want to write about 'truth individual in relation to truth absolute'? Is my thesis that each individual's distinctive truth is realized in relation to a truth more complete and penetrating conceived as that of a mind akin to its own though infinitely beyond? To attempt to prove this individuality would be far too ambitious and laborious an undertaking: all I could do would be to illustrate it referring to certain formulations of the idea in philosophic writers.

Nov. 19. After so long, I am again minded to write in this book something for myself as to how I look at my present place in my life's course and its environment. I am now fairly sure that I cannot write

for publication anything unless it were, at some future time, say next summer, a short essay for 'the common reader', concerned with one's individual truth and its communication. Meantime what I have to do is to get through my days, responding as well as I may to the challenge of circumstance, giving undistracted attention so far as I can to that. What reading I do will be for myself and my distinctive theme--to make more sure of whatever I have gained: 'my heritage' in the sense of Ezra Pound's saying: 'What thou lovest well remains, the rest is dross; / What thou lov'st well shall not be reft from thee; / What thou lov'st well is thy true heritage'. 'If (says Fraser [The Modern Writer and His World, G. S. Fraser, Derek Verschoyle, 1953]) one were trying to instil into a young man, in our troubled times, a sane loyalty towards all that is best in our strange mixed inheritance . . . one could hardly find better words than these of Pound's'.<sup>301</sup> So I, desiring to appropriate more fully what I can receive of my heritage look in my reading (of Fraser's book for instance ) for comment I find of value on that which I have already in some fashion loved, or used.

Writing of Forster's novels, Fraser speaks of 'sensitive Edwardians' turning to them 'for a lucid insight into the everyday problems of their own lives'--problems of personal relations.<sup>302</sup> Forster's 'main theme', Fraser says, is the response of the individual to others:<sup>303</sup> in A Room With A View the breaking down 'in the name of individual responsibility and initiative' of imperceptible barriers between 'segments of the English middle class'; in A Passage to India the theme has become tragic--concerned with the 'barriers, misunderstandings, between the British in India and the native educated Indians'.<sup>304</sup> 'The moral of the story is that individual sincerity and loyalty are possible

(as, in the novel, between the English official and the native Indian doctor in spite of antagonistic influences from their different communities ) but that the pressure of group life, and of accepted social conventions works very hard against them' (pp. 68-9).<sup>305</sup>

Writing primarily for an audience of educated Japanese, Fraser here considers Forster's recognition 'in the British professional and administrative classes' of an 'uneasy conscientiousness' that makes them recognize under pressure in spite of barriers, the justice of some demands from the less privileged group whether of their own or of another country (p. 70).<sup>306</sup>

Jan. 14, 1954. After a long interval when what I reckon the more spiritual part of me has been silent--isolated from the life that is in words--I am trying again to realize what there is for me in a book--Robert Raynolds' Sinner of St. Ambrose. I value the attempt to enter history--an historical situation--by a mind wondering at life--at the mystery life is 'at center', eager to communicate that wonder.<sup>307</sup>

The period chosen is apt for expression of the tension, conflict, between the joy that is in the life of sense, instinct and intellect, on the one hand, and on the other the spirit's intuition of a value in suffering--the suffering of the body, the failure of the psyche, involved in sense and action, the tragedy of the spirit. It is 'in the throes of the world',<sup>308</sup> that the protagonist-narrator achieves the spiritual 'ripeness' of tragic insight--<sup>309</sup> consciousness of the value that is in suffering and failure experienced under 'the white light of God'.<sup>310</sup> The supreme 'moment of truth' is when Stilicho--the Roman general who has striven to uphold the imperial order against its massive disintegration--finds himself betrayed, consents to failure



and death, communicating by a look to the awareness of one who has joined in the betrayal a sense of the presence of God--God both judging and sustaining.

One aspect of this attempt to enter history is the recognition that communication of ideas is best accomplished when those ideas are 'manifested as incarnate', when to me, a living being, they pass from some other being 'concrete, real'. Thus the idea of Roman law as 'a great net holding society together'<sup>311</sup> is presented as a 'ruling fact in the life of the protagonist's father, to whom also comes experience of tragic failure expressed in his own words chosen by his son for his epitaph: 'All the gods are one God and He breaks the human heart'. 'Deep in my soul', the son wrote, 'a subtle consonance was established between my father's outcry of mortality and the terrible cry of Christ on the cross' (p. 194).<sup>312</sup>

Jan. 23. It is in my mind that I might write--as well as my 'Individual truth' essay--an article for the Hibbert entitled 'Dogma or Symbol'. The idea is the same in the two studies: that religious revelation, the Divine persuasion, penetrates to different individuals and groups in different forms. When some Christian, like Gregor Smith, argues for the supreme importance of the dogma of the incarnation, to me it appears that it is the incarnation as a symbol that possesses the value he is experiencing.<sup>313</sup> One may object: the dogma, God become incarnate in the man Jesus of Nazareth, entails the reliability of the promises reported as made by Jesus: I am with you to the end of the world. I go to prepare a place for you.<sup>314</sup> If the gospel story is but a symbol of the divine self renewing elements within human life, those promises, that fellowship, are lost. Could one answer



by a reference to the mystic companionship experienced by men of other religious faiths? By Gandhi?<sup>315</sup> What one means by terming the Gospel story a symbol must depend upon whether one conceives reality as constituted by or including a personal or supra personal spirit aware of and responsive to individual human spirits. If so then Jesus, or Gautama,<sup>316</sup> or 'Our Lady',<sup>317</sup> would be figures historically based but fashioned by minds seeking God into symbols of this presence and guidance.

Jan. 26. Again today it seems to me that I might still write something urging, as in Studies I did, that there is a way for those who cannot with their whole being accept Christian dogma to find forms, symbols, through which they may encounter whatever kindred spiritual Power there is in the universe and receive sustenance from it--or, let us say, from Him, since such a Power will be God, the divine Thou.

Jan. 29. Today, coming first upon a discussion by [A.] Lichligfeld (p. 106) of 'Jaspers' concept of Transcendent God', I recurred to my projected article 'Dogma or Symbol'. I realized again how the indwelling Christ, of St. Paul, and the many Christians following him, must be, in Jaspers' terms, an 'immanent Transcendence generated in direct experience of the existential self's ascent to freedom' giving a 'positive expression . . . of the actions of God in relation to man in their historically determined mode of existence' (Ib., p. 258).<sup>318</sup> Thus, acceptance of the symbol of the incarnation, its incorporation in the life of the individual through faith, constitutes for that individual a Christianity without dogma though not without communion with all those for whom the gospel story, accepted as history, has worked in their lives this effect I am describing as that of the symbol.

If I should attempt the projected article on types or levels of order,<sup>319</sup> this same concept of the 'ascent to freedom' may be illus-

trated by the experience of St. Paul--his moral judgment: 'I have fought the good fight'.<sup>320</sup> All through his teaching, as in the lives of his followers, runs the faith a new type of order', a new dimension of existence, is being experienced. Yet for us today, the cutting loose of the experience of the new order from reliance upon the symbolic story in its literary detail has value in opening us to the future and possibilities of generating through communication 'meanings in respect of existence and Transcendence more profound and far reaching than those from which they spring' (Ib., p. 258).<sup>321</sup>

Feb. 11. This morning I thought that my idea about a form or level of order, or of being, has value for me as making sense, from my standpoint, of religion and of my own experience. When, after apathy and depression, the thought comes, 'O, I see Him again', it is as if I find myself again climbing, after falling back, to a point in space commanding a wider outlook. One way of regarding this attempt to produce an article for Philosophy is to realise myself trying to recognize in the expositions of different writers a common reference to this 'level' from which new relations can be seen. 'Seeing' is of course an inadequate term. The relations are intimately known and felt, experienced. I am a part, a member, of the Kingdom of Ends I see or glimpse.

March 4. After the discouraging experience of trying to talk with M. Adamson, I have been reading an article by Rev. R. G. Norbrien (Nov. 1943) glad of his tone of reasonable civility. His question is of the implications of moral experience: do they include reference to the will of God? His reply that in various degree they do.<sup>322</sup> My question at the moment is as to the necessity for each thinker to make the choice, right for himself, as to the terms, images and concepts in

which he may express his sense of life: its meaning, obligations, value. I am interested in the suggestion of L. J. Russell (reviewing A. J. Ayer's new introduction, 1946, to his Language, Truth and Logic (1936) [April 1940]) that his concessions to the metaphysician amount to 'describing the principle of verifiability, not as a proposition but as a proposal', 'an attempt to persuade' (p. 174).<sup>323</sup>

March 5. Today I have been comparing the positions expressed by G. Ryle (July 1937) and by Jaspers. The phrase in Ryle's discourse that I question is 'rigorous argument'.<sup>324</sup> Is it by rigorous argument that a philosopher transforms into a 'public truism' an aspect of reality that before him was not 'even the topic of a clearly recognized question'?<sup>325</sup> Jaspers' view that metaphysical systems express, in accordance with the methods and categories of the time, an individual philosopher's deciphering of transcendent Being, excludes, I think, such recognition of rigorous argument. The arguments used are convincing to those whose individual bias and free participation in the logical methods of contemporary thought are the same or similar to those of the thinker in question. When Jaspers, or say, Hallett or Buber, asserts that the Being of whom the metaphysician seeks to keep alive or awaken awareness is the unobjectifiable ground and goal of our human existence, can his procedure be described as rigorous argument<sup>326</sup> Rather, I think, he is trying by what devices of language he may to stimulate in those capable of it a certain perspective, vision.

March 8. 'All power is a derivative from the fact of composition attaining worth for itself' (M of I 163). Here again is the individual experience of decision with its sense of entities coming together to issue creatively. This is the 'activity disclosed in intimate experience' in terms of which 'we finally construe the world' (Ib., p. 158).

My own experience of 'ought' is certainly imperative, as Hare maintains, but looks also at a background awareness of past and future activity within which this decision of mine has its place.<sup>327</sup> My decision concerning the way I spend my morning, reading and meditating philosophy or preparing a meal, has its place in a way of life in which the wishes and needs of my immediate neighbors and those affected more remotely by what I do must all be taken into account. My sense that what I do matters seems to me, as I reflect on it, to pass into an awareness that I must, within the narrow limits imposed by the actualities of my life, do the divine will, conform to the type of order toward which that Will is now persuading men.

April 24. Today the memory of the talk by F. W. Bateson, 'A Harsh Word for the Novelist', suggested to me, a discussion of the value Bateson disregards in the serious novel.<sup>328</sup> The essence of the value I find is related to an individual quest of his own truth. The communication under concrete images of another's vision or interpretation of life sets one actively groping towards that interpretation as taking shape between writer and reader. In K. O'Brien's That Lady I am reading now it is through dialogue especially that an individual understanding of life seems to be communicated.<sup>329</sup>

April 25. Reading Jaspers' on the aims and meaning of philosophy,<sup>330</sup> I see more clearly what I was trying to say about such novels as That Lady. Wonder at experience--my own experience as enlarged, enriched by all communications--finds a kind of fulfillment as I read of life mirrored by another mind. K. O'Brien's heroine becomes real to me and her experience of life's ultimate situations (Grenzsituation), her reaction to them and final acceptance somehow eases my anxious shining sense of them, helps me to make this sense articulate.



Oct. 30. I thought today I would like to write a few fragments on the wonders that attend even a life so narrowly limited as mine. My reading and writing has focused partly on the mystery of the present in relation to the past of an individual consciousness. How should one express the different ranges of an individual present--the power to make present, or the wonder of finding present experiences that have fallen into the past? Questioning my memory for an image that would join itself as one with my present, I found entering my mind a memory of a hill where I lay and watched the light changing on the birches and another scene in Switzerland with morning light leaping toward me as the mountain shadow shrank and left dewdrops gleaming on the pines. I tried then to fix in memory with words the scene I found beautiful; and the need for comfort and enrichment that prompted the treasuring of those scenes binds that experience of over forty years ago to this present, where I still seek comfort and enrichment. Such love as I have of poetry is bound up with the same need. I love the poems, or lines of poetry, that offer concentrated expression of significant experience, for instance Housman's lines that tell of 'homely comforters',--how these 'walked beside me, close and dear, / The beautiful and deathstruck year'.<sup>331</sup> The sympathy with the life and the perishing of the forms of nature, mine and that of men through the ages, is given concentrated expression there.

When I watched just now the woodpecker on the lawn, so busy in his search for things to eat among the green roots, and so beautiful as the sunlight fell on the plumage of head or breast or back as he moved, I felt another aspect of the enrichment. The simple satisfaction one can feel in tasks connected with food getting gains enrichment through



sympathy with creatures so concentrated upon their own fashion of food getting and within the rigid limitations of their activity so beautiful.

Nov. 10. The comfort and enrichment one may get from record of another's experience is illustrated for me by Arthur Grimble's A Pattern of Islands. His enjoyment of the humanity of the islanders, his sense of fellowship with them, is what I delight in. There is a 'kinship' of human beings with each other, 'a kinship that springs from the immutable constancy of man's need to share laughter and friendship, poetry and love in common'--that Grimble found with his islanders 'who despite the old savagery of their wars and the grimness born of their endless battle with the sea, were princes in laughter and friendship, poetry and love' (pp. 11-12).<sup>332</sup>

Dec. 27. Just now W. H. was speaking to me of the saying, 'give service to men and your heart to heaven', and of its relevance to times when one felt shut away, rejected.<sup>333</sup> I had somewhat the same element in my experience of a wakeful night when I tried to pray recalling Jericho's difficult story of her distress when she prayed for help.<sup>334</sup> Looking just now at my note of the many reflections from different contexts on the clear natured word 'take', I remembered how the passage from the psalm came to me, 'When my father and mother forsake me then the Lord will take me up': 'take', there, needs its half magical meaning 'draw to oneself'.<sup>335</sup> Since prayers remain apparently unanswered, the 'taking' by the Lord is, for most of us, at best a sort of obscure underground movement, like the whole movement of the 'Power beyond', the unknown God, through different channels toward His creatures.

It was some time ago I cut out from the newspaper this record of

the brave and sensible career and end of two sisters.<sup>336</sup> That too seems to me relevant to my life. I wish I might have the strength to clear up as sensibly the loose ends of my life.

Dec. 28. Of his play The Holly and the Ivy, heard last night, Wynyard Browne writes that its 'pattern of moods' was shaped after seeing a fir like a Christmas tree under a lowering December sky. To him it suggested Christmas as a 'great festival of religious rejoicing in a sceptical age', and so the irony of a family struggling to retain some kind of unity within all the 'cross currents' of feeling drawing them apart--currents that can be felt especially at Christmas time. He is writing, he says, of disturbances, that could pertain to Christmas time, blowing away mists of habit, making possible the sight of the persons concerned 'as they really are'.<sup>337</sup> Something like that has perhaps happened to us. To me at any rate seems to have come some new awareness of our plight; and the play, with its picturing of a father, to whom because of his religion the truth could not be told, reaching his estranged daughter by a personal confession, touched in me that longing for the relation that achieves a deep sincerity--a longing one can never appease more than in the smallest measure, but that yet in one way or another can be borne.<sup>338</sup>

Dec. 29. Would either of these Catholics with whom I have opportunity to talk respond to that observation of V. White (supra 39), that his introduction to Frazer's work gave him 'a sense of solidarity' in his Catholic faith 'with creation', 'the processes of nature' and 'humanity as a whole'?<sup>339</sup> That thought connects for me, first, with the widening or shrinking of that inner world, or life, that my attempted article would establish as against Ryle.<sup>340</sup> Such inner changes have their

effects and may be guessed at by others but not experienced as the individual experiences them. Such changes are part of the immense problem of communication. In W. Browne's play, the daughter had no idea that her father, a parson, held his faith against a background of doubt almost to despair, of wonder, perplexity, at the inconsequence and cruelty of life, such as she herself experienced. The moment of communication --one might say, communion--seemed to alter life and its possibilities, whatever might come later. It is such a 'communion of saints' that gives meaning to the 'forgiveness of sins' that follows in the Apostle's creed: the Church members, it is assumed, live with an openness to communication between them through their common background of faith, and when the sinner, through a betrayal of his faith, has cut himself off from that communion, it is by confession and absolution that he is restored.<sup>341</sup>

How far this communion of church members was ever an actuality remains a question. It is suggested in Paul's letters. N. Mitchison has tried to depict it. If the Christian faith could be broadened, enriched, purged of its arrogant exclusiveness, it might conceivably--perhaps it does within certain groups of individuals--achieve such a reality today. Meanwhile the idea of such communion helps to explain that bitter need of isolated individuals for a relation with someone of what I have called 'deep sincerity', a kind of spiritual relation within which communication becomes possible of such thought as I try to express here.

Today I must go on writing because I can and it brings me relief. From L. Powys' Love and Death (Bodley Head, 1939) I wanted to take something for memory. But first this saying, from 'Ancient Wisdom', struck me. 'For like as the ground is given unto the wood, and the sea to his flood, even so they that dwell upon the earth may understand nothing but

that which is upon the earth'. It is L. Powys' motto for rejection of that community of Christian believers of which I was speaking.<sup>342</sup> In his last chapter he imagines one dying who had been always 'blindly eager for earth experience',<sup>343</sup> who can recall how as a four-year-old child, he would not stop 'jumping up and down' and repeating over and over, 'Happy me! Happy me!',<sup>344</sup> one who had rejected 'deep in my heart' any faith that 'when once the quick clay that surrounds our bones is dead' there can be any survival of the spirit.<sup>345</sup>

But to return to the saying, it suggests to me that with the 'ancient wisdom' it is as with modern poetry: a reader must try to interpret by feeling the influence upon each word of its context: here, try to feel the suggested interaction of the ground and the trees of the wood, of the vast bulk of sea-water with its coming and going, moon and wind driven, against the shore, then the like interaction of each creature of the earth with its habitation, so penetrated thereby that only in terms of it if at all can anything beyond be understood. But unless the lines at the first glance strike one as having some value the effort of interpretation seems not worth while.

Dec. 30. I want to find today a starting point in the experience of F. Allshorn as reported in the biography by J. H. Oldham (SCM Press, 1951). Sent to Uganda of which mission station her friend, Bishop Gresford Jones wrote, 'perhaps no where else in Uganda is this psychic pressure of evil to be felt in anything like the same degree'--'an ominous, unaccountable shadow that preys upon life', 'something heavy and malevolent' (Uganda in Transformation), (pp. 87-8, p. 23)--<sup>346</sup> F. A. encountered--under conditions of a climate with 'debilitating and nerve-racking effect', a senior missionary colleague of such a temper that



of seven young missionaries sent out to her none had been willing to stay.<sup>347</sup> A few weeks after her arrival, in a letter telling of the difficulties of the conditions, F. A. wrote, 'The queer thing is that I have really been happier this month than I have ever been before; you get driven back and back on God every time' (p. 26).<sup>348</sup> Later, when brought almost to despair, 'my spirit wilted'--to her in tears an old African matron said, 'I have been on this station for fifteen years, and I have seen you come out, all of you saying you have brought to us a Saviour, but I have never seen this situation saved yet'. F. A. prayed then, 'as I have never prayed', for Christ-like love that it 'might be in me' and 'slowly things rightened'; 'the old matron saved me' (p. 28). 'The atmosphere of the place altered' (p. 29).<sup>349</sup> Oldham speaks of this as a profound experience, 'a spiritual regeneration'.<sup>350</sup> For me it seems an instance of that which James describes as the individual seeking to save himself through touch with something beyond him (pp. 250-3), though akin to what is most real in himself.<sup>351</sup>

It is this conclusion James draws from his collected documents that seems to me the essential element in the religion the churches offer, or should offer to men. When Joad suggests (NS and N, Oct. 27, 1951) that the Church, abandoning much of its traditional teaching, and willing to accept whatever scientists may agree upon regarding phenomena, may lose all that affects lives,<sup>352</sup> he seems to me to ignore this assertion upon which James ventures that the 'further limits of our being plunge' into an 'other dimension of existence' where work can be 'done upon our finite personality' and 'in opening ourselves' to such influences 'our deepest destiny is fulfilled' (pp. 515-17).<sup>353</sup> If this can be believed with some degree of sincerity, actuality, and awareness of personal need, life must be affected, one's own and those



with whom one has contact.

Jan. 2, 1955. A thematic image was in my mind this morning as I read The Observer and looked out at the garden lawn and trees with birds foraging and fluttering there. The image was of each individual having a vital station or base where he manages as he best may to supply his bodily needs and adjust to those vicissitudes of the great world beyond so far as by these his base, his individual life, is affected. For a creature like me the inevitable importance of the base recedes as the spirit follows the lines that run outward toward conceived values in the world beyond. Yet by a necessity of the human condition it is the base that must sustain and qualify all the relations, the thought-lines to the beyond.

As I read of American politicians considering their strategic reliance upon France, or, alternatively, on Spain,<sup>354</sup> and felt the remoteness from my mind of those minds upon whose calculations the welfare of me and my immediate associates depends, memories arose of other individuals in the world--background historians uncover who had not even such opportunity as I have to understand the distant agents of good and evil affecting their lives: that scribe, (~~E~~φ), in ancient Egypt who clung to his faith in his Divine king while he yet saw, through conformity to royal commands, confusion and violence spread through the land. Those are happier who, like the prophets of a small weak community broken between great empires, can look beyond these to a God who for each individual soul that trusts Him can transform calamity into a means of insight and salvation. Hearing, in the talk about the 'drift migration' of birds, about their dangers driven by contrary winds from their intended course, desperate for food, I felt again

solidarity with the sub-human world. I am glad that while I contemplate the animosities of men, over whose passions I have no more control than the bird over the gale that drives it, I can at least reach out in thought to those, like Nehru perhaps, who seem to me to speak as the Divine justice might dictate.<sup>355</sup> I can respond in my fashion--so far as is possible for me--to such exhortations as those of the Archbishop of York to Christians to pray that negotiators in conflict may be guided toward peace.

Jan. 5, 1955. Oldham writes of the intensity with which F. Allshorn apprehended the love of God, and Christ, and for her friends as for herself desired this as a central reality between the two who are enjoying friendship.<sup>356</sup> I who am sure I could not so apprehend love as a central reality yet try to understand the possibility of it and to relate to it what is possible to me.

Jan. 24. 'The tradition is dead; our task is to revivify life that has passed away. We know that ghosts cannot speak until they have drunk blood: and the spirits which we evoke demand the blood of our hearts. We give it to them gladly; but if they then abide our question, something from us has entered into them'.<sup>357</sup> Wilamowitz, Greek Historical Writing and Apollo, p. 26, quoted [in] Conversion by A. D. Nock (Oxford, 1933), of his own attempt to trace men's 'groping after truth' from the time of Alexander to Augustine.<sup>358</sup>

Jan. 27. Are we 'to go on preaching the gospel in terms that make sense to' us but not to our hearers, because their experiences, pre-suppositions, are different?<sup>359</sup> That represents Oldham's problem ([The Christian Newsletter, July, 1954) to which I referred in the conversation yesterday with Mr. Carter, that I felt in the evening

to have been so baffling and futile.<sup>360</sup> Today I feel it as a stimulus to get clearer my idea concerning communication. What is the nature of the communication that both Oldham and I so earnestly desire? Nock's study should offer illustration because what Oldham desires is communication of something new and momentous in its effect upon the individual life. The phrase that comes to my mind, 'It was written in the book as it was written in my heart', will apply to much true communication, to the effect on me of Plato's dialogues, but it does not express the element of novelty. One must add that, noting how the writing in the book supplies words, and with the words a new clarity and distinctness to the obscure fused meaning of the individual heart--the lived accumulated experiences--that responds to the writing. Thus Nock speaks of the Christianity to which Augustine was converted as having been 'present in subconsciousness'. Something of this calling forth of what is inarticulately present there must always be, I think, when communication is achieved. If the ideas of God and Devil, and a divine birth or rebirth, are, as I have urged, implicit in our experience, in the interactions between ourselves and the universe, then it is to these in the form they have so far assumed in the mind addressed that the spoken or written word of teacher or preacher has to appeal.

One should say perhaps that it is the speech we use in interaction with our fellows that most of all contains the furled, or implicit meanings that further speech may make explicit; and that is where the contrast of idioms often makes communication so impossible. I recoil from certain idioms as alien so that one to whom such idiom is congenial should if he wants to make contact with me attend to my speech to find in it some suggestion of his own meaning, as E. G. Oldham finds an

expression of the Christian ideal in Comfort's opposition of life and love to 'death and power' and accepts the test he proposes of the Christian faith as whether or not it enables men to live 'triumphantly in the ordinary life of every day';<sup>361</sup> or C. A. Coulson finds in certain sayings of F. Hoyle thoughts, aspirations, known to 'the Christian' ([The] Frontier, Nov. 1950, p. 432).<sup>362</sup> That test of triumphant living is related, closely I think, to the idea of 'witness to truth' as illustrated by martyr or ascetic. Zeus, Epictetus says, 'wished to make me obtain from myself the proof' of 'whether he has in me' a worthy 'witness to what things are unworthy of choice' (quoted Nock, pp. 194-95).<sup>363</sup> The glory on the face of the dying Stephen bore witness of the Christian faith to Saul.<sup>364</sup>

Feb. 7, 1955. From the unsatisfactory talk with M. Adamson remains the strengthened conviction that it is from the side of man that we inevitably approach any knowledge of God--or any other reality. For such knowledge we can use only our experience in the encounter. When I read--as in The Golden String of Bede Griffiths of a soul's encounter with God, I try to discern what in him made possible powerful awareness of a reality I find so obscure, so remote. That experience he describes as 'one of the decisive events of my life', I can partially understand: the 'shock of surprise' as though he had never before heard birds singing, smelt the sweetness of blossoming hawthorn: the 'feeling of awe' as though 'I hardly dared to look on the face of the sky because it seemed but a veil before the face of God'. He became aware of 'another world of beauty and mystery' of which a record was in the poetry of Wordsworth, Shelley, Keats (pp. 9-10).<sup>365</sup>

I agree with the saying that 'to discover God is to awake to that



part of one's existence which has been hidden from sight and which one has refused to recognize' and the discovery 'is like going through a kind of death' (p. 12).<sup>366</sup> Is there any truth I wonder in that explanation the young men gave themselves of the ugliness they hated in 'the modern city', as contrasted with the beauty they found in the Cotswold villages, by reference to the divorce of 'the scientific and rational mind from nature', from 'feeling and imagination' (p. 35)?<sup>367</sup>

Feb. 8. His reading of Dante, says B. G., was 'a turning point in my life'. It gave him a '"criticism of life"' on a level which was deeper than that of Shakespeare' (p. 54). Dante taught him that 'a passion which was disciplined and controlled was stronger and deeper than an undisciplined love. I had already begun to glimpse this in Spinoza but Dante presented it to me with all the force of great poetry'. The reading of the Purgatorio acted 'as a real illumination of my mind: It was not merely a poetic experience but a moral experience of extraordinary depth and significance', (p. 55) and this though Christianity was for him at the time an interesting 'historical phenomenon', 'a thing of the past' (p. 53). The Purgatorio stamped on my mind the fact that moral virtue is the transformation of passion and not its suppression and so freed me forever from the fear of Puritanism' (p. 56).<sup>368</sup>

To me all this suggests the range of that 'truth' having the nature of faith rather than of knowledge which can be communicated from one mind to another that has reached a certain stage of development of consciousness. He began to realize, says B. G., 'the massive power of a religion, which did not cramp the natural powers of man but on the contrary developed



them to their highest point' (p. 56).<sup>369</sup> If those great archetypes present in a distinctive form within the Christian religion are indeed latent awaiting conscious realization in every mind, then the sciences of history, of anthropology, must take account of this truth in the many forms in which it appears in individuals and in groups. It is a process of growth that B. G. finds himself again living through as he writes, recalling the intense 'effort of thought' and 'desire for a new life' (p. 58). He speaks of the immense and continuous influence upon his life of the Gita, the Buddha's Way of Virtue (a version of the Dhammapada) and the Sayings of Lao Tzu (a version of the Tao Te Ching) in the Wisdom of the East series.<sup>370</sup>

His serious reading of the Bible began with the Old Testament in which he recognized an encounter with Reality that was 'an experience of the Soul in its inmost depths' (p. 71).<sup>371</sup> The Gospels appeared to him as 'authentic speech' so 'intimately related to the facts which were recorded' that 'the one could not be separated from the other' (p. 76). 'Always I came back to this overwhelming impression of truthfulness' (p. 77). Of the 'experience of unfathomable depth' he encountered in St. John's Gospel he felt 'to reject this would be to reject the greatest thing in all human experience'; 'to accept it would be to change one's whole point of view' (p. 78), 'to enter into that tradition which on other grounds I had learned to love and respect'.<sup>372</sup> I could compare the words in Toynbee's view of this book: 'ill equipped to follow him'. Toynbee is still 'convinced that his experience is both genuine and very important'.<sup>373</sup> Recognition of 'the Church' as the 'new humanity' transcending 'all human civilization' is the step that appears to me an aberration from any true growth. For me 'the mystical body of

Christ' must be those who seek God and in some degree are conformed to that Will toward harmony that may be discovered in tradition and in the individual soul.<sup>374</sup>

Feb. 9. The 'strong inclination' toward fasting, the 'overwhelming need to repent', not knowing of what the repentance was to be, the 'resolution' coming as it seemed not from his own volition but 'with the force of a command' (p. 92) to spend the whole night in prayer, are all accepted by B. G. (after he had listened to exposition of Catholic doctrine at the Retreat, to which another 'irrational urge had directed him), as the voice of God who had been seeking him while he had thought it was he who was actively seeking. A wave of love seemed now to invade his soul and body.<sup>375</sup> But conflict was renewed between reason and the passion for fasting and vigil until at last, in a long vigil in which consciousness of time was lost and he afterwards believed himself to have entered that inner sanctuary of one's being where the soul is 'in direct contact with God' (p. 104): there he surrendered his will to the power that had led him to this renunciation.<sup>376</sup> It was after this and a study of Newman that he became convinced that the true church was that of Rome and that the atmosphere of prayer and fellowship in the monastery he visited was that which he had been seeking.

Feb. 25. Today, looking at a passage in Archetypal Patterns, thinking how much of all one has realized and enjoyed slips away and seems lost, I saw the ideal I have termed that of faith, in contrast to the ideal of scientific knowledge, as so far shirked in my article. Should I not, before I end, speak of the inner life as in some manner craving a fulfillment? Plato wrote of the Good that every soul in its perplexity pursues:<sup>377</sup> Augustine of the restlessness to be appeased only

in God.<sup>378</sup> Surely that philosophic and religious tradition with which according to Jaspers the thinker conducts his dialogue must supply means of indicating a character in faith's ideal of knowledge which my article can't be completed without.<sup>379</sup>

March 1. I seem always wanting to look at my life from some standpoint truer than that of chance impulses. That need seems related to this theme at which I work in my article. I recognize an 'inner' and outer aspect to my own as to every other life. Yet the inner aspect as reflectively known must be known from some standpoint; and here enters the 'other', the group-member, the intelligence with whom I am in communication, finally the Divine compassion and judge who sees and knows all.

March 16. 'Alas! it was an evil time; / God cursed me in my sore distress; / I prayed, yet every day I thought / I loved my children less'. Those lines come often in my mind when, because things have gone wrong, I am addressed in curt resentful tones. The shepherd's prayers brought him no miracle of grace, transforming bitterness to compassion. Where there is no prayer, nor answering grace, frustration leaves bitterness that turns upon any being in the way, in this case specially any familiar human being, and, as in the case of the shepherd, those for whom the painful effort is made. I despise myself somewhat for suffering so much oppression from that resentful manner. I write this to help me in the struggle, if I must keep braced to meet ill temper, not to let it penetrate too far.

March 18. Yesterday, as I grew tired with copying my article for typing, misgivings strengthened that, isolated, I could not tell whether or not my writings made sense for others. Today my spirits revived a little as I read the article by Eric Ashby in The Listener on 'Purpose

for the British Universities'. He writes on the 'rhythm of recurrent enthusiasms now for utilitarianism and now for the esoteric training of an élite, now with emphasis on the highly trained professional, and now on the broad humanist'. He thinks of 'the response of a university to pressure from society' being rightly 'a dynamic equilibrium, always drifting this way and that, always adjusting itself'.<sup>380</sup> The university should according to the direction of the pressure emphasize in opposition either 'the relevance of knowledge to the problems of society' or the 'timeless quality about some kinds of knowledge'.<sup>381</sup> I find his distinction correspondant to that my article considers between the knowledge that is faith's ideal, of the 'inner life', the knowledge of the good communicated in symbolic terms and imagery by one spirit to another, and that other knowledge verifiable in sense or in terms of the impersonal intellect. Our ordinary thought and speech, one might say, moves between the two kinds of meaning, symbolic personal, and objective impersonal, in such an equilibrium as Ashby describes. Surely some readers might recognize in my discussion an idea of some value.

March 20. The heroic and tragic drama, as Trevelyan characterizes it, by Hope Muntz, for me illustrates what I have called 'the universal tragedy of our history', how persons and events in which we find a divine beauty and value become changed, obscured, in their issue.<sup>382</sup> About Harold as Earl and as King the author contrives a glory, that shines before all men at the moment when William's troops cheered him after his rescue of the two soldiers from the quicksand;<sup>383</sup> or again when skilful speech wins him an answer of 'thunderous' assent from formerly hostile men of York.<sup>384</sup> But the tragic glory shines more authentically in the vision of Bishop Wulfstan by whom Harold was loved in God. Wulfstan sees Harold as undergoing a supreme trial: 'The power of the Cross beside him and



the power of the Curse upon his head', a curse symbolized by the golden arm ring that belonged to the betrayed prince. In Wulfstan's eyes, Harold fails in the trial of the oath imposed by Duke William. He is absolved from keeping but not from taking the oath till atonement shall have been made.<sup>385</sup> Yet the encounter between them has given Harold peace (p. 145), a peace within which he could recall the story King Canute told him, a child, how the peace King Edmund fought and died for, Canute destroyed and made anew. 'Can it be possible', King Harold spoke, following his thought 'that a man's foe should destroy him yet fulfill his work?' (p. 234)<sup>386</sup> Again before the last battle, of which Harold said, 'Nothing in all my life have I desired as I desire this battle', (p. 326)<sup>387</sup> having received the holy sacrament and 'vowed himself anew', Harold beheld his church, standing 'as some pilgrim before the long road home' (p. 329).<sup>388</sup> He sees the dawn at peace, but still [feels] the destructive pain to him of that friendship that had flowered between him and William when they talked together, and 'I saw the man himself that night'. To his brother reviling William, Harold answered, 'It never fortun'd me before to love a man and be deceived'. 'I could not tell which struck more deep, that I should lose my honour or that by him I lost it' and again 'Can I judge William? I followed the same road, the same spur drove me. He goes a bitter journey' (p. 355).<sup>389</sup>

As I wrote those words the novelist gives to Harold, telling his secret history, I thought: Ryle speaks of things a man says as if these could be observed as the scientist observes behaviour. Words spoken with intent to convey immediate experience are not 'behaviour' in the scientist's sense. If they achieve their end, meeting with the



'imaginative leap' of another self, they are an encounter, a part of the secret history of each. Whether or no my article, speaking of all this, is accepted, I am sure what I am trying to say has meaning. Surely for some reader, as for myself, it could help to give articulation to true thought.

April 10. The 'inner quality of experience', Wittgenstein asserted, 'can play no part in linguistic intercourse' or, so far as words have a use in communicating this, the 'use must be tied up with something showable'.<sup>390</sup> So [J.] Findlay, summarizing Wittgenstein. He expresses it also: talk about the 'inner life' is 'parasitic' on talk about the 'outer life',<sup>391</sup> and defends as 'correct' whatever persons who engage in 'the enterprise' of communicating this inner quality of experience feel pressingly, persistently and well nigh generally prompted to say.<sup>392</sup> Being myself one pressingly and persistently prompted to attempt such communication, if only within the pages of this book, I am thinking now, how one reads or listens and appropriates stories of other lives as reflections of that inner experience of one's own that so craves expression.

A story told on the Radio by L. A. E. Strong has stayed in my mind of a child journeying in charge, as she felt, of an excitable, truculent father: the child listens as the man does the wrong thing, annoys, and is annoyed by fellow passengers; the child speaks with her eyes to the stewardess: help me to look after him. She prays, 'O God, let him go to sleep'. All the time he imagines himself protecting her.<sup>393</sup> In the production recently of [J.] Barrie's Twelve-Pound Look, the same character of human intercourse appears, as the man imagines he knows women and how they envy his pampered wife whose spirit he has destroyed unwittingly by that impatient contemptuous tone one so poignantly recognizes.<sup>394</sup>

The child in the plane beside the truculent father, the wife under the domineering husband are 'showable' figures. So again was that Cousin Henry described by Trollope sitting hour after desolate hour alone in the book room, conscious of the general indifference or dislike.<sup>395</sup> It is the aching loneliness in me that catches at each 'showable' figure as in its inner loneliness an image of myself.

April 20. An article by P. S. Maclellan in The Hibbert (Jan. 1952) on Ryle's Concept of Mind has partly reassured me concerning my finished article. He urges the distinction between mind as object and mind or 'self', 'I', transcending the distinction of subject-object.<sup>396</sup> For me the attempt to develop our thought of the 'I' by reference to the 'individual' 'inner' history, and the symbolic speech by which we attempt to communicate it, does appear a contribution to philosophic thought.

Last night and today I suffer--an hour or two of my individual history darkened--by another instance of clash of minds, imperviousness of another mind to my thought and feeling, emphasizing that aching loneliness of which I wrote in my last entry--emphasizing also that shame at my own weakness that makes me silent in helpless misery before another's petulant injustice and overbearing truculence. I turn in my need to writers who appear to me able to think calmly, justly, and with whom so far I have fellowship, though in valuing such a relation I cannot but blame myself--my nature as object--for its relative coldness toward those whose injustice so alienates me, in spite of the bonds between us.<sup>397</sup>

June 20. The novel The Cornerstone I have finished reading today links in my mind with the talk I so much enjoyed last Friday. Questioned as to the spread of the Catholic faith, Mr. Carter spoke of its variety of appeal, to people of most various mentality; and accepted my suggestion

of the different characters assumed by statements as received into different contexts of world outlook. Of the persons portrayed in Mme. Oldenbourg's story, the old crusader interested me most, partly for the generous kindness that in him contended with the hatred of infidels and heretics required of him by his so confidently held creed. Hearing the story of a heretic whose wife and children crusaders had slaughtered, he accepted this as natural yet even so was compassionate in presence of the father's suffering taking him as companion of his own destitute pilgrimage.<sup>398</sup> At the last, sheltered in the squalid hovel of an infidel, he grows to love both the children and the goats who share the cave-like dwelling. At times cursing the 'unclean infidels' whose contact, he feels, 'profanes' him when he would worship his God, he is yet conscious of their kind intention toward him, anxious lest on account of it they should come to harm.<sup>399</sup> Later still when he has escaped from them, to die in his blindness and agony of heart on the barren hillside, an overpowering sense of the presence of God comes to him. For the first time he tries to make his confession 'directly to God, not a priest and it was very terrible. . . . Strong and awful as thunder, tremendous as the sea was the Presence he became aware of, receiving the admissions from his lips' (p. 525).<sup>400</sup>

July 3. I incline to connect the essential for me of Esther Warner's Trial by Sasswood (Gollancz, 1955) with the thesis of John Wren-Lewis' article in The Hibbert Journal (Oct. 1954) that 'the religious or supernatural dimension of living'<sup>401</sup> is experienced in 'truly personal relationship'.<sup>402</sup> Mrs. Warner in her Foreword speaks of her story as 'one of persons whose lives became part of my own', a story imperative only as friendship and individuality . . . have become imperative' (p. 7).<sup>403</sup>

It is because, I feel, she realizes and values her African friends for what they are 'in themselves' that she accepts without apparent demur thought and behaviour that the 'lawyer English' she has almost forgotten would brand as 'ignorant native superstition' (p. 154).<sup>404</sup> Certainly she finds tragedy in a 'longing for individual freedom that is not assured by a community of free men. She values the 'ordinary individuals' so gives 'a hand up' to those among them capable of greatness (pp. 164-65).<sup>405</sup> Yet she is prepared to accept in the present, and value, the lives in servitude to 'the authority of the massed dead, as their memories are perpetuated. . . in the Poro' (p. 164).<sup>406</sup> They are valued for their power of entering into relationship. Among her white friends she had felt herself 'unable to share in more than a tangential way in the pooled enthusiasms of a group'. Now she 'had been floated on their great buoyancy of spirit. . . . This immersion into their collective humanness . . . had a deep significance to me'. It had come about, she thought, 'because they had allowed me to share in the lively relish they felt for themselves', in 'their pride and their laughter' (pp. 171-72).<sup>407</sup>

Of the writer's relation to individuals I choose, as showing that respect for equality that she requires between persons, her encounter with Lega, the blacksmith who is also 'the grand master of the Poro, the big Devil of the secret cult' (p. 117).<sup>408</sup> At their first meeting she 'sensed him all retracted from me' (p. 177).<sup>409</sup> Instead of putting out a hand she spoke his name as Loma courtesy demanded and made the gesture meaning 'I make myself your stranger'. 'There was a searching quality in his concentrated study of my face. . . . I looked straight back at him, letting him read of me what he could'. She accepts the relief of her sponsor at the meeting, Zabogi. 'You carried that all



right, Ma'.<sup>410</sup> When, finally, her message is conveyed to Lega that according to her judgment Comma, the mission-trained //...// individual best should become his father's apprentice and initiated according to the Loma ritual, Lega is first incredulous, then 'his hands shot out toward mine' in the gesture of 'merging', of communion.<sup>411</sup>

July 28. Today I am still gladdened by that 'consent of my fellow-men' received through Mr. Hooper's letter--consent to my article and its thought of a 'form of experience' presented within those inner histories at which Ryle mocks. That 'divine persuasion', experienced in different modes, in which I do believe, though not without such 'strain' as Margaret Masterman tries to describe (The Twentieth Century, March 1955),<sup>412</sup> is illustrated for me in its character troublingly obscure by the lives of John and Charles Wesley (A Tale of Two Brothers by M. R. Brailsford, 1954). M. Brailsford comments on that character of the Wesleys' religion that gave basis for Marx' phrase 'opium of the people'. Though she can say of Wesley's society of 150,000 members at the time of his death, that each of them 'had caught some glimpse of a world outside . . . this work-a-day life and us pledged to an ideal of unselfish service' yet 'the weak point of the service' was its lack of constructiveness. There was no struggle against intolerable conditions, bad laws and exploitation.<sup>413</sup> Moreover the 'other worldliness' thus illustrated seems to have encouraged a certain blindness and distortion in personal relations, misgivings concerning the needs and pleasures of the young on the part of their parents, such condemnation of natural vanities as made Charles Wesley rejoice in the removal of his wife's youthful beauty through the disease they both recognized as 'immediately sent from God'--innoculation they had regarded as 'taking the matter out of God's hands'.<sup>414</sup>

Aug. 18. I like Anthony Quinton's formula of the need that novels



satisfy--the need to increase 'our understanding of our human environment' (Encounter, Feb. 1955).<sup>415</sup> Criticism, in the form of a reflective estimate of the novel as a presentation of life, serves that need for me sometimes as well or better than the novel itself. So also biography, or such documentary writing as 'Journey Among the Saints', by Herbert Passin (American anthropologist). One gets in that narrative the reaction of an individual, accustomed, like oneself, to a life of care and comfort--somewhat anxious care of health and belongings--to a carefree dedicated life. The renunciation of the Gandhians dedicated to poverty, celibacy, and service remained for him a tantalizing puzzle. He reports the words of one such, who had given away accumulated wealth and relates how owning much he 'always had to worry'; 'now I am completely free. . . . I can entrust myself to God and man in this India of ours'.<sup>416</sup> As they walked through mud and foulness the writer notes how 'my fastidiousness peeled away layer by layer' as pain and fatigue increased. He would have asked himself whether the journey was worthwhile but his companions did not; they remained cheerful, imperturbable.<sup>417</sup>

Aug. 19. This morning in my earliest meditation came words from Belloc: how the sight of mountain tops amid high cloud, permanent above the world, changes the being that receives it in contemplation. 'It is as though humanity were permitted to break through the illusion of daily sense' and for an instant shown 'those ultimate places where . . . the divine part in us which adores and desires breathes its own air and is at last alive'.<sup>418</sup> It is long since those words took up their habitation in my mind, but they came today--as words welcomed long ago will come--with new force and meaning in alliance with words

newly met and cautiously welcomed. The new words came today from 'A Study of the Symbolism of the Centre' by Prof. Mircea Eliade (Selection II, edited C. Hastings and D. Nicholl, Sheed and Ward, 1954).

Aug. 21. For Eliade's discussion the 'centre' is that of any 'inhabited region', any 'microcosm' or 'closed world' as conceived by a 'primitive and traditional society'. Beyond this world, 'this familiar space, there is the unknown and fearful world of demons, larvae, dead men, strangers, chaos, death and night' (p. 24). Enemies who endanger the 'life of the city, (or of any other inhabited, organised territory )' are by that fact identified 'with the demonic powers, for they are trying to re-absorb the microcosm to the state of chaos'.<sup>419</sup> At the microcosm's centre, 'the Holy manifests itself in some total form' (p. 25). 'We are here dealing with sacred space', with a 'mythical geography', to the living being 'effectively real'. Not with that "objective" geography . . . a theoretical construction of a space and a world where nobody really lives'. In mythical geography the centre 'is the point at which partitions can be broken' and 'communication made between different regions such as Earth, Heaven and Hell' (p. 29).<sup>420</sup> The 'archetypal image' of the three cosmic regions linked by an axis running through the "Centre" is found 'especially in the ancient civilizations of the East'. 'It is told in the Mishna that the Temple stands just above tehōm, the Hebrew equivalent of the Babylonian apsū, the waters of chaos before the creation' (p. 30).

Connected with this image is that of the 'World Tree' or 'World Mountain' that can imperfectly now or at the time of death, be climbed to reach heaven. Sometimes the 'World Axis' takes the form of a ladder or stairway. Thus the stairway becomes 'an image of that breakthrough from one level to another which makes possible a passage from

one mode of being to another'. Eliade is prepared to accept the appearance in 'psychoanalytical literature' of 'climbing and step symbolism' as evidence or 'indication' 'that we have here a primitive characteristic of the human psyche' (p. 38).<sup>421</sup> As 'a spontaneous rediscovery of this primitive symbol' Eliade cites the Journal for the fourth of April, 1933 by Julien Green, where he writes of an anomaly appearing in his novels, 'an idea of fear, or of some other fairly strong emotion . . . linked in some inexplicable way to that of an exposure' (p. 39). 'As a child I used to dream of being carried on a staircase'.<sup>422</sup> 'Climbing', (says Eliade) 'going up steps, symbolizes a journey towards absolute reality; any ordinary person approaching such a reality is conscious of an ambivalent sensation--fear and joy, attraction and repulsion, etc.'. A stairway, he thinks, 'is a concrete form of the mythical ladder, creeper, thread, World Tree or Universal Pillar which links together the three zones of the cosmos' (p. 39).<sup>423</sup>

Sept. 14. "There is always . . . a personal reality that eludes the examination by the psychologist; . . . a reality that cannot fully be expressed in his selected terms'.<sup>424</sup> Meeting this in the Times Literary Supplement I felt liberation of things I was trying to say in yesterday's not very satisfactory talk with Mr. Carter. When in my projected article I comment on the dissatisfaction felt by scientific anthropologists at Eliade's speculative discussion of an archetypal pattern, can I go on to speak of the different kind of thought and language needed to express something of our awareness of personal reality? Such an archetype as that of the axis relating different levels of being experienced by the student of religion, is not to be verified

through any exact analysis of behaviour, but rather authenticated--dubiously enough of course--in the imaginative life at a certain level of conscious realisation. It is the sense of need for it--as expressed in those articles of Koestler,<sup>425</sup> and of Spender, in Encounter--that witness to its validity.<sup>426</sup>

Sept. 27. Thomas Mann tells how 'In the Pit', the thoughts of Joseph were not with his lamentations, 'but far below them, while lower down again were others yet more real, like their undertones and ground basses'.<sup>427</sup> During the attack by his brother upon him, Joseph had been so rudely shaken that his eyes were opened and he saw what he had done--and that he had done it. . . . His thoughts 'sped back over a past in which all this hidden to his blissful self-conceit though partly and presumptuously known to it, had the while been preparing itself': 'he did understand that he had brought (his brothers) to this; through manifold and great mistakes which he had committed, in the assumption that everybody loved him more than themselves; this assumption which he believed, and yet did not actually quite believe, but according to which he had always acted and which had brought him . . . to the pit'. He realized he ought never to have told his brothers his dream. 'He even realized that he had actually known this all the time--and yet he had done it'.<sup>428</sup> Together with the fear and danger 'he actually experienced a sort of joy as well: the pleasure of enlightenment'.<sup>429</sup> That saying brings one to the thought of that enlightenment that is present at the close of Shakespearean tragedy and of how the case histories in analysts' records bear out that intuition in tragedy.<sup>430</sup> But what I wanted to speak of here is the relation to my own experience: my faith that in the deeper mind of another there



is a secret knowledge--a voice drowned by the clamour of resentful self feeling--that echoes the kind of judgment that would be passed by an impartial onlooker.

Sept. 29. 'With amazement he contemplated the riddle of self destructive arrogance presented to him by his own extraordinary behaviour. His wits could not cope with the riddle successfully--nor can anyone's'.<sup>431</sup> That sentence embodies well the meaning one feels in Shakespeare's tragedy and seeks in one's own life, recalling from the far past memories when--it seems--a self wiser than the self determining action is judging what the 'historical' self says or does. I have memory now of saying--perhaps to the nurse--things that I knew were silly --knew were silly almost in the way I know it now. Such memories give one the distinction of a 'central' self, from a self more varying and superficial--the self to which the 'prodigal' son came back when he said, I will go to my father.<sup>432</sup>

I have turned to my thesis of fifty odd years ago to see how I then expressed the idea that is with me now, of the almost incredible richness implicit in any pulse of conscious being. I have referred to that ideal critic, whether of act or of thought, that I then recognized in Locke's saying--his rather puzzled recognition of a 'secret reference' to the 'ideas in the minds also of other men' though 'properly and immediately' the words used could 'signify nothing but the ideas that are in the mind of the speaker'.<sup>433</sup> Is this 'the climate' or 'common perspective' of the group with whom one is in communication regulating the thought of the individual? Yet in the instances I recall I was seeking the approval of my group by saying what I half knew was silly, insincere. It seems some voice, beyond the actual voices, is speaking --some mind whose perspective is that one must climb the cosmic ladder



to enjoy. Again, it seems the central self is in communication with some agency of a wisdom beyond that of oneself or one's contemporaries in communion with whom, in prayer or contemplation, one attains a 'hill top' vision that makes possible criticism of all that is of the moment only.

Nov. 29. Reading Arthur Bryant's The Man in the Making I enjoy both his genial tolerance toward his hero and that incongruity, unflinchingly presented, between Pepys as 'a man licentious in thought and deed' and as an example 'of hard work and splendid achievement in the service of his country'.<sup>434</sup> "Music and women", he writes, "I cannot but give way to, whatever my business is", and though he deplored his frailty, he could not think it very heinous provided always that he did not cause scandal or allow it to interrupt his labours--"knowing", he said, "that this is the proper age of my life to do it".<sup>435</sup> Yet when his work was threatened, he could control his impulse. "But Lord!" he wrote, "what a conflict I had with myself, my heart tempting me a thousand times to go abroad about some pleasure". "However, I reproached myself . . . and prevailed with difficulty and did not budge, but stayed within and to my great content did a great deal of business" (p. 290).<sup>436</sup>

Jan. 8, 1956. This morning I thought about the sentence that had troubled me in my article for Encounter--the sentence about the latent power of such words as 'height', 'depth'. Watching the woodpecker and wondering what it could be that he seemed to be pulling out of the lawn now and again, with his fast-stabbing beak, I thought of the fused wealth of our sense-experience all penetrated by memories and questions: the same kind of fused wealth that tempts me to reflection and analysis

of the imaginative use of words. It is with some such interest that I reflect on the novel I have just been reading, by Howard Fast. For me the terms 'slave', 'gladiator', 'crucifixion' are enriched now and in the future by the fictional history with which he has endowed them. Slaves working in Nubian mines, their bodies 'hard and with a tight clutch on life', fitted to survive privations and a violence and continuance of toil that makes hours seem eternity: then the revolt of the gladiators and the wonder of standing if only for once, for a moment, as a free man, one who had made the great decision to dare all for freedom: the crucified bodies all along the Appian way and the agony of crucifixion too vividly portrayed: all this passes into memory to be present, though not opened out in detail, when one meets these terms again.<sup>437</sup>

Jan. 18. The Figure in the Mist, by E. Coxhead, finds words for aspects of experience that it is a relief to meet thus objectified--not so much words as images of encounter between persons. The two women: Margaret, the pretty but unperceptive wife, Agnes, the plain but perceptive virgin, meet in the atmosphere of mutual exasperation that I know too well. On the girl's part there is the attraction, now grown painful in its intensity, to the man she must leave to this wife with whom he has to 'bear'. In the pain of her struggle to adjust to her loss the beauty that was round her in the time of companionship is gone; 'floor of heather and wall of mountain' are 'flat and monotonous', yet she believes that beauty 'by resolution could be re-captured'. The pain drives her to that inner act of 'shutting out' reflective minds now know so well; also she has to prove herself 'adult'.<sup>438</sup> The new awareness of the effect upon a child of ill feeling between its

guardians is also illustrated. Adam becomes 'fractious and tired--generally difficult'. The fierce longing for the 'wonderful experience' of talking 'on equal terms' with someone whose vision of life is felt as wiser than one's own, in Agnes' reference to it finds its image also.<sup>439</sup> So also the wise woman counsellor who challenges the sufferer tormented at the moment by 'angry hysteria' by faith in her power to 'go on learning, no matter if it's painful', to try to realize her desired friend as a mere man with 'a foolish streak'.<sup>440</sup> Is 'the figure in the mist' inadequate to effect that rediscovery of the wonder of the world, the wonder of all that was to be seen and learnt? Not that figure only but the immense view that in //. . .// clarity had opened before her, had given a vision she could 'take home' to the difficulties she must meet there. 'Thankfulness smote and humbled her'.<sup>441</sup>

Nov 21 Thinking of a research such as the student in Michigan might pursue into the image pattern of the 'heron transgressive learner' as presented in The Ancient Mariner, & invited by a suggestion of a two-fold interpretation of the Mariner's sin, I want to make clear to myself where such interpretation might lead.

The Mariner's sin, in defiance of... the well organized system of 'friend' may be related to infantile rebellion against the ideas of a father-god.

Nov 22 That Daemon who in the poem loved & avenged the bird man, in that midregion of our racial as well as literary interlance towards Mr. S. Lowes says we harbour the primal will to believe, bear close relation to the <sup>divine</sup> father who marries the sparrow's fall, & the <sup>divine</sup> <sup>father</sup> <sup>who</sup> <sup>marries</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>sparrow's</sup> <sup>fall</sup>, & the <sup>divine</sup> <sup>father</sup> <sup>who</sup> <sup>marries</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>sparrow's</sup> <sup>fall</sup>.

Nov 24 The other aspect of the Mariner's sin is the violation of loving kindness. The albatross had eaten food with his cousin he had 'loved' the man that stood in his way; the protective tenderness excited & violated by the act sets up by its own strength the forces of remorse.

I have been reading again in Jung's 'Psychology of the Unconscious' his account of the sublimation of the erotic impulse by Christianity. The death of the Redeemer in which his followers could participate by the sacrificial death of 'the old man', 'the carnal self', could create a 'new way of love' (p. 78) permitting that force the Mariner outraged of loving-kindness to attain a new reality when the great spiritually united brothers: Who to his Cousin's sin says Jung (82) expressly places in opposition religion [or here I might say reversed love of living creatures] does something the goodness of which cannot be denied.

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## Notes to the Text

<sup>1</sup> Helen Wodehouse, One Kind of Religion (Cambridge: University Press, 1944), p. 3. Wodehouse says that God is "the sum and substance of all good." She phrases this another way when she says, "Let God be the concrete universal of good" (p. 7). Acknowledging that the phrase is a source of controversy in philosophy, she defines it as all that anything is capable of being. "Possibly we come to grasp this part of reality with the aid of a first step that might be called abstraction, but the final result, of perceiving and holding an identity that takes on so many differences, and so many differences that press into an identity, is not an abstraction but a concretion" (p. 8). John Crowe Ransom uses this phrase in "The Concrete Universal: Observations on the Understanding of Poetry," in Poems and Essays (1924; rpt. New York: Knopf, 1955), pp. 159-85, where he points out that a critic should read technical philosophy "to save him from unconscious errors, like some cheapening of the poem's effect, or some wretched exclusions that he might feel inclined to make within its meaning" (p. 160). He says Hegel uses the word universal to mean "any idea in the mind which proposes a little universe, or organized working combination of parts, where there is a whole and single effect to be produced, and the heterogeneous parts must perform their several duties faithfully in order to bring it about. . . . It becomes a

Concrete Universal when it has been materialized and is actually working" (p. 163). See AP, p. 70, TI, pp. 47-49, and TP, p. 467 for further references to Wodehouse.

<sup>2</sup> Karl Jaspers, The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), pp. 21-22. "Nowhere is the truth ready made; it is an inexhaustible stream that flows from the history of philosophy as a whole from China to the West, yet flows only when the primal source is captured for new realizations in the present. . . . The word 'Philosophy' has become a symbol of our gratitude for the possibility of continued dialogue with this tradition." Jaspers (1883-1969) laid the groundwork for the modern philosophy of existence. See pp. 221, 224, and 244-45 following.

<sup>3</sup> Graham Greene, "The Lost Childhood," in The Lost Childhood and Other Essays (New York: Viking, 1951), pp. 17-18. "But when--perhaps I was 14 by that time--I took Miss Marjorie Bowen's The Viper of Milan from the library shelf, the future for better or worse really struck. From that moment I began to write. All the other possible futures slid away: the potential civil servant, the don, the clerk had to look for other incarnations. Imitation after imitation of Miss Bowen's magnificent novel went into exercise-books--stories of 16th century Italy or 12th century England marked with enormous brutality and a despairing romanticism. It was as if I had been supplied once and for all with a subject."

"Why? On the surface The Viper of Milan is only the story of a war between Gian Galezao Visconti, Duke of Milan, and Mastino della Scala, Duke of Verona, told with zest and cunning and an amazing pictorial sense. Why did it creep in and colour and explain the

terrible living world of the stone stairs and the never quiet dormitory? It was no good in that real world to dream that one would ever be a Sir Henry Curtin [a character in another boyhood book, King Solomon's Mines ], but della Scala who at last turned from an honesty that never paid and betrayed his friends and died dishonoured and a failure even at treachery--it was easier for a child to escape behind his mask. As for Visconti, with his beauty, his patience, and his genius for evil, I had watched him pass by many a time in his black Sunday suit smelling of mothballs. His name was Carter. He exercised terror from a distance like a snowcloud over the young fields. Goodness has only once found a perfect incarnation in a human body and never will again, but evil can always find a home there. Human nature is not black and white but black and grey. I read all that in The Viper of Milan and I looked round and I saw that it was so." These journal excerpts also appear in the introductory note by Greene to Bowen's novel (Chester Springs, Great Britain: Dufour, 1906; rpt. Philadelphia: Dufour, 1965). See pages 138-39 for further references to Greene.

<sup>4</sup> A. E. (pseudonym for George Russell [1867-1935]), "Germinal." This poem is the epilogue to Greene's essay "The Lost Childhood."

<sup>5</sup> Greene, p. 18. "She had given my my pattern--religion might explain it to me in other terms, but the pattern was already there--perfect evil walking the world where perfect good can never walk again, and only the pendulum ensures that after all in the end justice is done."

<sup>6</sup> Edwin Muir, "The Way," in Collected Poems 1921-1958 (London: Faber and Faber, 1960), p. 166. See "Poetry and the Human Condition," p. 353, for further reference to Muir.

<sup>7</sup> Dante Gabriel Rossetti, "A Last Confession," in The Poetical Works of Dante Gabriel Rossetti (London: 1887; rpt. Boston: Little, Brown, 1905), I, 58-83. In this poem, subtitled "Regno Lombardo-Veneto, 1848" and written in 1870, the speaker is an Italian patriot, mortally wounded by the Austrians, who is making his last confession to a priest during the battle. He tells the priest that eleven years ago, during a severe famine, he found a little girl who had been abandoned. He takes care of her and as she grows older falls in love with her. But her filial respect for him disappears and he fears that she has become a whore. In hopeless despair, he stabs her with a knife that he had given her. "O Father . . . pardon me" are lines 17-19 and "I think . . . utterance" are lines 103-08 of the poem. See page 165 for further references to this poem.

<sup>8</sup> These lines could not be identified.

<sup>9</sup> Basil Willey, "Books in General," New Statesman and Nation, 44 (1952), 108-09. In this review of The Note-Books of Matthew Arnold, ed. H. F. Lowry, K. Young and W. H. Dunn (Oxford: Statesman and Nation Publishing Company, 1952), Willey says: "What these notebooks represent is not the multitudinous concerns of a man who is primarily a literary critic or even an educationalist, but (to quote Mr. Eliot on Stoicism) 'the permanent substratum of a number of ways of cheering oneself up.' The question they really answer is 'Who prop, thou ask'st, in these bad days my mind?'" Willey says of Arnold: "Although we knew it before, we can here see him more clearly than ever as a man in whom constitutional lassitude and melancholy are being fought down from day to day, and mastered, by deep spiritual convictions and an overriding sense of obligation."



He then lists, in addition to the passage from 2 Thess.: "Be not weary in well-doing" iii. 13 (mistakenly attributed by Bodkin to Galatians), passages from Arnold's spiritual guides: St. Benedict, Michelet, Goethe, Bishop Wilson, and Thomas à Kempis, thought to be the author of The Imitation of Christ. The texts on which Arnold lays stress are those which speak of the "method" or "secret" of Christianity: "inwardness, the change of heart, inner cleansing, renunciation, losing one's self to gain eternal life, and dying to sin to rise again with Christ."

<sup>10</sup> G. Lowes Dickinson, Justice and Liberty: a Political Dialogue, 2nd ed. (1908; rpt. New York: Doubleday, Page, 1909), p. 225. "What with one arm he attacked with the other he defended, and the inheritance of the brute, toss and plunge as he may, drags at his heels and hangs about his neck." A professor, a banker, and a "gentleman of leisure" meet to discuss the relation of ideals to social realities. Martin, the professor, argues that by maintaining particular social institutions, certain evils are thereby maintained. Defending his ideal of socialism against the banker's capitalism and the gentleman's aristocracy, Martin calls for population control, the elimination of inheritance laws, and the end of a class society. They all agree that man is bound to nature; while forced to fight her brutality, he needs her because she "produces or withholds that conjecture of the man and event whence leaps into life the spark we call an idea" (p. 222). This impulse to create the ideal saves man from his own proclivities toward violence and depravity. Agreeing that moral reformation must precede institutional reform, Martin hopes that the power of imagination, seeing man as he should be, will be used to transform man's inner life. See pp. 115-16

for further references to Dickinson.

<sup>11</sup> The Confessions of St. Augustine, trans. Edward B. Pusey (New York: Modern Library, 1949), p. 62. "Blessed whoso loveth Thee, and his friend in Thee, and his enemy for Thee. For he alone loses none dear to him, to whom all are dear in Him who cannot be lost." In Book IV, Augustine talks about his dear friend who becomes very ill and is baptized while unconscious. When he recovers, Augustine, who at this time was a Manichaeian and thus rejected any rite which employed a material substance, tries to joke with him about the futility and stupidity of the baptism. But his friend, to his amazement, has taken the baptism seriously: "he so shrunk from me, as from an enemy; and with a wonderful and sudden freedom bade me, as I would continue his friend, forbear such language to him" (p. 58). Augustine decides to speak with him later, but his friend dies. Augustine describes his grief, telling how long it took before he could accept his loss.

<sup>12</sup> James Thomson (B. V.) [These initials, which Thomson included with his signature, stand for Bysshe (Shelley was Thomson's favorite poet) and Vanolis (an anagram for Thomson's friend, F. von Handenberg Novalis)], "The City of Dreadful Night," in Poems and Some Letters of James Thomson, ed. Anne Ridler (Carbondale: University of Southern Illinois Press, 1963), p. 198. A congregation is gathered to listen to a preacher in a huge, unilluminated cathedral. He says: "Can we not bear these years of labouring breath? / But if you would not this poor life fulfill, / Lo, you are free to end it when you will, / Without the fear of waking after death" (p. 196). A man cries out that there is no God: "My wine of life is poison mixed with gall / My noonday passes in a nightmare dream / I worse than

lose the years which are my all / What can console me for the loss  
 supreme? / Speak not of comfort where no comfort is, / Speak not at  
 all: can words make foul things fair? / Our life's a cheat, our death  
 a black abyss: / Hush, and be mute, envisaging despair." The lines  
 Bodkin quotes are also quoted by William James in "Is Life Worth  
 Living?" in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy  
 (1897; rpt. New York: Dover, 1956), pp. 35-36.

<sup>13</sup> Euripides, "Medea," trans. Gilbert Murray, Fifteen Greek Plays  
 2nd ed., (1929; rpt. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 455.  
 The chorus of women, with Medea's children's nurse, stand outside  
 listening to Medea wail over Jason's decision to marry a Corinthian  
 princess: "Give me to see / Him and his bride, who sought / My grief  
 when I wronged her not, Broken in misery, / And all her house."  
 They are afraid of Medea's wild words and the nurse predicts, "This  
 wrath new-born / Shall make mad workings ere it dies" (p. 454).  
 The women ask the nurse to bring Medea out. She agrees, saying,  
 "That will I: though what words of mine / Or love shall move her?  
 Let them lie / With the old lost labors." Medea, daughter of  
 Aietes, king of the Colchians, helps Jason steal the Golden Fleece,  
 having also killed her brother when he plotted to kill Jason. They  
 flee to Iolcos, where Pelias refuses to keep his promise to return  
 Jason's kingdom to him. Through Medea, Pelias is killed and Medea  
 and Jason go to Corinth. There Jason decides to marry a princess  
 and does not intervene when Medea is banished.

<sup>14</sup> Alistair Cooke, "Letter from America," in The Listener,  
 23 October, 1952, p. 670. Cooke calls the film technique, cinerama, a  
 revolution in the movies comparable to the advent of the "talkies"

in 1927. He describes the size of the screen, the unique use of camera, and the utilization of the principle of peripheral vision, saying that cinerama's charm is "that it has taken a giant stride backwards, back to the direct sensation those first people felt when they saw the creaking train of the brothers Lumière [in the first film made in Paris in 1895]." There is no reference in this article to Edmund Burke; nor is the article terrifying.

<sup>15</sup> Eric H. Wamington, Philip G. Rouse, eds., W. H. D. Rouse, trans., Great Dialogues of Plato (New York: New American Library, 1956), pp. 466-70. In the Phaedo (Phaidon), Simmias is asking Socrates, who is in prison awaiting death, how he can "take it so easily" to die. Socrates answers that he has "good hopes that something remains for the dead. . . . The fact is, those who tackle philosophy aright are simply and solely practising dying, practising death, all the time, but nobody sees it. . . . Then in fact, Simmias, those who rightly love wisdom are practising dying, and death to them is the least terrible thing in the world." Bodkin quotes from this discussion in TI, saying that when she first read the Phaedo, an image formed in her mind "of a man happy, secure and at peace in his death, through the power of philosophic thought" (p. 5).

<sup>16</sup> Bible, 1 Cor. x. 32-33. Paul says: "Give none offense, neither to the Jews, nor to the Gentiles, nor to the church of God / Even as I please all men in all things, not seeking mine own profit, but the profit of many, that they may be saved." He also says: "Lie not one to another, seeing that ye have put off the old man with his deeds, / And have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him" (Col. iii. 9-10).

See p. 197 for another reference to this quotation. "If ye then be risen with Christ, seek those things which are above where Christ sitteth on the right hand of God" (Col. iii. 1). "And let the peace of God rule in your hearts, to the which also ye are called in one body; and be ye thankful" (Col. iii. 15). And whatsoever ye do in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God and the Father by him" (Col. iii. 17).

<sup>17</sup> Although this citation could not be identified, the thought is related to what Bodkin says in "Poetry and the Human Condition": "I have read of men in prison or concentration camp to whom, amidst times of depression or despair, have come moments of imaginative vision. A single glimpse, perhaps, of sky, or tree, or road leading the eye into distance, could waken such vision and restore, at least for the moment, hope and fortitude" (p. 353).

<sup>18</sup> New Statesman and Nation.

<sup>19</sup> Basil Davidson, "Japanese Ally? The Facade--and the Facts," Union of Democratic Control, n. p., n. d. (circa 1951), pp. 3-11. Davidson says that in 1945 America formally approved Japan's peacetime demilitarization under the auspices of the Far Eastern Commission. Now, in 1951, he contends that America wants to re-arm Japan in order to defend herself against Russia: "Japan is to become an integral part of the strategic system of the United States" (p. 5). Because he believes that American policy has not succeeded in changing Japan's militant nationalism, Davidson wants Britain, "tragically involved in American decisions" (p. 10), to intervene to stop American war-makers by refusing to acquiesce in Mr. Dulles' request that America be allowed to sign a separate peace treaty with Japan. Instead he calls for a treaty negotiated



by the five great powers. (The Union of Democratic Control is a non-party organization, supported by voluntary contributions, which seeks to provide the facts upon which an enlightened foreign policy may be formed. It was founded in 1914 by E. D. Morel and others).

<sup>20</sup>John Murphy (1882-1972) was a friend who often visited Bodkin during the last twenty years of her life and who had known her from her years in London.

<sup>21</sup>This reference could not be found.

<sup>22</sup>Ann Bridge, Frontier Passage (Boston: Little, Brown, 1942). (Ann Bridge is a pseudonym for Mary Dolling Sanders O'Malley, 1889-1974). In the fall of 1938, an English family is vacationing in a village on the Spanish-French border, filled with refugees, correspondents, and suspected spies. They accidentally discover two secret frontier passages where the Nationalists smuggle people and money out. Seventeen-year-old Rosemary meets James Milcom, a correspondent, and through him the Condesa de Verdura, a refugee. James helps the Condesa with clothing and food and also visits her imprisoned husband, whom she has never loved. Although James loves her, he refuses to marry her, saying that her husband has changed and will be a good husband to her when he is released. James's selfless love is the love to which Bodkin refers. Rosemary also is a symbol of such love in her unspoken affection for James. See p. 27 for additional reference to Bridge.

<sup>23</sup>Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). In "Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone" (1793), Kant argues that Jesus is the divinely given moral example. Having once seen such a good and pure disposition, man, using his innate freedom, must adopt genuinely

moral principles into his disposition to serve as basis for his actions: "Moral religion consists, then, in the heart's disposition to fulfill all human duties as divine commands" (Masterpieces of Christian Literature, ed. Frank N. Magill [New York: Harper and Row, 1963], p. 629).

<sup>24</sup> Dickinson, The Meaning of Good: a Dialogue (Glasgow: James Maclehose, 1901), pp. 191-92. "And, on the other hand, it may very well be that one who passes through life without attaining the fruition of love yet with his gaze always set upon it, in and through many other connections, may yet come closer to the end of his seeking than one who, having known love, has sunk to rest in it then and there, as though he had come already to his journey's end, when really he has only reached an inn upon the road." Dickinson discusses and rejects three postulates concerning the nature of good: that our ideas about God have no relation to any real fact; that we have easy and simple criteria for what is good, such as instinct, the course of nature or current conventions of pleasure; and that all reality is good and all evil mere appearance. He then talks about the good we seek, the characteristics and defects of each kind of good, and asks if there is such a thing as the good. Finding the good of art and of knowledge defective, he speculates whether or not the love of other persons is the closest we will come to absolute good. Dickinson concludes that the question of whether or not the good is attainable depends upon one's view of the possibility of personal immortality. His description of an ideal society ends the dialogue.

<sup>25</sup> Dickinson, The Meaning of Good, p. 193. "But every man has to live his own way, according to his opportunities and capacity. Only, as I think myself, all are involved in the same scheme, and

all are driven to the same consummation." To the dissenting view that such consummation is "in the clouds" he answers: "I do not know about that; but, at any rate, and this is the important point, that which urges us to it is here and now."

<sup>26</sup> C. E. M. Joad, "Thinking about Immortality," The Hibbert Journal, 51 (1952), 23. "It is, then, to the experience of Value in its traditional forms of Truth, Goodness and Beauty, that I should look for an intimation of what the concept of immortality may hold. But this entails that one accepts the traditional Christian view of the Values as the modes of God's revelation of Himself to man on earth." Joad rules out three views of immortality: the spiritualist, which holds that only an abstracted fragment of a person survives; the concept that the personality survives "without radical change from what I now know myself to be" (p. 20); and the belief that the individual soul merges into an impersonal, universal consciousness. Instead, he argues for the Christian teaching concerning immortality: intercourse with God, which will be "a prolongation, intensification, and assurance of the continuance of the highest and best experiences that we enjoy in our present earthly condition" (p. 23). These are experiences of value, whose traditional forms are truth, goodness, and beauty, through which God reveals himself to man.

<sup>27</sup> Begun in 1869 as The Charity Organization, this is one of the oldest groups in England working in the field of social service (Letter from Irene Swallow, 15 October 1977).

<sup>28</sup> William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902; rpt. New York: New American Library, 1958), p. 388.

"Disregarding the over-beliefs, and confining ourselves to that which is common and generic, we have in the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come, a positive content of religious experience which, it seems to me, is literally and objectively true as far as it goes." The "wider self," says James, is the subconscious continuation of our conscious life, which the religious person interprets as "higher." James discusses this subliminal consciousness at greater length on pages 186-90 and 383-87, where he calls attention to Frederick Myers' essay on the subliminal consciousness in Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, VII, 305, and to another work by Myers. See pp. 232-35 for further references to James.

<sup>29</sup> Roger Frison-Roche, The Last Crevasse, trans. Janet Adam and Nea Morin (London: Methuen, 1952), p. 39. "She was afraid--of the mountains and of Zian. Here everything was cold and cruel. Her body was weary from the four hours' approach. Food made her feel sick; she kept herself going with nothing more than a drop of the very sweet cold tea which she drank straight from the flask that her companion had already held to his lips. She felt far from everywhere. Her loneliness was absolute, the landscape round was nothing but ice and rock, bold peaks, range after range, one behind the other as far as the horizon." Brigitte has come to the Alps to learn mountain-climbing; she falls in love with her guide, Zian. After they marry, because Brigitte is very unhappy living in Zian's ancestral village, Zian buys a chalet in a neighboring town and tries unsuccessfully to start a school to train guides. A break between the pair comes when Zian accepts an offer to guide a

group for a month-long hike. He answers Brigitte's protests by saying that they need the money, but he thinks, "I ought to have realised that Brigitte isn't the same as our women. She hasn't got the patience that a guide's wife needs" (p. 159). Brigitte leaves for Paris and does not return when the month is up. Zian, who misses her very much, suffers an accident while hiking alone and dies before she returns.

<sup>30</sup> Frison-Roche, pp. 41-2. "Now it was her turn to explore the rock with tentative fingers that groped for invisible holds, and to place the toes of her rubbers with precision on the wet notches. Very soon nothing mattered any longer to her but the climbing--how to force her way up."

<sup>31</sup> Frison-Roche, p. 46. "Suddenly Brigitte felt happy, free, unfettered. She was at one with the landscape around her, and peaceful as the vast stretches of snow which filled the rock gorges and transformed them into welcome resting places. . . . For the first time in her life, Brigitte wanted nothing more; it seemed to her that she was living in a dream more wonderful than she could have imagined. And this she owed to the simple fellow sitting beside her."

<sup>32</sup> Frison-Roche, p. 103. On one of their climbs, Brigitte and Zian are joined by Dayot, another guide, and his two clients, a Swiss father and son. As they stand talking, a small avalanche occurs, knocking the elder Swiss to his death and crushing Dayot's hand.

<sup>33</sup> Margaret Leigh, The Fruit in the Seed: Chapters of Auto-Biography (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1952), p. 91. "All three passages [taken from her three books] touch on certain aspects of



solitude, silence and the sea--the things I loved so much in those days and still do. From Highland Passage, 1948: "I am here alone in a boat between sea and sky. . . . There is salt on my lips, the taste of sweat and tears; but life unsalted has no savour. Away from the land, I have no age, no sex, no cares, no passions."

Leigh, born in Oxford in 1895, calls her book "a piece of spiritual autobiography, written mainly to help others, and more particularly to show that doubt is not incompatible with faith" (Pref., p. 7).

She left the Church of England in 1916 and taught at Reading University before buying a farm in 1925, where she says her love of nature became her philosophy for twenty-five years: "The peace of wild nature had become a substitute, or a synonym, for the God I could not find" (p. 81). She wrote three books while running the farm and living the life of a good pagan stoic. In 1947, after reading Pascal's Pensées, she became a Catholic and eventually joined the Carmelite order.

<sup>34</sup> Leigh, p. 80. "Philosophy is perhaps too intellectual and cold a term: it was rather a kind of spiritual awareness, which kept ajar the door into that spiritual world so deeply longed for, of which I seemed to possess but to have mislaid the key. At the back of my mind was the sense of eternity, symbolized by the boundless sea and everlasting hills; in comparison with it our human strife and suffering are as nothing."

<sup>35</sup> Leigh, pp. 122-23. She was not happy when she made her first Communion in the Catholic faith: "For I was filled with an inexplicable, unreasoning repugnance, so that I had to drag myself to the altar from sheer obedience because I believed that our Lord wished it, and even then I could refuse Him nothing. Later,

when as a tertiary I was bound by rule to weekly Communion, the sense of compulsion was still there, although some hours later I was conscious of grace."

<sup>36</sup>Leigh, p. 126. After she was confirmed in the Catholic faith in 1949, a friend asked if she were thinking of becoming a Carmelite. Leigh answered that she was not. "But afterwards, when returning to Oxford by an evening train, I was aware of a secret, steady influx of grace: and it came to me that these limitations [among which is the rule that one cannot enter a religious order until one has been a convert for two years] might be the one thing necessary for the training and scouring of a soul generous up to a point, but deeply in love with its own will."

<sup>37</sup>H. S. Shelton, "Jesus: God or Man," The Hibbert Journal, 49 (1951), 271-76. Shelton urges Christians to abandon belief in the incarnation and resurrection, stating that the gospels are ordinary, fallible, human documents and not accurate history. Human thought has changed since the time of Christ, and today "this dogma of the Divinity of Christ makes the task of a Christian who attempts to state a rational defence of his creed to an intelligent outsider very difficult" (p. 272). Instead, he believes that the gospels and Paul's letters should be viewed as a unique body of teaching: "If you have a body of teaching so sublime that for very many years it has been possible to regard them as the words of God himself, they are still there, and remain as sublime as ever, even when we no longer assert his actual and literal Divinity" (p. 276).

<sup>38</sup>Carl Francis Keppler wrote to Bodkin when he was writing his dissertation, subsequently published as Symbolism in "The Ancient

Mariner": a Study in Method (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1956; 1978). Although he criticizes all previous interpretations of the poem for arbitrariness of interpretation, confusion between the conscious and unconscious levels of Coleridge's mind, confusion of symbol and allegory, or preoccupation with Coleridge as a person, Keppler calls Bodkin's treatment in Archetypal Patterns "the most subtle, penetrating, and convincing" work done on the poem: "In Miss Bodkin's essay for the first time we find the suggestion of a level of thinking and feeling, or rather of thinking-feeling, which does not lie apart from but seems to lie somewhere far beneath the level on which the personal life is lived and the personal thoughts are formed, a level of what she calls (following C. G. Jung) primordial imagery, representing dim memories that reach back farther than those formed by specific individual experiences" (p. 78). After applying his method of interpretation, based upon Jung's concept of the collective unconscious, Keppler finds that the poem consists of the crime of ego-consciousness expiated through growth. See p. 17 for a further reference to Keppler.

<sup>39</sup> St. John of the Cross (1542-1591), a Spanish mystic, wrote The Dark Night of the Soul, a manual for mystical contemplation.

<sup>40</sup> "In deference to the force of collective assertion of the well-organized school of Freud, one finds oneself thinking of a more specialized offence--repressed childish lust in regard to one parent and hostility to the other--as the crime which analysis should discover beneath the haunting dream-sense of guilt" (AP, p. 58).

<sup>41</sup> John Livingston Lowes, The Road to Xanadu: a Study in the

Ways of the Imagination (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1927), pp. 239-40. After quoting Coleridge's statement in his Biographia that in his Literary Ballads he wanted from his readers "that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment which constitutes poetic faith," Lowes says: "And as for daemons, the grounds of our willing suspension are clear. They belong, like spectre-barks and eternal wanderers, to that misty midregion of our racial as well as literary inheritance, toward which we harbour, when the imagination moves through haunted chambers, the primal instinctive will to believe." Lowes says that his book "is not a study of Coleridge's theory of the imagination. It is an attempt to get at the workings of the faculty itself. . . . I am attempting to do this only--to discover how, in two great poems ['The Rime of the Ancient Mariner' and 'Kubla Khan'], out of chaos the imagination frames a thing of beauty" (Intro., pp. x-xi). Lowes begins his study by quoting from a notebook known as the Gutch Memorandum Book, kept by Coleridge from the spring of 1795 to the spring or summer of 1798, "the years which lead up to and include the magnificent flowering of Coleridge's genius and on which his renown as a poet rests" (p. 5). The second chapter of Bodkin's Archetypal Patterns is devoted to a study of the major Coleridge poems and the rebirth archetype.

<sup>42</sup> Donald A. Stauffer, ed., Selected Poetry and Prose of Coleridge (New York: Random House, 1951), p. 18. "The spirit who bideth by himself / In the land of mist and snow, / He loved the bird that loved the man / Who shot him with his bow" ("The Rime of the Ancient Mariner," III, 402-05).

<sup>43</sup> Carl Gustave Jung, Psychology of the Unconscious, a Study

of the Transformation and Symbolism of the Libido, 2nd ed., trans.

Beatrice M. Hinkle (1916; rpt. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1931), p.

79. Jung is speaking of the effects of Christianity in the first three hundred years after Christ's death: "The people of this age had grown ripe for identification with the *λογος* (word) 'become flesh,' for the founding of a new fellowship, united by one idea in the name of which people could love each other and call each other brothers. The old vague idea of a *Μεσσίας* (Messiah), of a mediator in whose name new ways of love would be created, became a fact, and with that humanity made an immense step forward. This had not been brought about by a speculative, completely sophisticated philosophy, but by an elementary need in the mass of people vegetating in spiritual darkness." This book is a demonstration of the analysis of a troubled personality by Dr. Jung's methods. He analyzes an American girl who uses the pseudonym Frank Miller by discussing all the trains of thought suggested to him by her phantasies, which she had written down in diary form. Bodkin's quotations are all taken from the third chapter, "The Hymn of Creation," in which Jung finds unconscious allusions to the book of Job in one of Miss Miller's poems. In one of the many digressions in this long book (483 pages), Jung discusses the rise of Christianity, which, like Mithracism, "strove after precisely that higher form of social intercourse symbolic of a projected 'become flesh' idea (logos), whereby all those strongest impulsive energies of the archaic man, formerly plunging him from one passion into another, and which seemed to the ancients like the compulsion of the evil constellations . . . and which in the sense of later ages might be translated as the driving force of the libido . . . could be



made use of for social preservation" (p. 78). Although Jung blames Christianity for erecting barriers of repression to protect man from his own sinfulness, he would like to make use of some of its wisdom. "The stumbling block is the unhappy combination of religion and morality. That must be overcome" (p. 85). He continues to discuss the girl's phantasies in subsequent chapters, elucidating their significance by analogies and allusions to literature, mythology, religion, etymology, and social customs.

<sup>44</sup>Jung, pp. 81-82. "To the degree that the modern consciousness is eagerly busied with things of a wholly other sort than religion, religion and its object, original sin, have stepped into the background; that is to say, into the unconscious in great part. Therefore, today man believes neither in the one nor in the other. Consequently the Freudian school is accused of an impure phantasy, and yet one might convince one's self very easily with a rather fleeting glance at the history of ancient religions and morals as to what kind of demons are harbored in the human soul. With this disbelief in the crudeness of human nature is bound up the disbelief in the power of religion. The phenomenon, well known to every psychoanalyst, of the unconscious transformation of an erotic conflict into religious activity is something ethically wholly worthless and nothing but an hysterical production. Whoever, on the other hand, to his conscious sin just as consciously places religion in opposition, does something the greatness of which cannot be denied."

<sup>45</sup>Lowes, p. 239. In the Biographia Coleridge says that he set out to deal in his Lyrical Ballads with "persons and characters supernatural . . . yet so as to transfer from our inward nature . . .

a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for the shadows of imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith."

<sup>46</sup>Lowes, p. 240. "And as the immemorial projections of human questionings and intuitions--shadows of things divined, 'which having been must ever be'--they are the poet's inalienable possession."

<sup>47</sup>Lowes, p. 250. "The poem ['The Rime of the Ancient Mariner'] is no 'New Adventures of Ahasuerus.' It is a subtle transfer to a figure [the Wandering Jew] which is essentially a new creation, of associations that had long been gathering about an accepted and mysterious personality of legend."

<sup>48</sup>Lowes, pp. 295-96. "Every mortal who finds himself enmeshed in the inexplicable or the fantastic reaches out instinctively to something rooted deep, in order to retain a steady hold upon reality. . . . For through the spectral 'mise en scène' of 'The Ancient Mariner,' side by side with the lengthening orbit of the voyage, there runs, like the everlasting hills beneath the shifting play of eerie light, another moving principle, this time profoundly human: one of the immemorial, traditional convictions of the race." Lowes identifies this conviction as the need to do penance for sins committed.

<sup>49</sup>Lowes, p. 299. "But we accept illusion only when in some fashion it bears the semblance of truth. And bound in with every living fibre of this poem, bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh, is a truth as old as Cain's and as new as yesterday's experience. 'Yes,' we unconsciously say as we read, 'that is true to life--and that--and that' as one who catches reassuring glimpses of the contours of familiar hills through the fantastic pageantry

of cloud or mist."

<sup>50</sup> James Bridie, pseud. for Osborne Henry Mavor, Tobias and the Angel (London: Constable, 1931). Tobit, Anna, and their son, Tobias, having once been wealthy (though shunned as Jews), are now poor. Anna is bitter because she thinks that they would still have their money had not Tobit always been generous to anyone in need. Now Tobit has become blind. A stranger who says his name is Azarias comes to their door with food. When Anna burns some of Tobit's old parchments so as to cook the food, she finds an old promissory note signed by Gabael, who has since moved to Rages and become rich. Azarias goes with Tobias to collect the money, protecting him from danger and building up his confidence. When they stay for a few days with a friend, Tobias falls in love with his daughter, Sara, and they marry. With Azarias' help, Tobias survives the spells which were meant to bring harm to any husband of Sara's. Having collected the money from Gabael, they return home and Azarias tells Tobias how to cure Tobit's blindness. After revealing that is is really the angel Raphael, Azarias disappears.

<sup>51</sup> See page 116, n. 28.

<sup>52</sup> Jung, p. 61. "But in any religious discipline it is of the highest importance that one should remain conscious of one's difficulties--in other words, of one's sins. An excellent means to this end is the mutual confession of sin (James v: 16), which effectively prevents one from becoming unconscious. These measures aim at keeping the conflicts conscious, and that is also a sine qua non of the psychotherapeutic procedure. . . . The conscious projection at which Christian education aims therefore brings a double psychic benefit: firstly, one keeps oneself conscious of the conflict ('sin') of two mutually opposing tendencies, thus

preventing a known suffering from turning into an unknown one, which is far more tormenting, by being repressed and forgotten; and secondly, one lightens one's burden by surrendering it to God, to whom all solutions are known."

<sup>53</sup> Jung, pp. 76-77. "One must not forget that the individual psychologic roots of the Deity, set up as real by the pious, are concealed from him, and that he, although unaware of this, still bears the burden alone and is still alone with his conflict. This delusion would lead infallibly to the speedy breaking up of the system, for Nature cannot indefinitely be deceived, but the powerful institution of Christianity meets this situation. The command in the book of James is the best expression of the psychologic significance of this: 'Bear ye one another's burdens.'"

<sup>54</sup> Naomi Mitchison, Blood of the Martyrs (London: 1939; rpt. New York: McGraw Hill and Toronto: Whittlesey House, 1948), p. 33. "He had been thinking about himself, sorry for himself, wrapped up in himself like a snail in its stupid shell. Now he had looked out and seen the others." Beric, son of the king of East Britain, is a prisoner in the home of Flavius Crispus, a wealthy nobleman, in the time of Nero. Publicly humiliated by Flavia, Flavius' daughter, Beric is comforted by some of the slaves, who he later finds are secretly Christians. He is attracted by their devotion and attends some of their services. When they are subsequently arrested and sentenced to death, Beric is baptized and dies with them in the Circus Maximus. Eunice, a freedwoman, has escaped the murders and welcomes people into her home to prepare them for instruction and baptism. See pp. 132 and 136-37 following.

<sup>55</sup>Mitchison, p. 61. As Persis, who had been baptized in her native country before being sold to Flavius, watches Eunice's son form bread dough into the shape of a fish, she recognizes her new friends as Christians. To comfort the homesick girl, Eunice tells her about her brother, who had been sold years ago: "Think if you'd been sold, the way my brother was--he was a skilled man, of course, a joiner--right away into Spain, where there's no church--unless he was able to make one." When Persis asks what he could make a church of, Eunice replies: "Why, what I've been trying to give you, all this time, not knowing you were part of us: poor folk's feeling for each other."

<sup>56</sup>The Book and Administration of the Sacraments and Other Rites and Ceremonies of the Church (New York: The Church Pension Fund, 1945), p. 71. "I believe in God the Father almighty, creator of Heaven and earth, and in Jesus Christ, His only son, our Lord, who, for us men and for our salvation, came down from Heaven, was crucified, died, and was buried." This prayer is part of the Order for the Administration of the Lord's Supper, or Holy Communion.

<sup>57</sup> See p. 129, n. 59 following.

<sup>58</sup>Lowes, p. 298. Lowes says the law of cause and effect operates in both poetry and life: "You do a foolish or an evil deed, and its results come home to you. And they are apt to fall on others too. You repent, and a load is lifted from your soul. But you have not thereby escaped your deed. You attain forgiveness, but cause and effect work on unmoved, and life to the end may be the continued reaping of the repented deed's results. That



is not a system of ethics; it is the inexorable law of life, than which nothing is surer or more unchanging."

<sup>59</sup>Lowes, pp. 299-300. Lowes says that Coleridge was not teaching a moral in "The Ancient Mariner": "He is giving coherence and inner congruity to the dream-like fabric of an imagined world. Given that world--and were it not given, there would be no poem, and were it otherwise given, this poem would not be--given that world, its inviolate keeping with itself becomes the sole condition of our acceptance, 'for the moment,' of its validity. . . . And through the very completeness of their incorporation with the texture of 'The Ancient Mariner,' the truths of experience which run in sequence through it, have lost, as far as any inculcation of a moral through the poem is concerned, all didactic value."

<sup>60</sup>Lowes, p. 302. In a letter to Robert Southey, Charles Lamb writes: "A moral should be wrought into the body and soul, the matter and tendency, of a poem, not tagged to the end, like a 'God send the good ship into harbour' at the conclusion of our bills of lading" (Works, VI, 144).

<sup>61</sup>C. A. Anderson Scott, "What Happened at Pentecost," in The Spirit, ed. B. H. Streeter (London: Macmillan, 1919), p. 140. Koinonia means participation in the life of the same body; another translation is fellowship or unity. The coming of the spirit, with all the accompanying physical and psychological phenomena--speaking in tongues, tongues of fire, sound of wind--has traditionally been interpreted as the foundation of the church. But Scott says that what resulted was increased emphasis on Koinonia of the

hundred or some people gathered together because of a common attitude toward Jesus. Devotion to him meant devotion to the highest interest of the fellowship. The organization of the church is an outgrowth of the purpose of this fellowship: building up the body of Christ.

<sup>62</sup>Scott, p. 139. "They were steadfastly adhering to the teaching of the Apostles and to the fellowship, to the breaking of bread and the prayers."

<sup>63</sup>Scott, p. 137. "It was a new name for a new thing, community of spirit issuing in community of life: this was the primary result of the coming of the Spirit."

<sup>64</sup>Scott, pp. 138-39. "He [Paul] reminds the Corinthians for their comfort that it is a 'faithful' God who has called them (with an 'effective calling') into the Fellowship of Christ. And by this he means not the 'companionship' of Christ but the Fellowship belonging to and named after Him."

<sup>65</sup>Scott, p. 139. "If Christ has any appeal, if love carries any sanction, if the Spirit has really created a Fellowship, if affection and tenderness are really its atmosphere, show it in word and deed." Although Bodkin quotes Scott, who has referred to Philippians ii. 1, she inserts a phrase which appears in the second verse: "Fulfill ye my joy, that ye be like-minded, having the same love, being of one accord, of one mind."

<sup>66</sup>Scott, p. 145. Paul prays that Philemon's "faith-fellowship (the fellowship founded on your faith) may be effective unto the recognition of every good thing that is ours in Christ" (Phil. i. 6).

<sup>67</sup>Scott, p. 147. Scott finds the classical expression of the fellowship as the organ of insight John's gospel: "He shall

lead you into all truth."

<sup>68</sup> Scott, p. 146. "For the Ephesians he [Paul] prays in like manner, that, 'being rooted in love, they may be able to comprehend with all God's people, what is the breadth,' etc. [Phil. iii. 18] and for the Colossians that, 'being knit together in love,' they may have all the wealth of conviction and insight into the mystery of God [Phil. ii. 2]."

<sup>69</sup> Scott, p. 147. "The 'truth' is the living reality, the eternal which lies beyond and behind the changing phenomena of experience. One function of the Spirit was to conduct men into the whole region of reality. Under His influence (and that was supremely experienced within the Fellowship), they saw things of time and of eternity as they are, and saw them in their right proportionate value."

<sup>70</sup> Michael Tippett, British composer, takes this line from T. S. Eliot's "Gerontion" in The Complete Poems and Plays 1909-1950 (1930; rpt. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1958), p. 22. It is probable that Bodkin heard Tippett speak on the B.B.C.'s Third Programme. A collection of his talks given between 1945 and 1948 was published under the title Moving into Aquarius (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959). Tippett says that the unifying aim of these talks is "the question of what sort of world we live in and how we may behave in it" (Intro., p. 1).

<sup>71</sup> Margot Adamson, poet, novelist and translator. See pp. xvii, 45, 53, 70, 133-35, 158, and 195.

<sup>72</sup> Mitchison, p. 49. Manasses asks Acté for a blessing. "She laid her hands on his head and gave it and he forgot that

she was a Gentile woman and only felt the blessing and the trust again, and knew that the teaching of Jesus was not in vain. . . . He [Manasses] and Josias came to the breaking of bread and they learnt how in the lovefest all those eating together could be sure of the temporary experience of the Kingdom and got from it enough faith to go on in a world which seemed utterly against them."

<sup>73</sup>Mitchison, Lobsters on the Agenda (London: Victor Gollancz, 1952), p. 212. Kate Snow, a doctor and district councillor in Port Sonas, Scotland, is trying to win the townspeople's approval for the construction of a town hall. Remembering when poverty and the absence of radio made the people need each other more, she wants the hall "to keep people together, to make them able to stand up against the cities and all they've got there. Some place where people would come together naturally in friendship, for a common purpose" (p. 49). She fails to overcome the opposition engendered by fear of social change and a long history of mutual mistrust among the people.

<sup>74</sup>This citation, probably referring to Robert Bridges (1844-1930), could not be found.

<sup>75</sup>Mitchison, Lobsters on the Agenda. When Roddy MacRimmon is falsely accused of raping a girl whose family has been the most intransigent in discussing the building of a town hall, he comes to Kate for help in proving his innocence of the charge.

<sup>76</sup>There is no record of this article.

<sup>77</sup>Sir John Stewart-Wallace, "Vedanta and the West," The Hibbert Journal, 51 (1953), 115. "Our Western minds are now well attuned by science to the idea that matter is not 'real'; that the table is not a solid out there in space after all. It

is an appearance, an illusion or Maya, happily enabling us, with our incapacity to comprehend reality, to treat it as real for the purpose of our finite lives." Vedanta is the philosophical religion of the Hindus which holds that the self ascends from the illusions of the world to mystical union with Samadhi, God. Since God is far beyond man's capacity to comprehend, he manifests himself in a series of minor gods which lie within man's ability to worship. The beliefs of karma and reincarnation grow out of this conception that God can be realized by the man who leads a good life.

<sup>78</sup> Adamson, "For All Souls: a Requiem Mass," The Tablet, 200 (November 1, 1952), 357. "For X the curtain has gone up;/ The prevailing division / Is dissolved; / And the electric current whereby the world, / The world beside whose forces / The mathematical immensities of planetary motions / Are no more than the frail shadow of a fading leaf, / Has taken X as a drop of water / In the surge of the Atlantic tides / So to creation's centre-point: / To know invincibly / Not whatso seems or may be / But what is." Non-Catholic friends are puzzled by the gestures and movements of the priest and servers at X's funeral mass, whereas a Catholic observer sees in the servers' actions an analogy to human life. Because the consecration of the host and wine in the mass crosses "the unbridgeable gap" between creator and creature, the poet prays that X will be received into heaven.

<sup>79</sup> Adamson, p. 357. The servers' actions are like X's actions: he had only "inexplicable motions, inaudible words, / Fussy actions and a ritual / Here and there: / A book, wine, incense,



handwashing water, / A towel / And that earthly staple of men's  
mortal life, / A portion of bread. / We have, as he had, / No more,  
only these means / To know, to see, to live with, / As once he."

<sup>80</sup> Stewart-Wallace, p. 117. "But at the end there is the  
exceeding great reward, Vedanta teaches, of losing the memory  
of the little, jealous, grasping, selfish Ego in the supreme  
consciousness of the Eternal ONE."

<sup>81</sup> Stewart-Wallace, p. 115. "The Brahman in man, Hindu thought  
emphasizes to the full, is indeed hidden, buried and lost in  
the illusions of Maya, the deceits of the world, where the passing  
phenomenal is taken for the Eternal Reality. But, because of the  
indwelling Brahman, Vedanta equally insists that by leading the  
dedicated life of humility, non-attachment, holy meditation, and  
one-pointed concentration of body, mind and will on the search,  
man can find the Great Self within."

<sup>82</sup> Adamson, p. 357. "Bring us to our knees: / Bend like  
bending grass / Our human incapacity. / This is a gap we have no  
means to bridge: / The distance shivers between more and less; /  
Between All and--nothing."

<sup>83</sup> Adamson, p. 357. "The unbridgeable gap / Is crossed / By  
the Creator-in-the-Creature: / All and nothing are rounded in  
one circle: / The light of it flashes crucially / Invisible and  
still."

<sup>84</sup> Adamson, p. 357. "We offer you, Lord, our incorporation  
with his humanity, / This X is faced, / As we alike will be, /  
With ultimate judgment. . . ."

<sup>85</sup> Adamson, p. 357. "With eternal light / Enlighten him, O  
Lord. / And grant him a part in everlasting rest; / Where the tides

of time and space / Are still about the Centre / And the moment  
 of eternity / Scents and opens like a rose. / Call him--as once, /  
 In a confusion of more and less-- / You called Abraham and he  
 followed, / In Ur of the Chaldees."

<sup>86</sup> Karl Stern, The Pillar of Fire (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951), p. 4. "That one, simple question, whether Jesus of Nazareth was God incarnate, becomes increasingly decisive between people, as history moves forward. Dostoievsky once said that it is the one question on which everything in the world depends. The answer to the question cuts into human ties and seems to reflect even on the nature of inanimate things. What if all that is folly in the eyes of the Greeks, and scandal in the eyes of the Jews is truth?" Stern, a Jewish physician, tells of meeting a friend whom he had not seen in fourteen years. During that time he had converted to Catholicism, having become interested in the spirit while he was "informally" psychoanalyzed by Dr. Rudolph Laenderheimer. Stern says, "On a spiritual plane Christianity is Jewry. It is Jewry led to its fulfillment" (p. 188). The book is the story of his conversion and its consequences.

<sup>87</sup> Stern, p. 2. "Some of my friends even pale and their pupils dilate. A common world falls asunder."

<sup>88</sup> Stern, p. 2. "She paused for a moment and then said simply and shortly: 'Oh!' Her polite exclamation contained a cosmic abyss. It is about this 'Oh!' that this book is being written."

<sup>89</sup> S. G. F. Brandon, "Myth and the Gospel," The Hibbert Journal, 51 (1953), p. 122. "The salvation thus won for mankind [through Jesus' crucifixion] is variously described as salvation from sin, from the consequences of sin, from the wrath of God, and from

death, which is sometimes conceived of in a hypostatized form. And this salvation becomes effectual to the individual person through his faith, its actual mediation being apparently made through a ritual identification of the devotee with the Saviour, in both his death and resurrection, by means of the sacrament of baptism." Brandon summarizes Rudolf Bultmann's work in "de-mythologizing" (separating mythical from historical elements) the New Testament and accepts his assertions that the gospel is framed in a mythical conception of the world, that the mythos must be accepted or rejected as a whole, and that the gospel reveals God's intervention in history. However, Brandon criticizes Bultmann's belief that one cannot go back to investigate the historical origins of the preaching in the gospels to prove its soundness. Brandon argues that two seriously diverse interpretations of the person and mission of Jesus were present in the church within twenty years of the crucifixion: one was the disciples' Palestinian Jewish belief that Jesus was the Messiah, and the other was Paul's identification of Jesus with a pre-existent being so closely associated with God as to be called his son. Brandon argues that these interpretations are reconciled "in the Markan gospel, in which the Palestinian tradition of the historical Jesus was skilfully used to exhibit the Saviour God of Paul" (p. 127).

<sup>90</sup> Mitchison, Blood of the Martyrs, p. 85. Argas is being baptized a Christian in the Tiber very late at night: "They were breast-deep now, staggering in the current. He felt Manasses' hands on his shoulders, weighing him like sin; his feet sunk into the sucking mud. He heard Manasses saying 'in the name of Jesus.'

And, with that name in his mind, he went down into the water, dark, choking, over his head and tear-hot face; he struggled up, toward the name of Jesus; three times Manasses ducked him; three times he felt the cold and darkness of death and each time his body seemed to die a little, until as he came up the third time he felt nothing, but was only aware of the name that had been with him under the water, and heard his own voice shouting it."

<sup>91</sup>Betty Miller, Robert Browning, a Portrait (London: John Murray, 1952), p. 271. "Startled by this table-thumping, confronted with the loud, sound, normal hearty presence, all so assertive and so whole, all bristling with prompt responses and expected opinions and usual views, it is impossible not to wonder, with Henry James, what conceivable 'lodgement on such premises the rich proud genius one adored could ever have contrived.'" In trying to account for what she calls "the rapid suffocation and extinction of genius" (p. 271) which occurred in the last twenty years of Browning's life, Miller makes use of James's theory that Browning had divided his personal consciousness into a pair of independent compartments: one was the man of genius and one the bourgeois. It was the bourgeois whom one knew. The tension thus created taxed and eventually overcame the genius.

<sup>92</sup>W. R. Inge, "Russian Theology," The Hibbert Journal, 51 (1953), 107-12. After Inge quotes Nicolai Berdyaeff's statement that personality is essentially creative, he says: "And what does it create? Values; not only the instrumental values which are means, not ends, and which come and go, but the ultimate values, Goodness or Love, Truth, and Beauty; in which, to the religious mind, God has revealed three aspects of his own nature. But these

values belong to the eternal, spiritual world; they can be apprehended and lost, but never created by us" (p. 108). Inge contrasts the philosophies of Berdyaeff and Semyon Frank, both expelled by Stalin from Russia. Inge calls Berdyaeff a Personalist, along with Heidegger, Scheler and Kierkegaard. "Personalism means an unlimited estimation of the value of the human person" (p. 107). A champion of liberty, Berdyaeff believes that freedom is essentially creativity and that values are created. Inge criticizes this idea, saying that values are gifts of the Holy Spirit and as such are revealed. Along with the relation of time to reality, of human to divine personality, and the problem of evil, Inge admits that this question of the creation or revelation of values is insoluble. He admires Frank's work more than Berdyaeff's.

<sup>93</sup>This quotation is the frontispiece of Greene's novel (see note following). Léon Bloy (1846-1917), French novelist and writer, preached a spiritual revival through suffering and poverty.

<sup>94</sup>Greene, The End of the Affair (New York: Viking, 1951), p. 150. Maurice reads in Sarah's journal: "Did I ever love Maurice as much before I loved you? Or was it really you I loved all the time?" The "affair" referred to in the title is the relationship between Sarah Miles, a married woman, and Maurice Bendrix, a novelist. In wartime London, just after Sarah and Maurice have made love, a bomb hits the house and Sarah believes that Maurice has been killed. In her fear, Sarah, not a religious person, promises God that if Maurice's life is spared, she will give up seeing him. Maurice survives, and Sarah, without explanation, refuses to see him again. Knowing that Sarah and her husband have not had any sort of relationship for years, Maurice is extremely



jealous and believes Sarah has gone to another lover. He hires a detective who, unable to observe Sarah with another man, steals her diary and gives it to Maurice. There he reads of the anguish that keeping her vow has caused Sarah, who continues to love him while drawing to a belief in God. Sarah dies, still groping in great confusion towards certainty that God does intervene in human affairs.

<sup>95</sup>Greene, The End of the Affair, p. 150. Sarah writes in her journal: "You might have killed us with happiness, but You let us be with You in pain."

<sup>96</sup>Greene, The End of the Affair, p. 151. Sarah writes: "You were there, teaching us to squander, like You taught the rich man, so that one day we might have nothing left except this love of You."

<sup>97</sup>T. S. Eliot, The Cocktail Party (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1950). Celia is having an affair with Edward, whose wife, Lavinia, has just left him. Lavinia returns, and she and Edward visit a famous psychiatrist, Sir Henry Harcourt-Reilly, to get help for their marriage. Celia has also come to him for help, telling him of her despair and her new knowledge that she does not love Edward. Sir Henry sends her to what he calls a sanatorium for treatment. Two years later, Edward and Lavinia, having achieved a loving relationship, give a party. All their friends except Celia come. Sir Henry tells them that she is dead, having been crucified by African natives among whom she had been working as a nursing sister. Shocked, each person reacts to the news with feelings of guilt. Only Sir Henry is serene; he counsels them to

accept the past. In his essay, "Poetry and Drama," Eliot says he modeled his play on Euripides' Alcestis. See pp. 142-43, 184-86, and 192-95 following.

<sup>98</sup>Shakespeare, King Richard II (London: Dent, 1935), p. 11.

The Duke of Gloucester, under arrest for treason, has died in prison in Calais in 1397. Whether or not the King ordered his death is uncertain, but he must have approved of the murder. The Duchess of Gloucester asks the Duke's brother, John of Gaunt, to avenge her husband's death. He refuses, saying, "But since correction lieth in those hands / Which made the fault that we cannot correct / Put we our quarrel to the will of heaven / Who, when they see the hours ripe on earth / Will rain hot vengeance on offenders' heads" (I, ii, 4-8). When she asks, "Where then, alas, may I complain myself?", he answers, "To God, the widow's champion and defence" (I, ii, 42-43).

<sup>99</sup>F. M. Powicke, History, Freedom and Religion (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 22. This quotation ends Powicke's lecture entitled "History." He defines history as "events which have their own validity, their own right, so to speak, to exist because they are informed as a body is informed by a soul, by human intelligence" (p. 6). The popular belief that history exists only to help us explain the present ignores the fact that the un-recorded experiences of man affect us "just because history is so full of intelligence and of human purpose which eludes us" (p. 16). Thus, cautions Powicke, we must be careful never to forget the vast amount of history which is unknowable but which someday might be comprehended by others. Powicke's essay "Freedom" states that while history records man's use of freedom, we have not yet solved the

problem of how to assure every person the free exercise of his spirit. "Religion" speaks of the contrast between history as the whole of human experience and the record of what is believed to have happened. The only relation between the truest experience of man in history and the reflections he brings to bear from his religious experience is that his sense of justice is enlarged. The transfiguration of justice into righteousness is the work of the religious man and proof of the working of God in history. See p. 209 for further reference to Powicke.

<sup>100</sup> Neal Harrison could not be identified. For Miss Taylor, see introduction, pp. xv-xvii and lxii-lxiii.

<sup>101</sup> Type-Images, pp. 52-55.

<sup>102</sup> Paul Gallico, The Lonely, (1945; rpt. New York: Knopf, 1949). Jerry Wright is a young American pilot stationed at Gedsborough Airbase in Huntingdon, England, during the second world war. Partly because of his habit of drinking too much, he is ordered to take a two-week rest in Scotland. Patches, an English girl in the WAAF, accompanies him. Jerry begins to compare her with Catherine, the girl to whom he is engaged. When Jerry is suddenly able to fly home for just one day, he sees the shallowness of his parents' and Catherine's life and realizes that he loves Patches. Unhappy that he is hurting all the people associated with his boyhood, he nevertheless breaks his engagement and returns to England planning to marry Patches.

<sup>103</sup> H. D. Lewis, rev. of Art and Scientific Thought, by Martin Johnson, Philosophy, 21 (1946), 167-68. "But he is also apt to underestimate the uniqueness of artistic insight and the peculiar character

of the need that aesthetic experience meets. For more is involved here than the fact which the author regards as the main difference between art and science and which he seems to exaggerate, namely, that art requires 'a creative response which must differ from one individual to another.'" Finding that Johnson fails to appreciate the true nature of symbolism, Lewis says that it is unfortunate that Johnson, "a writer with such a range of scholarship and such a feeling for what is excellent in art and a flair for describing it, should be the victim of ill-founded theories about art and science" (p. 167). Looking for relationships between scientific and other creative thought, Lewis says that Johnson finds structure, communicability, discipline, and "remoteness from direct sense experience" (p. 167).

<sup>104</sup> Although it is very likely that Bodkin did indeed hear Eliot make this statement, Eliot says in a review of three books of poetry that a writer needs a more nourishing stimulus than mere admiration of another writer: "If we stand toward a writer in this other relation of which I speak, we do not imitate him, and though we are quite as likely to be accused of it, we are quite unperturbed by the charge. There is a feeling of profound kinship, or rather of a peculiar personal intimacy with another, probably a dead author. It may overcome us suddenly, on first or after long acquaintance; it is certainly a crisis; and when a young writer is seized with his first passion of this sort, he may be changed, metaphorphosed almost, within a few weeks even, from a bundle of second-hand sentiments into a person" ("Reflections on Contemporary Poetry," rev. of The Naked Warrior, by Herbert Read, The Charnel Rose and

Other Poems, by Conrad Aiken, and an unnamed book of French verse by M. Tristan Tzara, The Egoist, 3 (1919), 39. Eliot goes on to say that this passion is useful: "We may not be great lovers; but if we had a genuine affair with a real poet of any degree we have acquired a monitor to avert us when we are not in love. Indirectly, there are other acquisitions: our friendship gives us an introduction to the society in which our friend moved; we learn its origins and its endings, we are broadened. We do not imitate, we are changed; and our work is the work of this changed man, we have not borrowed, we have been quickened, and we become bearers of a tradition" (p. 39). Eliot finds traces of this type of experience lacking in the poetry he is reviewing.

105 This reference could not be found.

106 James Elroy Flecker, Hassan (London: Heinemann, 1923). This play in five acts, subtitled "The Story of Hassan of Bagdad and How He Came to Make the Golden Journey to Samarkand," is the story of Hassan, a confectioner of middle age, who is in love with Yasmin, a young girl who does not return his love.

107 John Keats, Complete Poems and Selected Letters, ed. Clarence DeWitt Thorpe (New York: Odyssey, 1935, pp. 609-10). In a letter to his brother and sister-in-law, George and Georgianna Keats, dated 13 March 1819, Keats writes: "The common cognomen of this world among the misguided and superstitious is a 'vale of tears' from which we are to be redeemed by a certain arbitrary circumscribed straightened [sic] notion! Call the world if you please 'the vale of Soul-making.' Then you will find out the use of the world. . . . I say 'Soul-making'--Soul as distinguished from an



intelligence. There may be intelligences or sparks of the divinity in millions--but they are not Souls till they acquire identities, till each one is personally itself. . . . How then are Souls to be made? . . . How, but by the medium of a world like this? This point I sincerely wish to consider because I think it a grander system of salvation than the christian religion--or rather it is a system of Spirit creation." Keats goes on to speak of three materials which act upon one another in every man's life: the intelligence of the human heart, intelligence as Mind, and the world of elemental space. "Do you not see how necessary a World of Pains and troubles is to school an intelligence and make it a Soul? A Place where the heart must feel and suffer in a thousand diverse ways. Not merely is the Heart a Hornbook, it is the Mind's Bible, it is the Mind's experience, it is the text from which the Mind or intelligence sucks its identity. As various as the Lives of Men are--so various become their Souls, identical Souls of the Sparks of his own essence." See pp. 148-49 and 155 following.

<sup>108</sup> Konrad Z. Lorenz, King Solomon's Ring, trans. Marjorie Kerr Wilson, foreword Julian Huxley (New York: Crowell, 1952), p. xi. "Only if we know and face the truth about the world, whether the world of physics and chemistry, or of geology and biology, or of mind and behaviour shall we be able to see what is our own true place in that world. Only as we discover and assimilate the truth about nature shall we be able to undertake the apparently contradictory but essential task of re-establishing our unity with nature while at the same time maintaining our transcendence over nature. The work of men like Lorenz is a very real contribution to our understanding

of our relations with that important part of nature constituted by the higher animals." This book is a collection of autobiographical essays by Lorenz, a comparative ethologist, who has always kept animals--birds, fish, dogs, cats, the higher animals--in a state of unrestricted freedom so that he could better observe their habits and understand their actions. As a child of nine, watching pond organisms with a magnifying glass, his fate was sealed: "for he who has once seen the intimate beauty of nature cannot tear himself away from it again. He must become either a poet or a naturalist" (p. 3). Maintaining that man has an enormous animal inheritance, Lorenz says that what we call human weakness "is, in reality, nearly always a pre-human factor and one which we have in common with the higher animals" (p. 152). In describing how a species of animals, in its evolution "develops a weapon which may destroy a fellow-member at one blow, then, in order to survive, it must develop, along with the weapon, a social inhibition which could endanger the existence of the species" (p. 197), he wonders if man will develop such an inhibition.

<sup>109</sup> Lorenz, p. 147. The "pecking order" is an order of rank. Lorenz, describing a colony of jackdaws he has raised, asserts that birds do recognize one another.

<sup>110</sup> See introduction, pp. xiii-xvii and lxx.

<sup>111</sup> Twentieth Century Authors (First Supplement), p. 97. "When, on leaving college, I began work as a lecturer in a training college in Cambridge, I thought of my task mainly as an attempt to bring such psychological thinking as that of [William] James, at once empirical and speculative, within reach of young minds often without

much inclination or capacity for psychological thought of any kind. While still holding this teaching post, I was granted a year's leave to visit America to study there methods of teaching educational psychology. Though during this visit I received much kindness and encouragement, I remained troubled by the difficulty of bringing psychology, as I understood it, into helpful relation with the work of the schools and, influenced partly by declining health, decided on early retirement to devote myself to literary and philosophic studies." Bodkin, on leaving the college, was thirty-nine years old.

<sup>112</sup>Lorenz, pp. 186-88. Lorenz describes a battle between two wolves in a supervised environment which closely simulated actual free movement. The vanquished wolf offered its neck to the victor who chose not to fight further. Lorenz says that the victorious wolf will not kill its victim so long as the defeated wolf retains this posture of submission. Similarly, "a jackdaw will turn away his head from the conqueror, making the nape of his neck bulge, seemingly inviting the conqueror to peck at the tender spot" (pp. 193-94), and the victorious jackdaw will not kill its victim. Lorenz says that the roedeer is "the most malevolent beast I know" (p. 192). He also describes the torturous mutilation one dove inflicted on another while together in a cage (p. 184). He states that peacocks and turkeys are closely related as a species and so may fight in captivity: "The peacock will strike with his sharply pointed spurs--the turkey will assume the species' attitude of submission, but the peacock doesn't 'understand' the gesture. It does not inhibit his fighting drives and it will kill the turkey" (p. 194).

113 "Poetry and the Human Condition."

114 Keats, pp. 527-28. In a letter to his brothers George and Thomas Keats, written 18 December 1817, Keats says that he has been to see Benjamin West's picture "Death on the Pale Horse": "It is a wonderful picture, when West's age is concerned; but there is nothing to be intense upon, no women one feels mad to kiss, no face swelling into reality. The excellence of every art is its intensity, capable of making all disagreeables evaporate from their being in close relationship with Beauty and Truth. Examine 'King Lear,' and you will find this exemplified throughout: but in this picture we have unpleasantness without any momentous depth of speculation excited, in which to bury its repulsiveness."

115 F. S. C. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities (New York: Macmillan, 1947). Bodkin may be referring to the chapter "The Functions and Future of Poetry" in this study of logic as a form of knowing in religion and art as well as science. Northrop says that art functions either in and for itself, or as a means to an end. He calls symbols used by the poet concepts by intuition, which give knowledge of the aesthetic component of reality, whereas he labels symbols used by the scientist concepts by postulation, giving knowledge of the theoretical component of reality. The relation between these concepts is an epistemic correlation. In its second function, as a means to an end, art can metaphorically convey a theoretical doctrine; an historical instance is Dante's Divine Comedy, which made the Catholic church's theology articulate in terms of Aristotle's metaphysics: "To people who could not grasp the technical doctrine literally in terms of

its concepts by postulation, Dante conveyed an analogue of this doctrine metaphorically in terms of the vivid, immediately apprehendable aesthetic materials denoted by the poet's concepts by intuition" (p. 175). Northrop argues that this use of poetry is needed now because our emotions are still geared to the old basic scientific and philosophic concepts by postulation.

<sup>116</sup> Brandon, p. 123. Brandon says that Bultmann wanted to investigate "the 'christlicher Seinverstandnis'--which we may perhaps be allowed to translate into 'the Christian view of the human situation.'" This is that man's situation is hopeless without the saving intervention of God.

<sup>117</sup> Brandon, p. 124. Bultmann says that one can not see the crucifixion as the salvation act because "such an evaluation of this historical event of the Crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth depends upon the prior acceptance of Jesus as the Christ with all the theological significance which so early gathered around that title." Consequently one is led on to recognize that "to the first believers conviction came not through the fact of the Crucifixion but through the experiences of the Resurrection."

<sup>118</sup> Keats, p. 559. In a letter to John Hamilton Reynolds dated 3 May 1818, Keats says: "My Branchings out therefrom have been numerous: one of them is the consideration of Wordsworth's genius and as a help, in the manner of gold being the meridian Line of worldly wealth, how he differs from Milton. And here I have nothing but surmises, from an uncertainty whether Milton's apparently less anxiety for Humanity proceeds from his seeing further or not than Wordsworth: And whether Wordsworth has in



truth epic passion , and martyrs himself to the human heart, the main region of his song. In regard to his genius alone--we find what he says true as far as we have experienced and we can judge no further but by larger experience--for axioms in philosophy are not axioms until they are proved upon our pulses."

<sup>119</sup>C. E. M. Joad, The Recovery of Belief: a Restatement of Christian Philosophy (London: Faber, 1952), p. 22. "Where I would testify to certain conviction, I must still speak in terms of plausible hypothesis; when I would rely on the support and enjoy the comfort of a firm faith, I must still confess to moments of disbelief, days of doubt and periods of absolute indifference." Joad's book, "an account of some of the reasons which have converted me to the religious view of the universe in its Christian version" (p. 13), is designed to appeal to the intellect and not to faith. Formerly an agnostic and kept from Christianity mostly by the problems of pain and evil, Joad now sees that "evil in the universe is the consequence of wrong choices" (p. 23). He accepts on faith the doctrines of Christianity--incarnation, resurrection, and ascension--because he finds it impossible to explain its endurance unless it has a divine origin.

<sup>120</sup>Joad, The Recovery of Belief, p. 203. "Mind is brought into being in consequence of the soul with the natural, temporal order, which results from its incorporation in a physical body. It is brought initially into being in the form of ideas. More precisely, ideas emerge on the combination of soul with body much as water emerges on the combination of oxygen and hydrogen, and it is the cluster of these emerging ideas which constitute [sic] a mind."

<sup>121</sup> Joad, The Recovery of Belief, p. 204. "A mind is simply the bundle of the ideas which constitute it at any given moment."

<sup>122</sup> Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: an Essay in Cosmology (1929; rpt. New York: Macmillan, 1941), pp. 46-54. Whitehead says that this book, the Gifford Lectures delivered at the University of Edinburgh during the session 1927-28, is intended "to state a condensed scheme of cosmological ideas, to develop their meaning by confrontation with the various topics of experience, and finally to elaborate an adequate cosmology in terms of which all particular topics find their interconnections" (pref., p. vii). In these phrases Bodkin summarizes Whitehead's thought in sections I and II of chapter III, entitled "Some Derivative Notions," in which he advances the meaning of his philosophy of organism. In "Physical Agencies and the Divine Persuasion," Bodkin discusses Whitehead's concept of God in relation to both Plato and Martin Buber; there are also numerous references to Whitehead in Bodkin's books. Margot Adamson says in a letter dated April 8, 1972: "Authors she did refer to--in general--as deeply affecting her were Karl Jaspers and Whitehead, particularly the latter, with whom I think she felt much agreement." See pp. 194 and 197-98.

<sup>123</sup> Joad, The Recovery of Belief, pp. 18-19. Joad is speaking of Plato's three parts of the soul: "Thus, the first 'part' of the soul is not intellect; it is the soul or personality as a whole, in so far as its appetite is centred upon the ends appropriate to the intellect; that is to say, upon knowledge. Plato adds that only the perfectly 'real' can be perfectly known and that is the knowledge of the 'real.' What we call the intellect is transcended so that it is the whole personality, albeit a personality trans-

figured by the nature of its quest, that knows the Forms."

<sup>124</sup>Joad, The Recovery of Belief, p. 203. Joad says that the soul is the point at which higher spiritual agencies in the world contact us: "My view that this region is normally inaccessible to consciousness is consistent with the well-known fact that we are often unaware of the sources of our inspiration and ignorant how the healing and strengthening influences that bear upon us when, as we say, our prayers are answered, do their work."

<sup>125</sup>John Baillie, Our Knowledge of God (New York: Scribner, 1939), p. 42. Baillie quotes from Dr. Heinrich Emil Brunner's God and Man, trans. David Cairns (London: Student Christian Movement, 1936): "Man has spirit only in that he is addressed by God. . . . Therefore the human self is nothing which exists in its own right, no property of man, but a relation to a divine Thou." Discussing Biblical revelation, Baillie says that what God has revealed in the Bible is that we know God through our knowledge of one another. He calls this development, derived primarily through Kierkegaard, the most hopeful element in the philosophy of our time. Citing the thought of Buber, Barth, Heidegger, and Jaspers, Baillie predicts that as we more deeply understand other subjects, we will better understand the nature of our knowledge of God.

<sup>126</sup>Joad, The Recovery of Belief, p. 101. "Briefly, the position is that of Plato. It is to the effect that as grades of knowledge are set over against and correlated with grades of reality, so it is only the completely real that can be completely known; also that perfect knowledge is never adequately described as a purely intellectual process, but involves an integration and results in an enhancement

of the whole personality, the knower being enlarged and enriched by the nature of that upon which his cognition is directed."

<sup>127</sup>D. H. Lawrence, Lady Chatterley's Lover (New York: Knopf, 1932), p. 118. Connie is ashamed that she enjoys listening to Mrs. Bolton gossip about the villagers of Tevershall: "She ought not to listen with her queer rabid curiosity. After all, one may hear the most private affairs of other people, but only in a spirit of respect for the struggling, battered thing which any human soul is, and in a spirit of fine, discriminative sympathy. For even satire is a form of sympathy. It is the way our sympathy flows and recoils that really determines our lives. And here lies the vast importance of the novel, properly handled. It can inform and lead into new places the flow of our sympathetic consciousness, and it can lead our sympathy away in recoil from things gone dead. Therefore, the novel, properly handled, can reveal the most secret places of life: for it is in the passional secret places of life, above all, that the tide of sensitive awareness needs to ebb and flow, cleansing and refreshing." Connie marries Clifford Chatterley, scion of Wragby Hall near Tevershall, in 1917. He is subsequently injured in the war and left paralyzed. Together they live a life of isolation at Wragby; although Clifford seldom speaks with Connie, he wants her near him at all times. Connie becomes very restless, especially after they hire Mrs. Bolton, who gradually takes on Clifford's full care. Connie begins an affair with Mellors, their game-keeper. She soon leaves for a trip to Europe, knowing that she is pregnant. While she is gone, Bertha, Mellors' estranged wife, insists on coming to stay with him. His efforts to rid himself of her cause Clifford to dismiss

him. When the book ends, both Connie and Mellors are unable to obtain the divorces which would enable them to marry.

<sup>128</sup>"The contrast of The Fountain [by Charles Morgan] with The Man Who Had Died and other works of Lawrence--if we make of the books a complete experience, appropriating their pattern of meaning as communicated by every force of diction, rhythm, imagery, and association--illustrates it seems to me, the manner in which the more deeply conceived novels of his time offer to the reader instruments for the discovery of his own truth" (AP, pp. 298-99).

<sup>129</sup>Gallico, p. 177. "There were many parts to their knowledge, some sweet, and some bitter, and in the clear vision that had come to him he seemed to see and understand each one and how they came to make the whole. He knew, for instance, that he had never loved Catherine, because he had never understood the hunger, the pity, the power, and the terror of love."

<sup>130</sup>Gallico, pp. 178-79. "But he had come to know the deepest implications of his relationship with Patches and what was meant by them. It was that, without her, life for him would be something half lived, that to give her up would destroy not one, but two humans who together had found beauties and satisfactions of physical and spiritual relationship not dreamed of by most, and that to do so, to bring about that destruction, would be something evil and a sin."

<sup>131</sup>Charlotte Bronte, Jane Eyre (1847; rpt. New York: Grolier, n.d.). Bodkin may have made this observation in response to the events of the novel. As Jane prepares for her wedding, she writes: "My future husband was becoming to me my whole world; and more than the world; almost my hope of heaven. He stood between me and every thought of



religion, as an eclipse intervenes between man and the broad sun. I could not in those days, see God for His creature, of whom I had made an idol" (pp. 407-08). Yet after the marriage ceremony is interrupted and Rochester admits that he had returned to England to look for a wife, Jane tells him, "But you could not marry, sir" (p. 462). She counsels him to "trust in God and yourself. Believe in heaven. Hope to meet again there" (p. 472). Rochester asks: "Is it better to drive a fellow-creature to despair than to transgress a mere human law--no man being injured by the breach" (pp. 472-73)? But Jane still refuses: "I will keep the law given by God; sanctioned by man. I will hold to the principle received by me when I was sane, and not mad--as I am now. Laws and principles are not for the times when there is no temptation; they are for such moments as this, when body and soul rise in mutiny against their rigour; stringent are they, inviolate they shall be. If at my individual convenience I might break them, what would be their worth? They have a worth--so I have always believed" (p. 473). Bodkin says she wrote a psychological study of Bronte; however, no record of it exists (RDF, pp. 292-95).

<sup>132</sup>"Among those concerned with the effort towards justice and fellowship between men of different race, I think of Alan Porter's [Paton's] novel, Cry, the Beloved Country [London:] (Cape, 1948). For me there is power and beauty in the image--conveyed indirectly through his influence upon others after death--of the white man who had given his life to the cause of justice between white and black in South Africa. What drove him into that service, his private papers recorded, was the conflict, felt in his own soul, between faith in human brotherhood and its denial in the established

social order."

<sup>133</sup>This reference could not be found.

<sup>134</sup>This Henn citation could not be identified, but Bodkin quotes from T. R. Henn's The Apple and the Spectroscope (London: 1951; rpt. New York: Norton, 1966), in two articles. In "Poetry and the Human Condition," p. 350, she discusses Shakespeare's use of imagery suggesting both gentleness and violence in Macbeth as an example of the twofold nature of pity, and quotes Henn's comment that Shakespeare brought these opposites "into a kind of compressed or accelerated relationship" (Henn, p. 40). Bodkin also mentions Henn in "Literature and the Individual Reader," p. 46, as an example of a critic who examines passages from the Bible, concentrating only upon the instrumental qualities of the language: "clarity, precision of outline, economy of substance, and the graces of the cadence."

<sup>135</sup>Keats, p. 208. In a letter to his brothers dated 23 January 1818 Keats writes: "I sat down yesterday to read King Lear once again; the thing appeared to demand the prologue of a sonnet, I wrote it, and began to read--I know you would like to see it" (p. 535). In "On Sitting Down to Read King Lear Once Again," Keats says that he must put aside the romance he has been reading, "for once again the fierce dispute / Betwixt damnation and impassion'd clay / Must I burn through, once more humbly assay / The bitter-sweet of his Shakespearian fruit" (l. 5-8).

<sup>136</sup>Michael Burn, The Midnight Diary (London: Hart-Davis, 1952), p. 250. Part V of this book takes the form of a letter written to Rose Meredith by Irene Mannheim. She says that the police have come,

asking about her papers and that she is afraid she will soon be arrested. In despair, she tells Rose how she went back to her old diaries, hidden for years in the yard of her aunt's ruined house, and re-read them. As a result she has come to understand herself better: "Now I see that I have been living not merely as I have been obliged to live, but as I would have wished to live, had the choice been plain to me from the beginning." Just released from a concentration camp in Poland, Irene supports herself by translating and giving language lessons. As the Russian occupation of Hungary makes life increasingly ugly, she tries to be detached from the life around her as a defense against further pain: "I live in a high room at the end of a telescope, surveying revolution, rumours of war, trials, conspiracies, threats and perils, almost forgetting that they press in on me as well . . . ." (p. 109). Her cousin Poldi tells her he will send money through his friend, Bob Meredith, at the British Legation. Irene forms a close friendship with Rose Meredith, who confirms what Irene already knew: because she did not declare her Austrian birth when she first returned to Budapest, her papers are not in order. Not only can she not emigrate, but she also faces arrest should her situation be discovered. When the Merediths are forced to leave because of worsening diplomatic relations, Irene writes: "Why did I continue to go to them, when I knew there would be a parting? The camp should have turned me to stone, then I would not have felt this. I could have lived here as a stone. I should not have needed them" (p. 241). The book ends with Irene's diaries being delivered to Rose because Irene has been arrested.

<sup>137</sup>Burn, pp. 250-51. Irene writes that the New Testament has been her guide and her hope: "One must believe in something which

is above them all [men's treasured convictions], something which cannot be framed or put into words or dogmas, in which I do believe; it is the recognition of necessity, and that is still the best definition of the truth I know. . . . It has been so dreadful, this feeling all along of not being able to do anything, but now I believe that what I tried to do was right."

<sup>138</sup> William Empson, "Dover Wilson on Macbeth," Kenyon Review, 14 (1952), p. 89. "The chief thought here . . . is that Macbeth wants somehow to get away from or hoodwink his consciousness and self-knowledge and do the deed [murder Duncan] without knowing it." Empson says that Wilson's argument in his 1948 edition of Macbeth that Shakespeare revised and shortened the play for a court performance before James I is incorrect. The confusions cited by Wilson as evidence for his belief Empson thinks were written specifically for their dramatic effect. Empson thinks that the audience was meant to see Macbeth hurried into an ill-considered action, while Wilson writes that Duncan's murder occurs too quickly, the result of Shakespeare's excisions. Wilson also believes that Banquo's behavior is ambiguous since he knows of the witches' prophecy yet keeps silent, while Empson explains that Banquo reacts to the prophecy as a statement about the future while Macbeth "immediately accepts his part of the prophecy as a kind of order that he must bring it about. . . . He feels that the imaginary world has become real and must now be acted upon" (p. 99). Empson admits that the question of how many children Lady Macbeth has is "a radical dramatic ambiguity" (p. 91).

<sup>139</sup> William Clark, The Listener, 9 April 1953, pp. 587-88. Clark is speaking against a proposed central African

federation comprising 6,000,000 people of whom about 170,000 are Europeans, in the nations of Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and the Nyasaland-protectorate, on the grounds that Africans are wholly opposed to the plan. He says that the British Commonwealth's success depends upon a genuine feeling of partnership by all concerned. "It is our duty here in Britain to examine the plan and to see if it really protects the interests of the Africans not merely now but in the future." Clark asserts that it will not. Of the thirty-five members to be elected to the proposed Federal assembly, twenty-nine will be European, and a two-thirds majority is required to change any portion of the constitution. One constitutional proviso is that there will be one delegate to represent every 1,000,000 Africans. Clark concludes that true success lies in winning the Africans' confidence. Bodkin's entry is dated March 22 and Clark's article did not appear until April. See p. 61 for Bodkin's comment that she invented some of the dates in the journal.

<sup>140</sup>Adamson, p. 357. "X with his 'more or less' / Is face to face with God; / Fearfully now to know the balance / Of that 'more or less.'"

<sup>141</sup>J. M. Cohen, Robert Browning (London: Longmans, Green, 1952), p. 193. "As it was he embodied ever and again in fresh poetry his flashes of comprehension concerning the relations of the trinity, Love, Knowledge and Faith, which came thickest in his early maturity, but which did not desert him in his long years of outwardly barren living, and which returned with renewed strength in the years immediately before his death." Cohen discusses the evaluations many important critics made of Browning and refutes many of their unfavor-



able assessments. Of John Heath Stubbs Cohen says, "For he approaches poetry from a psycho-analytical point of view that presupposes inspiration to arise from the same 'unconscious' level as dreams: a misconception which confuses the two very distant human activities, the one purely mechanical, the other the product of some profounder intimations from a source outside man's common thoughts and feelings, the record of some emotional flashes of comprehension that lights for him a universe outside that of his own fears and guilt" (pp. 183-84). Calling Browning seriously underrated, Cohen says that he did not write great poetry until his marriage brought him emotional maturity. His early poems are the poetry of mood; many were "inextricably difficult" (p. 20) because Browning cared more for the sound than the sense of words. Although he wrote on a variety of subjects, "My Last Duchess" and "Artemis Prologizes" illustrate his most enduring interests: the vitality of the Italian renaissance and classical subjects. Cohen says that Browning is ill served by anthologizers who choose his more facile and smug works such as "Pippa Passes." Cohen considers blank verse to be Browning's most successful form. In the decade after Browning's death in 1889 at seventy-eight, he was loved for his "vigour, his sense of character, and that picturesqueness which his early contemporaries had dismissed as a mere 'savour of the Continent'" (p. 177).

<sup>142</sup>Cohen, p. 184. Cohen considers The Ring and the Book Browning's greatest achievement. Responding to Stubbs's criticism of the poem, Cohen says, "But the vast panorama of The Ring and the Book required a degree of intellectual organization beyond the capacities of any of the later Romantic poets whom [John] Heath Stubbs praises."

<sup>143</sup>Cohen, p. 6. "Browning was a poet of considerable intellectual ingenuity, but he was not a philosopher; he makes no general statement about man's place in the world."

<sup>144</sup>Cohen, p. 185. Cohen asserts that today a large obstacle exists toward appreciating Browning; it is "the background of imagist theory which makes us look too closely at the power of the single image making us blind to the importance of large scale poetic organization." Cohen admits that Browning was not an accomplished poet on a small scale: "He was an adventurous poet, at his best only when handling large conceptions" (p. 4).

<sup>145</sup>Cohen, pp. 186-87. "Purely as a lyrical poet of mood, Browning is, as [Sir Maurice] Bowra says, careless in his language. For his idiom is not sufficiently pure for such small-scale purposes. But Browning's nearest to lyrical perfection, such a poem as 'Love in a Life,' contains hardly any of those archaisms and inversions that trouble our contemporary ear."

<sup>146</sup>Cohen, pp. 184-85. In his assessment of the opinions of some of Browning's critics, Cohen says: "Somewhat deeper in her incomprehension because more muddled in her thinking, is the advocate of 'subjective universality,' Miss Kathleen Raine, whose ideal visionary poet must 'participate in the unconscious and half-conscious imaginings of the community.'" Cohen goes on to say that although Miss Raine does not like Browning, she cannot say that his talent is altogether negligible.

<sup>147</sup>Cohen, p. 190. Cohen sees Browning as an ancestor of T. S. Eliot, Edith Sitwell, Ezra Pound, and W. H. Auden: "Recessive rather than dominant, he remains nevertheless an ancestor."

<sup>148</sup>Bodkin chose for her funeral service a reading of Tennyson's "In Memoriam. A. H. H." and "Crossing the Bar."

<sup>149</sup>Cohen, pp. 6-8. Cohen is discussing the "voice given to doubt" in Browning's poems: "It was not that he was a man with first-hand religious experience. He remained a doubter to the end, and if ever he ventured to affirm more than he knew the resulting falsity in his poetry is easy to detect. But Browning, at his best, could express the whole of his experience of love, faith and creative power, which were the three poles upon which his universe hung." These lines Bodkin quotes are from the Pope's monologue in The Ring and the Book in which he speculates upon the small effect which Christianity has had upon the world:

And is this little all that was to be?  
Where is the gloriously decisive change,  
Metamorphosis the immeasurable  
Of human clay to divine gold, we looked  
Should, in some poor sort, justify its price?  
Had an adept of the mere Rosy Cross  
Spent his life to consummate the Great Work,  
Would we not start to see the stuff it touched  
Yield not a grass more than the vulgar got  
By the old smelting-process years ago? . . .  
I  
Put no such dreadful questions to myself,  
Within whose circle of experience burns  
I must outlive a thing ere know it dead--  
The central truth, Power, Wisdom, Goodness, God:

<sup>150</sup>Cohen, pp. 7-8. Although Bodkin omitted quotation marks, the lines she quotes here occur immediately before the ones she just excerpted from The Ring and the Book: "If this were sad to see in just the sage / Who should profess so much, perform no more. / What is it when suspected in that Power / Who undertook to make and made the world, / Devised and did effect man, body and soul, /

Ordained salvation for them both, and yet-- / Well, is the thing we see salvation?"

<sup>151</sup> John S. Smart, "Tragedy," in Essays and Studies by Members of the English Association, III, collected by G. C. Moore Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922), p. 13. "Of the two theories already mentioned, those of Fate and Responsibility, he [Shakespeare] perceives that both, each in its own place, have in them something of truth; that both correspond to indubitable realities of life." Smart discusses Shakespeare's use of two definitions of tragedy in his plays: that tragedy shows the workings of destiny, of forces outside of man, and that man himself is responsible for his destiny. When Shakespeare began to write, fortune was the symbol of the influence of external forces upon man. Smart finds that Horatio in Hamlet is the result of Shakespeare's blending of both of these definitions. Horatio is not helpless in the presence of fortune: he can control her because he can control himself. "By fortitude in suffering, where suffering is inevitable, and by the intelligent management of life with foresight and decision, the influence of mere fatality may be diminished and man's own power asserted against it" (p. 13). Smart finds that many contemporary German critics deal obtusely with Shakespeare's tragedies because they accept Hegel's definition that there must be some defect in a hero before one can call his sufferings tragic. Smart believes that tragedy is present only when there is something of greatness and strength in the character, who reacts against his calamity and struggles to escape while trying to comprehend the mysterious change occurring in his life.

<sup>152</sup> Smart, p. 12. "The belief that there is something arbitrary

and irrational in human experience is thus fundamental in Shakespeare's thought."

<sup>153</sup> Smart, pp. 12-13. The quotation is from Hamlet (III.

ii. 69-77). Hamlet says to Horatio:

Horatio:

Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice,  
And could of men distinguish, her election  
Hath seal'd thee for herself; for thou hast been  
As one, in suffering all, that suffers nothing,  
A man that Fortune's buffets and rewards  
Hast ta'en with equal thanks; and blest are thou  
Whose blood and judgment are so well commingled  
That they are not a pipe for Fortune's finger  
To sound what stop she please.

<sup>154</sup> Smart, p. 13. "Nor is Fortune to be conceived of as always hostile. She has smiles as well as frowns; our part is to know when she is at last on our side, and to seize the propitious moment before it has passed away."

<sup>155</sup> Smart, p. 16. "The latter [poets] are more often satisfied with fragmentary and vivid glimpses of reality; but the philosophers seek to survey all things and coordinate them."

<sup>156</sup> Smart, p. 30. Mr. Crawley, a poor curate in Anthony Trollope's The Last Chronicle of Barset (London: Dent, 1909), I, is speaking of Samson Agonistes: "The impotency, combined with his strength, or rather the impotency with the memory of former strength and former aspirations, is to essentially tragic." Overwhelmed with debts, Mr. Crawley has been accused of theft. Because he has a powerful and energetic soul and knows he is innocent, he is bearing his fears concerning his approaching trial courageously. He finds very moving his daughter's reading of a Greek poem in which Samson Agonistes is reduced to slavery



because of his blindness. Mr. Crawley exclaims, ostensibly about Samson: "The mind of the strong blind creature must be so sensible of the injury that has been done to him" (p. 30).

157 Smart, p. 28. "But in Mr. Crawley he [Trollope] has created a character who is instinct with life and energy, and to whose sufferings the tragic interest cannot be denied."

158 Smart, p. 26. "The significance of human life itself comes into contemplation; the question whether it has any place of value in the cosmos and the ultimate scheme of things; whether there is any such scheme of things."

159 Smart, p. 36. Smart says that the power of a tragic poet is his ability "to suggest something illimitable, to place life against a background of eternity, and to make the reader feel the presence of problems which he cannot solve."

160 This quotation is from Hamlet (1. ii. 158-64) as Marcellus says to Horatio:

It faded on the crowing of the cock.  
Some say, that ever 'gainst that season comes  
Wherein our Saviour's birth is celebrated,  
This bird of dawning singeth all night long:  
And then, they say, no spirit dares stir abroad;  
The nights are wholesome; then no planets strike,  
No fairy takes, nor witch hath power to charm,  
So hallow'd and so gracious is the time.

161 Bonamy Dobrée, The Broken Cistern: the Clark Lectures 1952-53 (London: Cohen and West, 1954), p. 6. Dobrée traces the manner in which poets from the sixteenth century to the present have treated "the great impersonal themes": stoicism, scientism, and patriotism. These are underlying themes: they "branch out from feelings lying deep in the work-a-day mind though not unreachable by common thought."

Sensitive to the present declining interest in poetry, Dobrée maintains that poets, whom he calls "broken cisterns" after a passage in Jeremiah. ii. 13, can win back a following if they merge one of these public themes "with the explorations of reality they want to do" (p. 143).

<sup>162</sup> John Galsworthy, The Man of Property, in The Forsyte Saga (1906; rpt. New York: Scribner, 1934), p. 252. Soames Forsyte, the "man of property," is bringing suit against Philip Bosinney, a penniless architect who has overrun the agreed upon costs in designing Soames's new house. Soames is motivated as much by the knowledge that his wife, Irene, is in love with Bosinney as by greed. George Forsyte, a cousin, sees Irene in a carriage with Bosinney, and later sees him alone, staggering around in the foggy night as if ill or drunk. George says to his companion that Bosinney has "taken the knock," and follows him, worried by his erratic behavior. He hears Bosinney crying aloud that Soames had raped Irene the previous night; then George loses sight of him. The next day Bosinney inexplicably does not appear in court to defend himself in the suit. It is later discovered that he was killed the night before, run over by a bus in the fog.

<sup>163</sup> Rossetti, "A Last Confession," lines 40, 42, and 488-89.

<sup>164</sup> Rossetti, "A Last Confession," lines 489 and 497-99.

<sup>165</sup> Walter Allen, Arnold Bennett (London: Home and Van Thal, 1948), p. 64. Allen quotes E. M. Forster, who says that the novel misses greatness and that the real hero is time: "Our daily life in time is exactly this business of getting old which clogs the arteries of Sophia and Constance, and the story that is a story and

sounded so healthy and stood no nonsense cannot sincerely lead to any conclusion but the grave. Of course we grow old. But a great book must rest on something besides 'of course.'" The sentence Bodkin quotes appears on page 65.

<sup>166</sup> Allen, p. 63. In the preface to his book, Bennett describes an incident in a restaurant involving an old, repulsively fat woman and a beautiful young waitress which was the impetus for his writing The Old Wives' Tale. Allen refers to this description: "For at the time of the encounter with the old woman in the restaurant, Bennett, we know, was already preoccupied with the theme of age, with the fact that young girls grow old. . . . The contrast between the fussy old woman with her parcels and puce dress and the beautiful waitress vitalised the theme that obsessed him into a compulsive image."

<sup>167</sup> Allen, p. 65. The contrast of youth and age is between Sophia and her mother: "They sat opposite to each other, on either side of the fire--the monumental matron whose black bodice overhung the table, whose large rounded face was creased and wrinkled by what seemed years of disillusion, and the young, slim girl, so fresh, so virginal, so ignorant, with all the pathos of an unsuspecting victim about to be sacrificed to the Minotaur of Time!"

<sup>168</sup> Allen, p. 66. "The theme, youth and age, and the contrast belong to the oldest material of lyric poetry; nothing could be further from lyrical than Bennett's expression, and yet it seems to me that the final effect of The Old Wives' Tale is poetic." Allen finds this book the "most carefully, seriously and lovingly pondered of Bennett's novels" (p. 61).

<sup>169</sup> Allen, pp. 68, 70. "For, apart from the objectivity in the great set passages, elsewhere the tone is one of what one must call, for want of a better term, facetious irony somewhat akin to the mock heroic. . . . On the one hand, there was the theme of the novel, which had high dignity, on the other the characters through which and the background against which the theme must be worked out, and these were unsophisticated and unfashionable in the extreme. . . . So, in a way, the tone of facetious irony implies that Bennett is apologizing, or at least pleading that allowance must be made for his characters and background."

<sup>170</sup> Allen, pp. 71-73. "One is left feeling that never has the rhythm of ordinary normal life, life in time been transcribed so faithfully, so surely. . . . For all that [lack of integration and proper perspective of the chapters set in Paris with those in Bursley, England] The Old Wives' Tale is a triumph of the overriding conception; a triumph too, of style. . . . It [style] is at once a unifying agent and the condition in which the book has its existence."

<sup>171</sup> Allen, p. 73. "It is Bennett's achievement in The Old Wives' Tale that his style can range from the farcial, the trivial and the grotesque to the most gravely serious, from the recordings of a ship assistant's toothache and the adventures of souvenir-hunters round the corpse of a circus elephant to the considered reflections of an old woman in the presence of death."

<sup>172</sup> Reginald Pound, Arnold Bennett: a Biography (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953), p. 194. In a letter dated 7 October 1908, to his sister and brother-in-law, Bennett writes about finishing

The Old Wives' Tale: "Still, I must say, it's a bit of honest work. And the effect as you finish the last page is pretty stiff--  
when you begin to think things over. It isn't in many books that you can see people growing old. I read 'Une Vie' again (than which I meant to try and go one better) and was most decidedly disappointed in it. Lacking in skill."

<sup>173</sup> Owen Barfield, Poetic Diction: a Study in Meaning, 2nd ed. (London: 1928; rpt. New York: McGraw Hill, 1964), pp. 53-54. Barfield prefaces these quotations, both from Santayana, with the remark that real aesthetic experience is rare. Santayana says that taste is formed in moments, often occurring in youth, when aesthetic emotion is massive. Barfield says that poetry's pleasure derives from sound, the manner in which rhythm and music are wedded to sense, and knowledge, caused by the reader absorbing metaphor, simile, and other poetic devices. This study deals only with knowledge. Aesthetic pleasure accompanies that rare moment of expansion Barfield calls "a felt change of consciousness" (p. 52). This change usually occurs over a period of time because language, Barfield asserts, progressed historically from the poetic to the prosaic. "It thus tends to bring about conditions suitable for appreciation, such appreciation being no other than when an unconsciously created meaning (the poetic in language and experience) is realized, or finds itself in full waking consciousness--which latter state is itself made possible by the prosaic principle" (p. 152). The poetic is not concerned with words whose meanings are relatively fixed; rather, the poetic manifests itself as "fresh meaning; it operates essen-



tially within the individual term, which it creates and recreates by the magic of new combinations" (p. 131). Barfield calls this process the making of meaning: "language does indeed appear historically as an endless process of metaphor transforming itself into meaning" (p. 141).

<sup>174</sup> Barfield, pp. 92-93. After quoting Emerson's statement from "Language" in Nature, Barfield says that a history of language from a poet's view would be the mythologies, concrete vocabulary, which contain the world's first poetic diction. He also says that Emerson's statement "Language is fossil poetry" would cover practically all that Barfield has written (p. 179).

<sup>175</sup> Barfield, pp. 112, 116. Barfield says that the poet is the creator or re-creator of meaning itself: "He brings farther into consciousness something which already exists as unconscious life." The principal means of so doing is the metaphor. He also says that the "contact with other words is the precise point at which the potential new meaning originally enters language."

<sup>176</sup> Barfield, p. 126. Barfield quotes Edward Lewis Davison's lines as an example of a poet summing up all previous poetic uses of a word and then going a step beyond.

<sup>177</sup> Barfield, pp. 116, 114. "In Latin, then, the four letters 'r-u-i-n' never lost the power to suggest movement. In certain contexts they may seem to modern readers to possess a purely static material reference; but if so, it is because those readers are of the kind described by Maupassant as demanding only a sens, a definable meaning. [Barfield had quoted Maupassant: "Les mots ont une ame; la plupart des lecteurs, et meme des ecrivains, ne leur demandent qu'un sens. Il faut trouver cette ame qui apparait au contact

d'autres mots . . . .] The soul of such a word as ruina [a Latin word] is really inseparable from motion." While discussing the inadequacy of the words rush or fall to translate the Latin verb ruo, Barfield says: "The Greek ῥέω, to flow, and similar words in other European languages (whether philologists admit a lineal connection is a matter of comparative indifference for periods so remote), suggest that the old rumbling, guttural 'r,' which our modern palates have so thinned and refined, once had its concrete connection with swfit, natural movement such as those of torrents or landslides."

<sup>178</sup> Barfield, p. 116.

<sup>179</sup> Barfield, p. 116. Barfield quotes these lines: "Min is the ruine of the highe halles / The falling of the toures and of the walles."

<sup>180</sup> Barfield, p. 117. The words "the terrific phrase" are Barfield's, presenting these lines of Milton's as an example of a poet preserving that old content of large and disastrous movement in the word ruin: "Hell heard the insufferable noise. Hell saw Heaven ruining from Heaven."

<sup>181</sup> This reference could not be found.

<sup>182</sup> This reference could not be found.

<sup>183</sup> A. E. Housman, The Collected Poems of A. E. Housman (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1965), p. 112. These lines, inaccurately cited, are from "The Deserter": "My friends are up and dressed and dying, / And I will dress and die."

<sup>184</sup> Bruce Marshall, The Fair Bride (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1953), p. 233. Don Arturo is chaplain to the Bishop, an ineffectual and self-centered man, in a town in Spain in 1936 just when a communist uprising begins. Because one of the aims of the revolt is

to kill priests and nuns, it falls to Don Arturo to try to save himself and also to deliver a relic to Franco, who, with his armies, is advancing on the city. On his way through the burning city, he witnesses the pick-axe murder of a fellow priest and comes across the body of a nun, an old friend. Having escaped, he suddenly is overwhelmed by guilt and surrenders to the chief of police. Don Arturo says that he will give up his faith: the church has failed the working-man and the presence of such evil must mean that there is no God. However, he goes to hear the confession of a fellow priest and impulsively agrees to continue the secret Masses his friend had been saying. During his first secret Mass, the militia men break in and Don Arturo is tortured, but not before he manages to give the relic to Soledad, a young prostitute who originally helped him cross the barricades. Later she is tortured and killed for her aid to hunted people. The story ends ironically: Don Arturo is again chaplain to a new Bishop who is just as blind to the cause of justice as his predecessor had been.

<sup>185</sup> Marshall, p. 240. Don Arturo is called to hear Soledad's confession: "He knelt down with the blessing on his lips before he looked. Christ whose hands had been torn by the bosh shots of the nails understood."

<sup>186</sup> G. F. Stout, God and Nature (Cambridge: University Press, 1952), p. 241. In his chapter "The Transmission Theory of William James," Stout discusses James's explanation of his theory. After quoting Shelley, ("Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass, / Stains the white radiance of eternity"), James says that the dome is the physical world, not distinguished from matter. The white

radiance is the Eternal and Universal Mind, which permeates the dome, is refracted, and so stains the glass. "Thus the Universal Mind transmits itself to the physical world and gives rise to those finite streams of consciousness [corresponding to stains on the glass] with its own body, known to us as our private selves" (p. 240). This process of penetration is obstructed by the opacity of the medium. Stout criticizes James for being obscure as to the relation of the physical world to the psychical life. He agrees with James's transmission view for "denying that brain-process or any material process produces or creates mind." He also agrees, while deprecating the metaphysical and thus inadequate language, that "finite individuals arise wherever and whenever material conditions adapted to their existence come into being" (p. 241). "Here, however, my agreement with James ends. I am bound to reject as a baseless fiction the conception of the Eternal Mind struggling to penetrate an alien and obstructive physical barrier and succeeding only here and there, where the resistance is comparatively feeble. . . . [He believes] matter is eternally and completely controlled by mind, and cannot therefore offer obstruction to it. The same Eternal Mind, from which finite minds proceed also, in another aspect of the same individual activity moulds for them the presentation-continuum which they need for their existence and development."

<sup>187</sup> Ernest Hemingway, The Old Man and the Sea (New York: Scribner's, 1952), pp. 115-16. Santiago, an old fisherman who has single-handedly caught a huge fish, hopes he can get it back into port before any more of it is eaten by sharks. "It is silly not to

hope, he thought. Besides I believe it is a sin. Do not think about sin, he thought. There are enough problems now without sin. Also I have no understanding of it. I have no understanding of it and I am not sure that I believe in it. Perhaps it was a sin to kill the fish. I suppose it was even though I did it to keep me alive and feed many people. . . . But he liked to think about all things that he was involved in and since there was nothing to read and he did not have a radio, he thought much and he kept on thinking about sin. You did not kill the fish only to keep alive and to sell for food, he thought. You killed him for pride and because you are a fisherman. You loved him when he was alive and you loved him after. If you love him, it is not a sin to kill him. Or is it more?" Santiago, suffering from hunger, thirst, and cut hands, is unable to prevent packs of sharks from eating the marlin lashed to the side of his skiff. When he returns to port, all that is left of the giant fish is the skeleton.

<sup>188</sup> Hemingway, pp. 101-02. As the fish circles the boat, Santiago gets the harpoon ready to kill him. "He felt faint again now but he held on the great fish all the strain that he could. I moved him, he thought. Maybe this time I can get him over. Pull, hands, he thought. Hold up, legs. Last for me, head. Last for me. . . . 'Fish,' the old man said. 'Fish, you are going to have to die anyway. Do you have to kill me too?' That way nothing is accomplished, he thought. His mouth was too dry to speak but he could not reach for the water now. I must get him alongside this time, he thought. I am not good for many more turns. Yes you are, he told himself. You're good for ever."

<sup>189</sup> Hemingway, pp. 82-83. In his suffering, Santiago thinks



of the stars as his distant friends. "'The fish is my friend too,' he said aloud. 'I have never seen or heard of such a fish. But I must kill him. I am glad we do not have to try to kill the stars.'"

<sup>190</sup> Victor White, God and the Unconscious, introd. C. G. Jung (London: 1952; rpt. Chicago: Regnery, 1953), p. 78. "Originally and ideally [in Paradise], man was created with this needful grace; and as a consequence of this positive imaging of his Creator as the source and centre of his life, his constituent parts and functions are balanced and co-ordinated within themselves and with his environment. Grace was thus the co-ordinating and governing principle both of the human individual and of human society. This original and ideal condition is known to theology as 'the state of integrity,' of 'original rightness,' or 'of innocence.' Analytical psychology shows the persistent power of this 'Eden-archetype.' The 'Fall,' according to this teaching, is brought about by superbia, the autonomous self-assertion of the conscious ego over and against God, involving the refusal and rupture of the bond of grace." White says that the fundamental Christian doctrine of man is that he is made in the image and likeness of God. Man fulfills his purpose "in the measure in which he conforms to this divine image and realizes it within himself and his environment" (p. 77). Central to White's thesis is the saving power of Christ's death on the cross after man had sinned. God must give man the grace purchased by Christ's death so that man can achieve this conformity to God's image; man gets this grace through his unconscious, not from his conscious powers. See p. 75 for further reference to White.

<sup>191</sup> White, pp. 221-22. In his discussion of symbols, White contrasts Jung's and Freud's handling of their significance: "Freud seemed to have viewed the symbol only as a source of disguised, and usually disagreeable, information for the resisting consciousness. Jung saw that it was very much more than that; that it was the very instrument which, just because it was polyvalent, transformed consciousness itself and thereby the rich personality. This is what Jung meant when he calls the symbol the psychological machine which transforms energy into work. . . . The analytical psychologist does watch the actual functioning of symbols produced in dream and phantasy by his patients and by himself. He sees something at least of their actual causes and effects, and the role they consciously or unconsciously play in moulding character and behaviour for weal or woe; and he has a language or a jargon into which to translate their 'meaning.' And he finds this very noteworthy fact, that the old symbols and images and rites which we associate with the dying God are still brought forth spontaneously in the dreams of modern people, and are still consciously or otherwise, immensely potent in shaping their lives."

<sup>192</sup> White, p. 223. White states that Frazer's work, The Golden Bough, was thought to make nonsense of Christianity. It did make nonsense of some of the ideas about Christianity, says White--that it was "some sort of transcendental ethic, dropped ready-made from the sky." But Frazer's work had a different effect on White: "The Christian Scriptures and the Catholic rites to which I was accustomed, without losing their wonted sense, gained a quality and a sense of which my pastors and catechism had told me nothing; a sense of

solidarity with creation, with the processes of nature, with the cycles of the seasons."

<sup>193</sup> John Strachey, The Frontiers (New York: Random House, 1952), preface. The preface was written in 1941 when the author was the adjutant of #87 Squadron of Fighter Command in the English army. "James [the hero] is a sort of composite of the pilots of 87 squadron as I knew them. For the rest, the book contains--besides, I hope, something of France--some chapters in which there is a suggestion, in dialogue form--of the fundamental objections which I had formed to the totalitarian world outlook in general, and to the Communist view of world development in particular. Rereading these chapters ten years later, after I have had some political experiences myself, I find that they still suggest my views on these matters as well as I can manage it. It was I who had the conversation with Portella Valladares at the meeting of the Spanish Cortes." James, having parachuted out of his burning plane over France, is hidden by Madelaine and other French patriots in the home of a professor at the Sorbonne known as the Abbé. James overhears the conversation between the Abbé and Nordenac, a powerful Frenchman who was known to collaborate with the Germans. Nordenac, hoping for a United Europe, berates England for bombing the continent since she will surely be beaten by the Third Reich and offers the Abbé a rectorship at the University of Paris if he will join the collaborators. The Abbé refuses, noting that Valladares, the Spanish prime minister in 1936, had refused a similar offer from Franco. The Abbé and James discuss Valladares' decision of conscience and debate whether or not it can serve as a model for future years. Knowing that he will be arrested, the Abbé and James try to

escape across the border. James escapes by swimming out to a waiting boat, but the Abbé, not having his strength, drowns.

<sup>194</sup> Strachey, p. 143. The Abbé is talking about his meeting with Valladares at the meeting of the Spanish Cortes at the mountain monastery of Montserrat. "The old-fashioned pageantry of the meeting made the Abbé feel the Spanish government could not win."

<sup>195</sup> Strachey, p. 146. The Abbé is speaking to James about his experience in Spain in 1936: "'It appears that Valladares really did not refuse Franco's proposal because of timidity or inertia, but in all simplicity, because he thought that it was wrong. If that was so, it was one of the strangest events in the history of our times. For think of its consequences. Naturally we cannot know what would have happened if he had agreed. But everything would have been different. If the Generals had had the central government in their hands, the Civil War--if and when it had broken out--would probably have taken the form merely of another brief revolt, which would have been quickly put down. Fascism would have come to power in Spain three years before it did. The three years of resistance put up by the Spanish Republic would never have taken place. The world war might have come some years earlier: or not come at all. Fascism might have conquered the world without a struggle. We cannot tell. And of course Valladares had no conception of the consequences of his actions.' The Abbé raised his voice: 'He did what he did in blind integrity.'"

<sup>196</sup> Strachey, p. 156.

<sup>197</sup> Strachey, pp. 154-55. When asked if he is "going religious," the Abbé says, "No, about religion I have nothing of interest to say. I do not know if it is opium. And I do not know whether, if it is,

I disapprove of opium."

198 Strachey, p. 155.

199 Strachey, p. 156. The Abbé is speaking: "But the point which we have reached [in 1941]--the historical Konjunktur, as the Boche would say--is Portella Valladares. Portella Valladares or the question of blind integrity. Is it a virtue, or is it just a bore? That is the main question with which history confronts us today. Do we or do we not any longer need this type of conduct--the Valladares type of conduct? Do we any longer need to condition people to act in this particular way?"

200 Strachey, pp. 164-65. The Abbé is justifying his belief that England's example in resisting Hitler gave him the courage to say no to Nordenac and thereby bring his life in France to an end. "One can give a certain independent weight to our historically established code of conduct. In that way one's scepticism of one's estimate of a given situation produces, not inaction, but action from a different principle. At that point scepticism turns back into its opposite of reliance upon those actions which feel right. For those actions feel right which are in accordance with one's code of conduct--with the herd, the tribal mores, that have been distilled out of the whole experience of the race. Absurd to give that traditional code uncritical allegiance. Equally absurd, surely, to suppose that we can yet foresee consequences sufficiently to disregard it altogether. For, however hopeless and purposeless they may seem to us, in our ignorance, to be, it may be that these actions alone will stand well."

201 Strachey, p. 166. The Abbé says to James, "I can see no conceivable gain to anybody from my refusal to collaborate with Vichy. But that does not mean there will be no gain."



202 Edward Thompson, An End of the Hours (London: Macmillan, 1938), p. 229. An Englishman, Robert Alden, is on a ship bound for India. He is a member of a commission which is to report on changing conditions in India as they affect the Christian missions. He is saddened by the increased crowding and squalor which has occurred since his last visit five years ago. His former students are blander and less intelligent. He and John Findlay, an old friend, try to explain to each other, and to themselves, why England is moving toward giving up her Empire. Much of their conversation concerns Christianity vs. Hinduism, the Empire vs. a changing world, and Franco vs. the Reds. Most of the last third of the book is a discussion between Alden and Findlay, who is dying, concerning the possibility that a true Christianity would end the troubles of this earth. Alden comes to see that he is trying to come to grips with old age. He feels that his spirit is being guided to healing and peace as he wanders through the Indian countryside, remembering his ardent and strong past and realizing how little remains.

203 Thompson, p. 222. Alden feels happier when walking through the countryside than he does visiting the school where he once taught. This countryside is the wilderness in which he is wandering, where he finds "A body for my needs that so / I may not all unclothed go. . . ." The words feeling for the lands are italicized in Thompson's book.

204 Rev. of Existentialism from Within, by E.L. Allen, The New Statesman and Nation, 45 (1953), 681. The review goes on to praise the book's treatment of Heidegger, Sartre, and Jaspers as a progress from self-torment to faith, and from aesthetic obsession with death

to assured knowledge of God.

<sup>205</sup> Thompson, p. 235.

<sup>206</sup> Peter Bien, L. P. Hartley (London: Chatto and Windus, 1963). There is no collection of Hartley's articles, book reviews, or lectures delivered in England after 1952. However, Bien quotes from a lecture, "The Novelist's Responsibility" (identified as "Lecture 4, unpublished materials, delivered at Aldeburgh Festival, 1957," p. 413), in which Hartley calls for the rehabilitation of a moral view among novelists: "When we realize the psychological reasons for misdeeds, we tend to sympathize with wrongdoers, and this--combined with the fact that 'priggishness' is now a deadly sin, for it suggests superiority, and superiority is taboo --makes us often go so far as to prefer bad people to good" (p. 262). Freud and Marx, whose work "combined to undermine the individual's sense of personal responsibility" (p. 262), and Dostoievsky, who said that evil deeds don't matter "because one's actions are no indication of one's spiritual state" (p. 261), have contributed to what Hartley sees as a breakdown in this sense of responsibility. Bien says that Hartley's characteristic critical approach is to measure the author's intention against his performance and to look for a moral point of view: "some transcendental standard for life, typified by the relationship between the individual and his conscience" (p. 236).

<sup>207</sup> J. D. Scott, "New Novels," in New Statesman and Nation, 45 (1953), 378. "There is nothing smart about Mr. Baron's writing, but at the same time there is nothing mousy; it is assured and full of power, with an occasional assaulting ferocity; and I for one can read it like a thirsty man drinking." Scott is speaking of Alexander Baron's The Human Kind, the story of an English working-

boy's adolescence and experiences in the war. He also discusses other novels which he designates as autobiographical fragments, whose business it is "to celebrate the mystery of the personality" (p. 378).

<sup>208</sup> Elizabeth Bowen, To the North (London: 1932; rpt. New York: Knopf, 1950), p. 226. Bowen describes Mark's feelings after spending the night with Emmeline in Paris: "If the complete moral calm with which she had stepped in Paris over one line in behaviour surprised, in a sense even shocked him, some elusiveness underlying her generosity, something she still withheld unawares, renewed the hunter in him, restoring to love what compliance might have destroyed: its mobility." Cecelia Summers, a young widow on her way back to London, meets Mark Linkwater on a train from Rome. She introduces him to her sister-in-law, Emmeline, with whom she lives, although neither Emmeline's cousin, Lady Waters, nor Cecelia herself, likes him. Emmeline begins to fall in love with Mark though she is aware of his selfishness and crudeness. When she has to go to Paris on a business trip, Mark invites himself along. Emmeline becomes nervous and tense, yet keeps seeing Mark until they have a violent quarrel at a cottage they take for a week-end. Later, at Lady Waters' insistence, and full of her own plans for her approaching marriage, Cecelia invites Mark to dinner. Emmeline offers to drive him home and, though he says he wants to resume their relationship, deliberately crashes her car, killing them both. See pp. 186-188 following for further references to Bowen.

<sup>209</sup> Bowen, p. 226. "The fact was, she kept him uneasy. While her passivity soothed him, an exaltation at all times latent in her regard and, so great a part of her passion, likely to spring out at

any time, alarmed, irked and often fatigued him. He had still the sense, as after that first night in Paris, of having been overshot."

<sup>210</sup> Bowen, p. 187. "An idea of the stored-up darkness of its [a Roman basilica's] interior--only apart from them by a door and curtain--stale gilt, cold incense and peering images in the perpetual scarlet of hanging lamps, created for Markie a kind of suction, setting up in him a nervous frenzy unlike the coldness of disbelief."

<sup>211</sup> Bowen, p. 187.

<sup>212</sup> Bowen, pp. 229-30.

<sup>213</sup> John Buchan, Mountain Meadow (1940; rpt. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin), 1941. Published in England under the title Sick Heart River, this book is the story of Sir Edward Leithen, seriously ill from having been gassed in the First World War. At a time when he begins to disengage himself from life, thinking that he will soon die, a friend comes to him at his home in England and asks his help in locating Francis Galliard, who has disappeared from what seemed a very satisfying and productive life. Galliard is thought to have gone to his childhood home in Quebec; Leithen is intrigued with the idea of visiting northern Quebec and accepts the challenge. When he arrives, his health fails dramatically. "Suddenly he felt acutely his weakness, but with no regret in his mind, and indeed almost with comfort. He had been right in doing as he had done, coming out to meet Death in a world where Death and Life were colleagues and not foes" (p. 100). With the help of an experienced half-Indian guide, Johnny Frizel, Leithen finds Galliard after a very strenuous journey. Galliard appears dazed and mentally unbalanced. Johnny explains: "It's a queer thing, the North, and you need to watch your step for fear it does you down. This fellow was crazy for it

till he poked his head a wee bit inside, and now he's scared out of his life and would give his soul to quit. I've knowed it happen before" (p. 123). Leithen succeeds in bringing Galliard back to civilization and back to sanity. The hard trip has also restored Leithen's health. Later, however, in an attempt to improve the condition of the Indians in the north, Leithen dies.

<sup>214</sup> Benedetto Croce, Goethe (New York: Knopf, 1923), p. 73.

Gretchen is in prison after she kills her child. Faust enters to save her from death, but she refuses to see him. When she sees Mephistopheles at the door, she has already surrendered to God's judgment. "This last scene is the meaning of the whole. Not light indulgence, not morbid compassion, but effective redemption by the redeeming of a soul, rather by the birth of a soul where formerly there was only instinct and sense." In her chapter "The Image of Woman" in Archetypal Patterns, Bodkin discusses Gretchen who, although she had sinned as Francesca sinned, "is exalted to Heaven in the train of the Mater Gloriosa" (p. 205). Like Francesca in Dante's Inferno, Bodkin says that Gretchen symbolizes the "transmutation of a sentiment rooted more strongly in instinct than was the love through which Dante rose to Heaven" (pp. 205-06). Although Dante felt compassion for Francesca, "no question could arise concerning the condemnation of the sinful love, for all its sweetness" (p. 209). Goethe, on the other hand, has Gretchen distinguish between the sin and the love she still perceives as good. Thus she achieves redemption.

<sup>215</sup> Croce, p. 71. Croce says that Gretchen's conscience, formed for her by her mother and her priest and later overwhelmed by passion,



"awakes and forms itself; the outer law gradually becomes an inner law." Love takes away her peace of mind but gradually awakens her religious feeling, leading her to question Faust about matters of faith. "This first 'moral recognition of herself' appears especially in the wonderful scene at the well. She talks with Lieschen, who tells her about their friend Barbelchen's bad conduct. Gretchen compares herself to Lieschen: Lieschen is Gretchen herself before her love and her guilt." She cannot blame their friend.

<sup>216</sup> Archetypal Patterns, p. 209. Bodkin quotes Croce on this scene at the well: "Now she too has sinned; now she grasps and understands; and, though she does not justify, she does not condemn, and there comes to her lips the excuse that it was irresistible: 'And yet--all that drove me to sin, God! was so good! Ah, was so sweet!'" Bodkin then says that these words are "the assertion of the wondering yet vivid moral intuition of a creature newly awakened from the sleep of a childish docility. She admits the sin, but distinguishes from it the love whose goodness she cannot doubt."

<sup>217</sup> Eliot, "The Waste Land," in The Complete Poems and Plays 1909-1950 (1930; rpt. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1958), p. 38, l. 37-41. "--Yet when we came back, late, from the Hyacinth garden, / Your arms full, and your hair wet, I could not / Speak, and my eyes failed, I was neither / Living nor dead, and I knew nothing, / Looking into the heart of light, the silence."

<sup>218</sup> Eliot, The Cocktail Party, pp. 43-44. Peter, not knowing about the affair between Celia and Edward, is telling him about his infatuation with her: "But a girl like Celia, it seemed very strange, / Because I had thought of her merely as a name / In a

society column, to find her there alone. / . . . I had never imagined such quiet happiness. / I had only experienced excitement, delirium, / Desire for possession. It was not like that at all. / It was something very strange. There was such . . . tranquillity."

<sup>219</sup> Eliot, The Cocktail Party, p. 45. Peter is talking about Celia: "It is not her interest in me that I miss-- / But those moments in which we seemed to share some perception, / Some feeling, some indefinable experience / In which we were both unaware of ourselves."

<sup>220</sup> Eliot, The Cocktail Party, p. 46. Peter tells Edward that his relationship with Celia was his "first experience of reality."

<sup>221</sup> Bowen, p. 229. Mark tells Emmeline that he is alarmed for her reputation, and she answers: "If I'm not--and of course I do see in one way I am ruined--I don't see why you should be."

<sup>222</sup> Eliot, The Cocktail Party, p. 62. Celia wants Edward to divorce his wife and marry her. He has made her happy. "I abandoned the future before we began, / And after that I lived in a present / Where time was meaningless, a private world of ours, / Where the word 'happiness' had a different meaning / Or so it seemed."

<sup>223</sup> Eliot, The Cocktail Party, p. 67. Celia is speaking to Edward: "I see you as a person whom I never saw before. / The man I saw before, he was only a projection-- / I see that now--of something that I wanted-- / No, not wanted--something I aspired to-- / Something that I desperately wanted to exist."

<sup>224</sup> Eliot, The Cocktail Party, p. 137. Celia visits the psychiatrist Sir Henry Harcourt-Reilly and tells him about her feelings for Edward: "Oh, I thought that I was giving him so much! / And he to me--and the giving and the taking / Seemed so right: not in terms

of calculation / Of what was good for the persons we had been /  
But for the new person, us."

225 Eliot, The Cocktail Party, p. 138. Sir Henry tells Celia that her compassion for Edward is a clue to finding her way out of the forest [of unhappiness] in which she has been lost. She answers: "But even if I find my way out of the forest / I shall be left with the inconsolable memory / Of the treasure I went into the forest to find / And never found, and which was not there / And perhaps is not anywhere? But if not anywhere, / Why do I feel guilty at not having found it?"

226 Eliot, The Cocktail Party, p. 140. Sir Henry tells Celia that there are two treatments for her illness: the first is to reconcile her to "the human condition" and make her forget her unhappiness (p. 139). But Celia rejects this, saying that it seems to her a betrayal: "You see, I think I really had a vision of something, / Though I don't know what it is. I don't want to forget it. / I want to live with it. I could do without everything, / Put up with anything if I might cherish it."

227 Bowen, p. 299. Emmeline is confused because Mark does not want to marry her. She recalls her intense happiness when they first met: "All that can't have been for nothing; it can't just have been a deception. I still think there must have been meant to be something more."

228 Bowen, p. 171. Although these exact words are not in the novel, Emmeline thinks, as they fly to Paris: "She was embarked, they were embarked together, no stop was possible, she could not turn back only by some unforeseen and violent deflection--by which her exact idea of personal honour became imperilled--from their set

course."

<sup>229</sup> Bowen, p. 302. "But from beyond, the North's ice and unbreathed air, lights whose reflections since childhood had brightened or chilled her sky, touching to life at all points a sense of unshared beauty--reclaimed her for its clear solitude."

<sup>230</sup> Bowen, pp. 130-31. Emmeline, surprised by a very early morning visit from Mark, refuses to give him a letter she has just finished writing to him, wanting instead the pleasure of imagining him reading it. "Yet, embracing once more her integrity, Emmeline's heart smote her. For here Markie was, in his presence--within reach, if she cared to kiss, of his kiss, within reach, if she dared to put out a hand, of his hand--this idea of pleasure as isolated, arctic, regarding its own pleasure only, became desolating to Emmeline as a garden whose flowers were ice. Those north lights colouring the cold flowers became her enemies; her heart warming or weakening she felt at war with herself inside this cold zone of solitude. She desired lowness and fallibility, longing to break the mirror and touch the earth."

<sup>231</sup> Bowen, p. 168. Emmeline is very happy as she and Mark take off for Paris: "No noise, no glass, no upholstery boxed her up from the extraordinary: as they smoothly mounted and throbbed through the shining element she watched trees and fields in the blue June haze take on that immaterial loveliness, that foreign and clear intensity one expects of the sky."

<sup>232</sup> Bowen, p. 304. 'Nervously shaking her hair back, gripping the wheel beside Markie, Emmeline, who said nothing, drove, as though away from the ashy destruction of everything, not looking back. Running dark under the wheels the miles mounted by tens: she felt

nothing--Like a shout from the top of a bank, like a loud chord struck on the dark, she saw 'TO THE NORTH' written black on white, with a long black immovably flying arrow. Something gave way. An immense idea of departure--expresses getting steam up and crashing from termini, liners clearing the docks, the shadows of planes rising, caravans winding out into the first dip of the desert--possessed her spirit, now launched like the long arrow. The traveller solitary with his uncertainties, with apprehensions he cannot communicate, seeing the strands of the known snap like paper ribbons, is sustained and more than himself on a great impetus; the faint pain of parting sets free the heart. Blind with new light she was like somebody suddenly not blind, or, after a miracle, somebody moving perplexed by the absence of pain. Like earth shrinking and sinking, irrelevant, under the rising wings of a plane, love with its unseen plan, its constrictions and urgencies, dropped to a depth below Emmeline, who now looked down unmoved at the shadowy map of her pain."

233 William Law, A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1948), p. 118. This book, first published in 1728, consists of exhortations toward behavior patterned upon the Biblical stories about Christ. It also makes use of many role models, both moral and immoral people, for the readers' edification. "But alas! though God, and nature, and reason, make human life thus free from wants and so full of happiness, yet our passions, in rebellion against God, against nature and reason, create a new world of evils, and fill human life with imaginary wants, and vain disquiets."

234 Alexander Baron, "Old Beethoven," in The Human Kind: a Sequence (London: Jonathan Cape, 1953), p. 58. "'Genius!' Tom's



voice was awake now, awake with pain. 'Bloody torture I call it! Think of writing all that lovely, bloody music and not being able to hear it. Here, if that was me, my bloody head would burst. All that music thundering away inside.'" Tom, twenty years old and ill with dysentery, and the unnamed narrator are in a foxhole under fire in Sicily during the war. They are listening to Beethoven's music on a radio. Tom has never before heard Beethoven, and the narrator recounts some of the facts of his life. Tom tries to articulate the emotions the music arouses in him, and says that after the war he will listen to all of Beethoven's music. Then Tom stands up in a burst of enthusiasm and is killed.

<sup>235</sup> Baron, p. 55. Tom asks the narrator whether the tune they heard was just one tune. The narrator explains, "There's anything from fifty instruments upwards in those orchestras, and he [Beethoven] writes a separate part for each of them. Only they all harmonize." Tom answers, "Here, well I reckon there was about twenty tunes in that piece, at least, and they all went in together, and that sort of made the one big tune."

<sup>236</sup> Baron, p. 59. Tom is talking about what he will do when the war is over and they are back home. "'I'll tell you what, ' he resumed. 'You were right, what you said, about having a busy time when I get back. When I get back, do you know what I want to do?' His whole body came alive, and before I could restrain him, he straightened up, all upright and shining with youth, looking out over the parapet as if beyond the dismal plain was appearing all the bright beauty of the world that he had never seen. 'When I get back I want to--.' Those were his last words."

<sup>237</sup> Baron, "Victory Night," in The Human Kind. p. 162. A

doctor is treating Frank, a young soldier who has suffered a mental breakdown during the war. "He did not sympathise with Frank, or permit him to think of himself as unfortunate, but attacked him intellectually, laughing at him, accusing him of being unable to face life without throwing away the crutch of consoling but outgrown ideas, and forcing Frank to define and clarify what experience had taught him instead of letting it gather like a fog inside his head." Rest does not seem to help Frank, and the doctor thinks, "Probably his own physical experience had affected him little, except to lower his resistance; it was his silent brooding over the sufferings of others that had bled him of his strength" (p. 156). Frank is eventually helped to put an end to the inward monologue with which he has been living.

<sup>238</sup> Baron, "Victory Night," pp. 156-57. "It had been painful then, for Frank, who had an advanced education but no schooling in life, to discover, in six years of war, how close man still is to the other animals, how savage, depraved, treacherous, filthy and invincibly stupid he can be and how long, agonized and doubtful must be his struggle to change for the better. . . . He had come amongst us as one of those 'progressives' who are inspired by an over-simplified belief in human perfectibility; who believe that a few generations of reform will purge humanity of its faults and produce a race of angels."

<sup>239</sup> Michel Alexander Vallon, An Apostle of Freedom: Life and Teachings of Nicolas Berdyaev (New York: Philosophical Library, 1960), p. 158. Vallon says, "Berdyaev denies that God is Master, that He has any power at all." God is existence, not being. He is Spirit and precedes being. Thus he has nothing to do with the natural

world: "Spirit and nature are utterly incommensurable with one another" (p. 154). Vallon states that under Berdyaev's philosophy lay a mystical intuition, the Christian ungrund. It is infinite mystery and cannot be comprehended. Spiritual life is a symbolic life; symbols and myths give expression to events in the spiritual world. On this point Berdyaev's philosophy is similar to that of Paul Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr, who also hold that conceptual explanations of the divine mystery are impossible.

<sup>240</sup> Aldous Huxley, "Wordsworth in the Tropics," in Collected Essays (1943; rpt. New York, Harper, 1958), p. 3. "It is only very occasionally that he [Wordsworth] admits the existence in the world around him of those 'unknown modes of being' of which our immediate intuitions of things make us so disquietingly aware." Huxley states that the Wordsworthian who tries to export his pantheistic worship of nature, proper to England where nature is half tamed, to the tropics, is going to have his religious convictions disturbed. Wordsworth thought that the worst nature could do to him was to make him realize, in the shape of "a huge peak, black and huge," the existence of "unknown modes of being" (The Prelude, p. 1). Huxley says that Wordsworth's adoration of nature has two defects: it is possible only in a country where nature is already enslaved to man, and only for those "who are prepared to falsify their immediate intuitions of Nature" (p. 3). Huxley sees the world as "bottomlessly strange" (p. 4), whereas Wordsworth sees it as familiar and safely simple. Huxley surmises that Wordsworth began as a "natural aesthete" and then transformed himself into a moralist, using his intellect to distance his "exquisitely acute and subtle intuitions of the world" (p. 9), all in the interests of a preconceived religious theory.

<sup>241</sup> Empson, "China," rev. of Daybreak in China, by Basil Davidson, The New Statesman and Nation, 45 (1953), 750. Empson begins his review by discounting himself as an expert on China, saying that he heard a lot of talk but saw little during his five years at Peking University. He agrees with Davidson that the Chinese are enthusiastic concerning their future and says that he, like Davidson, saw no signs of terror. Empson discusses the General Confession movement of 1952, and the population problem which Davidson does not mention. Because of basic differences in the atmosphere of the two countries, Empson says he was always afraid, after he had responded to English questions as to whether or not intellectual freedom was being suppressed, that he had said something false when he answered that it was not.

<sup>242</sup> Eliot, The Cocktail Party, p. 140. Sir Henry tells Celia that the first possible treatment for her illness will reconcile her to "the human condition" (p. 139) and make her forget her unhappiness. Celia asks him if this is the best life. He answers, "It is a good life. Though you will not know how good / Till you come to the end." Although Bodkin quotes Sir Henry's answer as if it is his final statement, in the play he goes on to tell Celia that there is a better way.

<sup>243</sup> Eliot, The Cocktail Party, p. 139. Sir Henry says that he can cure Celia of her unendurable sense of life's meaninglessness. She will "Learn to avoid excessive expectation / Become tolerant of themselves and others, / Giving and taking, in the usual actions, / What there is to give and take."

<sup>244</sup> Eliot, The Cocktail Party, p. 142. Sir Henry tells Celia that the second treatment requires courage, for it is a "journey

blind," a terrifying journey: Both treatments, both ways "avoid the final desolation / Of solitude in the phantasmal world / Of imagination, shuffling memories and desires."

<sup>245</sup> Thomas Merton, Sign of Jonas (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953), p. 20. In his entry dated December 29, 1946, Merton lists the directions his confessor, Dom Gildas, has given him: "To profit by all the crosses Jesus sends me, especially the ones that come in connection with work--delays, accidents to manuscripts, adverse criticisms, insults, and so on. To realize what pleasure it gives Jesus when He sees that we recognize the action of His love, doing good to us in all these trials." The book is Merton's journal. kept over a period of years after his profession as a Trappist monk at Gethsemani in Kentucky. Overcrowding at the monastery, together with his superiors' orders that he write, obscures for Merton what he sees as the real purpose of the monastic life: "a more or less habitual state of simple prayer and union with God which varies in intensity at different times of the day, which finds a particular and proper rhythm in the life of each individual, and which brings the soul of the monk at all times under the direct and intimate influence of God's action" (p. 4). He is troubled by his intense desire for solitude: "I was in Father Abbott's room complaining that I was not the contemplative or the solitary that I wanted to be, that I made no progress in this house and that I ought to be either a Carthusian or an outright hermit" (p. 19). He prays for the grace to accept his superiors' advice, whatever it is, and not "judge them by human standards, taking the things they tell us as opinions that are to be weighed in the balance with our own" (p. 19). He recounts his efforts to resolve this problem and finally concludes: "If I am



to be a Saint--and there is nothing else that I can think of desiring to be--it seems that I must get there by writing books in a Trappist monastery" (p. 123).

<sup>246</sup> Whitehead, p. 523. "Thus by reason of the relativity of all things, there is a reaction of the world on God. The completion of God's nature into a fulness of physical feeling is derived from the objectification of the world in God. He shares with every new creation its actual world."

<sup>247</sup> Merton, p. 162. In his entry dated February 20, 1949, Merton says: "My complaints about the world in the [Seven-Storey] Mountain and in some poems are perhaps a weakness. Not that there isn't plenty to complain about, but my reaction is too natural. It is impure."

<sup>248</sup> Merton, p. 20. "He [Dom Gildas, his confessor] said I must remember that my desire to become a Carthusian is full of self-love and only some very extraordinary upheaval in my whole life would justify my leaving here for a Charterhouse."

<sup>249</sup> Eliot, The Cocktail Party, p. 178. Edward, Lavinia, and Peter are shocked to hear of Celia's death. Lavinia tells Peter: "You were saying just now / That you never knew Celia. We none of us did. / What you've been living on is an image of Celia / Which you made for yourself, to meet your own needs." Lavinia admits that in fact she is talking about herself. Edward continues: "Lavinia is right. This is where you start from. / If you find out now, Peter, things about yourself / That you don't like to face: well, just remember / That some men have to learn much worse things / About themselves, and learn them later / When it's harder to recover, and

make a new beginning."

<sup>250</sup> Merton, p. 129. Merton writes, "The fire of love for the souls of men loved by God consumes you like the fire of God's love, and it is the same love. It burns you up with a hunger for the supernatural happiness, first of people that you know, then of people you have barely heard of and finally of everybody. This fire consumes you with a desire that is not directed immediately to action, but to God. And in the swift, peaceful, burning tide of that desire you are carried to prayer rather than to action; or rather action seems to flow along with prayer and with desire, as if of its own accord--you do not think so much of what you are to do and write and say for souls: you are carried away to God by hunger and desire."

<sup>251</sup> Jacques Maritain, True Humanism, trans. M. R. Adamson (n.p., Centenary, 1939), pp. 56-7. "To every soul, [Divine Grace offers in some form] that Reality of absolute goodness which merits all our love and is able to save our life. . . and if this grace is not rejected . . . the soul in question, in its choice of that reality, believes obscurely in the true God and really chooses Him, even where it conceptualizes this faith in the true God under formulas that deny Him." Bodkin uses this same quotation in Type-Images and goes on to say, "The reality of prayer, and of religion, is in the choosing, the reaching out towards a Reality indicated however obscurely under the images of good inherited by that spirit" (p. 49).

<sup>252</sup> In a conversation 9 August 1977, Adamson said that she remembers that Bodkin had written a three-page description of Harrison as a craftswoman and Taylor as an artist which Adamson told her conveyed meaning.

<sup>253</sup> F. LaMotte Fouqué, Sentram and his Companions and Undine

(London: Gardner, Darton, 1896). Huldbrand, a knight, marries Undine, the daughter of peasants. She then confesses that she is an undine, a creature who resembles a human but who lives underwater and has no soul. Her uncle, Kuhleborn, brought her up from the Mediterranean to marry a mortal and thus obtain a soul. If Huldbrand stops loving her, she will be forced to go back to the water. When Huldbrand begins to be interested in Bertalda, arousing Kuhleborn's wrath, Undine has the castle fountain sealed up out of fear for her husband's life. She begs him not to be cruel to her near water. But he shouts, "In the name of all witches, go and remain among them with your presents, you sorceress, and leave us human beings in peace" (p. 259)! Undine disappears and later comes to her husband in a dream, warning him not to marry Bertalda. However, he does marry her; on the day of the wedding, Bertalda wants the fountain opened again. Undine rises out of the water and Huldbrand dies. When he is buried, a spring gushes out of the ground, almost encircling his grave. The villagers believe that the spring is "the poor deserted Undine, who in this manner, still fondly encircles her beloved in her arms" (p. 279).

<sup>254</sup> William Wordsworth, "The Prelude," The Complete Poetical Works of Wordsworth, ed. Andrew J. George (1904; rpt. Cambridge: Riverside, 1932), p. 215. Although Bodkin changes Wordsworth's word under-agents to underhelpers, she is quoting from Book XIII in which he says that he will write about many kinds of men: those "adroit / In speech, and for communion with the world / Accomplished" (ll. 256-58), adept at "Expressing liveliest thoughts in lively

words" (l. 264). But he also wants to write about other kinds of men:

Others, too  
 There are among the walks of homely life  
 Still higher, men for contemplation framed,  
 Shy, and unpractised in the strife of phrase;  
 Meek men, whose very souls perhaps would sink  
 Beneath them, summoned to such intercourse:  
 Theirs is the language of the heavens, the power,  
 The thought, the image, and the silent joy:  
 Words are but under-agents in their souls;  
 When they are grasping with their greatest strength  
 They do not breathe among them: this I speak  
 In gratitude to God, Who feeds our hearts  
 For his own service; knoweth, loveth us  
 When we are unregarded by the world (ll. 265-78).

<sup>255</sup> Bible, Col. iii. 9-10: "Lie not to one another, seeing that ye have put off the old man with his deeds / And have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him." Paul also refers to this death of the self in Eph. iv. 21-24: "If so be that ye have heard him and have been taught by him, as the truth is in Jesus / That ye put off concerning the former conversation the old man, which is corrupt, according to deceitful lusts / And be renewed in the spirit of your mind / And that ye put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness."

<sup>256</sup> Whitehead, p. 11. "In any human society, one fundamental idea tingeing every detail of activity is the general conception of the status of the individual members of that group, considered apart from any special preeminence." In his second chapter, "The Human Soul," Whitehead discusses Plato's "notion of the ideal relations between men based upon a conception of the intrinsic possibilities of human character" (p. 53). He then gives a short summary

of the advances in human institutions, beginning with the Greeks' metaphysical speculations upon the nature of the soul, while living in a world economically based on slavery, to the gradual dawning of a presupposition of man's freedom, largely influenced by the French humanitarian thinkers of the eighteenth century. Whitehead then goes on to discuss the Wesleyan protestant revival which made the conceptions of the brotherhood of man and the importance of man realities. See "Physical Agencies and the Divine Persuasion" for further references to this aspect of Whitehead's thought.

<sup>257</sup> St. John Ervine, "Jane Clegg," in Plays of Today: First Volume (1925; rpt. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1930), pp. 153-230. Jane is a thirty-two-year-old woman who has lived ten years with Henry, her unfaithful husband, whom she has long ceased to love. She stays with him only for the sake of their two children. When her uncle dies, she is determined that Henry will not get her legacy. The action of the play takes place over a three-day period, during which we learn that Henry's mistress is pregnant and wants him to marry her, and that he owes money to a bookie. Since Jane will not lend him money, Henry steals from his employer. When the theft is discovered, Henry pleads with Jane to give him money to save him from imprisonment. She agrees on condition that he resign from his firm and move with them to Canada. The bookie arrives, demanding his money, and angrily tells Jane about Henry's mistress. Henry leaves, pleading that he is too weak to live up to Jane's expectations.

<sup>258</sup> J. B. Priestley, "I Have Been Here Before," The Plays of J. B. Priestley (London: Heinemann, 1953), I, pp. 203-68. In the introduction Priestley says he re-wrote the play many times, "chiefly



because it was very difficult to explain Ouspensky's [ P. D. Ouspensky wrote A New Model of the Universe and is called Dr. Görtler in the play] theory of recurrence on which the action is based." Dr. Görtler's arrival at an English country inn disturbs Walter and Janet Ormond and Oliver Farrant, the other three guests, because he knows many intimate details of their lives. Walter is a successful businessman who drinks too much and is constantly preoccupied with his work; Janet is very unhappy and is also nervous because of her sudden strong attraction to Oliver. Dr. Görtler explains the feeling each guest has that he has been at the inn before by means of his theory of Recurrence and Intervention: he reveals that he has "seen" the three of them in a dream and knows that Walter will kill himself and that Janet and Oliver will go off together. He also tells them that this predetermined future can still be changed if one of them wills the change strongly enough. Walter decides that he will let Janet go. This free act breaks the circle of fatality in which Walter has always felt that he moved. For a fuller treatment of this play, see Bodkin's "A Symbol from a Play," The Adelphi, 14 (1938), pp. 218-21. There Bodkin compares Walter with Othello, just as she follows this reference with one to Othello.

<sup>259</sup> For further references to Shakespeare's heroes, see Archetypal Patterns, pp. 219-24.

<sup>260</sup> This reference could not be found.

<sup>261</sup> John Bunyan, The Pilgrim's Progress (1678; rpt. New York: Grolier, n.d. ), pp. 123-25. Christian, reading a Book and directed by Evangelist, leaves the City of Destruction on his way to the Celestial

City. Attended after a while by Hopeful, he takes a path off the main road called Bypath-Meadow, following a man called Vain-confidence, but loses his way. They come to Doubting Castle, owned by Giant Despair, who captures them and puts them into his dungeon. Counseled by his wife, Diffidence, to encourage Christian and Hopeful to kill themselves, Giant speaks with them: "'For why,' said Giant, 'should you chuse life, seeing it is attended with so much bitterness?' But they desired him to let them go. With that he looked ugly upon them, and rushing to them had doubtless made an end of them himself, but that he fell into Fits (for he sometimes in Sun-shine weather fell into Fits) and lost for a time the use of his hand; wherefore he withdrew and left them as before, to consider what to do." After beatings and great fear, Christian is kept from despair by Hopeful's words. Just as all seems lost, Christian remembers that he has a key called Promise. With that Christian and Hopeful escape.

<sup>262</sup> An excerpt from this Egyptian "God-intoxicated" king's prayer to the sun appears in Archetypal Patterns: "With seeing whom may my eyes be satisfied daily when He rises in this temple of Aton in the city of the Horizon, and fills it with His own self by His beams, beauteous in love, and lays them upon me in life and length of days for ever and ever" (p. 141). (This quotation Bodkin takes from Arthur Weigall's The Life and Times of Akhnaton [London: Butterworth, 1923], p. 84.) Bodkin says that Akhnaton's adoration of the sun is for her "a communication made across the ages, and an influence passing on into new realization," making it possible for her to appropriate Dante's description of heightened radiance seen in Beatrice. The prayer lets her "reach out to the world around us" and makes sunlight

seem like "the kindled look on the face of a friend" (p. 142).

263 This reference could not be found.

264 H. G. Wells, The Outline of History: Being a Plain History of Life and Mankind, 3rd ed. (1920; rpt. New York: Macmillan, 1921, 1922), p. 104. "The history of mankind henceforth is a history of more or less blind endeavors to conceive a common purpose in relation to which all men may live happily, and to create and develop a common consciousness and a common stock of knowledge which may serve and illuminate that purpose." Wells is discussing the primitive origins of religion. Replete with maps, illustrations, time-charts, tables, and graphs, Wells's book begins with the description of the formation of the Azoic, Proterozoic, and Paleozoic rocks, the record of early life contained in their fossils, the natural selection among the forms of life which arose, and the emergence of man. He then discusses primitive philosophy and religion, the formation of languages, and the first civilizations: the Sumerian, Assyrian, and Egyptian. He continues man's history up to what he calls a forecast of the next war: the failure to produce a satisfactory world settlement in 1919-20. His last chapter calls for the creation of a federal world government which would allow a utopian new phase in human history to evolve.

265 Wells, Mind at the End of its Tether and The Happy Turning, a Dream of Life (New York: Didier, 1942), p. 5. "Now it is as if that cord had vanished and everything was driving anyhow to anywhere at a steadily increasing velocity." Wells says that at age seventy-nine, facing death because of a heart condition, he is bringing to a conclusion all that he has written upon the fundamental nature of life

and time. He has become convinced that life as we know it is nearing its end.

<sup>266</sup> Wells, Mind, p. 8. "A harsh queerness is coming over things and rushes past what we have hitherto been wont to consider the definite limits of hard fact."

<sup>267</sup> Wells, Mind, p. 9. "But there are thousands of mean, perverted, malicious, heedless and cruel individuals, coming into the daylight every day, resolute to frustrate the kindlier purposes of man."

<sup>268</sup> Wells, Mind, pp. 12-13. "Adapt or perish has been the inexorable law of life through all these ever intensifying fluctuations and it becomes more and more derisive as the divergence widens between what our fathers were wont to call The Order of Nature and this new harsh implacable hostility to our universe, our ally . . . ." Utilizing the structure of Greek tragic drama, Wells calls life the Protagonist. "The 'Antagonist,' then, in that qualified sense, is the term the present writer will employ to express the unknown implacable which has endured life for so long by our reckoning and has now turned against it so implacably, to wipe it out."

<sup>269</sup> Wells, Mind, p. 15. "It [our world] is like a convoy lost in darkness on an unknown rocky coast, with quarrelling pirates in the chartroom and savages clambering up the sides of the ships to plunder and do evil as the whim may take them."

<sup>270</sup> Wells, Mind, p. 30. "The writer sees the world as a jaded world devoid of recuperative power. In the past he has liked to think that man could pull out of his entanglements and start a new creative phase of human living. In the face of our universal inadequacy, that optimism has given place to a stoical cynicism."

<sup>271</sup> John Holloway, The Victorian Sage: His Message and Methods

(London: Macmillan, 1953), p. 129. This quotation is from George Eliot's Mill on the Floss (1908; rpt. London: Dent, 1966), p. 430. Eliot believes that nature is a system determined through and through by law. "Tom Tulliver and his prejudices show what must happen to those who 'can get no sustenance out of that complex, fragmentary, doubt-provoking knowledge that we call truth,' and we see something of the system in how he comes to terms with the truth about it." Holloway discusses Eliot, Carlyle, Newman, Arnold, Disraeli, and Hardy in their shared role of sage: "All of them sought (among other things) to express notions about the world, man's situation in it, and how he should live" (p. 1). The sage wants both to quicken his readers' perceptiveness and to give expression to his outlook imaginatively, drawing upon "resources cognate, at least, with those of the artist in words" (p. 10). The novelist, working with illustrative incidents or characters, and the essayist, using examples in an argument, both use figurative language and control the senses of the words they use. "The rich, single word is a mode of expression peculiarly apt for the distinctive task which the sage is attempting-- as we saw, a task often of awakening or reawakening something, not of transmitting information" (pp. 16-17). Eliot especially conveys her moral outlook through characters; no one ever sins and escapes, though punishment may be long delayed and its source unexpected. She uses characters both as specimens of how the general scheme of things proceeds and as examples of the good or bad. "Within one continuous system of character, therefore, we can be shown bad in the good and good in the bad, and progressively instructed in what to follow or avoid, until even the villain of the piece can



display something of each" (p. 132).

<sup>272</sup> Holloway, p. 4. Holloway says that Carlyle believed that he had answers to man's ultimate questions. Everyone can read them in his own heart, and failure to do so is blind and vicious. "This is how he [Carlyle] brings home that what he calls a 'Life-Philosophy' has its own mode of confirmation. He is aware, too, that a difficulty remains to be overcome about its meaning. 'To know; to get into the truth of anything is ever a mystic act,--of which the best logics can but babble on the surface.' [This quotation is from Carlyle's Heroes and Hero-Worship (1841; rpt. London: Chapman and Hall, 1903), p. 47.] Hence Carlyle constantly invites the reader to meditate humbly and carefully on some assertion that he admits is essentially simple."

<sup>273</sup> Holloway, p. 7. Newman, in The Grammar of Assent, "systematically studies the various forms taken by conviction, and the various mental processes which may generate it; and he undertakes this survey for the ultimate purpose of establishing and justifying exactly that kind of knowledge with which we are concerned, and of which Newman saw religious belief as a crucial example" (p. 6). Newman differentiates between notational assent (assent to general, abstract propositions, such as in logic, science, or mathematics), which yields various degrees of belief but not knowledge, and Real Assent: "This kind of Assent is directed towards assertions based on the whole trend of our experience; and because of this foundation, their meaning is too rich to be sharply limited, always liable to be unfolded further, and likely to vary from one person to another in exact content. It is a meaning which arises from one individual

out of his own history, and exists for him in vivid particular images that bring his belief to life, and naturally lead him in the end to some active and practical step like joining a church, for example."

<sup>274</sup> Holloway, p. 58. This quotation is taken from Eliot's Adam Bede (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1947), pp. 165-66. She says that far from inventing ideal characters, her "strongest effort is . . . to give a faithful account of men and things as they have mirrored themselves in my mind." Realistic pictures of obscure mediocrity serve a didactic purpose: "These fellow-mortals, every one, must be accepted as they are . . . these people . . . it is needful you should tolerate, pity and love: it is these more or less ugly, stupid, inconsistent people whose movements of goodness you should be able to admire."

<sup>275</sup> Holloway, p. 124. Holloway observes that Eliot leaves out a large part of human nature: "What is crucial is that George Eliot's preoccupation with those whose life is obscure or frustrated determines her portrait of human duty."

<sup>276</sup> Holloway, p. 126. In Mill on the Floss (1908; rpt. London: Dent, 1966), p. 284, Eliot sees resignation as a duty because nature is as it is. "Our life is determined for us," says Maggie, "and it makes the mind very free when we give up wishing and only think of bearing what is laid upon us."

<sup>277</sup> Holloway, pp. 122-23. Holloway says of Eliot's work: "The staple of the books lies in slowly ripening, intermittent, half-conscious things like disillusion, the quest for insight, growing affection, reformation, or, above all, temptation. Dorothea slowly

learns that Casubon is a false god. . . . She [Eliot] sees these things like seasonal changes in their gradualness and necessity. . . . [Holloway thinks that Eliot's vision derives from her thinking of how her characters relate to each other.] Two processes interest her chiefly, and they are of this same gradual and half-unseen kind. They are, estrangement, and--in its widest sense--endearment. They are not phases or episodes, their resolution makes the substance of these novels from beginning to end. George Eliot cares for those aspects of human nature which come nearest to the geological."

<sup>278</sup> Holloway, p. 136. Holloway takes this quotation from Eliot's Impressions of Theophrastus Such: "My philosophical notions, such as they are, carry me back to the time when the fitful gleams of a spring day used to show me my own shadow . . . riding . . . over the breezy uplands . . . or along by-roads with broad grassy borders. . . . I often smile at my consciousness that certain conservative prepossessions have mingled themselves for me with the influences of our midland scenery, from the tops of the elms down to the buttercups. . . . Our national life is like that scenery which I early learned to love, not subject to great convulsions, but easily showing more or less delicate (sometimes melancholy) effects from minor changes. Hence our midland plains have never lost their familiar expression and conservative spirit for me. . . . But because our land shows . . . this readiness to be changed, all signs of permanence . . . raise a tender attachment. . . . A crumbling bit of wall where the delicate ivy-leaved toadflax hangs its light branches, or a bit of grey thatch . . . is a thing to visit."

<sup>279</sup> Holloway, p. 122. Holloway says of Eliot's characters. "No

one consciously finds pleasure in doing wrong, or in inflicting pain on themselves or others. No one is savage, no one is depraved. The world of serious characters divides into the good and the weak; being weak is essentially being stupid, being blinded to all the consequences."

<sup>280</sup> Arnold Kettle, An Introduction to the English Novel: From Henry James to 1950, II, 2nd ed. (1953; rpt. London: Hutchinson University Library, 1967), p. 63. Kettle takes this quotation from Conrad's Under Western Eyes: "Some kind of 'moral discovery,' Conrad wrote, 'should be the object of every tale.' He was no Art-for-Arte, this artist who, incredibly, wrote his books in a foreign language which he learned as an adult, and wrestled with his novels in a way reminiscent of Flaubert, the novelist whom he most admired. And by 'moral discovery' he did not mean merely the illustration of some preconceived moral truth. It was in the creation of the work of art that the discovery was made. This seems to me very important. The very act of artistic creation, that moulding into significant form of some thing or part of life, is in itself a discovery about the nature of life and ultimately its value will lie in the value of that discovery." Kettle says that we do not know what these discoveries were for Conrad because he did not say, but that they are connected with the social nature of man.

<sup>281</sup> Kettle, pp. 65-67. Kettle says that Conrad's Nostromo's main theme "is the corrupting power of the silver mine which changes all that touches it--dehumanises Gould and dries up his marriage, makes a mockery of the liberal ideals of the parliamentarians and the Christianity of the American capitalist, corrupts the incorruptible Nostromo, Capataz de Cargadores, the great man of the People, the

symbol of their aspirations. . . . Conrad's method is to over-simplify somewhat individual character in the sense of giving individuals very sharply-defined personal characteristics, so that each stands out clearly." Kettle says that Conrad associates the color silver with Nostromo, and cites examples of this association throughout the novel.

282 Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: an Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational, trans. John W. Harvey, 4th ed. (1917; rpt. London: Oxford University Press, 1926 ), p. 159. "For to the Christian, it is a momentous question whether or no a real divination--a direct, first-hand apprehension of holiness manifested, the 'intuition' and 'feeling' of it--can be got from the person and life of Christ; whether, in short, 'the holy' can be independently experienced in him, making him a real revelation of it." Otto states that this question cannot be answered from inquiries into "Jesus' consciousness of himself." What evidence there is sheds light on the prophet or seer, not on Jesus. The gospel narratives show unmistakably that many people believed that Jesus was "the 'Messiah,' the being who stood for this circle in which he moved as the numinous being par excellence" (p. 163). Otto sees Christ's achievement as "the effectual bestowal of 'salvation' as future hope and present possession by arousing a faith in his God and in the Kingdom of God" (p. 172). What makes Christ "the summary and climax of the course of antecedent religious evolution" is that with his death he repeats the classic problem of the Old Covenant, "the problem of the guiltless suffering of the righteous" (p. 177). The main criterion of a religion's value,



says Otto, is "the idea of holiness as such, and the degree of perfection with which any given religion realizes this" (p. 177).

<sup>283</sup> Powicke, p. 51. In his essay "Religion," Powicke speaks of ecclesiastical history as "the history of the occasions offered to man for the practice of religion. . . . The value of the Church to the free man is that in the Church man finds the occasion of religious freedom."

<sup>284</sup> Francis Herbert Bradley, "The Presuppositions of Critical History," in Collected Essays (Oxford, 1935; rpt. Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries, 1968), I, pp. 26-27. "The contents which in early life are taken into and build up our consciousness, consisting as they do of our individual experiences blended into one substance inextricably with the experiences of others, exist in the uncritical mind as that which (for itself at least) is a confused and unsystematized world of consciousness. It is to such a world that the critical intelligence awakens, and its awakening is the sundering of its material from itself. It stands (so far as awakened) a self-conscious unity on this side, and regarding its matter as from the outside demands from it the same oneness, that intelligible unity which, as the world of an intelligence, it is to have and virtually has. The new object, which now for the critical mind is the sole and increasing reality, is the reorganization of the old world; it is true only because recreated, and can be recreated only because connected into a rational system." Bradley points out in this essay, first published in 1874, that critical history involves both objective and subjective aspects. Each historical fact is a complex totality containing both judgment and conclusion. Any testimony from others

depends on inferences from our own life, and to expect uniformity from history means that all historical facts are subject to inference from the present world.

<sup>285</sup> Bradley, p. 27. "What we stand upon is personal observation; and what we have ground to connect with, that we will receive because of its connexion with that, and subject to appeal to that; and we will receive nothing else, but from that basis we will order our world."

<sup>286</sup> George Tyrrell (1861-1909), Anglican priest who converted to Catholicism in 1879 and became a Jesuit the following year, played a prominent part in advocating Modernism, a European intellectual movement which sought to reinterpret traditional Catholic teaching. When he opposed Leo XIII's encyclical of 1893, "Most Provident God," which restricted critical exegesis of the Bible, Tyrrell was excommunicated. This quotation could not be found.

<sup>287</sup> Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, trans. W. Montgomery (New York: Macmillan 1968), p. 403. Montgomery used the original German edition Von Reimarus zu Wrede, 1906, for his translation. "He [Jesus] was not teacher, not a casuist; He was an imperious ruler. It was because He was so in His inmost being that He could think of Himself as the Son of Man. That was only the temporally conditioned expression of the fact that He was an authoritative ruler. The names in which men expressed their recognition of Him as such, Messiah, Son of Man, Son of God, have become for us historical parables. We can find no designation which expresses what He is for us. He comes to us as One unknown, without a name, as of old, by the lake-side, He came to those men who knew Him not. He

speaks to us the same word: 'Follow thou me,' and sets us the tasks which He has to fulfill for our time. He commands. And to those who obey Him, whether they be wise or simple, He will reveal Himself in the toils, the conflicts, the sufferings which they shall pass through in His fellowship, and, as an ineffable mystery, they shall learn in their own experience Who He is." Finding ordinary methods of historical investigation inadequate because of the nature of the sources of Jesus' life and of what we know of the contemporary religious world of thought in which Jesus lived, Schweitzer surveys the work of predominantly German Protestant theologians of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with this question in mind: "Does the difficulty of explaining the historical personality of Jesus lie in the history itself, or only in the way in which it is represented in the sources" (p. 11)? He criticizes each work, beginning with Reimarus (1694-1768), who was the first to grasp the fact that "the world of thought in which Jesus lived was essentially eschatological" (p. 23) and who believed that Jesus never intended to found a church, and calls them fictitious (those which ignore all supernatural events), rationalistic (those which explain all of the miracles on natural grounds), skeptical (those which deny the existence of Jesus), and liberal. The writers of liberal lives sought to combine, in various ways, the Jesus of the synoptics, a Messiah waiting for an earthly Kingdom, with the Johannine Jesus, who represented a fundamentally Greek conception of the coming of an apocalyptic Kingdom. Schweitzer calls theirs a negative benefit--"a deeper understanding of a subject is only brought to pass when a theory is carried to its utmost limit and finally proves its own inadequacy" (p. 221). Schweitzer's hypothesis is that Jesus

only gradually came to believe that He was the Messiah and that God wanted Him to suffer and die as a scapegoat for many. The result of his quest, says Schweitzer, is to realize that Jesus as a historical figure cannot be taken out of His own context: it is His spirit which speaks to men of every age.

<sup>288</sup> Bradley, p. 31. "For, however possible any matter may be, yet we cannot on testimony receive it as real, unless we have ground to connect it with the real. Analogy is such a ground, but, failing analogy, there is nothing left but the inference to a strength of testimony which can exist only on the assumption of the identification of our own with another's consciousness (in general, or in relation to one particular division of the world); and this assumption, in the case supposed at present, we have no right to make."

<sup>289</sup> Bradley, p. 29. "The explanation [of how to be certain of others' testimony] is this--that by inferences, however complicated yet in the end resting on personal observation, we have so apprehended and possessed ourselves of the consciousness of others, that we are justified in assuming the identity of their standpoint with our own, i.e. [sic] we can be assured that the already systematized world, which was brought as a canon by the witnesses to the observation and to the subsumption of the mesmeric phenomena, was practically the same which we ourselves should have brought."

<sup>290</sup> Bradley, p. 36. "The interest of science is the discovery of the laws of what is, neither past nor present nor future events, nor events at all, but only the abiding. The interest of history is in the recalling of a course of events which are not, which neither exist nor will exist but which have existed."

<sup>291</sup> Bradley, p. 35. "History for us too is a record of events, but the record of a single field, the tradition and the tale of the

deeds and sufferings of men."

<sup>292</sup> Bradley, p. 39. "And it should not be forgotten that, if the interest of history is not the enlargement of the territory of science, but rather the exhibition of the oneness of humanity in all its stages and under all its varieties; if it is ourselves that we seek in the perished (and is there anything else which we can seek?); if the object of our endeavor is to breathe the life of the present into the death of the past, and re-collect into this pantheon of the mind the temporal existences which once seemed mortal--then, where we encounter an alien element which we cannot recognize as akin to ourselves, that interest fails, the hope and the purpose which inspired us dies, and the endeavor is thwarted. The remembrance of our childhood and our youth is the sweetest of pleasures, for it gives us the feeling of ourselves, as the self of ourself and yet as another; and this failure to recognize or the impossibility of interest in our earlier life is to whom it has befallen, the bitterest pain or the most cruel estrangement."

<sup>293</sup> Bradley, p. 40. "In that ceaseless process which differentiates itself only as a means to integration, and which integrates itself only with the result of a fuller differentiation, the consciousness of the earlier stage of humanity is never the consciousness of a later development. The knowledge it has of itself is partial and false when compared with the epoch of an intenser realization. And when we reflect that for this highest development it is that history exists, we see that it is a hope doomed only to disappointment, when the present expects in the mind of the past to find the views and beliefs of the present."



<sup>294</sup> Bradley, p. 20. "There is no such thing as a history without a prejudication; the real distinction is between the writer who has his prejudications without knowing what they are, and whose prejudications, it may be, are false; and the writer who consciously orders and creates from the known foundation of that which for him is the truth."

<sup>295</sup> Bradley, p. 50. "'Testimony is a phenomenon,' says Paley, 'and the truth of the fact solves the phenomenon.'"

<sup>296</sup> Bradley, p. 51. "But if we are unable to accept the averred fact because it is either as yet without guarantee, or because it is an historical impossibility, are we then bound to account otherwise for the phenomenon of the testimony? Can it be urged against us that our theory contains within itself facts which contradict it, and that we must solve the facts or abandon the theory? By no means, for this is to confound that which is negatively with that which is positively irrational. The unrationalized recorded events are in contradiction with criticism only when affirmed by criticism, but now, in the character of objects which history does not yet know, they are nothing positive, they fall as yet without the theory: they are no foreign body taken up within the system, but are yet an external and unassimilated crudity."

<sup>297</sup> Bradley, p. 51. "It is no disgrace to be ignorant where the problem is recognized and the effort is made."

<sup>298</sup> Bradley, p. 51. Bradley says that Baur (Ferdinand Christian Baur [1792-1860]) did not intend to exclude any historical event from the field of criticism: "That which 'lies without the sphere of historical investigation' is, he means to imply, not an event, not a fact for critical history at all: though it may be an object for a higher

form of knowledge."

<sup>299</sup> Bradley, p. 52. "Every phenomenon has a possible solution because as historical it must be the result of an historical antecedent, and the cause is a possible object of knowledge, because the result is known already as that which by its very nature is a member in a series of links, the essence of which is to be knowable."

<sup>300</sup> Bradley, pp. 51-52. Bradley finds it not surprising that Baur states that the spiritual process, the sole historical fact, cannot be analyzed: "What Baur may very well have meant is that there are results for which no 'genetic development' will account, or give a reason, however much it may 'explain' them; and processes again (as we see, for example, in the case of many works of art) the elements which defy distinction, because indissolubly fused within particular personalities by a flowing which mixes the substance of the elements with the nature of the vessel that holds them, and which itself is the new birth of an individual soul. Hence they are not natural growths but creations; and if we like to call them miracles, we may."

<sup>301</sup> George Sutherland Fraser, The Modern Writer and His World: Continuity and Innovation in Twentieth-Century English Literature (Japan: n.p., 1950; London: Vershoyle, 1953), pp. 21-22. This quotation is from Pound's Cantos. Fraser goes on to say: "Certainly, if one were trying to instil into a young man, in our troubled times, a sane loyalty towards all that is best in our strange mixed inheritance--to instil in him, in fact, a balanced attitude to history, so that even in these bad times he would keep his courage up and not weakly or unnecessarily repine--one could hardly find better words than these of Pound's [from Canto 81] to do this in: 'What thou lovest

well is thy true heritage.'" Fraser's preface says that his book was "originally composed and published in Japan in 1950, and then revised and expanded for an English audience in 1953 . . . to give the Japanese a plain and clear though not simplified account of the main new movements and great innovating figures in English literature since about 1880" (p. 7). Fraser chooses Henry James, H. G. Wells, George Orwell, Angus Wilson, Evelyn Waugh, Anthony Powell, and Virginia Woolf as writers who expressed the mood of their times. The concept of modernity in these works carries with it a lively interest in the past for its own sake and also emphasizes complexities in life.

<sup>302</sup> Fraser, p. 66. "On the whole, however, it is probably not to Kipling or to Conrad that the more sensitive Edwardians turned for a lucid insight into the everyday problems of their own lives." Rather, Fraser goes on to say, they turned to E. M. Forster.

<sup>303</sup> Fraser, p. 68. "The theme of the individual, the individual's own response, his own sense of responsibility, his own sense of reaction towards and trust in a 'stranger' for which he must sacrifice 'tradition,' is really Mr. Forster's main theme."

<sup>304</sup> Fraser, p. 68. "In an early novel, A Room With a View, he [Forster] treats the theme in a vein of genteel, almost ladylike comedy, but in his last novel, A Passage to India, it has become tragic. Now it is no longer a matter of gaps, barriers, misunderstandings between different segments of the middle classes, it is a matter of gaps, barriers, misunderstandings between the British in India and the native educated Indians."

<sup>305</sup> Fraser, p. 69. "The moral of the story is that individual sincerity and loyalty are possible, but that the pressure of group life,

and of accepted social conventions, works very hard against them."

<sup>306</sup> Fraser, p. 70. "But there is also a strong puritan conscience at work in the British professional and administrative classes which makes them feel that any principle, which they apply to their own group, ought ideally to be applied to all groups, that discrimination is unfair, and it is from this basis, from the uneasy conscientiousness the high principles and the refined sensibilities of our traditional ruling classes in Great Britain that our present democratic system has partly evolved; there has also, of course, been pressure from below. But British democracy is not a democracy which has been achieved through violence or revolution; it has evolved rather through the fact that various social groups, deprived of advantage belonging to more privileged groups, have demanded a reasonable share in this advantage; and the more privileged classes because of this honesty and conscientiousness, have had to recognize the justice of the demand."

<sup>307</sup> Robert Raynolds, Sinner of St. Ambrose (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1952), p. 173. Gregory's wife, Marcia, wants their sickly son Marcus to be baptized because she fears that he will be condemned to hell should he die. Gregory cannot believe in hell: "I thought: What terrible symbols, leading to what tragic acts, our need of truth can devise to answer the impenetrable mystery of our human life! Holding my child, compassionate for my wife, I could not assent in my inner heart to the worm and fire of hell for a babe in arms." Gregory Julian, an elderly Roman member of the senatorial class, tells the story of his life during the reign of Theodosius the Great. Living nearly four hundred years after the birth of Christ, Gregory distrusts the

Christians: "In our age this passion [that which is most important to the people] is religion, Paganism and Christianity being the great opponents, the very life of Rome at forfeit in the struggle, and with fierce and bitter fissures still costing men their lives within the Christian sect" (p. 29). He comes under the influence of Ambrose, a bishop. When Gregory's father, Marius, a wealthy provincial governor, witnesses Theodosius bowing to Ambrose while doing public penance, Marius says that paganism is ruined: "the fall of the Empire was being fulfilled by the rise of the Christian Church" (p. 63). Gregory cannot accept the faith because he honors his father; he tells Ambrose, "If Christ conquers, Rome must die, and I love Rome" (p. 115). When Theodosius dies, Stilicho becomes general of the armies just as Alaric is threatening Rome. Although Gregory tries to aid Stilicho as the empire disintegrates, he cannot prevent his murder. At the end of his life, Gregory is a Christian bishop in Britain.

<sup>308</sup> Raynolds, p. 413. Gregory's daughter Livia is killed when she opens one of Rome's gates to Alaric's forces. Gregory thinks: "I had come to my ripeness in the throes of the world; I was no longer capable of emotional or mystic assertions of faith or hope or radiant communion with God; in Livia's tragic fate and Marcia's suffering and my failure was the piercing presence of God on the steps of night, and the compassionate apprehension of our tragic being flared throughout the human anguish of my heart."

<sup>309</sup> Raynolds, p. 379. Gregory perceives identity between himself and his dead son Marcus and becomes aware of his continuous movement toward God: "Faith, I thought, grows bound to what has been, and logic excludes the inexplicable yeast of life; but love, by all its acceptances,



is ripeness of the soul for intensity of being, and overflows outward continually."

<sup>310</sup> Raynolds, p. 343. Gregory is suffering from moral exhaustion after seeing Stilicho beheaded: "The thought that we three dark little mortals had anything serious to do in the great white light of God struck me as very funny."

<sup>311</sup> Raynolds, p. 30. "'Our Roman law, Gregory,' he [Marius] told me, 'our vital Roman concept of justice is the great net of equity and good which holds world society together.'"

<sup>312</sup> Raynolds, p. 194. Gregory repeats Christ's cry on the cross: "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?"

<sup>313</sup> Ronald Gregor Smith, *Introd., The European Spirit*, by Karl Jaspers, trans. R. Gregor Smith (London: SCM, 1948), pp. 1-28. Smith discusses two views of history, noting that both can be believed but not proved. One is H. A. L. Fisher's assertion in History of Europe (1936) that history's forward movement is dependent upon the insights of many men, illuminating one small area at a time. The other is Donald Baillie's belief in God Was in Christ (1948) that the significant point of all human history is the incarnation of Christ. Smith believes that the source of Jaspers' claim in this book--that community exists between men, that love is the final guide, and that men should submit to no form of exclusive knowledge--is European history, which has derived its energy from the incarnation: "History surges up to this newness, and flows from it to the end of time" (p. 18).

<sup>314</sup> Bible, Matt. xxviii. 19-20. "Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, / Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and lo, I am with you always, even unto the

end of the world." The second quotation is from John xiv. 2.

<sup>315</sup> Gandhi, "The Story of My Experiments with Truth," in The Essential Gandhi, ed. Louis Fischer (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 228. Writing in the October 11, 1928 issue of Young India, Gandhi says, "[While] everything around me is ever changing, ever dying, there is underlying all that change a living power that is changeless, that holds all together, that creates, dissolves, and recreates. That informing power or spirit is God. . . . I shall never know God if I do not wrestle with and against evil even at the cost of life itself." Earlier, in the August 4 issue, he writes, "I am endeavoring to see God through service of humanity, for I know God is neither in heaven nor down below, but in everyone." Gandhi's full name was Mohandas Karamchaud Gandhi; he was given the name Mahatma, 'Great Soul in Beggar's Garb,' by the poet Tagore. Gandhi's program was to work for Hindu-Moslem unity, for the removal of untouchability, the 3000-year-old caste system which then affected 60 million people, and for the promotion of homespun. He led the movement which culminated in independence for India and died in 1948 at the age of seventy-nine.

<sup>316</sup> The Asian Journal of Thomas Merton, ed. Naomi Burton, Brother Patrick Hart, and James Laughlin (New York: New Directions, 1968), glossary. Gautama Siddhartha (563-483 B. C.) is the historic Buddha. He was born near Kipilavastu in India of the Sakya clan. He is also known as Tathagata, one who is following the path of dharma and has gone from and to tathata, the absolute, unchanging real. Literally, Buddha means an awakened or enlightened being; the word comes from the Sanskrit root bodhati: "he awakes or understands."

<sup>317</sup> In Christian theology, this phrase belongs to Mary, the mother of Jesus.

318 Adolph Lichtigfeld, Aspects of Jaspers's Philosophy (Pretoria: Committee of the University of South Africa, 1963). Although this quotation does not appear in the book, Lichtigfeld quotes from Jaspers' The Way to Wisdom: "God does not speak through the commands and revelations of other men but in man's selfhood and through his freedom, not from without but from within. Any restriction on man's freedom, created by God and oriented toward God, is a restriction upon the very thing through which God manifests himself" (p. 64). Lichtigfeld discusses the philosophical basis of Jaspers' faith, finding that Jaspers believes in the necessity of the venture of faith as an interpretation of the meaning of existence. His thought offers an alternative to contemporary "life is absurd" beliefs.

319 "Mental Climate and Perspective and the Cosmic Stairway." See pp. lxxx-lxxxii, 95-98, 100, and appendix, pp. 306-21.

320 Bible, Timothy iv. 7. Paul says, "I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith."

321 This quotation could not be found.

322 This reference could not be identified.

323 Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd ed. (1936: rpt. London: Gollancz, 1946; New York: Dover, 1952). Ayer reviews some difficulties of formulation in the introduction to the 1946 edition. He defines his principle of verification as a criterion by which it can be determined whether or not a sentence is literally meaningful: a sentence has literal meaning "if and only if the proposition it expressed was either analytic or empirically verifiable" (p. 7). Because of various difficulties related to this and to other definitions, Ayer introduces the word statement: "any form of words

that is grammatically significant shall be held to constitute a sentence, and . . . every indicative sentence, whether it is literally meaningful or not, shall be regarded as expressing a statement" (p. 8). The word proposition will be reserved for what is expressed by sentences which are literally meaningful. The principle of verification can thus be used to determine when an indicative sentence expresses a proposition. A difficulty that Ayer says he overlooked in his book is the fact that most empirical propositions are in some way vague: consequently he introduces into his definition of statement criteria for saying whether a statement is directly or indirectly verifiable. The review Bodkin cites could not be found.

<sup>324</sup> Gilbert Ryle, "Taking Sides in Philosophy," in Collected Papers (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1971), II, 11, 153. "No, a philosophical argument is neither a piece of induction nor a piece of Euclidean deduction. . . . It aims at being logically rigorous; for self-contradiction is the promised penalty of default in it. Any serious philosopher would be as grateful for rigorous arguments for as for rigorous arguments against the principle of 'Idealism' (say), or 'Thomism,' or 'Logical Positivism.'" Ryle's essay, reprinted from Philosophy, 12 (1937), argues that there are no "isms" in philosophy. To admit their existence Ryle says is to work against the testing of philosophic beliefs and the very nature of philosophical inquiry: "A philosophy that is, is something which has a definite trend; and it is or else it rests on some dominant structure of argument" (p. 161). Its rightness is rational and does not rest on the personality of its discoverer. Every rigorous philosophical argument is a discovery which advances philosophy.

<sup>325</sup> Ryle, p. 167. "His arduously achieved discovery becomes a public truism, and if it is of any importance, becomes crystallized in the diction and the thought of educated people, even though the great majority of them have never read a word of his. The historian who wants to find out what Aristotle or Locke 'discovered' must see what public truisms existed after the philosopher's work was done which were not even the topic of a clearly recognized question before he began it."

<sup>326</sup> Harold Foster Hallett, British philosopher, wrote Aeternitas: a Spinozistic Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), which he calls a metaphysical essay written to provide a corrective for phenomenalism. Hallett states that only metaphysics can give knowledge of the real and can oppose naturalism's view of life as existing only from birth to death.

<sup>327</sup> Although this citation is unclear, Bodkin may be referring to Richard M. Hare, who wrote The Language of Morals (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), a logical study of morals. Hare says that the task of philosophers is to clarify the nature of moral judgments and terms. Because they guide choice, moral judgments are more like imperatives than descriptions. Like indicatives, imperatives are subject to logical rules.

<sup>328</sup> This citation could not be found.

<sup>329</sup> Kate O'Brien, That Lady (New York: Harper, 1949). This is a dramatization of her story "For One Sweet Grape," published in 1946. "That lady" is Ana de Mendoza, Princess of Eboli, who marries Ruy Gomez, Secretary of State of Philip II in sixteenth-century Spain, and bears him ten children. Although she had lost one eye in



a childhood accident, she is considered a beautiful woman. After Gomez' death, she lives in the country until Philip orders her to come to Madrid to handle her family's business matters. There she meets Antonio Perez, Philip's new Secretary of State, and falls in love with him. Escovedo, secretary to Don Juan of Austria and in residence at the court of Spain, remonstrates with Ana over her affair with Antonio, and gossips about them openly. A few months later he is killed; we find later that Antonio killed him on orders from Philip. Reacting to the gossip, Philip orders Ana and Antonio to stop seeing each other; they refuse. Philip then banishes Antonio and imprisons Ana in her home by having all unnecessary doors and windows built up in stone.

<sup>330</sup> Jaspers, p. 156. "Philosophy strives to apprehend eternal truth. . . . But the complete truth is not objectively assessible in time. Neither man as an individual, nor history, can apprehend it otherwise than in ephemeral manifestations." Jaspers goes on to say: "The aim of philosophy is at all times to achieve the independence of man as an individual. This he gains by establishing a relation to authentic being. He gains independence of everything that happens in the world by the depth of his attachment to transcendence" (p. 166). Believing that peace of mind is the aim of philosophic thought, Jaspers states: "From the beginning there has been something irreplaceable in philosophy. Through all the change in human circumstances and the tasks of practical life, through all the progress of the sciences, all the development of the categories and methods of thought, it is forever concerned with apprehending the one eternal truth under new conditions, with new methods and perhaps with greater

possibilities of clarity" (p. 173).

<sup>331</sup> Housman, p. 59. These lines are from "A Shropshire Lad":

"In my own shire, if I was sad, / Homely comforters I had: / The earth, because my heart was sore, / Sorrowed for the son she bore; / And standing hills, long to remain, / Shared their short-lived comrade's pain; / And bound for the same bourn as I, / On every road I wandered by, / Trod beside me, close and dear, / The beautiful and death-struck year."

<sup>332</sup> Arthur Grimble, A Pattern of Islands (1952; rpt. London:

J. Murray, 1954; published under title We Chose the Islands [W. Morrow: 1952]), pp. 11-12. "It began to dawn on me then that, beyond the teeming romance that lies in the differences between men--the diversity of their homes, the multitude of their ways of life, the dividing strangeness of their faces and tongues, the thousand-fold mysteries of their origins--there lies the still profounder romance of their kinship with each other, a kinship that springs from the immutable constancy of man's need to share laughter and friendship, poetry and love in common. A man may travel a long road, and suffer much loneliness, before he makes this discovery. Some, groping along dark byways, never have the good fortune to stumble upon it. But I was luckier than most. The islands I had chosen blindly, for the only reason that they were romantically remote, were peopled by a race who, despite the old savagery of their wars and the grimness born of the endless battle with the sea, were princes of laughter and friendship, poetry and love." Grimble began his service in the British diplomatic corps as a cadet in the Gilbert and Ellis Islands in 1913. He then lived at Ocean Island for six years, during part of which time he

served as Commissioner. This book is an account of his life there. Toward the end of his career, from 1943 to 1948, he was governor of the Windward Islands.

<sup>333</sup> W. H. is probably Winifred Harrison. See introduction, pp. xvi-xvii.

<sup>334</sup> Bible, Joshua vi. 1-2; ii. 9-13. "Now Jericho was straitly shut up for fear of the children of Israel: none went out, and none came in. And the Lord said unto Joshua, See, I have given into thy hand Jericho, and the king thereof, and the mighty men of valour." Before attacking the city, Joshua sent two of his men there to spy. Rehab the harlot met them and hid them from the King. "And she said unto the men, I know that the Lord hath given you this land that your terror is fallen upon us, and that all the inhabitants of the land faint because of you. For we have heard how the Lord dried up the water of the Red Sea for you, when ye came out of Egypt; and what ye did unto the two kings of the Amorites, that were on the other side of the Jordan; Sihou and Og, whom ye utterly destroyed. And as soon as we had heard these things, our hearts did melt and neither did there remain any more courage in very many because of you; for the Lord your God, he is God in heaven above, and in earth beneath. Now therefore, I pray you, swear unto me by the Lord, since I have shewed you kindness, that ye will also shew kindness unto my father's house, and give me a true token. And that ye will save alive my father, and my mother, and my brethren and my sisters, and all that they have, and deliver our lives from death."

<sup>335</sup> Bible, Ps. xxvii. 10. "When my father and my mother forsake me, then the Lord will take me up."

<sup>336</sup> Hugh McLeave, "Our Last Day," unidentified newspaper clipping found in Bodkin's journal, Bodleian TS e 828, p. 1. The article describes the last day in the lives of Florence and Emma Brown, eighty-seven and ninety years old, who lived together in one room in Notting Hill. Early in their lives, the sisters had worked as nurses and then as governesses, but for the past fifteen years they had been unable to find work. Last Thursday, the article says, a Mrs. Clifton, to whose father the sisters had been governesses, received a parcel containing trinkets and a note saying, "Don't bother to reply. This will be our last day on earth." She sent a policeman to check on the women, but they convinced him he was mistaken. However, they continued giving fruit to neighbors, leaving a note for the milkman, and cleaning out their room. The next day both were found dead of aspirin poisoning.

<sup>337</sup> These references could not be found.

<sup>338</sup> Wynyard Brown, "The Holly and the Ivy," in Plays of the Year, 1949-50 (London: Paul Elek, 1950), III, 16-104. The play opens with an argument between Jenny and David; David wants to marry her immediately because he is to leave shortly for five years' work in South America. Jenny, however, although very much in love, is worried over who will care for her widowed father, Martin, a vicar in a small Norfolk village. She has kept their engagement a secret for fear of upsetting him. David points out that her father is in very good health and that arrangements can be made for him. But Jenny says that she won't marry David at all unless she can convince her sister, Margaret, a successful copywriter in London, to come home to take care of their father. When Margaret arrives home for Christmas, it is obvious that

she has been drinking heavily. She tells Jenny that she had had an illegitimate son five years ago; she had kept his existence a secret for fear of upsetting Martin, who had to be protected from such "evil" facts. Now her son has died of meningitis. When Martin hears about this, he is thunderstruck that his children cannot talk to him.

Margaret says that her experience has taught her that the most important thing in life is to relate one's experience to real values: "I want to relate life, here and now, not only my own life but all life, to whatever may be true about the . . . about the universe" (p. 95).

Martin tells her that she is more religious than he is because the prime essential of all religion is to make sense of the world. He confesses that his belief in religious dogma is tenuous and that his doubts have led him often to the brink of despair. Martin seems for the first time to become aware of how selfish he has always been. Margaret decides to stay home with her father, leaving Jenny free to marry.

<sup>339</sup> The two Catholics are probably Margot Adamson and Donald Carter. See pp. xviii, 80, 90, 96, and 131.

<sup>340</sup> "Knowledge and Faith." See pp. lxxvi-lxxvii, 85-90, and 93 following.

<sup>341</sup> The Book of Common Prayer, p. 578. These phrases occur in "A Catechism, that is to say, an Instruction to be Learned by Every Person Before he is brought to be Confirmed by the Bishop": "I believe in the Holy Ghost, the holy Catholic Church, the Communion of Saints, the Forgiveness of sins, the Resurrection of the Body, and Life Everlasting, Amen."

<sup>342</sup> Llewelyn Powys, Love and Death (London: the Bodley Head,



1939), p. 292. These words, identified only as "from 'Ancient Wisdom,'" are the foreword to chapter 31; they are not from Annie Besant's book of the same name. Powys rejects not only Christian but all believers: "Morality must be purged of its last claim to divine sanction. It must be recognized for what it is, a pragmatic system of social accommodation varying with the customs of each epoch, and of each race. . . . There is no absolute morality; all is relative and each separated circumstance is like no other that ever was. There is no immorality. There is no God either! The recognition and acceptance of these denials are the beginning of all wisdom. Only so can we hope to become generous enough, humane, honourable, and happy enough to lay the first foundations of a Utopian existence here on earth" (pp. 290-91). Calling his book an imaginary autobiography, Powys begins with a description of his country life in the west of England and then recalls various events in his life, dedicated as it is "to increasing the sum of his own happiness in all hours, and in all places" (p. 17). He remembers especially a summer with a young girl he loved, Dittany Stone, who later married another man and died soon after in a hiking accident.

<sup>343</sup> Powys, p. 294. "And always in those days of my childhood, of my youth, of my manhood, long periods of my life seemed still to lie before me, blindly eager as I was for earth experience."

<sup>344</sup> Powys, pp. 298-99. "Glimpses of my life passed by me in rapid succession. Once more, as a four-years-old child, I stood in the 'Little-room,' ready to be measured for my velvet suit by Ellen Greenham, so excited at being alive that my mother had to be called to stop me jumping up and down and repeating over and over, 'Happy

me! Happy me!'"

<sup>345</sup> Powys, p. 22. "Well enough did I know at that moment deep in my heart that when once the quick clay that surrounds our bones is dead it is the end, and that even Francois Rabelais was mistaken in supposing that 'intellectual souls are exempted from Atropos' scissors.'"

<sup>346</sup> J. H. Oldham, Florence Allshorn and the Story of St. Julian's (New York: Harper, 1951), p. 23. Oldham quotes from Bishop Gresford Jones's book Uganda in Transformation, 1926: "Perhaps nowhere else in Uganda [Busoga] is this psychic pressure of evil to be felt in anything like the same degree. You have only to sit alone on the verandah in the short African twilight, when the mind is receptive to impressions, to feel the ominous, unaccountable shadow that preys upon life. It is not difficult then to imagine how in the beautiful evergreen forests, below the rank mass of undergrowth, something real and sinister is urging those cruel, tightly-clinging creepers to choke slowly and surely the life out of the trees to which they cling; that in this chill, penetrating miasma rising from the swamps is something heavy and malevolent, ready to weave into the minds and souls of the people its web of abominable emotions." Florence Allshorn was born in 1887 in Sheffield, orphaned at three, and eventually graduated from the Sheffield School of Domestic Science. She began to do church work and in 1920 sailed for the Church Missionary Society station of Isanga in Busoga, Uganda, known for its unhealthy climate. She stayed four years and was sent home when it was discovered that she had tuberculosis. In 1928 she became head of one of the two training colleges for women missionaries in England, retiring in 1941. Then she founded St.

Julian's, a house of retreat, which twice was moved to larger quarters before being established finally at Coolham in 1950. She died later that year.

<sup>347</sup> Oldham, p. 23. "The difficulty was not only the debilitating and nerve-racking effect of the climate, but also the temperament of the senior woman missionary."

<sup>348</sup> Oldham, pp. 25-26. Allshorn writes in a letter: "Well, what with all this loneliness, disheartening language [she was in charge of a boarding-school of about one hundred girls who could not speak English], rats in your bedroom, lots of them, hyaenas, leopards and jackals in the garden, keeping you awake half the night more often than not, another seven foot black snake outside my bedroom door, ant bites by the hundred, you've simply got to grip on to all the courage you possess and fight and fight and fight not to get under it all. The queer thing is that I have really been happier this month than I have ever been before; you get driven back and back on God every time."

<sup>349</sup> Oldham, pp. 28-29. "I was young and I was the eighth youngster who had been sent, none of whom had lasted more than two years. I went down to 7 stone and my spirit and soul wilted to the same degree. Then one day the old African matron came to me when I was sitting on the verandah crying my eyes out. She sat at my feet and after a time she said, 'I have been on this station for fifteen years, and I have seen you come out, all of you saying you have brought to us a Savior, but I have never seen this situation saved yet.' It brought me to my senses with a bang. I was the problem for myself. I knew enough of Jesus Christ to know that the enemy was the one to be loved

before you could call yourself a follower of Jesus Christ, and I prayed in great ignorance as to what it was, that this same love might be in me and I prayed as I have never prayed in my life for that one thing. Slowly things rightened. . . . She [the senior matron] had been beaten in that place, and I was only in the process of being beaten and the old matron saved me. . . . Gradually the whole atmosphere of the place altered."

<sup>350</sup> Oldham, p. 29. "It was the spiritual regeneration that Florence experienced in Uganda that was the fount of all that she taught in later years to successive generations of missionaries." Oldham says that when Allshorn was principal of St. Andrew's Hostel, a training college for women missionaries, she looked for evidence of this spiritual relationship. "The relation of the student to God was for Florence the fundamentally important thing, because out of that everything would grow, whereas if that relation was broken or weakened, there would be no growth" (p. 61).

<sup>351</sup> James, pp. 177-206. In the second chapter devoted to "Conversion," James cites examples of men and women who, as a result of some traumatic experience, have thought themselves to be converted. James says that theology has concluded that "the spirit of God is with us at these dramatic moments in a peculiarly miraculous way" (p. 184). In answering the question of whether or not all of these experiences should be considered miracles, James mentions Myers' essay on subliminal consciousness (see p. 116, n. 28) and says that "one's ordinary fields of consciousness are liable to incursion from it [ultra-marginal life] of which the subject does not guess the source, and which, therefore, take for him the form of unaccountable impulses to act, or

before you could call yourself a follower of Jesus Christ, and I prayed in great ignorance as to what it was, that this same love might be in me and I prayed as I have never prayed in my life for that one thing. Slowly things rightened. . . . She [the senior matron] had been beaten in that place, and I was only in the process of being beaten and the old matron saved me. . . . Gradually the whole atmosphere of the place altered."

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inhibitions of action, of obsessive ideas, or even of hallucinations of sight or hearing" (p. 189). James goes on to say that the theory of the existence of the subliminal consciousness would explain post-hypnotic suggestion, all forms of sensory automatisms, and "the perception of external control" (p. 195), which is so essential a feature in conversion experiences. Characteristics of the state of assurance that one has been in contact with a higher power are intense happiness, the sense that one can perceive truths not known before, and the sense that the world has objectively changed.

<sup>352</sup> C. E. M. Joad, "The Twilight of the Church," New Statesman and Nation, 42 (1951), 452-53. Joad discusses a booklet, Towards the Conversion of England, put out in 1945 by a Church Commission on Evangelism, which states that because of declining numbers of both clergy and church members, the definite action required is "no less than the conversion of England to the Christian faith" (p. 452). The report documents common complaints that religion is the opium of the people, that the clergy is overpaid and underworked, and that what the church teaches is nonsense. In response to this third charge, Joad says that the church has modified a great many of its tenets: it has abandoned belief in the verbal inerrancy of the Bible, Satan, Christ's miracles, the Virgin birth, and the physical resurrection of Christ. However, Joad points out that the church cannot accommodate itself to every change in the climate of the times, brought about by new discoveries in science: "It [the church] cannot veer with every wind that blows from the laboratories. To do so would be to produce a religion which might move with the times, only at the cost of losing all that made it worthy of belief. Or, rather, men might succeed in believing such a religion, but such belief would no more affect their lives than belief in evolution or the creation of matter from inter-

stellar gas" (p. 452). Joad goes on to discuss the fact that the churches which are full today are those which have made the fewest concessions to the spirit of the times. He finds that one must answer the question: is it desirable the churches should continue, according to one's answer to the question, is what the church asserts true? He ends with a hope that history might repeat itself: 1400 years ago, it was the church which preserved what there was of culture, knowledge and human charity, and today an estimated thirteen million people listen to the B. B. C. Sunday services.

<sup>353</sup> James, pp. 388-89. "The further limits of our being plunge, it seems to me, into an altogether other dimension of existence from the sensible and merely 'understandable' world. Name it the mystical region, or the supernatural region, whichever you choose. So far as our ideal impulses originate in this region (and most of them do originate in it, for we find them possessing us in a way for which we cannot articulately account), we belong to it in a more intimate sense than that in which we belong to the visible world, for we belong in the most intimate sense wherever our ideals belong. Yet the unseen region in question is not merely ideal, for it produces effects in this world. When we commune with it, work is actually done upon our finite personality, for we are turned into new men, and consequences in the way of conduct follow in the natural world upon our regenerative change. But that which produces effects within another reality must be termed a reality itself, so I feel as if we had no philosophic excuse for calling the unseen or mystical world unreal. God is the natural appellation, for us Christians at least, for the supreme reality, so I will call this higher part of the universe by the name

of God. We and God have business with each other; and in opening ourselves to his influence our deepest destiny is fulfilled."

<sup>354</sup> Alistair Buchan, "U. S. Policy After French Vote Emphasises Alignment with Britain and Germany: New Importance of Spain," The Observer (London), 2 January, 1955, p. 1. Buchan, writing from Washington, says that the administration believes it must shift its European policy to place less reliance on France and more on Britain and Germany because the French Assembly accepted German rearmament by a very narrow margin. The administration's doubts, temporarily allayed by M. Mendès-France's leadership, about France's ability to live up to the role of a great power, are back. Should a new link have to be built in the European strategic supply system, Spain would likely be the site. American policy now is to concentrate less on NATO as a vehicle for fostering European unity and more on making bilateral arrangements with Britain and the Netherlands within NATO and with Spain and Yugoslavia who are not in it.

<sup>355</sup> Philip Deane, "Nehru's Economic Crusade--New Plan to Inspire the Masses," The Observer (London), 2 January, 1955, p. 4. Writing from Delhi, Deane says that within two weeks, when the annual convention of India's ruling Congress party begins, Nehru will have named Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant, the sixty-seven-year-old leader of the United Provinces, Home Minister and 'stand-in' for Nehru, who wants to be free to lead an economic crusade throughout India. The only man of any stature within his fragmented party, Nehru will use mass labour to carry out economic advance, holding out the 'carrot' of a future welfare state along Socialist lines. However, the inequalities of wealth distribution, unemployment, under-employment and the suffering

of the peasants continues unabated. Hampered as he is by his fellow party members who have repeatedly sabotaged his plans for implementing the welfare state, it remains to be seen whether or not his immense popularity can achieve his goals for India.

<sup>356</sup> Oldham, p. 119. "Seeing God was the central reality of her life. Friendship consequently was for her the relation of two persons whose eyes are fixed on God's will and purpose and whose hearts are unceasingly open to the love which He freely squanders on his children. These are Christian commonplaces. It was the intensity with which Florence apprehended them and the richness of the context that they had for her that gave to her life a peculiar quality."

<sup>357</sup> Arthur Darby Nock, Conversion: the Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), p. 270. Nock quotes from Ulrich von Wilamowitz' Greek Historical Writing and Apollo: "The tradition yields us only ruins. The more closely we test and examine them, the more clearly we see how ruinous they are; and out of ruins no whole can be built. The tradition is dead; our task is to revivify life that has passed away. We know that ghosts cannot speak until they have drunk blood; and the spirits which we evoke demand the blood of our hearts. We give it to them gladly; but if they then abide our question, something from us has entered into them" (p. 26). Nock is interested in how religious frontiers were crossed in antiquity. He finds that it was done primarily through conversion, adhesion (accepting new worships as supplements to existing ones), and the emergence of prophets. Calling the two kinds of religion traditional and prophetic, two opposing poles in

man's spiritual history, he finds in the created "middle country" the place where "the changes in belief and worship due to political development or cultural interplay" occur (p. 5). He attempts to show how the Roman empire responded to Christianity, starting with the Book of Acts and the first recorded conversion to Christianity, that of Paul, describing the importance of both prophecy and miracle, and going on to Augustine, "whose boyhood saw the face of society as a whole becoming Christian" (p. 259). He finds that Augustine was predisposed to Christianity in his subconsciousness and was willing to move to it as soon as he could find it intellectually adequate.

<sup>358</sup> Nock, p. 271. Nock agrees with von Wilamowitz in hoping that "the mistakes and gropings of the present will lead to a deeper understanding." He also agrees in the belief that our attempts will never be complete: "This applies to any of our attempts to follow the history of man's gropings after ultimate reality just as fully as it must needs to these gropings themselves."

<sup>359</sup> J. H. Oldham, "The Scientific Revolution," The Christian News-Letter, 2 (1954), p. 21. "Is it [the church] to go on preaching the Gospel in terms that make sense to the preacher or teacher, but make no contact with the assumptions and experience of the hearers, and consequently make no sense to him? . . . If there is any truth in what I said earlier about the newness and strangeness of the scientific and technological civilisation in which we are living, a tremendous task of translation has to be undertaken to make the Gospel intelligible to the large part of the population whose outlook is being shaped by the new influences." Oldham, a former missionary, sees the rise of modern science in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as not simply a new factor in history, but a change in human mentality. The church is not taking account of this change. Today the number of



students receiving a scientific and technical training is far larger than the number receiving any other kind. How is the church reacting to this fact? "The meaning of a statement cannot be separated from the person who makes it and the persons who hear and read it" (p. 121). Thus Oldham says that translation is overdue because today many people wrongly believe that scientific knowledge is the only kind to have.

<sup>360</sup> Margot Adamson writes in a letter 20 December 1977: "Donald Carter was in the Film industry and for a time, before he and his family left for Canada, an active figure in [Welwyn] Garden City. . . . The Carters were friends of Mrs. Liza Sheridan, the photographer, whose name you must have come across frequently in Bodkin Miscellanea."

<sup>361</sup> This reference could not be found.

<sup>362</sup> C. A. Coulson, "The New Cosmology," The Frontier, 1 (1950), 425-32. Coulson says that a recent book by Fred Hoyle, The Nature of the Universe, discusses facts which may be disturbing to a Christian: that human life might not be unique to this planet, and that "material is continuously being created" (p. 428). This doctrine of creation is opposed to the Christian view. Even more disturbing might be Hoyle's recognition of the insignificant size of the earth as compared with the vastnesses of space and his belief that the mathematical laws which govern the earth also are valid for the universe. These are ideas which we are asked to believe "beside which that of the fundamentalist theologians seems child's play" (p. 430). Coulson gives two reasons for Hoyle's seeming complete ignorance of the Christian religion: many scientists have "an emotional antagonism" towards religion, and Christian apologists have explained their case badly. "So far are we from mutual dependence that we have not

got even to mutual intelligibility" (p. 431). When Hoyle says that we live in a wholly fantastic universe, where we remain uncertain whether our existence has meaning, Coulson says that Christians should speak of those personal relationships within which man may find fulfillment. He applies Hoyle's words concerning evolution (he sees an evolution of life whereby all mankind is part of one structure) to the Christian belief in the communion of saints, with the church on earth as the body of Christ.

<sup>363</sup> Nock, p. 194. "The blood of martyrs is the seed of the Church: the death of Socrates created the type of wisdom and virtue standing in heroic opposition to a world which can kill but which does not have the last word." Epictetus' On Firmness sets forth the lesson that we must fulfill the duties to which we are called. In III. 24. 112, he says: "Zeus wished to make me obtain from myself the proof of this [whether he would fulfill the duties to which he was called] and himself to know whether he has in me such a soldier, such a citizen as he should and to produce me before the rest of men as a witness to what things are unworthy of choice." Epictetus says that Zeus sends him in all manner of places "not in hatred nor in neglect . . . but by way of training me and using me as a witness to others."

<sup>364</sup> Bible, Acts vii. 54-60. "When they heard these things, they were cut to the heart, and they gnashed on him with their teeth. / But he, being full of the Holy Ghost, looked up steadfastly into heaven, and saw the glory of God, and Jesus standing on the right hand of God. / Then they cried out with a loud voice, and stopped their ears, and ran upon him with one accord, / And cast him out of the city, and stoned him: and the witnesses laid down their clothes at a young man's feet whose name was Saul. / And they stoned Stephen, calling upon God and saying, Lord Jesus, receive my spirit. / And he kneeled down, and

cried with a loud voice, Lord, lay not this sin to their charge,/And when he had said this, he fell asleep."

<sup>365</sup> Bede Griffiths, The Golden String, (New York: P. J. Kennedy, 1954), pp. 9-10. Griffiths recounts a walk he took once in the woods while at school: "I remember now the shock of surprise with which the sound broke on my ears. It seemed to me that I had never heard the birds before and I wondered whether they sang like this all the year round and I had never noticed it. As I walked on I came upon some hawthorne trees in full bloom and again I thought that I had never seen such a sight or experienced such sweetness before. . . . I remember now the feeling of awe which came over me. I felt inclined to kneel on the ground, as though I had been standing in the presence of an angel; and I hardly dared to look on the face of the sky, because it seemed as though it was but a veil before the face of God. . . . It came to me quite suddenly, as it were out of the blue, and now that I look back on it, it seems to me that it was one of the decisive events of my life. Up to that time, I had lived the life of a normal schoolboy, quite content with the world as I found it. Now I was suddenly aware of another world of beauty and mystery such as I had never imagined to exist, except in poetry. . . . I had begun to read the romantic poets, Wordsworth, Shelley and Keats, and I had found there an experience like my own." Griffiths recounts the experiences and readings which led to his conversion to the Roman Catholic church. His readings in the Bible, the ancient Greeks, and the famous Christian classics led him to the conclusion that the thirteenth century was the supreme period of European art and philosophy and that the Renaissance was the initial stage in "that decline of culture and spread

of civilisation whose last stages are present today" (p. 57). With friends, he began an experiment in the common life. They lived in the Cotswolds with no modern amenities and read nothing more modern than sixteenth or seventeenth-century works. After his conversion he became a Dominican monk.

<sup>366</sup> Griffiths, p. 12. "To discover God is not to discover an idea but to discover oneself. It is to awake to that part of one's existence which has been hidden from sight and which one has refused to recognise. The discovery may be very painful; it is like going through a kind of death."

<sup>367</sup> Griffiths, p. 35. "It was the divorce of the scientific and rational mind from nature, from the world of instinct and feeling and imagination, which seemed to us to be the root of all evil. It was when the human mind became separated from its roots in feeling and instinct that it became diseased, and the infallible mark of this disease was the ugliness of its production. That was how we explained the ugliness of the modern city in comparison with the beauty of the Cotswold towns and villages which we visited."

<sup>368</sup> Griffiths, pp. 53-56. After reading Augustine, Griffiths thought about the Catholic church: "I was still far from being a Christian even in name, and I think that I still regarded Catholicism as a thing of the past. It interested me as a historical phenomenon.

. . . My reading of Dante was nevertheless a turning point in my life.

. . . Dante therefore answered all my requirements in poetry up to that time, but he also gave me something more, a 'criticism of life,' on a level which was deeper than that of Shakespeare. . . . [I learned from Dante that] a passion which was disciplined and controlled was stronger and deeper than an undisciplined love. I had already begun to glimpse this in Spinoza but Dante presented it to me with all the

force of great poetry. . . . [Later I realized that Dante had written an allegory of the soul's journey to God.] Of this I had very little conception at the time, but the reading of the Purgatorio acted nevertheless as a real illumination of experience of extraordinary depth and significance. . . . But the Purgatorio stamped on my mind the fact that moral virtue is the transformation of passion and not its suppression, and so freed me for ever from the fear of Puritanism."

<sup>369</sup> Griffiths, p. 56. "But I could not help seeing that behind Bach no less than behind Dante and Giotto there stood the massive power of a religion, which did not cramp the natural powers of man but on the contrary developed them to their highest point."

<sup>370</sup> Griffiths, p. 58. Griffiths believes that the Bhagavad Gita, the writings of Buddha, and the writings of Lao Tzu [the legendary founder of Taoism, known to us through the writings of Chuang Tzu (third and fourth centuries B. C.) are "the three greatest books of spiritual wisdom outside the New Testament." These readings were the beginning of Griffiths' effort to bring eastern thought into relation with Christianity: "The effort of thought was so intense, the desire for a new life which I experienced was so fervent, the light which I received penetrated so deeply into my mind, that the marks of it remain in my soul like the grain in a tree, and I still feel it as part of a living process of thought which has never ceased."

<sup>371</sup> Griffiths, p. 71. He was deeply impressed by the Old Testament: "These encounters were an experience of the soul in its inmost depths, an experience not of the mind alone but of the mind and will, the imagination and the senses."

<sup>372</sup> Griffiths, pp. 76-78. When he read the gospels, he found that



"this authentic speech was intimately related to the facts which were recorded so that one could not be separated from the other. . . . Always I came back to this overwhelming impression of truthfulness, that quality of truth which I sought in all literature, and which I had learned to recognise by the beauty, the rightness, of its expression. . . . Whatever its [John's gospel] precise import might be, it was the record of an experience of unfathomable depth. . . . I realised that to reject this would be to reject the greatest thing in all human experience; on the other hand to accept it would be to change one's whole point of view. . . . Already I had begun to see that to do this [accept the gospels' message and thus pass from reason and philosophy to faith] would be to place oneself with St. Augustine and with Dante: it would be to enter with that tradition, which on other grounds I had learned to love and respect."

<sup>373</sup> This reference could not be identified.

<sup>374</sup> Griffiths, pp. 81-82. "Now I realised that the Church was nothing else than this new humanity [a new nature in Christ]. . . . It was a social order indeed, but it was an order that transcended this world, that is to say, all human civilisation."

<sup>375</sup> Griffiths, pp. 90-92. "I had a strong inclination now to fasting. I found that when I fasted my brain became clearer and my prayer gained in fervour and intensity. . . . Now for the first time I felt an overwhelming need to repent. . . . There was nothing conscious or deliberate about it, it came to me as a command, and I kept saying to myself, scarcely knowing the meaning of what I said: 'I must repent, I must repent.' I went up in this state of mind to a small chapel at the top of the house one evening, and there, as I prayed, a

resolution formed in my mind that I would not go to bed that night, but would spend the whole night in prayer. Again the resolution seemed not to come from my own volition; it was an instinct with the force of a command."

<sup>376</sup> Griffiths, p. 104. "Beyond this, beyond all thought and feeling and imagination, there is an inner sanctuary into which we scarcely ever enter. It is the ground or substance of the soul, where all the faculties have their roots, and which is the very centre of our being. It is there that the soul is at all times in direct contact with God."

<sup>377</sup> Wamington, Plato, p. 303. Socrates is telling Adeimantos: "You have often heard that the greatest task is to learn the perfect model of the good, the use of which makes all just things and other such become useful and helpful. . . . Do you suppose there is any gain in possessing everything in the world without possessing the good? Or to understand everything in the world except the good? to understand nothing of the beautiful and the good?" Socrates goes on to develop an analogy between the idea of the good and the sun.

<sup>378</sup> Augustine, p. 3. In his prayer to God which opens Book I of the Confessions, Augustine says, "Thou awakest us to delight in Thy praise; for Thou madest us for Thyself, and our heart is restless, until it repose in Thee." The rest of the book recounts events of his boyhood up to about the age of fifteen.

<sup>379</sup> Jaspers, pp. 9-10. Bodkin summarizes Jaspers' comment in her article "Knowledge and Faith," p. 132: "A philosophic thinker so affected [intimidated by the prevalence of the impersonal methods of science in every field of public thought] may feel, as Karl Jaspers has said, that communication has been broken off with those who in other ages

within the philosophic tradition could believe strongly in things unseen, and venture their lives upon their faith."

<sup>380</sup> Eric Ashby, "The British Universities: II, Purpose," The Listener, 17 March, 1955, p. 468. "I wonder whether this very rhythm of recurrent enthusiasms, now for utilitarianism, and now for the esoteric training of an elite, now with emphasis on the highly trained professional and now on the broad humanist, may not itself be the nearest to a solution we can ever hope to get. For the university, if it is not completely withdrawn from the community and if it is not completely submerged in it, must reach some sort of equilibrium with it. There will always be what the scientists call a dynamic equilibrium: always drifting this way and that, always adjusting itself." Ashby discusses German universities in the nineteenth century none of which, because of the political division of the German states, could monopolize higher education. By the 1860s, these universities became interested in specialization and research: "The search for truth, not the cultivation of the intellect, became the prime purpose of the German universities" (p. 467). Ashby sees a change for the British universities heralded in a speech made by Joseph Chamberlain in 1898 to the University College in Birmingham, in which he said that the universities "should do something to leaven the whole mass [the population of the surrounding towns] with higher aims and higher intellectual ambitions" (p. 468). This new feature, relevance to the local community, together with the extension movement of the 1930s, has influenced the British, but not the German, universities. A countermovement back to the "ivory tower," begun in the 30s, failed because of the war. Ashby calls for the formation of a shifting equilibrium between the "ivory

tower" and "filling station" mentality of the universities, in response to shifting public opinion.

<sup>381</sup> Ashby, p. 468. "I mean that when society begins to invest academic work with a mystique and to regard the latter-day scholar as a latter-day priest, then the university should respond by emphasising the relevance of knowledge to the problems of society, by coming into the market place, demonstrating that science is only organised common sense, encouraging the study of its applications, debunking the expert. And when society swings the other way and begins to undervalue pure scholarship, to press for quick and tangible results, to let loose the Philistines on the university, then the university should respond by withdrawing, it should emphasise that the higher learning cannot be justified by profits or popularised without losing some of its precision, it should remind society that the scholar must inevitably belong to an elite, it should assert that there is a timeless quality about some kinds of knowledge."

<sup>382</sup> G. M. Trevelyan, Pref., The Golden Warrior: the Story of Harold and William, by Hope Muntz (New York: Scribner's, 1950), p. vii. "The atmosphere is that of heroic drama sustained throughout. The impression is undisturbed by irrelevant archaeological description, or by modern speculations on the results of the Norman conquest. So the book has a real artistic unity. It is purely human in its appeal, leading to a tragic climax, after which silence falls on the field of battle." Muntz says in a note that she went to contemporary sources for facts and characters. The book contains many obsolete Anglo-Saxon words and dialogue is written in a stilted, supposedly authentic grammar. The fact of the invasion of England by William of Normandy in 1066 is told against the background of a relationship between William and

Harold, the designated heir to the English throne, which was formed when Harold spent the year of 1064 in Normandy. William had visited England in 1051 and his cousin, King Edward of England, had told him that Brihtwold, a bishop, had had a vision in which he saw that William would be the next king. Before William will let Harold leave Normandy, he extracts a vow from him to recognize William as the next English king. Harold takes the oath, under duress, and leaves his brother, Wulfnoth, as a hostage. Harold goes to Wulfstan, a bishop, to confess his sin in taking an oath in which he did not believe. As atonement, Wulfstan orders Harold to give up his beloved but "hand-fast" (illegal) wife, Edith, and marry Aldyth. He also prophesys that Harold will not be king long, and that his sons will not succeed him. When Harold does become king, he puts down an insurrection led by his outlawed brother, Tosti, and the Norse king. While this battle is raging, William lands at Hastings. Instead of resting his army, Harold attacks, is killed, and his army defeated. In an epilogue, Muntz quotes King William (who died in 1087) in the Roman de Rose: "By wrong I conquered England. . . . By wrong I seized the Kingdom . . . in which I have no right. . . ."

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Muntz, p. 128. While in Normandy, Harold

helps William fight the Count Corran of Brittany. While crossing the river Coeshon, two of William's men begin to sink in wet sand. William says they are dolts and deserve to die, but Harold goes to them: "Ere they [Harold's men] could reach him, he had sprung down and snatched shields from the watching soldiers. He went out beyond the marks, treading upon the shields. His men followed, still calling to him. The Duke, William, narrowed his eyes. The host stared, breathless. When they saw their comrades safe, a roar went up."



384 Muntz, p. 196. After he is crowned king, Harold goes to York, in Northumbria, to ask the men there for allegiance in preparation for a certain war with William. He wins their fealty only by pointing out that they stand to lose their freedom more from attack from the north by his outlawed brother, Tosti, than by allegiance to him. "'Northumbrians, ' said the King, 'I have fought your battle in the Council [to outlaw Tosti]. I will fight it on the field if the day come. Will you have me for Lord?' They gave him such a thunderous answer that the blood came to his cheeks. When Harold could be heard, he gave them thanks."

385 Muntz, p. 104. Wulfstan tells Harold that he has had a second vision, in which St. Dunstan said that Harold must atone for his father's sin in murdering Alfred, King Edward's brother: "He may not win the Atheling's [Alfred's] heritage, unless he pass a trial as bitter. . . . The power of the Cross shall be beside him and the power of the Curse upon his head." The curse is symbolized by a golden arm ring which had belonged to Alfred and which Harold now wears.

386 Muntz, p. 206. Harold is speaking with Peter, one of his sons: "'I remember, ' said he, 'how King Canute spoke to us once of peace, to me and Tosti, long ago at Bosham when we were children. We sat by him in Quay Meadow and he told us of his battles with King Edmund. Then he bade us look around and say what strange thing we could see. We beheld nothing strange. The creek, the boats, Grim with his nets, the forest and the downs, we knew them all. The King said to us: 'It is peace you see. To you it is not strange, for you have known no other; but for that peace King Edmund fought and died.

It is his work. I wrought it in his memory; I made it new, I who destroyed it."

"'A strange story,' said Peter, 'the friendship of such enemies.'"

"Harold said, 'Of late those words come often to my mind. He reigned but seven months, King Edmund. Can it be possible that a man's foes should destroy him, yet fulfil his work?'"

<sup>387</sup> Muntz, p. 284. The night before the battle with William, Harold goes once more to Edith. She begs him not to go into the battle. He says, "Nothing in all my life have I desired, as I desire this battle." William, remembering how Harold had risked his life to save the two soldiers, tells his men, waiting for the English army at Hastings, to burn, loot, and plunder the land. He surmises correctly that Harold will be so anxious to save the people and the countryside that he will join battle immediately, giving his men no time to recuperate after their battle with Tosti. "Could he wait to see two worthless soldiers drown? No, he must risk his life to save them. If he could do that piece of folly, he will risk his crown to save these peasants."

<sup>388</sup> Muntz, p. 287. Bishop Wulfstan is saying a Mass for the success of the battle. Afterwards, Harold looks at the church. "He stood there as some pilgrim before the long road home." Then he falls on the floor and Wulfstan hears him cry a vow to Christ. Harold begs Wulfstan to see that Wulfnoth is brought home safely. "The dawn began to break above the forest. The King watched it, his face at peace."

<sup>389</sup> Muntz, pp. 309-10. Just before the battle, Harold's brother, Gyrth, asks him how he could call William his friend? Harold answers, "It never fortune'd me before to love a man and be deceived. . . . I could not tell which struck more deep, that I should lose my honour,

or that by him I lost it." Harold tells Gyrth how he came to know William: "One night upon the Breton Marches he told me of himself, of what his life had been from childhood. It was a hero's story. I saw the man himself that night." When Gyrth protests that William is no hero, Harold answers, "Can I judge William? I followed the same road, the same spur drove me. He goes a bitter journey."

<sup>390</sup> John Niemayer Findlay, "Review of Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations,' " in Language, Mind and Value (London: Allen and Unwin, 1963), p. 201. "The inner quality of experience can in fact play no part in linguistic intercourse among persons: it resembles something which each man keeps in a box of his own, and which he never scans but in secret. . . . On this thesis a second thesis depends: that in so far as the expressions applicable to mental states have a use at all, this use must be tied up with something showable, i. e. with behavioural criteria." Findlay criticizes and appraises four of Wittgenstein's theses: that a purely private language is impossible, that expressions applicable to mental states must link up with behavioral criteria, that an attitude or orientation of mind can declare itself in a single performance or occasion, and that the forms of our language promote in us an illusion through which a thing absurd in itself would seem to become a matter of direct observation. Findlay finds that Philosophical Investigations, though unfinished in comparison with Wittgenstein's earlier Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, makes a major contribution to "the question of what may be involved in the acts and orientations of our minds, to the question of how these may be related to the outer acts and words that are said to 'manifest' them, [and] to the question of the manner in which they

refer or point to objects, as well as of the manner in which we refer or point to them" (pp. 197-98).

<sup>391</sup> Findlay, p. 204. "Our talk about the so-called inner life is throughout parasitic upon talk about the so-called outer life. Wittgenstein is the first to have made us fully aware of the many implications of this readily forgotten fact."

<sup>392</sup> Findlay, p. 205. "It is, however, clear, as Wittgenstein himself admits (see SS 316, 436), but as he does not always obey in his practice, that our problem here is not one of describing refined or elusive phenomena, but of making up our minds how to speak about the inner quality of experience. We may refuse to do so on principle, but if we decide (as Wittgenstein himself has decided), to engage in such an enterprise, then it is hard to see how we can adopt any other standard of correctness than one which bases itself on what those who engage in the enterprise feel themselves pressingly, persistently and generally (or nigh-generally) prompted to say."

<sup>393</sup> This reference could not be identified.

<sup>394</sup> Sir James Matthew Barrie, "The Twelve-Pound Look," in The Plays of James Matthew Barrie (New York: Scribner's, 1929), pp. 739-58. Barrie's play deals with a chance encounter between Harry Sims, soon to be knighted, his wife, and Kate, his former wife. In the foreword to the play, Barrie describes the present Mrs. Sims as having "a drawn face and shrinking ways as if there were some one near her of whom she is afraid" (p. 739). In the opening scene, Mrs. Sims asks her husband if he hasn't practiced enough for his presentation to the Queen. He answers, "Don't talk nonsense. Wait till your opinion is asked for" (p. 739). When a typist who has been hired to answer the many letters

of congratulation arrives, Harry tells his wife, "You can tell her the sort of things about me that will come better from you" (p. 741). While the typist is removing her coat, Harry tells his wife that Tombes, the butler, told him how happy everyone is that Mr. Sims is to be knighted: "Especially the females. And he is right. Success! The women like it even better than the men. And rightly. For they share. You share, Lady Sims. Not a woman will see that gown without being sick with envy of it. I know them. Have all our lady friends in to see it. It will make them ill for a week" (p. 741). The typist is found to be Harry's divorced wife who left him fourteen years ago as soon as she had earned twelve pounds with which to buy a typewriter. Telling Lady Sims to leave the room, Harry tries to patronize Kate, who tells him, looking at a picture of Mrs. Sims on her wedding day: "That dear creature capable of becoming a noble wife and mother--she is the spiritless woman of no account that I saw here a few minutes ago! I forgive you for myself for I escaped, but that poor lost soul--oh Harry, Harry" (p. 752)! Barrie ends the play with advice to husbands that they should beware of the twelve-pound look coming into their wives' eyes.

<sup>395</sup> Anthony Trollope, Cousin Henry (Leipzig: Bernard Tauchnitz, 1879). Indefer Jones, elderly and ill, wants to leave his considerable estate to his beloved niece, Isabel Broderick, but he feels compelled to leave it instead to his lone male heir, Henry Jones. Plans to have the two young people marry are abandoned because everyone dislikes Henry, described as "sly, given to lying" (p. 13). While Henry is visiting his uncle, he spends most of his time in the book room. Indefer dies and in his will leaves his estate to Henry. The servants



insist that the squire had made another will the day he died, but it cannot be found. Henry alone knows that the missing will is in one of the books in the book room. Although he will not tell anyone about the will, he cannot bring himself to destroy it. "While that fatal paper remained hidden in the fatal volume he would do nothing but sit there and guard it in solitude" (p. 98). When he tries to prevent Isabel's father from examining one of the books, suspicions are raised and the will, which leaves everything to Isabel, is found.

<sup>396</sup> P. S. Maclellan, "Professor Ryle and the Concept of Mind," The Hibbert Journal, 50 (1952), 141. "There are two sides to existence: existence as subject, and existence as object to be known. The latter is merely appearance and is inferred by us to be existence from our own certainty of our own existence as subject." Disagreeing with Ryle's statement that in any act "there should be considered to be two distinguishable parts" (p. 138), against the official theory of mind as cause, Maclellan says that the mind as concept only comes to be when one is thinking about the mind and therefore treating it as object. Only to the observer of an action are there two parts to it (mind conceiving and body executing the action): to the performer, there is only one. If the performer analyzes his own action, he splits it in two only to make it more intelligible to himself. Although Ryle can make the concept of mind as cause seem foolish (he uses the analogies: university is to buildings, team-spirit is to team as mind is to the combined functions of the brain), Maclellan states that there is the universal certainty among people that they and their minds exist. "Antithesis is really between being and knowing. What we know must be outside of us in space or treated as if it were so"

(p. 142). Maclellan rejects Ryle's contention that mind is description of the acts of people and not cause.

<sup>397</sup> The references on this page are probably to M. Agnes Taylor. In a conversation on 9 August 1977 with H. John Bodkin, he said that during an illness Bodkin suffered in the early 1960s, she spoke resentfully of Taylor's interference in her life. Margot Adamson says, "Miss Taylor, who felt for Miss Bodkin something near mental adoration, is herself a person as fixed in her opinions and obstinate of will as any I have ever known; and her own vehement agnosticism and rationalism cannot but have affected Miss Bodkin's convictions" (Letter of 28 July 1972).

<sup>398</sup> Zoé Oldenbourg, The Cornerstone, trans. Edward Hyams (1954; rpt. New York: Pantheon, 1955), p. 125. On his way to Jerusalem, Ansiau meets Bertrand, a Frenchman, who says that he witnessed the murder of his wife and three daughters because they refused to accept the cross. Because he recanted, he was spared though later his assailants blinded him. "Ansiau listened, thoughtful and calm; he was not at all inclined to be sorry for people mad enough to spit on the cross; naturally the soldiers had killed them, anyone would have done likewise in their place. But, even so, poor Bertrand aroused his pity. What man would want to see his children's throats cut, though they were heretics? 'Listen, brother,' he said. 'You well know that I shall not leave the son of a free man to beg for his bread on the roads. Tell me where you want to go and I will go with you. No one shall harm you.'" Set in the early thirteenth century, this is the story of Ansiau of Linnieres, an old Frankish crusader, who had one eye destroyed during his participation in two crusades, and who later lost the sight of his remaining eye. When he feels no

longer able to lead his people, he gives his fiefdom to his son and embarks on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, taking with him a young servant, Auberi. After Bertram joins them, they go on to Marseilles and then by boat to Acre. Shortly afterwards they are captured by Saracens and made slaves. Bertrand is later killed and Auberi escapes. Ansiau is put to work turning a mill until he becomes too ill to work. Left to die, he is taken in by a destitute potter, Ali. One night Ansiau leaves, thinking to continue on to Jerusalem. After three days, having lost his way, he dies.

<sup>399</sup> Oldenbourg, pp. 462-63. "He [Ansiau] has fallen ill and a villager, a potter named Ali, had taken him into his house out of charity, his house being a kind of dark and stinking hole, half dug out of the cliff face, where he lived with his wife, his children, and goats and his dog. . . . Little by little the potter's whole family had become accustomed to the Christian. Like the wife and children, he ate the remains of the master's meals. Munira brought him his share on an earthenware plate and laughed to see him make the sign of the cross before lifting the food to his mouth, and was rewarded by a round oath which made her laugh all the more, delighted to discover that the Christian was not as stupid as he looked."

<sup>400</sup> Oldenbourg, p. 479. Exhausted and hungry, Ansiau prepares to die by trying to think of his sins. "It was the first time he had made his confession directly to God, without a priest. And it was very terrible, as if the heavens had suddenly fallen upon the earth, burning and massive, and compassed him about on all sides, cutting off his breath, beating at his ears. Strong and awful as thunder, tremendous as the sea was the Presence he became aware of,

receiving the admissions from his lips." He dies.

<sup>401</sup> John Wren-Lewis, "The Evangelistic Situation in England Today, Some Reflections Inspired by the Questionnaire on Evangelism, Issued by the World Council of Churches in Preparation for the Evanston Assembly," The Hibbert Journal, 8 (1954), 25. "I doubt whether Church or Chapel membership ever meant much in terms of real Christian redemption or incorporation into the Body of Christ during the last half-century in England at any rate, and I believe that the present wholesale desertion of the churches has occurred largely because those churches have been 'found out' for the hollow shams they mostly are. But whether that be so or not, the mission campaign and the mass meeting leave most people today quite cold because they presuppose something which does not exist, and to my view has not existed for a century here, namely an awareness of the religious or supernatural dimension of living, without which the whole apparatus of 'traditional' evangelism means nothing at all." Wren-Lewis says that evangelism must awaken a supernatural sense by teaching people to be aware of "a new dimension in ordinary experience itself" (p. 26), that of personal relationships, "a realm of reality higher than anything which the world values" (p. 28). Outside of the churches, groups are springing up around mutual centers of interest, such as psychology and what Wren-Lewis calls pseudo-religion and pseudo-science. Evangelists should learn from these groups that people demand a "personalist" philosophy.

<sup>402</sup> Wren-Lewis, p. 27. Christians should form groups in which people can actually experience for themselves the freedom of the spirit, i. e. the liberation, "which comes from truly personal relation-

ship [Bodkin has quoted this word in the plural], where a man is recognized and valued for himself and not for the function he performs."

<sup>403</sup> Esther Warner, Trial by Sasswood (London: Victor Gollancz, 1955), Foreword, p. 7. "This story is one of persons whose lives became part of my own. . . . It is not imperative, except as friendship and understanding, no matter on how small a scale, have become imperative." Warner, a westerner, lives on a plantation in Liberia, collecting animals to be exported to a Florida breeding farm. Comma, a young Loma tribesman, had been sent to his village, Boitai, with fifty dollars with which to bring back a chimpanzee. When he returns, two months later than expected, he says he was beaten and robbed of the chimp. As no one believes him, he begs Warner to return to his village with him so that he can undergo trial by sasswood, clear his name, and use his scholarship to study medicine at the Mission school. "Trial by sasswood is an ordeal in which an accused person drinks an infusion made from the poisonous bark of the sasswood tree. If he is guilty, he will die. If he is not guilty, his stomach will acquit him. Vomiting establishes innocence. In common speech, sasswood has come to apply to any form of trial by ordeal, and there are many. Plucking a brass anklet from the bottom of a potful of (apparently) boiling palm oil is a popular variety in general use. It was the kind of trial Comma wished to stand" (p. 50). On the trip, Comma explains that the men of his village belong to the cult of the Poro, which requires that they be cut with ritual knife marks called the Devil's tooth-marks. Because Comma was sent to the Mission school, he did not have these marks and so made comma marks on his arm: "I burned the mark of

learning into my skin. A man has got to belong to something" (p. 62). Warner and the natives share love and respect for the other's often incomprehensible beliefs and practices. Lega, the blacksmith, the chief Poro and Comma's father, accepts him back into the tribe after his innocence is proved by both native and western standards.

<sup>404</sup> Warner, p. 154. Comma tells one of the Bassau tribesmen that believing in lucky numbers is just "ignorant native superstition." Because of his Mission school training, Comma knows both black and white superstitions. The phrases in themselves and lawyer English are not in the book.

<sup>405</sup> Warner, pp. 164-65. "Looking into Comma's troubled eyes, I read the tragedy of a longing for individual freedom which is not insured by a community of free men. . . . The conviction had been slowly forming in me on this trip that where these rights do not exist [the rights to achieve independently] ambition is a siren lure to destruction. . . . We honour our great men, rightly. But those in whom we should truly and deeply exult are the ordinary fellow beings who gave them a hand up along the way."

<sup>406</sup> Warner, p. 164. "In the case of tribal Africans, it is not a dictator, not an all-powerful state, which keeps them in servitude, but the authority of the massed dead, as their memories are perpetuated and eternalized in the Poro."

<sup>407</sup> Warner, pp. 171-72. "Surprisingly, perhaps, I too experienced a tingle of reception, a feeling of arrival at a right place. . . . I had been floated in their group buoyancy of spirit. Never before had I been a part of a unit of people in this same way. Always I had felt myself the separate one, unable to share in more than a



tangential way in the pooled enthusiasms of a group. . . . Now, I had experienced commonness with people who on the surface of it might seem to have little in common with myself. This immersion into their collective humanness was a spiritual invigoration; it had a deep significance to me. As I puzzled over it those last few moments of our trek, it seemed to me it had come about because they had allowed me to share in the lively relish they felt for themselves. . . . They take some getting-used-to--people who are contented and satisfied with what they are and what they have. . . . They had offered their pride and their laughter, the only wealth they possess for me to sample and share."

<sup>408</sup> Warner, p. 117. "I already knew that the blacksmith is usually the grand master of the Poro, the Big Devil of the secret cult." Warner explains that the word devil is not the best translation of the Loma word, since no connotation of Satan is intended.

<sup>409</sup> Warner, p. 177. "I did not stretch out my hand to Lega; I sensed him all retracted from me."

<sup>410</sup> Warner, p. 178. "There is a gesture in Africa which is almost a curtsy, although it is only a slight flexing of the knee and a bob of the head. It means, 'I make myself your stranger.' . . . I said only my name (not to do so is an unforgivable rudeness), and made myself Lega's stranger. He could have cowed me with one piercing glance, but he did not. There was a searching quality in his concentrated study of my face. Lega was no churl. He had a sensitive, one might say spiritual face. I looked straight back at him, letting him read of me what he could. At last, he released me with a curt nod. 'Whew!' Zabogi mopped his face and sighed his relief as we walked

back to Bola. 'You carried that all right, Ma!'"

<sup>411</sup> Warner, p. 218. "Then his hand shot out toward mine, one of them palm up, one palm down. We suddenly had commonness which he wanted to merge through our palms."

<sup>412</sup> Margaret Masterman, "The Humanists Answered: I. Belief Without Strain," The Twentieth Century, 157 (1955), 201-09. Masterman distinguishes between Believing, accepting a belief, and believing, believing without strain (a phrase taken from T. H. White's The Witch in the Wood). In response to Cambridge Humanists' fear that the liberal, scientific tradition is being threatened because today's college students want to Believe, Masterman says that religious people today can only believe. She suggests that what students really want is to have the whole religious question investigated seriously on the new humanist basis. For this to occur, two seventeenth-century skills would be required for each investigator: "a developed faculty for extensive analytic and imaginative thinking, coupled, and in the same person, with a sustained and resourceful capacity for handling detail" (p. 205). She says that this would require that one be trained both in the arts and the sciences. As 'proof' of her contention, Masterman says that those who take to Belief set a high value upon ceremony and ritual, and that there exists presently a great body of detailed work, done in many disciplines (social psychology, sociology, clinical psychiatry, social anthropology), concerning the development and varieties of ritual. She then lists thirteen currently viable guesses as to ritual's true nature; to investigate these hypotheses would take many minds all their lives, and no humanist thinks the time spent would be worthwhile. What is needed, she says, is "a new level of sustained,

detailed investigation of religious subjects" (p. 209).

<sup>413</sup> Mabel Richmond Brailsford, A Tale of Two Brothers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 291. "So died John Wesley, leaving behind him a Society of nearly 150,000 members, each of whom had caught some glimpse of a world outside himself and this work-a-day world he pledged to an ideal of unselfish service. The weak point in this service as in the activities of Wesley himself, was that, except in his opposition to the slave trade, its efforts were purely palliative, and not at all constructive. His energies and those of his followers were spent in making intolerable conditions less impossible to bear, and never in seeking to remove the cause of the suffering. Only in so far could John be rightly accused of other-worldliness." Brailsford uses the journals of both brothers for material, together with letters "self-revealing to an extraordinary degree" (Foreword, p. 12). Though she finds that Dr. Thomas Jackson's two-volume biography "suffers from the reticencies of the period," she uses his account of the Methodist revival.

<sup>414</sup> Brailsford, pp. 246-47. Sally Gwynne, Charles' wife, had a sister who accepted inoculation against smallpox; Sally, however, refused. "'I leave every one to his own conscience; but for my part I look upon it as taking the matter out of God's hands: and I should choose, if it depended on me, to trust her entirely to him [wrote Charles. Sally did get smallpox].' For twenty-two days Sally lay in the utmost danger, her lovely face unrecognisable, and no member of her body free from torment. One source of comfort remained to her, the strangest surely in all the annals of the saints. 'Under her sorest burden,' so writes her admiring husband, 'she blessed God that she had not been inoculated, receiving the disease as immediately sent from

God.'" Although she recovered, at age twenty-four she was permanently disfigured. She was happy that she no longer looked twenty years younger than her husband. This age difference had troubled her.

<sup>415</sup> Anthony Quinton, "The Errors of Formalism," Encounter, 4 (1955), 85. "If what we read novels for, the need of which supports the novel as an institution, is the increase of our understanding of our human environment, a high professional gloss is of secondary importance." As a reviewer, Quinton believes that novels are read by people who want to "fortify the imagination on which our sense of common humanity rests" (p. 85). Adequate standards for the criticism of fiction do not exist perhaps because mere information is all that people want. He says of recognized masterpieces, such as Women in Love and The Idiot: "For all their professional excellences they fail to catch the real humanity of their subject matter; their characters are not immersed in the real world which we read novels to find out about" (p. 87).

<sup>416</sup> Herbert Passin, "Journey Among the Saints," Encounter, 4 (1955), 72. "For these Gandhians it was self-evident that one prepares oneself for service to the people by first purging oneself of all selfish desires, that is, by renunciation, and that celibacy is a routine form of renunciation. . . . 'You feel better, free of all these desires and needs,' explained an elderly Gandhian to me. 'For the first time, you become truly free.' A famous civil engineer, now a Gandhian, said: 'I am richer now than when I had all that money. In those days, I always had to worry. I had to look after and protect my possessions. I had appetites to satisfy. But now I am completely free. . . . I can entrust myself completely to God and

man in this India of ours.'" Passin, an American anthropologist who has traveled extensively in Asia, wrote this letter to Encounter from Tokyo, describing a trip he took to an ashram fifty-six miles from Gaya, Bihar state, to meet Jayaprakash Narayan, the socialist leader who was the second-in-command of Bhoodan, a Buddhist movement. After an uncomfortable trip by train from New Delhi to Gaya, he traveled first by jeep and then on foot over roads which were almost impassable because of floods. He was fascinated by the young Bhoodans who were his escorts.

<sup>417</sup> Passin, pp. 73-74. "My fastidiousness peeled away layer by layer as we progressed from one agony to the greater agony of the next step." When he wondered whether the trip was worth the hardships involved, he looked to "my Gandhian friends, who were toiling on like myself for the sole purpose of helping me, and I knew that it was completely impossible to back off. For them, the niggling calculations that we ordinary mortals make do not have any meaning."

<sup>418</sup> Hilaire Belloc, "The Inn of the Margeride," in Hills and the Sea (New York: E. P. Dutton, n. d.), p. 54. Belloc discusses how fantastic something seems which, while keeping its proportions, is designed on a scale either much smaller or larger than what we habitually know. When he is in the mountains of southern France, he feels "a moderate ecstasy. The clouds are above the hills, lying level in the empty sky; men and their ploughs have visited, it seems, all the land about us. Till suddenly, faint and hard, a cloud less varied, a greyer portion, of the infinite sky itself, is seen to be permanent above the world. Then all our grasp of the wide view breaks down. We change. The valleys and the tiny towns, the unseen mites of men,

the gleams or thread of roads, are prostrate, covering a little watching space before the shrine of this dominant and towering presence. It is as though humanity were permitted to break through the vulgar illusion of daily sense, and to learn in a physical experience how unreal are all the absolute standards by which we build. It is as though the vast and the unexpected had a purpose, and that purpose were the showing to mankind in rare glimpses what places are destined for the soul--those ultimate places where things common become shadows and fail, and the divine part in us, which adores and desires, breathes its own air, and is at last alive." Belloc goes on to describe four Causses around the French town of Mende, and his experience in climbing the mountain of the Margeride. In an inn at the top of the mountain, he meditates on Europe and is optimistic about its future. See "Mental Climate and Perspective and the Cosmic Stairway," appendix, pp. 306-21.

<sup>419</sup> Mircea Eliade, Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism, trans. Philip Mairet (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961), pp. 37-38. "In archaic and traditional societies, the surrounding world is conceived as a microcosm. At the limits of the closed world begins the domain of the unknown, of the formless. On this side, there is ordered--because inhabited and organised--space; on the other, outside this familiar space, there is the unknown and dangerous region of the demons, the ghosts, the dead and of foreigners--in a word, chaos or death or night. . . . Because they attack, endanger the equilibrium and the very life of the city (or of any other inhabited and organised territory), enemies are assimilated to demonic powers, trying to reincorporate the microcosm into the state of chaos; that is, to suppress it." These myths of the center contain three cosmic regions: heaven,



earth, and hell, surrounded by chaos. A central mountain, tree, or pillar is the means of movement among these regions, and is also the place where man is created. A mandala is one of the patterns provided by religions for the ritual construction of centers. In addition to this symbolism, Eliade discusses knots, moon, water, shells, and fertility. He hopes that by showing the logical interconnectedness of these symbols he will help man experience an authentic mode of being: "Images, symbols and myths are not irresponsible creations of the psyche; they respond to a need and fulfill a function, that of bringing to life the most hidden modalities of being" (p. 12). See "Mental Climate and Perspective and the Cosmic Stairway," appendix, pp. 306-21.

<sup>420</sup> Eliade, pp. 39-40. "Every microcosm, every inhabited region, has what may be called a 'Centre'; that is to say a place that is sacred above all. It is there, in that Centre, that the Sacred manifests itself in its totality. What we have here is a sacred, mythic geography, the only kind effectually real, as opposed to profane geography, the latter being 'objective' and, as it were, abstract and nonessential--the theoretical construction of a space and world that we do not live in, and therefore do not know. In mythical geography, sacred space is the essentially real space, for, as it has lately been shown, in the archaic world the myth alone is real. . . . In cultures that have the conception of three cosmic regions, those of Heaven, Earth and Hell--the 'centre' constitutes the point of intersection of those regions. It is here that the break-through to another plane is possible, and, at the same time, communication between the three regions."

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Eliade, pp. 41-50. "Let us now return to the image of the three cosmic regions connected in a 'Centre' along one axis. It is chiefly in the early Oriental civilisation that we meet with the archetypal image. . . . But there was also in Babylon that link between the Earth and the lower regions, for the town had been built upon bāb-apsū, the Gate of apsū; apsū meaning the waters of Chaos before the Creation. We find the same tradition among the Hebrews. The Rock of Jerusalem went deep down into the subterranean waters (tehōm). It is said in the Mishna that the Temple stood just over the tehōm (the Hebrew equivalent for apsū). . . . These cities, temples or palaces, regarded as Centres of the World are all only replicas, repeating ad libitum the same archaic image--the Cosmic Mountain, the World Tree or the central Pillar which sustains the planes of the Cosmos. This symbol of a Mountain, a Tree, or a Column situated at the centre of the world is extremely widely distributed. . . . A good many of the myths speak of a tree, of a creeper, a cord, or a thread of spider-web or a ladder which connects Earth with Heaven, and by means of which certain privileged beings do, in effect, mount up to heaven. These myths have, of course, their ritual correlatives--as, for instance, the shamanic tree or the post in the Vedic sacrifice. The ceremonial staircase plays an equally important part, of which we will now give a few examples. . . . We can easily understand that the stairway in the Mithraic initiation was an Axis of the world and was situated at the Centre of the Universe: otherwise the rupture of the planes would not be possible. 'Initiation' means, as we know, the symbolic death and resurrection of the neophyte, or, in other contexts, the descent into Hell, followed by ascension into Heaven.

Death--whether initiatory or not--is the supreme case of a rupture of the planes. . . . As we have just seen, the ladder can carry an extremely rich symbolism without ceasing to be perfectly coherent. It gives plastic expression to the break through the planes necessitated by the passage from one mode of being to another, by placing us at the cosmological point where communication between Heaven, Earth and Hell becomes possible. . . . But we also know that the symbolism of climbing-up and of stairs recurs often enough in psycho-analytic literature, an indication that it belongs to the archaic content of the human psyche and is not a 'historical' creation, not an innovation dating from a certain historical moment (say, from ancient Egypt or Vedic India, etc. )."

<sup>422</sup> Eliade, p. 39. Eliade quotes from Diary 1928-1957, by Julien Green, trans. Anne Green (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1961): "In all my books, fear or any other rather strong emotion seems to be linked in some mysterious manner with a staircase. I noticed this yesterday, in going over all the novels I had written. . . . As a child, I dreamed that I was being pursued in a staircase by someone."

<sup>423</sup> Eliade, p. 51. "The act of climbing, or ascending symbolises the way towards the absolute reality; and to the profane consciousness, the approach towards that reality arouses an ambivalent feeling; of fear and of joy, of attraction and repulsion. . . . [A] staircase . . . is a concrete formula for the mythical ladder, for the creeper or the spider-web, the Cosmic Tree or the Pillar of the Universe, that connects the three cosmic zones."

<sup>424</sup> "Analysis of Worship," rev. of Psychology and Worship, by R. S. Lee, Times Literary Supplement, 9 September 1955, 529. Lee,

a Freudian psychologist and vicar of St. Mary's, Oxford, describes his application of accepted psychological principles to religious worship. "The essential difficulty in any such analysis [says the reviewer], and Dr. Lee is all the time conscious of it, is that however closely the psychologist may explore his human subject there is always in the last resort a personal reality that eludes his examination; it is also true that on the divine side of his question he is examining a reality that cannot fully be expressed in his selected terms." The most a psychologist can do, the reviewer feels, is to display certain psychological concepts and show how they may illuminate man's religious behavior. Lee discusses the foundations of worship in childhood, how symbol and ceremonial play a part in a satisfactory religious life, and how the knowledge of God is based on the components of human personality. The reviewer finds it a defect that Dr. Lee never asserts "the truth that man's search is met, that God, also searching, encounters man in prayer and there reveals himself."

<sup>425</sup> Arthur Koestler, "The Trail of the Dinosaur," Encounter, 4 (1955), 5-14. Koestler argues that the advent of atomic weaponry has created a wary coexistence in today's world; if we can prolong this period, we might hope for a reprieve: "some unexpected mutation in man's dominating passions and interests" (p. 9). In the seventeenth century the rise of national consciousness and a new philosophy based on the discoveries of Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler superceded the age of religious conflict and created a mutation in the European mind: the divorce of religion from science, art, and ethics. The new determinants of man's fate: mechanical laws, atoms, glands, genes, "destiny from below," replaced "destiny from above." With few exceptions, says

Koestler, this new philosophy made no frontal attacks on religious beliefs but instead gradually undermined their foundations. Our century, finding that there could be no perfect mechanical model of the universe, reverted to "the Jamesian view that a transcendental faith was a biological necessity for man" (p. 12). Koestler's "guess and hope" is for the spontaneous emergence of a new type of faith: "Every culture and every age did have its faith 'cut to measure,' and did re-state the perennial content of all religions on its own level and in its own language and symbols" (p. 13). Possible causes of a new mutation of the mind, Koestler believes, are the conquest of interplanetary space, the creation of artificial moons, and new discoveries in ESP.

<sup>426</sup> Stephen Spender and Irving Kristol, editors, "This Month's Encounter," Encounter, 4 (1955), 2-3. Spender and Kristol deplore the "alarming increase in the rate of divorce between language and meaning" (p. 2), using as an example the word co-existence. While its use can be traced back to Lenin's writings, it is now used in the game of politics. They cite Koestler's essay (see f.n. # 425) as giving the word a hopeful context.

<sup>427</sup> Thomas Mann, Young Joseph, in Joseph and his Brothers, trans. H. T. Lowe-Porter (1934; rpt. New York:Knopf, 1966), p. 389. "His soul was anguished to remain alone in the grave; for some time he wailed after the brothers and implored them not to leave him. Yet he scarcely knew what he cried out; his actual thoughts were not with these mechanical and superficial prayers and lamentations but far below them, while lower down again were others yet more real, like their undertones and ground-basses, so that the whole was like a moving music, perpendicularly composed, which his spirit was occupied with conducting on all

three levels." Young Joseph, published in 1934, is the second of four novels Mann wrote based on the story of Joseph, the son of Jacob and Rachel, as recounted in Genesis, chapters 30-49. Jacob's preference of Joseph over his eleven brothers made them try to kill him by throwing him into a pit and leaving him to starve to death; however, Ruben and Juda prevailed upon the others and instead they sold him as a slave to travelers on their way to Egypt. Joseph prospers there, eventually meeting his brothers again when they come to buy grain during a famine in Chanaan. When he is sure of their sorrow for their actions toward him, Joseph reveals himself and is reunited with Jacob, who adopts Joseph's sons as his own.

<sup>428</sup> Mann, pp. 384-85. "But pity for a pain the source of which we must recognize to be ourselves comes close to being remorse. Reuben's intuition had been quite right; this time Joseph had been so rudely shaken that his eyes were opened and he saw what he had done--and that he had done it. While he was flung hither and thither among their raging fists, while his robe was torn off, while he lay bound, and during his penitential journey to the wellhouse, amid all his daze of horror his thoughts had never once stood still. They had not paused upon the frightful present, but sped back over a past in which all this, hidden to his blissful self-conceit, though partly and presumptuously known to it, had been preparing itself the while. My God, the brothers! To what had he brought them? For he did understand that he had brought them to this: through manifold and great mistakes which he had committed in the assumption that everybody loved him more than themselves--this assumption which he believed and yet did not actually quite believe, but according to which he had always acted and which had brought him--as he now clearly and distinctly recognized--to the pit. . . . For one thing, he ought never to have told his brothers his dreams. It



had been impossibly and incredibly tactless. He even realized that he had actually known this all the time--and yet he had done it."

<sup>429</sup> Mann, p. 389. "Incredible as it may seem, in the thick of the turmoil, in the acutest moment of fear and danger of death, he had kept his mental eye open to realities. Not that fear and danger grew less thereby; but he actually experienced a sort of joy as well; the pleasure of enlightenment, almost like the relief which laughter brings, had illuminated the dark terror in his soul."

<sup>430</sup> See Archetypal Patterns, pp. 20, 85, 215, and 280-84 for more references to this enlightenment; see also "Literature and the Individual Reader."

<sup>431</sup> Mann, p. 388.

<sup>432</sup> Bible, Luke xv. 11-32. A son asked his father for his inheritance and then "wasted his substance with riotous living" (v. 13), while his brother stayed and helped the father. The prodigal son, reduced to eating husks which the pigs he cared for ate, decided to return home and ask his father's forgiveness: "I will rise and go to my father, and will say unto him, Father, I have sinned against heaven, and before thee" (v. 18). Ignoring the protests of his other son, the father welcomes the prodigal home.

<sup>433</sup> Bodkin, "Subconscious Factors of Mental Process Considered in Relation to Thought," Mind. "Just as in moral self-judgment we may seem to hear the voice of an ideal spectator--a 'man within the breast' --pronouncing upon even our secret acts, so in the silent elaboration of thought the demands of an ideal critic--an intellectual socius to whom the mind makes 'secret reference' must be satisfied by the arguments which we project." The words "secret reference" are taken from

John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding: "Words are secretly referred, first to the ideas supposed to be in other men's minds. But though words, as they are used by men, can properly and immediately signify nothing but the ideas that are in the mind of the speaker; yet they in their thoughts give them a secret reference to two other things" (Great Books of the Western World, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins, vol. 35 [Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1937], p. 273). Locke goes on to say that these things are a man's supposition that his words are marks of the ideas in the minds of other men, and the supposition that words stand also for the reality of things. See introduction, pp. xviii-xx.

<sup>434</sup> Arthur W. Bryant, Samuel Pepys: the Man in the Making (New York: Macmillan, 1933), i, xiii. "Thirty years ago Wheatley, in his great edition of the diary, included material which revealed the young Pepys as a man licentious in thought and deed, an unfaithful husband and a seducer." Bryant has "tried to combine with the story of Pepys's own self-revelment that other record, which his voluminous naval letters and memoranda afford, of hard work and splendid achievement in the service of his country." Pepys (1633-1703) was born in London, the son of a tailor. After studying at Cambridge, he went into the service of Edward Montagu, his cousin. About 1658 he moved to the Exchequer and began his diary the next year. Bryant used Pepys's journal covering nearly ten years, and his Memoirs of the Royal Navy, a collection of sea manuscripts and official correspondence.

<sup>435</sup> Bryant, p. 290. Pepys writes of seeing a certain prostitute, Mrs. Martin, more than once and concludes that it is positively dangerous to have anything more to do with her. He thinks he should sub-

stitute an evening in the cake-house in Hyde Park or an evening of singing with friends. However, he writes: "Music and women I cannot but give way to, whatever my business is." Although he deplored his frailty, he did not think his behavior was too evil because "it is the proper age of my life to do it, and out of my observation that most men that do thrive in this world do forget to take pleasure during the time that they are getting their estate, but reserve that till they have got one and then it is too late for them to enjoy it."

<sup>436</sup> Bryant, p. 290. "Yet when he felt his pulse for pleasure beat too high and saw his work threatened, he set his will against his erring heart and conquered it. 'But Lord!' he wrote, 'What a conflict I had with myself, my heart tempting me a thousand times to go abroad about some pleasure or other, notwithstanding the weather foul. However, I reproached myself with my weakness in yielding so much my judgment to my sense, and prevailed with difficulty and did not budge, but stayed within and to my great content did a great deal of business.'"

<sup>437</sup> Howard Fast, Spartacus (1951; rpt. New York: Crown, 1958), pp. 71-72. Although the exact words quoted here are not in this copy of the book, Spartacus suffers during his first weeks of slavery in the Nubian mines from seeing how the humanity of his fellow slaves is gradually reduced. "There is their own [slaves] lexicon of horror, their own refuge in knowledge of another place worse than where they are; but worse than the black escarpment of Nubia is nothing in the whole wide world." The slaves are without hope. The conditions of their lives have caused "a fading away of the desire or need to be human." Spartacus realizes that the essential secret of slaves is to

survive. The tortures he feels are indescribable, as he swings eighteen-pound hammers hour after hour: "Four hours are forever; four hours are eternity" (p. 81). When an eighteen-year-old boy dies, Spartacus "kisses him, but he cannot weep, for he is dry and singed, like burnt leather" (p. 82). The story begins in 71 B. C. with Caius Crassus, his sister Helena, and her friend Claudia journeying from Rome to Capua along the Appian way. They pass the body of a man hanging on a cross; he is one of some six thousand followers of Spartacus who have been killed in a revolt against the government. Spartacus is a Thracian, the grandson of an Egyptian slave, who is taken out of the Nubian mines by Batiatus to be trained in Rome as a gladiator. After some years of fighting in the arena, Spartacus and his fellow gladiators revolt, killing their masters. Later, slaves join them. Over a period of months, they defeat the Roman army. However, power sways, Spartacus is killed, and his camp is dispersed. His wife, Varinda, with her child, Spartacus, is sent secretly to the Germans. There she brings up her son and has more children who, as adults, strive against the Romans when they attack: "A time would come when Rome would be torn down, not by the slaves alone, but by slaves and serfs and peasants and by free barbarians who joined with them" (p. 363).

<sup>438</sup> (Eileen) Elizabeth Coxhead, The Figure in the Mist (London: Collins, 1955), pp. 207, 211. "She [Agnes] opened her eyes and looked around her for the beauty of Arran and it was gone. Floor of heather and wall of mountain were as flat and monotonous as a poster in a station waiting-room. . . . Beauty was in the eye of the beholder and by resolution could be recaptured." Knowing that Margaret hated her,

Agnes is determined never again to feel such pain as she is now experiencing. "So she shut him [Matthew] out, and bent all her love on Adam, and all her will and energy on to enduring Margaret, on to making the allowances, on to proving herself the adult." Agnes Flint, a college student, is hired as a sitter and general helper for the summer by Margaret Ogilvie, who with her husband, Matthew, and son, Adam, has taken a cottage on Arran, a lonely island off the coast of Scotland. Agnes falls in love with Matthew, who teaches both Agnes and Adam to climb mountains. When Margaret leaves to care for her invalid father, Agnes is very happy, believing that she knows better how to care for young Adam. She fantasizes that she and Matthew are married and living together. When Margaret returns, she is jealous of the love Adam has for Agnes; she speaks cruelly to her and determines to send her home. Agnes runs off to the mountains, feeling guilty although her actions have been irreproachable. Mrs. Gillies, the hotel-keeper who has become Agnes' friend, tries to relieve her guilt, pointing out that everyone who knows Margaret has to endure her: "All I'd seen was Margaret's husband, bearing with her" (p. 223). Mrs. Gillies reminds Agnes that Margaret knows how much more intellectually able Agnes is than she. On her last day, Agnes leaves the house very early and climbs the mountain, where she sees her shadow spread out among the rocks. This vision of a figure in the mist consoles Agnes.

<sup>439</sup> Coxhead, pp. 213, 225. Agnes is saddened to see Adam become restive under the subtle tearing down of his love for Agnes now undertaken by Margaret. "He, the conquerer of Goatsfell [a mountain], grew fractious and tired on quite small walks, he objected to his new sandshoes, he was generally difficult." Later, Agnes tries to explain her

feeling for Matthew: "Talking to someone like him on equal terms is the most wonderful experience I've ever had, or ever probably will have."

<sup>440</sup> Coxhead, pp. 225, 227. Mrs. Gillies points out to Agnes that "the man who marries a fool has a foolish streak himself." Later she says, to comfort Agnes: "'But Arran's taught you something, I don't doubt, and wherever ye are ye'll go on learning, no matter if it's painful.'" Mrs. Gillies met the hard challenge of her stare, and the angry hysteria that lay so close behind it, and her own gaze was as always affectionate, inflexible, ironic."

<sup>441</sup> Coxhead, pp. 240-41, 245. Agnes is walking up the mountain just as a misty dawn is breaking: "And then she saw it. A gigantic grey figure stood against the mist, and round it a perfectly circular rainbow, like a stained-glass frame. Instinctively she put up her hand to ward the apparition off, and it put up its hand. . . . It was herself. She moved forward again; and it moved with her shining against the white screen of the mist, playing with her, mopping and mowing, her companion, her image, herself translated into vastness and beauty, and yet not herself, for she had done nothing to create it." That afternoon when she is about to board the boat, she is cured of her resentment that Margaret has forced her to leave. "Take home what you can of Arran, had counselled Matthew, but he could not know that it was the whole world she would take. Thankfulness smote and humbled her."



## APPENDIX

## A NOTE ON UNIVERSALS AND THE CONTEMPORARY CONSCIOUSNESS

A reflection which I should like briefly to develop has been suggested by the discussion in the July and August numbers of Life and Letters, concerning the importance in story-telling, of the communication of universals, or, on the other hand, of catching the note of the contemporary consciousness.

One form of conflict present within the general social consciousness of today is that between a militant sense of solidarity, quick to scorn any dissenter from the spirit of the times, and, opposed to this, a growing awareness of differences in the make-up of individual minds, determining inevitable differences of outlook. Writing as one inclined to defend the value of individual differences against any over-ruling time-spirit, I wish to attempt some indication of the different perspectives which seem to me to determine the arguments of Mr. Charles Morgan and Mr. Graham Greene.

The 'perils of a prose divorced from the social consciousness, from the note and trick of life,' Mr. Greene illustrates by comparing the loose abstract writing of Mrs. Eddy with passages of the prose of religious leaders who use concrete images from the traditions or experience of a group. By consciousness of her time, he suggests Mrs. Eddy's prose might have been conditioned into exactitude; and argues that it is through the presence in a tale of landmarks of the ordinary life and ruling passions of the day that

the reader secures the illusion that liberates imagination, and the writer is saved from reliance upon hypnotic words and rhythms.

There is truth in this, yet is it true that only consciousness of one's time, and the interests allied to its ruling impulse, can thus quicken imagination and discipline to exactness?

One distinction that has almost penetrated from psychological theory into common apprehension is that between the extravert and introvert types of minds, with bias respectively towards the outer and inner life. In the assertion that imagination can be liberated only through the illusion for which one needs contemporary detail, the trick or idiom of the life of today, there seems recognisable the bias of the extravert mind. For another type of writer it is possible that the aim of delineating the forces of the inner life that persist may exercise as strong a discipline as could the attempt to catch the outward trick of the life of today. For a corresponding type of reader it is by such delineation that imagination is liberated.

It is legitimate, I think, to interpret Mr. Morgan's 'communication of universals' by reference to his own writing. In his novel, The Fountain, one finds incidentally contemporary detail and idiom, yet this does not give the book its distinctive quality. As one of its reviewers says, it is concerned, unlike most novels of to-day, with the adventures of the soul. Its title seems explained by a passage that describes the goal of the hero's quest as the "innermost court of quietness itself, where like a stream from the ground a fountain of the spirit was rising." For the writer who finds himself constrained to the presentation of such a quest and

such adventures, both the idiom and the ruling passion of his age can be but a matter of means - of the craftsmanship of communication. The forces that most strongly stimulate him to exact expression, the forces whose conflicts his work seeks to resolve, are the same whose interplay may be felt within such different settings as the writings of Plato or of St. Paul.

It is the genuineness of the concern of some minds with the forces of life or spirit in their universality that seems to be forgotten by certain critics insisting upon the contemporary idiom. One may refer, for example, to Michael Roberts' Critique of Poetry. Here we find eloquent and effective advocacy of the claim of modern poetry, with its new technique, to serve us in our adjustment to the distinctive problems of our own day. The argument seems almost to claim that poetry - unlike prayer - may so resolve our conflicts that the cure is complete, the task not to be done again. Thus the tragic poetry of the past, it is suggested, becomes for us no longer 'actual', merely 'elegant' in its adaptation to the needs of its own day. But beneath the problems and conflicts of our distinctive temporary conditions lie the deeper conflicts that pertain to our common human nature and state - those with which tragic poetry wrestled in the time alike of Shakespeare and of the Greeks. The persistence of these conflicts in our own lives makes the ancient poetry still actual for us.

It is these same problems, and conflicts of universal forces, that for certain story-tellers constitute the compelling interest of their theme and condition them to a mode of expression for which the trick and idiom of their time is incidental, or even superfluous.

## TRUTH, INDIVIDUAL AND UNIVERSAL

If, as participants in the discussions of this Journal, we were asked to define the nature of the truth we are seeking, our thoughts might first recur to the dictionary statement that truth is accordance with fact or reality. Then, at once, the question arises: What is our criterion of reality in discussions of religious and moral truth?

In everyday inquiries concerning what we call matters of fact, we are agreed on a criterion, that provided by the common accord of sense-perception. "Did such and such an event," we ask, "really happen?" Our criterion is the perception we should experience in common in presence of the happening; and we can so far rely upon the common factor in our physical and mental make-up as to accept - under condition of good faith - one another's testimony to everyday events. Similarly in questions of physical science, we seek to bring conflicting opinions to the test of the crucial experiment - sense-perception under certain test conditions. But in discussions of moral and religious truth we can appeal to no such criterion of common perception.

What should you and I have perceived if we could have followed Jesus of Nazareth on the momentous journey to Jerusalem, or have stood beside the cross? We know that no answer can be given to such a question except the diverse speculative constructions that

we do in fact build upon the records available to us. What do you and I perceive when present at the Catholic mass, or at some evangelical revival where in the experience of the faithful the spirit is outpoured? We know that the reality perceived will be diverse with the whole diversity of the traditional and temperamental resources each of us brings to bear.

Since the test of common external perception fails us, let us consider a more individual, subjective criterion of truth. Each of us, reading such discussions as are contained in this journal, or attempting to put into words his own religious and moral outlook, can test each statement as he proceeds by reference to his own 'sense' of reality.

Let us take an example from autobiographical record of the experience of encountering and assimilating truth.

R. H. Benson, in his Confessions has left a description of the effect upon his mind of the preaching of Father Maturin at a retreat in 1895.

"For the first time Christian Doctrine ... displayed itself to me as an orderly scheme. I saw how things fitted on one to the other, how the sacraments followed inevitably from the Incarnation, how body and spirit were alike met in the mercy of God ... He caught up my fragments of thought, my glimpses of spiritual experience, my gropings in the twilight, and showed me the whole, glowing and transfigured in an immense scheme whose existence I had not suspected. He touched my heart also profoundly, as well as my head,

revealing to me the springs and motives of my own nature in a completely new manner."

One might compare with this the effect upon the youthful John Mill of the reading of Bentham's Treatise on Legislation. The utilitarian principle, Mill tells us, as applied by Bentham to problems of human behaviour and institutions.

"fell exactly into its place as the keystone which held together the detached and fragmentary component parts of my knowledge and beliefs. It gave unity to my conceptions of things. I now had opinions; a creed, a doctrine, a philosophy; in one among the best senses of the word, a religion; the inculcation and diffusion of which could be made the principal outward purpose of a life."

These two examples may serve to remind us of experiences of our own when our whole mind sprang to endorse some statement or formulated theory. We may speak of such perception as intuition, in Bergson's sense of intuition,<sup>1</sup> as a sort of creative synthesis of the results of many partial apprehensions. Innumerable past impressions, glimpses, and gropings have left the mind active and sensitive in certain directions, so that the new insight is accepted as consummation of the mind's own effort, as well as a gift from beyond its range. Differences of temperament and mental habit will determine whether such a recognition of truth appears mainly as an intellectual fulfilment, passing readily to justification by lines of reasoning, or whether, its grounds remaining obscure, the intuition presents something of

<sup>1</sup>As expounded in An Introduction to Metaphysics.



a magical or supernatural character. In either case it seems that the bent and resources of the responding mind are the important operative factor.

Here then appears a sense in which we may speak of individual truth as a goal to be pursued in moral and religious enquiries. So far as the seeker for truth can discover formulae and imagery that sum up the results of his own experience and harmonize his own needs, he has attained a faith that goes far toward bringing him truth's gift of freedom - freedom from conflict and the self-stultification of professing the only half-believed.

"Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." For many seekers of religious truth these words from John's Gospel come near the heart of their desire. They crave freedom, not only from doubts and questioning, but freedom to love, freedom to act, the release of power that comes from finding statement and symbol adequately related to their life's experience and answering their spirit's need.

If such an individual truth is all we desire we shall hardly be drawn toward such discussions as are offered by this Journal. Rather, we shall try to find in some single church, or writer, a doctrine that meets our need, and having found it cease our quest, binding thought by loyalty to our chosen faith and so centering our emotional life upon its imagery that rival hypotheses become for us more and more irrelevant - mere heresies to be answered and dismissed.

To seek a satisfying faith is not the same thing as the quest for truth. A faith may be something individually chosen, guarded

by an individual loyalty, valid as meeting individual needs. But is not truth, by its very nature universal? When we spoke just now of Mill and Benson encountering truth, our thought interposed a qualification - each thinker encountered what he felt and accepted as truth, but these conflicting faiths cannot both have been true. Truth is something behind and beyond these conflicting visions that individuals apprehend from their varying standpoints and by means of their differing resources.

Yet if our ideal of truth is thus unattainably remote, can it avail as goal for any quest, or discipline for any loyalty? Can we pursue a truth we know we can never attain, or, seeing all other faiths as relative, shall we dare to hope that our individual vision, or that of our group, can attain truth absolute? Such a hope is found hard to sustain at the present day, even by some members of that church which has made the claim most explicitly. Miss M. D. Petre, in her book, My Way of Faith, has expressed the pain of a nature sensitive to the thoughts of others, craving 'solidarity with all mankind', and at the same time conscious, in regard to her own Catholic faith, of 'certainty begotten of entire adhesion of the whole being'. "It is profoundly distressing," she writes, "to find that whereas we are all in irresistible agreement on the facts of ordinary life and on the acquired truths of science, we can differ so profoundly on the most vital spiritual questions." (p. 173). If this distress can touch members of that church to which, above all, men flee in hope of finding unanimity through authority, even more must it affect the more thoughtful among the members of other communions.

The thinker who, in face of this difficulty, seeks truth in the sphere of morals and religion must recognise in his ideal a twofold character, individual and universal. Because spiritual truth is 'vital', necessarily apprehended not by intellect alone but by the whole personality, it is vain to imagine that others whose nature and course of experience is different from mine will perceive truth just as I do. Against opposition of others I must hold to what I see individually. Yet unless they and I seek continually with our separate resources to see the same reality, we do not pursue truth at all; we shut ourselves away in private worlds of prejudice and illusion. The truth we seek must be an individual perspective - the completest we can attain - of a reality common to all. This ideal requires from each of us, toward the differing visions of others, something more than tolerance - an eagerness to test and extend our own apprehension by entering imaginatively into others' experience as they variously interpret it. Only by such participation can we push our individual truth a little way toward the unattainable goal of truth universal.

An understanding of the relation between the individual and universal aspects of truth is, I think, helpful in interpreting the assurance which an individual may rightly feel in asserting his own faith - an assurance not incompatible with complete respect for the differing faiths of others.

In a recent enquiry into certainty in religious belief,<sup>(1)</sup> it was found that among the subjects - University and W.E.A. students

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(1) "The Tendency to Certainty in Religious Belief" by Robert Thouless. British Journal of Psychology, Vol XXVI, part 1.

of varying age, sex and occupation, asked to estimate the degree of certainty with which they believed or disbelieved statements such as "There is a personal God", "Jesus Christ is God the Son" - there was a strong tendency "for degree of belief to approach to certainty". On the whole it appeared - as one would expect - that statements of religious beliefs were affirmed or rejected with greater certainty than was the case with the group of "affectively indifferent non-religious beliefs" offered for the sake of comparison. So far as a conclusion could be drawn, the investigator found "no considerable decrease of the tendency to certainty amongst more intelligent subjects"; yet he embodies in his results the remark that acquirement of the comparatively rare ability to hold propositions with less than full certainty should be one of the aims of a liberal education. We may agree with this observation; and yet, so far as the certainty affirmed is of that momentous vital character indicated by Miss Petre's reference to an "entire adhesion of the whole being", this also is a value which a liberal education should foster rather than diminish.

No doubt such certainty results from education by life rather than by books. It comes from the testing of personal beliefs in acting and suffering with others. Yet certainty may be strengthened also through the reflective testing of individual belief against opposing assertion and argument. It is not till we have thus examined our beliefs that we can be sure of our own conviction - of what in our professed faith is essential and what may be merely an accidental limitation or accretion. At the present time we have been made aware, more clearly perhaps than ever before, of the

range of possible discrepancy between the faith a man professes and that by which he actually, unconsciously, lives. The more, therefore, we can realise the need, at every stage of life, to test what was professed yesterday by the insight of today - to look back upon our individual beliefs from the standpoint to which the shared researches of others may have brought us, while still we refuse to let the prestige of another's intellect or learning shake our loyalty to what we do ourselves intimately and sincerely apprehend.

I should like to illustrate this question of the right attitude of the individual toward conflicting religious belief by reference to a recent discussion concerning the divinity of Christ.

In the Hibbert Journal of July 1935, the Reverend R. A. Edwards, asserting the divinity of Christ, argued with a certain passion against what he termed the "peasant theory of Jesus". In the article a vivid impression is communicated of the value a Christian believer may attach to the sense of fellowship with One who is both 'Very God' and a figure in human history. The reader is made to realise that for such a believer the glory of the Christian church in its whole past and present existence may be so bound up with the identification of the historic Jesus and the divine, eternal, Christ that any assertion of Jesus' plain humanity appears to him as a reduction of his faith to mere error and fiction - an extinction of all radiance, leaving the past and present alike unlighted, blank.

If an individual's experience and study have led him to such a vision, one must respect it. Yet there is perhaps something of

moral as well as intellectual criticism in the comment offered by Dr. C. J. Cadoux:<sup>(1)</sup> "It seems never to occur to Mr. Edwards to allow for the fact that different minds need different words and even thoughts in contemplating the same spiritual realities." Let other men's affirmations, he urges, be generously taken in their full value, as attempts to render an inscrutable mystery; one could not then feel that modernism makes of Christianity "the blankest of blank illusions".

If, in some conservatively-minded thinkers, loyalty to the past inspires an almost irresistible anger against those who tamper with age-old embodiments of truth, so there is also, for others, a loyalty to the achieved vision of today which inspires something like moral indignation against those remaining blind to it. Insight into the immense and pervasive power in human life, for good or ill, of myth and symbol, is one of the distinctive achievements that have transformed the vision of the religious historian of today. The thinker who still, today, reads the history of the church as either a handing down of clear, authoritative, divine truth or else a piling of "one monstrous error upon another" may suffer from an invincible blindness one has no right to condemn; but it would seem that he should at least struggle to understand his fellow thinkers before, he on his side, condemns their inadequacy.

If in such a controversy one tries to lay aside, or allow for, heats of individual feeling, and to see one's own and the opposing

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(1) The Hibbert Journal. Jan 1936.



view under the aspect, as it were, of the universal, one may perhaps recognise that the vision of Christ, the God-man, and the sense of fellowship with him, as communicated by the New Testament writings, is indeed the reality that has shone through the greivously chequered history of the church, and still lightens every man entering upon the Christian heritage; but that whether we view the divine Jesus of the Gospels as our best human symbol of the paradoxical relation of spirit to flesh, the eternal to the mortal, or whether we accept the story in more literal fashion, is a matter of differing individual perspective. Across the gulf of that difference those who reverence the spiritual truth of Christianity may still claim fellowship.

There are other controversies to which - because they touch practice more nearly - it is even harder to apply the imaginative tolerance that springs from the philosophic view of truth, individual and universal. Questions concerning freedom, and justice, and Christian duty in the political and economic sphere - here one is even more tempted to react with moral indignation against the failure to conceive truth as to oneself it so plainly appears. Yet even here one may qualify the certainty of one's own individual vision by a wider-ranging social imagination, and reflective awareness of alternatives - the power to see oneself, together with others, as limited and conditioned in apprehension of reality.

It would seem that such awareness of the individual and universal aspects of truth is one, and not the least, of the qualifications valuable in the thinker who would give or gain benefit in discussion of moral and religious questions.

### THE PACIFIST PLEDGE

I was speaking the other day with a woman who, like myself, was drawn toward the Peace Pledge Union by its invitation to join in renunciation of war and in seeking the way of peace. Yet she felt scruples concerning the phrase 'never to support or sanction' war. "How can we so pledge ourselves," she questioned, "while we continue to pay taxes which we know are partly for the upkeep and increase of armaments, for fighting in Palestine and bombing in India? Is it just cowardice in me that I do not see my way to withholding income tax, or a proportion of it?"

I - sharing the scruple about the attempt to dissociate myself by a pledge from the national guilt in war - feel strongly that it is not mere cowardice or weakness of will that makes us submit to pay taxes, or to other forms of participation required of us within a state whose policy we disapprove. Such participation opens the whole wide-ranging problem of the tribute to Caesar, which I cannot ask for space to discuss here. I see that for one who may be called upon himself to kill or contrive death for his fellow creatures the question of Caesar's claim, and a pledge against it, takes on a special urgency. But for those of us who are women, and not of an age or physique to be conscripted for any auxiliary war service, the question of taking active part in war does not arise. To pledge ourselves against it means nothing. Yet the invitation to join in

achieving a "mentality" and "constructive policy" of peace may mean very much. To this aim the form of words offered as a pledge seems to have little relation.

Writing as one for whom conscription is not a personally relevant issue, I should like to make a proposal - or rather indicate a wish, in the hope that readers of the Adelphi may express some opinion upon it.

My wish is that the sponsors of the P.P.U. would accept from those who would prefer to use it an alternative form of pledge, expressing the more positive aspect of the Union's purpose - that side in which women as much as men are concerned. As an indication of what I mean I would suggest the words: I renounce violence and dedicate myself to the spirit that removes war's causes.

I should like to say something as to the value there might be in such a pledge. For one thing, its definitely religious character gives it special significance for those who are not members of any Christian church. For those who are, it may involve but reaffirmation of a vow already made to God. But there are others, needing and desiring the support of religious fellowship, who yet find themselves - perhaps through revolt against particular forms of religious teaching - unable to use the terms of personal devotion. To such it is of special interest that within the P.P.U. individuals speaking the language of Aldous Huxley can unite with those using distinctively Christian terms. For us there is need of a fellowship that can transcend any dispute as to whether God should be thought of as personal, Lord and Father, or as impersonal - to be discerned in meditation as spirit immanent and transcendent, or in

action as method and ideal, rather than in the personal communion of prayer. Middleton Murry has spoken of pacifism as the path by which bewildered men may "enter anew into the mystery of the Christian faith"; and for many like myself it may well be so. Our way of faith and unity in Christ may be through a dedication, clear of any form of dogma, to that spirit - shown, we believe, by Jesus and his true followers - of patient, self-sacrificing, imaginative good will.

There is one practical objection I can see to the P.P.U. accepting such a form of words as I suggest. The pledge as it stands is meant, I think, to exclude anyone, however religiously vowed to the spirit of peace, who retains any hope in the League of Nations and the method once known as "collective security". I wonder if the sponsors of the Union still feel that to be important. The League, with any faith it inspired in collective security, is too shattered now for likelihood that any war will be fought in its name. The war toward which we seem drifting will be fought not for any ideal of democracy or international justice, but for the existence of the British Empire. No vote the pacifist might cast for Norman Angell or Gilbert Murray could bring us nearer that war.

When, in the dark times we are entering, we seek support in pacifist fellowship, is it essential to exclude those who differ somewhat as to political possibilities, rather than to unite those who, like the Editor of the Adelphi, believe that "pacifism must go deep if it is to move powerfully", and would wish their unifying pledge to link their deepest loyalty in everyday intercourse with their ultimate hope for the world's salvation?

# THE BOUNDARIES OF SCIENCE: Summary of argument

1. The production of science is the peculiar contribution to human development of Western civilization in its modern period. This fact implies a concentration by thinkers upon the field of experience in which scientists' problems lie, and a corresponding conditioning of the minds of both those who welcome the influence of science and those who react against it. Such conditioning may find expression in the attitude, or implicit philosophy, known as scientific materialism. (Q. How far is the attitude Waddington expresses that which Macmurray criticises pp. 18-25? Do you accept his criticism?) Those thinkers who desire to put conscious philosophic judgement in place of prejudice must examine the relation of scientific to other aspects of experience. (Q. Is it important for the ordinary individual to have a conscious rather than an implicit philosophy?) Here an attempt is made to consider the scientific method as applied to human behaviour, and in particular the question whether in terms of that method an adequate account can be given of the scientists' behaviour in producing science.

2. Science as a mode of social behaviour is dependent on the presence of an effective intention to produce it. Not merely demand from a changing environment is necessary, but response in the form of intention to change things for the better. This

effective intention is particularly difficult to achieve in relation to our own behaviour. (On this difficulty of Waddington pp. 55-61. As an organised effort to overcome reluctance to study our own society, cf. Tom Harrison's "Mass-observation". What estimate do you form of his methods?) When we do study our own behaviour the problem emerges: can these facts, regarded as objectively determined, be intentionally controlled?

3. The limits of science must be the limits of our power to verify cooperatively by observation and experiment the results of constructive imagination. Of the knowledge required for intentional behaviour the instrumental part can be thus verified, not the other part - knowledge of intrinsic values. By the scientific method we may study persons as means to our ends, not as ends in the form themselves. (Q. What of Waddington's claim to study values as a scientist? pp. 25-7, 52-3, 64-6, 93-117).

4. Psychology as a science, i.e. as publicly verifiable, must consider all action as determined by observable conditions, not by intention. Yet the psychologist in his search for truth realises himself as a subject acting intentionally. Such action involves a different form of knowledge, akin to religious reflection.

5. In the theory and practice, considered together, of psychoanalysis, the scientific theory of motivation and the technique of control come together paradoxically. I am led to think of my own behaviour as, like that of others, externally determined matter of



fact. Yet the efficacy of the method depends upon my penetrating and transforming this behaviour by my conscious intention.

6. The paradoxes brought out by the argument may be understood through recognising that the scientist and the philosopher seek different kinds of knowledge - different as omitting or including the aspect of intentionality directly known to a self. The intrinsic knowledge of action analysed by the philosopher uses whatever knowledge of motivation can be acquired by the scientist. The philosophic enquiry includes the question whether there is in the universe beyond ourselves a ground for relating to one another, in respect of ultimate truth or rightness, the differing intentions of human subjects.

## BASIC SYMBOLS DISCUSSION

My contribution to this discussion is concerned with those basic symbols to which F. J. Hoffman's essay refers on page 5. If it is true that one important function of art is to give 'renewed and varied representation' to 'the basic symbols which have recurred vitally throughout man's history', it would seem to follow that one important function of the literary critic is to show in what manner, with what distinctive quality and power, these symbols, or patterns, appear within particular poems.

In his valuable study in criticism, The Poetic Image, C. Day Lewis has suggested a possible comment of 'the simple-minded reader' on Jung's theory of basic symbols or archetypes, as 'psychic residua' of numberless ancestral experiences: 'Translated into simple language, doesn't this mean that the stock subjects of poetry - birth, love, nature, death - are the best subjects of poetry? And, for the moment, the concession is made 'that this is just what it does mean. But critics must live; and critics of poetry live very largely by annotating, codifying, refining . . . this coarse and fundamental truth'.<sup>1</sup>

There is value, I think, for any critic, in reducing, at moments, theories which he himself finds satisfying and fruitful

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1. The Poetic Image (Cape 1947) p. 141.

to the meagre form in which they may appear to 'the simple-minded reader'. But even the simple reader, I think, may grasp in the theory of archetypes something more than this.

Consider, for instance, lines from the poem by Day Lewis, The Ecstatic, addressing a skylark, describing its song and flight:

Be strong your fervent soaring, your skyward air!

. . . . .

Buoyed, embayed in heaven's noon-wide reaches -  
For soon light's tide will turn - oh, stay!  
Cease not till day streams to the West, then down  
That estuary drop down to peace.

A critic,<sup>1</sup> writing of this poem, speaks of the floating rhymes, subtle interconnections and inversions that enhance its music, and notes that the more he realizes these 'the more I find myself thinking of the lark as well'. Why? Is it that the music, the dance, of the words widens and deepens the image of the lark, stirring associations far beyond any actual experience of the bird. The subject of the poem is the ecstatic lark<sup>2</sup> not birth and life and death, but within the trance of the poem's music, is not the lark's flight and song a symbol of our human noontide? 'There is something sun-like within us' Jung has said. The pattern of sunrise, noon, sunset, felt as akin to our own life-pattern, reverberates through poetry, and surely is felt here, as the poet longs

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1. Basil de Selincourt in The Observer Mar. 17th, 1935.

2. Or should we say the 'subject' in this last verse is the lark's ecstasy as an image of man's noontide and its decline toward death, and add that in almost any subject that has become a 'poetic image' we may hear such overtones related to our human condition? This, I take it, is Mr. Lewis' meaning, and the simple-minded reader, grasping this, might be perhaps, no longer 'disappointed'.

to stay the lark's ecstasy until the decline - inevitable as tide or riverflow - of day, and of all life, from noon's glory, down toward peace.

Does the making conscious of such a universal pattern within a poem bring any gain in appreciation? To me it does. I find my enjoyment of a poem heightened as I consciously follow some of those lines of association that run outward from the illumined central image into a far-reaching context of literature and life. In some minds I think it is otherwise. Their enjoyment of the central image is impaired, not heightened, by the making conscious of meaning which for them contributes feeling tone the better for remaining inarticulate.

In the poem from which I have just illustrated there seems certainly little need for a critic to make explicit the contributing associations. Let us consider an instance more relevant to F. J. Hoffmann's contention in another part of his paper for discussion that the critic's understanding of the mind's unconscious working should be used to deal with the 'obscurity' of many modern poems, reducing 'the language of such experimental literature to the level of common understanding'. A question may arise here: if the apparently unintelligible poem is so, not absolutely, but is 'only relatively unsuited to (my) capacity' to make it intelligible, yet, because of my incapacity, has 'stimulated only (my) distrust', (pp. 2 & 3) will the critic's paraphrase and explanation help me to enjoy what I did not enjoy before?

In A Critical History of English Poetry by H. J. C. Grierson and J. C. Smith, the authors - who in their prefatory note

confess themselves critics 'whose taste in poetry was formed in Victorian days', and who may thus 'fail to do justice to the poetry of the present generation' - bring against much of T. S. Eliot's writing in The Waste Land, and elsewhere, the accusation of 'an abuse of private association and allusion'. (p. 511). Of attempts made to explain the associations involved they say: if the guesses should be right, still 'the discovery . . . would have no poetic value'; and, comparing Livingston Lowes' analysis of the tissue of linked forgotten memories operating in The Ancient Mariner, they assert: 'the knowledge has not affected our appreciation of the unity and beauty of the poem. So it would be with The Waste Land'. (p. 512).

The verdict of these critics seems to me to suggest a qualification of Hoffman's contention, which he would perhaps accept. I think if a poem has stimulated no interest, only distrust in a reader's mind, no explanation or paraphrase is likely to be much good to him. It is when a poem, or certain lines in a poem, while seeming unintelligible, yet fascinate, remain in the memory, disturbing the mind with wonder, that the work of a critic, analysing, suggesting associations - not only in the poet's mind, but within what Yeats termed 'the Great Memory', and Eliot 'the mind of Europe' - may be able to intensify and enlighten enjoyment that began as blind feeling.

Hoffman's warning is relevant here, that little value can attach to an analysis of a poem that demonstrates 'not creation but the subconscious pattern (or chaos) of wishes, frustrations', etc, which may have been present in the artist's mind. (p. 2). My

own criticism, even of such good work as that of Lowes on The Ancient Mariner, is that he demonstrates an underlying tissue or chaos of memories, refuses, perhaps wisely, to consider 'undiscoverable', merely personal, wishes or frustrations, but also takes no account of emotional forces or patterns of more than personal significance, characterising the 'mind' common to the poet and his readers. Such a pattern, which I have called that of Rebirth, and tried to show as present in The Ancient Mariner, does seem to me to have relevance to the process of creation, and to intensify enjoyment of the poem and appreciation of its unity and beauty. Similarly enjoyment of Eliot's poem, The Waste Land, is increased for me by the making conscious of the links connecting its images, arbitrary as these may at first sight appear, with one another and with the ancient pattern of initiation or rebirth.

So again, in that instance, which we may regard as a classical one, of the application of psychoanalysis to literary criticism, the study by Dr. Ernest Jones of Hamlet, the mere insistence on the presence of a complex, the Oedipus complex, in the mind of poet and spectator, finding expression in the speech and baffled action of the play's protagonist, does not, I think, increase - for some minds it may diminish - the sense of the play's value. There must be more meaning than this, we feel, in the figure of Hamlet that has so captured the imagination of generations of men. I have tried to show<sup>1</sup> something of this meaning by tracing the influence in the tragedy of the archetypal ideas not only of the conflict of

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1. In Archetypal Patterns in Poetry (Oxford Univ. Press 1934).



the generations, but of kingship, sacrifice and atonement. These ideas have, I believe a wider influence in such a play as Hamlet than can be summed up in the Oedipus complex; and the recognition of them in tragedy, with comparison of their earlier expression in myth and ritual, does for some minds deepen literary appreciation.

The concept of the relation of an individual poem or play to a living heritage finding expression through art - a concept to which Eliot's 'impersonal theory' leads us no less than Jung's theory of archetypes - is a wider theme than that proposed to us in this discussion, if psychoanalysis is taken in its strict Freudian sense, but this concept shows us, I think, the nature of the context within which the value of psychoanalysis to literary criticism should be estimated.

If knowledge of the Oedipus complex helps us to appreciate Hamlet, it is not because of any interest in speculating concerning a neurosis, a psychic maladjustment in Shakespeare's mind; it is because the Oedipus complex, or an ambivalent attitude of the son toward the father, is a common element in some degree present in poet and audience alike, present also in men of long past ages, so that it has entered, together with other elements, into the varied patterns they wove in art and ritual, to which our minds still respond.

Thus there is a value to the literary critic in psychoanalytic studies, but I think, a greater value and relevance in the study, not through psychology alone but also through anthropology and history, of the basic symbols and patterns that are our common heritage.

## A THOUGHT ON MENTAL HEARING

The subject on which I wish to write briefly is an aspect of the problem suggested in the February issue of The Frontier: what are the conditions of "mental hearing" on either side in a discussion.

When the discussion is between members of a church and others who, having some form of faith yet cannot subscribe to any creed, the persons concerned often fail of any true hearing, any meeting of minds, because differences of presupposition, imagery, conceptual form, obscure deeper elements of common will and meaning. Each speaker, enclosed within his own circle of thought, fails to enter imaginatively the experience of the other.

I have read of someone - I think it was William Morris - who in the course of some amateur acting, playing the part of a bishop, so stiffened his bearing and dulled his features as to remind a spectator of a lantern when the light is blown out. As William Morris - perhaps - thought of bishops, so the convinced professing Christian is apt to think of those who cannot accept the dogmas of his church - forms of the faith that lights his own life.

A Catholic writer, reviewing in the Hibbert Journal the book, "One Kind of Religion", by Helen Wodehouse - a book which to me seemed to speak convincingly of the faith by which its author lived - denounced as "no religion" the faith which the book set

forth. Its speech he described as "no more than sounding brass or tinkling cymbal to heart and mind" - a lantern-frame, he might have said, using our former image, with light extinguished. To him, across the frontier of his difference from the thinker he reviewed, no truly heard speech, no meeting of minds was possible.

Another Catholic writer, Thomas Merton, whose story of his own religious pilgrimage has touched many readers, has said of the mystic faiths of those outside his own church: there is "only the void of Nirvana, or the feeble intellectual light of Platonic idealism, or the sensuous dreams of Sufis" - only "natural" imaginings as sharply contrasted with the supernatural means of Grace. Yet in one instance at least Thomas Merton found it possible to hear the speech of a faith whose form was different from his own. The "pagan monk", Bramachari, with whom for a time he lived in personal intimacy, he could describe as centered on God - the same God whom he himself was seeking. In this instance at least it seemed that the I-Thou relation was achieved, imagination quickened to enable the one man to realise in the other the faith-light burning within the lantern-frame of thought alien from his own.

Members of the Anglican or Free Churches are perhaps not so bound as Roman Catholics to distinguish sharply between "natural" and "supernatural" ways of approach to God. Yet it seems often that the evangelical is less able than the catholic thinker to separate himself imaginatively from the presuppositions of his own thought. In Radio appeals, for instance, addressed by ministers of different churches to listeners of widely varying outlook,

speakers seem often unable to realise how unmeaning to a great part of their audience are the terms of the "Thoughts" they propose.

'Why do you delay coming to Jesus who would guide you in all the perplexities of life?' To many who have felt, if not thought out, the difference of our outlook and circumstances to-day from those of the historic Jesus and his disciples, such questions and assertions seem strangely incongruous and unreal.

One reason why the cessation of the Christian News-Letter seemed so great a loss to some who were not members of any church was that both editors and contributors showed generous concern to make contact with minds whose presuppositions and personal responses to life were different from their own. Mrs. Stocks, writing with respect and sympathy of the religion and the habits of prayer of Beatrice Webb, stands at an opposite pole from the Catholic reviewer of Helen Wodehouse who denounced as "no prayer" that reaching out of thought and will toward Good beyond oneself which Dr. Wodehouse attempted to illustrate as "prayer without theism".

Or again, one might contrast, with the type of exhortation I illustrated from the Radio speaker, the generous recognition by George MacLeod of the difficulties many of us feel concerning the personality and nature of the Messiahship of the historic Jesus. By those who cannot sincerely repeat the creeds of the Church, he recognises, true faith may be expressed in a loyalty to what individually one can discern of the Christ spirit.

Such insights and recognitions as these instances illustrate made the Christian News-Letter a true expression of fellowship across the "frontier" that divides the Church member from those

whose form - or formlessness - of faith forbids church membership. It is the hope of those who valued the News-Letter especially as such an expression that the new organ of the Frontier will continue the quest for understanding, true encounter, between those unavoidably divided by differences in the presuppositions of their thought, in their personal and socially conditioned responses to reality.

# MENTAL CLIMATE AND PERSPECTIVE

## AND

### THE COSMIC STAIRWAY

There are many words having initial reference to material things and the life of the body, that we turn to use in attempting to communicate the life of the mind. Among these is a group of words having reference to the active life of sense in its continual spatial change: 'position', 'viewpoint', 'outlook', 'perspective'. These words we use also with reference to the intellectual and imaginative life, usually with little consciousness of the implicit metaphor. In debate with others we compare our 'viewpoints' or 'perspectives', our thought fixed upon the difference between our own individual or group manner of conceiving things and that of our interlocutor, or the group to which he belongs.

In the Editorial observations in the Encounter of May, 1955, there is a reference to the possibility of "a historic shift in spiritual perspective": a phrase used as equivalent to that employed by Arthur Koestler in his article, "The Trail of the Dinosaur". Koestler wrote of "a change of the spiritual climate, a spontaneous mutation of interest". The difference of implicit metaphor here makes no difference in the intention of the phrase, which still refers to a possible significant change, on the part of



a widely ranging group of persons, in their manner of conceiving the world and international relations. But let us look more closely at the metaphors implicit in these phrases.

Within the sensuous experience upon which imaginative and conceptual thought draws for its expression, we can recognize the importance both of the changing visual perspectives that accompany bodily movement and of the changing atmospheric conditions that pertain to the climate of the region we inhabit.

Experiences of sunlight and heat, gloom and cold, freshness and clarity or oppressive stagnation in the air we breathe - such changes as these, affecting pervasively our bodily life, are readily transferred to the life of the mind when we try to express its relation to the social conditions that penetrate it like an atmosphere. Those of us who are habitually sensitive to the implicit metaphor in the phrases we use or encounter can feel the emotional force of the term 'spiritual climate' in the context in which Koestler uses it. He describes "the muffled feeling of uneasiness, of growing frustration", that may afflict those whose interactions of thought are restricted by the scientific habits of their epoch. Such frustration seems an echo of our sensations when stifled by a physical atmosphere inimical to bodily life. To one suffering such frustration of the spirit encounter with a form of faith adapted to his need would come as, to his bodily life, the reviving breath of sea or mountain air.

From such changes of atmosphere the sense-experience used in the phrase 'mental perspective' differs, perhaps most strikingly,

in its active character, as contrasted with the relative passivity of our experience of climatic change. It is upon our own often purposeful movements that change of visual perspective depends: and this fact of correspondence, and control over change of perspective, makes this an apt vehicle for the expression of those changes of intellectual outlook where also purpose and effort enter.

There is one type of sense-experience connected with effort and perspective change that has peculiar significance for our mental life: the experience that attends upward and downward movement, the climbing of stairways, ladders, trees, mountains, and the descent from these and into places below earth level.

If we accept the view of present-day psychologists who have studied and emphasized the persistent influence within adult responses of experiences of infancy, we may find it worth while to question our adult experience for memory-traces of our earliest explorations of heights and depths, even if these were accomplished within what seem to us now the narrowest limits.

R.L. Stevenson, in the verses entitled, "Foreign Lands", has reminded us how stimulating to the imagination of a child can be his first experience of tree climbing: the experience in that new perspective of familiar scenes, together with "pleasant places ... never seen before", and the thought occurring:

"If I could find a higher tree  
Farther and farther I should see,  
To where the grown up river slips

Into the sea among the ships,  
 To where the roads on either hand  
 Lead onward into fairy land ... "

But there are experiences of climbing and descent likely to occur nearer to the dawn of a child's conscious perception, influencing perhaps more profoundly the imaginative after-life. I am thinking of the experience of going up and down stairways, and of the outlooks attained at the different levels of the home where one was born, if this is a house of several storeys.

Marcel Proust - though he has not written of any vivid association of differing outlooks with the staircase he knew in childhood - has told how among the few memories of Cambray that did present "the past itself" was that of "the hall through which I would journey to the first step of that staircase, so hard to climb, which constituted, all by itself, the tapering 'elevation' of an irregular pyramid; and at the summit my bedroom ...". I myself remember - with that deep remembering that helps to build, in sleep, the recurring scenery of dream action - the uncarpeted staircase that led from the nursery level to the floor above - gated off while any of us were babies, to guard against unauthorized climbing and tumbles - while perhaps still more vividly I recall adventurous descents to the underground cellars of that Victorian house: cellars wholly or semi-dark, damp and chill, like nothing else in one's experience.

These memories of going upward and down, with the consequent visual changes - the blindness of the cellars below, the far distances, as they then seemed, that opened to view from the upper windows - and the stairways that provided means for these

adventurings, were the material from which in childhood I made my image of the many chambered palaces and castles, with their towers and dungeons, inhabited by fairy-tale princesses. In particular, George MacDonald's story, "The Princess and the Goblins", offered an image of a mansion that was more than a dwelling place: an image of haunted caverns underground, of unending corridors and stairways above, with a thread, a clue, running through them, leading to vision and safety: an image that lured childish thought beyond itself toward something not yet conceived.

Beside our control through movement over changes in perspective vision, there is another character of visual sense-experience that appears in our descriptions of things seen, and that fits visual perception to be the vehicle of expression for spiritual experience. We endow the things we see with our own experience of posture and movement. We enter imaginatively not only the actual movements performed before us, but project ourselves into the form of things inanimate, speaking of the tower or mountain as rising into the air, or of the land as falling toward a lower level.

A notable instance of such imaginative speech, fully realized, occurs in Proust's record of his early experience. He writes of the love of his grandmother for the sight of the church steeple of Saint Helaire: "when she gazed on it, when her eyes followed the gentle tension, the fervent inclination of its strong slopes which drew together as they rose, like hands joined in prayer, she would absorb herself so utterly in the outpouring of the spire that her gaze seemed to leap upwards with it." He tells also of "the feeling

which makes us not merely regard a thing as a spectacle, but believe in it as in a creature without parallel", and of how the apse of this loved church, "drawn muscularly together and heightened in perspective, seemed to spring upwards with the effort which the steeple made to hurl its spire-point into the heart of heaven".

Those of us who have had no parallel experience in regard to a church or other building may have known something like this in our youthful experience among mountains. The sight of snow-covered mountain heights may not only excite a longing to climb them - as though they offered some heavenly experience that, alas! no actual climb may ever realize - but the mountain itself seems, as Proust says, no mere spectacle, a creature rather, with some character of divinity. Words that seem adequate for the shock of such wonder at some mountain height were found by Hilaire Belloc when he wrote of how, before such "a dominant and towering presence", ....

"all our grasp of the wide view breaks down. We change. It is as though humanity were permitted to break through the vulgar illusion of daily sense and to learn in a physical experience .... what places are destined for the soul - those ultimate places where things common become shadows and fail, and the divine part in us which adores and desires breathes its own air and is at last alive."

(From Hills and the Sea)

It was with such memories and images in mind - memories from my own experience confirmed by those communicated through writings of others - that I came upon a discussion by Professor Mircea

Eliade of "the symbolism of the centre".\* Eliade's thesis is an outcome of his studies of the religious beliefs and institutions of different peoples in different epochs. He writes of the centre of that "sacred space" in which men in the earliest historic times felt themselves to be living; the known and inhabited region beyond which was a waste and evil land, peopled by enemies against whom defences - at first magical defences - must be erected. The Centre is a sacred place pre-eminently, since there only is the possibility of a break through into other regions. Especially in the ancient civilizations of the East appears the "archetypal image" of the "three cosmic regions linked by an axis running through the 'Centre'". Those cities, temples or palaces that in the ancient East were thought of, and often named, as standing at the centre of the world, a "link between heaven and earth", and built upon a rock that reached down into the waters under the earth, "the waters of Chaos": all these, Eliade asserts, "are so many replicas of one primitive image", taking the different forms, 'World Mountain', 'World Tree', 'the Central Pillar which holds up the three zones of the cosmos'.

Within this archetypal image, the world tree, mountain or pillar, may be replaced by a ladder or stairway. In each form the essential element is the possibility, through ascent and descent, of communication: gods may descend, human beings climb upward. Various instances are given of the climbing of a mountain, ladder or stairway in funeral and in initiatory rites and myths, while the

\* In Selection Two, A Year Book of Contemporary Thought.  
 Edited C. Hastings and D. Nicholl (Sheed & Ward, 1954.)



fact of the appearing also in recorded present-day dreams and phantasies of climbing and step symbolism is held by Eliade to indicate "that we have here a primitive characteristic of the human psyche".

Yet this climbing and step symbolism appears to be only one form of a meaning that may find yet other expression. A rite of penetration upon a single plane - perhaps through a labyrinthine structure - to a sacred centre, may take the place of the ascent through several planes; and other instances are referred to by Eliade where the penetration is by an act of concentrated thought with no external aid.

What are we to think of these daring generalisations based on interpretation of such widely differing religious phenomena? Certainly they imply a very different attitude and method of study from that of the scientific anthropologist. Professor Eliade knows that, from the scientific standpoint, he will be challenged to show how these "general religious notions", of the Centre, rites of penetration, the axis linking cosmic regions, can be validated in the detailed study of particular cultures. As a critic has written, in regard to another work by Professor Eliade:

" It is almost a dogma in contemporary anthropology that no feature of social behaviour or thought can be understood apart from its context in the particular society in which it occurs. As human societies are almost infinitely variable, it therefore becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, to make valid generalizations about primitive thought or human thought in general. Since the death of Frazer, in the English-speaking world at least, serious

students of society have left such speculations to psychoanalysts, poets and popular philosophers."

(Times, Lit.Suppl. Aug. 26, 1955.)

Yet in answer to this implied criticism we may ask: is it not possible that these poets, and others pursuing enquiries in the wide sense philosophic, have some contribution to make to our understanding of human life in its entirety? Professor Eliade's answer to the scientist is that he who studies religion must be able to "understand the thing itself", share in some degree the religious or spiritual experience and outlook. The religious fact, though conditioned, "stamped like a coin with the marks of the historical moment" is not exhaustively known as the sum total of its historical conditioning; its nature transcends its historic limitations.

Whether or not we accept such a rejoinder as worth considering depends, I think, upon a kind of ultimate decision, mediated by our whole experience, that each of us is bound to make. Do we believe - even with a tentative and difficult faith - that in the universe beyond us, the self encounters some reality akin and responsive to that which in the self is most profound, most real? Also that such encounter between the human and divine has been possible through different forms, within all regions of the world and epochs since human beings appeared upon this planet? If this is our belief we shall be more ready to recognize common meaning in religious phenomena that differ widely, and may sometimes dare to use our own spiritual experience to interpret the more opaque symbolism of other peoples. Though it is with more confidence that we enter imaginatively the communicated experience of men of our own epoch and region: that exaltation, for instance, felt by Belloc before the

mountain's towering presence, or by Proust before the aspiring lines of the church at Cambray: we can also follow with something of a like sympathy the thought of men who, gazing from lowly dwellings on the surrounding plain at the lofty temple and Ziggurra, conceive it as the centre of their world and their approach to Heaven.

In an earlier part of this article I attempted to indicate some of the sensory experience that for us at the present time makes ascent and descent, and that by which we climb, mountain, tower, stairway, apt symbols for spiritual endeavour or achievement - even for a breaking through into another dimension of being. But Eliade has insisted that such a break through by means of an ascended stairway is deemed possible only because the stairway, "is felt as something that stands at the Centre", and he has traced a succession of religious phenomena within which a material central stairway gives place to an act of inward concentration which may or may not make use of a mandala, a complex figure of squares and circles about a centre.

To attempt any full discussion of the symbolism of the centre and its foundation in sense-experience is beyond the scope of this article, but a few suggestions can be offered.

Within our adult perceptual experience we are aware of a visual field extended around us, our bodily station its centre; while from a height, isolated hilltop or tower, it is possible to turn about and actually see the horizon line as a circle bounding our extended field of vision. Is there not relevance here to the conception of the central cosmic stairway, since it is as I stand, actually or

through imaginative faith, upon the hilltop or the temple tower that hill or tower becomes the centre of my world, my visible inhabited space.

Yet as I stand and look around me, it is upon the far ranging perspectives that attention fastens; the centre from which all these radiating lines of vision spring is at the moment ignored by me. It is by a contrary movement of attention that I explore that self where bodily station is the moving centre of my changing visual field. It is of this centralising movement of attention that we may find a spatial symbol in the temple constructed with outer courts and inner sanctuary, a place so holy that only with certain precautions can it be entered. Eliade has noted how, as such spatial forms, temple buildings and rituals of approach, lose their symbolic efficacy, need may be felt for a more individual and spiritual quest of the centre - a centre within the personality that can become a meeting place with the divine.

Of such a quest a significant expression in our own time appears in the researches into human psychology carried on by C. G. Jung and others. Through the procedure known as "deep analysis" Jung has arrived at conclusions concerning what he terms, "the centralising process, or the production of a new centre of the personality".<sup>1</sup> When an examination is undertaken of a series of the dreams and phantasies of an individual seeking a redirection of his life, it appears that images are produced that illumine the conflicting trends that have tormented the ego, and help the individual to

1. The Integration of the Personality. Trans. S.Dell. (Kegan Paul) 1940.

arrive at a new centre of personality where these trends can become reconciled and a wider, less distorted vision of the world become possible.

It is noticeable that in one of the latest expositions<sup>2</sup> of this 'analytic' process, the writer suggests an identity between the new 'deep centre' and that 'germinal higher part', akin to a responsive 'higher Power' in the Universe, of which William James wrote in Varieties of Religious Experience. Again one recognizes the symbolism of height and depth in this account of a distinctive spiritual experience.

The heights and depths moreover stand in a dynamic relation. In the metaphorical language so inevitable in communicating such experience, the ascent to new life and wider vision is preceded by descent, often with acute distress and bewilderment, into the hitherto unconscious depths of the personality. The experienced pattern is that of a rebirth; and again, a wealth of experience in the world of sense has helped to form the pattern in its spiritual application.

The sinking of the sun and its rising again, interpreted as the night journey under the earth, the dying down of life into the earth in winter and its upward springing in new growth; all this cosmic rebirth, emotionally shared, enters the imaginative experience at our command when we symbolize spiritual transitions as descent to the depths followed by a climbing or lifting toward new heights.

Amongst older expressions of this pattern, I choose an instance

2. An Experiment in Depth, by P. W. Martin. (Routledge and Kegan Paul.) pg. 95.

from the Psalms, since these have so long served religious feeling. In the 18th psalm the singer tells how, when compassed about by the sorrows of Hell, he cried unto the Lord, and the Divine power, laying bare the foundations of the world, "drew me out of many waters ... He brought me forth also into a large place... He maketh my feet like hinds' feet and setteth me upon my high places..." The psalmist mingles his story with a gloating triumph over his enemies, hardly compatible with later religious feeling; yet the cosmic scale of the deliverance, the manner in which the anguish of the depths, intensifying the cry to God, becomes precursor of the new power to live actively upon the heights, seems to indicate presence in the imagery of that Rebirth archetype that, drawing from so great a range of human experience, can unify the religious expression of generations of men.

Into the symbolism of the central cosmic stairway other elements enter. I have said nothing of manifestations from the sky of power readily conceived as numinous: sun-warmth and rain, destructive hail and thunderstorms. All these, suggesting the beneficence or the anger of God, must help to determine an attitude of awe in the approach to heights conceived as within the God's domain. Nor have I spoken of that sexual symbolism Freud has taught us to recognise in the image of the tower and the climbing of stairs.

"In the psychic life of man", Dr. E.B. Strauss has observed, "there is no truly water-tight compartment". Since the different elements we distinguish and name permeate one another within the flow of mental life, the thinker's choice to trace the presence and



influence of a particular element is, in a manner, arbitrary, though legitimate and perhaps illumining. Certainly individuals must differ in regard to the relative importance of the various elements of imagery influencing their use of spatial metaphor. To me, though probably not to everyone, recall of the sense-experiences I have noted does seem to illumine such terms as 'spiritual perspective', 'height', 'depth', in their present use - their latent power over feeling, even now when heights above the sky and depths below the earth are no longer conceived as seats of deity kindly or malignant.

One other instance I would refer to here, of the use of the perspective metaphor. A recent reviewer of the work of Arnold Toynbee<sup>1</sup> praises his courage in daring to ask from history large questions which are meaningful for all men, but raises the objection: how is it possible for an observer living within and sharing the perspectives of one civilisation to do justice to the values of another? Toynbee has confessed himself troubled by the same question. In attempting, "to see human affairs through God's eyes", to see them as though escaping from one's own position in the historic flux, the historian must be aware of falling "infinitely short of success". Yet the attempt must be made, required, Toynbee believes, as part of the historian's duty to his fellows. Nor should we, I think, regard as impossible partial achievement of the aspiration.

Our concept of the divine vision, infinitely penetrating, infinitely comprehensive, having the use of all our perspectives -

1 Hans J. Morgenthau in Encounter, March, 1955.

has been attained by help of reflection on experiences of extending our own limited vision. So far as we succeed in entering imaginatively the different standpoints and outlooks of those with whom we are in communication, we find we can look back, as through their eyes, upon our world as we had before seen it. It is as though we ascended a tower or mountain where we could look down upon our own domain and that of our neighbour spread before us in one landscape with new perspectives and a further horizon. In such terms, amongst his acknowledgements, Toynbee tells of his reading of Charles Eliot's Hinduism and Buddhism: "my geographical horizon, historical vista, and gamut of spiritual experience had all been doubled before I had finished reading this great book". Or we may think of that memorable image that attended the communication to Keats of Homer's vision of an ancient civilisation, the image of the adventurer who with eagle eyes stared at the Pacific, "silent, upon a peak in Darien".

In the strength of an individual perspective thus enlarged through many varied communications, a thinker may dare to resist the influence of what Toynbee terms, "an adverse Western mental environment". In view of the distinction suggested above between mental climate and perspective, we might think of ourselves as determined, at least in part, by the social climate of thought, as we interact upon the plane of everyday intercourse, while we may - though never completely, yet in significant degree - escape this influence as, by individual effort, we attain in contemplation perspectives more extended.

In communication with those who have descended to the depths and climbed to heights within the total range of personality, we may realise in our own experience the image of the central cosmic stairway with its break through to the new perspectives of a vision that may seem indeed a new dimension of being.

To the Editor of Philosophy.  
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Dear Sir,

It has been remarked (by Dr. John Baillie in Our Knowledge of God, 1939, p.201) that there "is no more hopeful element in the philosophy of our time than the reopening of the question of the nature of our knowledge of one another." It is because I agree with this statement that it seems to me important, in relation to the article by Professor Aaron on this subject in your April issue, to reaffirm the element stressed in these "reopening" discussions, which Professor Aaron's article seems to disregard. This element is mutuality. What is direct or unique in our knowledge of one another is that by each of us others are known as, in Dr. Webb's phrase, "partners in social intercourse." Every other person is to me potentially a Thou to whom I in turn am Thou. That element of self revelation which Professor Aaron admits as a unique feature of personal knowledge presupposes this mutuality; but when mutuality is to be traced to its earliest appearance, before self revelation in speech has become jumble, we must analyse what Aaron terms "a rudimentary communication", when child - or half-grown animal - experiences response of another being to its needs or learns to evoke such response.

In attempting analysis of the development of a child at the present time, it seems necessary to keep in mind those innate dispositions, "cognitive only as potentialities" (loc.cit.p.67) which we refer to ancestral experience. When the child's face smiles or puckers in response to the mother's smile or frown, it seems not rash to assume that the consciousness accompanying this inherited bodily reaction is tinged with something we might almost term an inherited reminiscence of mutuality. During the ages when the human organism was acquiring capacity to smile and frown, and otherwise react responsively to expressed feelings and purposes of others, it was acquiring also capacity to recognise itself and others as interacting persons. It is within this inherited capacity of interaction that we trace, as individual experience is clarified, both the growing awareness of self and others as persons continually co-operating or thwarting one another in action, and consciousness also of persons as distinct from things whose aiding or obstructing of action involves no such mutuality.

We cannot, Professor Aaron argues, explain our explicit assertion of another's existence in terms of "a vague potentiality with which we are innately endowed." Our knowledge of others, he asserts, "begins with the certain and indubitable perception of objects." What recent reflection upon the I - Thou relation would suggest, qualifying or in criticism of that assertion, may be put thus: our indubitable perception of objects is only achieved as we come gradually to distinguish within our innately determined social

experience interacting subjects - self and others - and the objects known and used in common by these subjects in their interaction.

Yours faithfully,

Maud Bodkin (signed)



Dear Sir,

Your Editorial, in the Winter issue of The Wind and The Rain, together with the article by D. S. Savage, has roused in me renewed questionings on a theme which has been often in my thoughts: that of the relation between ultimate and social perspectives.

'Almost all people descend to meet' is a saying of Emerson which, encountered in my youthful reading of his Essays, later experience has fully endorsed. 'We are armed all over with subtle antagonisms, which, as soon as we meet, begin to play, and translate all poetry into stale prose . . . . all association must be a compromise.' (Essay on Friendship) It is meeting and association in this sense - conflicting individualities groping, amid attractions and repulsions rather physical than spiritual, for safe, profitable conventions of speech and behaviour - that seems to be in mind when social perspectives are opposed to those ultimate ones that open to the individual in solitude.

On the other hand, since Martin Buber gave to the world his deeply pondered essay, I and Thou,<sup>1</sup> the idea that 'all true life is meeting',<sup>2</sup> - 'it is in the encounter of the I and Thou that spirit is born' - has become for many a starting point of constructive thinking. What is the nature of the meeting intended by these sayings?

1. Translated by R. G. Smith. 1937

2. See the collected papers with this title. (Christian News-Letter Books. No. 14. 1942.)

When we turn in weariness from the superficialities of conventional intercourse to solitary realisation of ultimate things, whence come, we may ask, those thoughts of life and death and their significance by which, as it seems, we make that contact with reality which in society eluded us? In my own experience such meanings have come to me through the writings of St. Paul and the authors of the Gospels, of Plato and Aeschylus, Shakespeare and Milton, and others, a 'cloud of witnesses', innumerable. Meeting these voices, something in me quickened and answered, so that I believed to encounter the Divine. Without such contacts should I have been, except potentially, a living spirit at all, or not rather, like an animal, have nourished only 'a blind life within the brain'?

This for me is the meaning primarily of Buber's thesis, yet the thesis has other applications. Even for me there has been at times, in purpose shared with living persons, a joy and fulfilment not attained in communion with voices from the past. If, as Buber's thesis maintains, it is God, the Eternal Thou, we encounter through true human relationship, and God is still working in the world, we cannot be content to hear immortal voices from the past, but must find comrades with whom to co-operate in present service. All those misunderstandings and antagonisms that through mortal frailty beset our day-to-day contacts grow insignificant when a common purpose relates us to the Divine. Those who find such relationship within a Christian Church may suffer in contact with members who seem to them bigoted or merely conventional adherents. Those who find fellowship of service within a political association have similarly to meet forms of insincerity and fanaticism. In his

book Forward from Liberalism (Gollanz 1937) Stephen Spender, speaking of the fear lest communism destroy values prized alike by liberals and by himself as a communist, answers the fear by the faith that one can criticize from within a movement that pursues 'a cause of justice in which one believes' - can by giving one's life to such a movement, modify it with one's own being.

We who are not communists find perhaps in Spender's communist hope only an 'optimistic social messianism' which can be 'negatived by the trend of events'. In a discussion elsewhere (The Adelphi, Jan - March 1945) D. S. Savage has affirmed the necessity of distinguishing between 'the inward experience of truth (springing from faith) and the detached outward formulation of that experience.' I take it that this inward reality of faith distinct from an outward acceptance of doctrine, which can 'guarantee nothing', corresponds to that encounter with the Divine to which Buber refers, and which he asserts no doctrinal formulation can adequately express. I myself, having once joined a socialist society as one might join a church, seeking the fellowship of common purpose in what I believed to be God's service, can believe of the sincere communist that he through the fellowship of his movement may encounter the Divine<sup>1</sup>. If his faith is of this nature, then though his hope for a reign of justice and brotherhood on earth may be a

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<sup>1</sup> I would refer here to the statement by the Catholic writer J. Maritain in his book The True Humanism (trans. M. Adamson 1938). He states his belief that to every soul Grace offers in some form the Divine Reality, and the soul may really choose God even when it conceptualizes its faith under forms that deny Him. I would refer also to the assertion of the same belief by John Baillie, Our Knowledge of God (Oxford Press, 1939).

myth, it is such a myth as was the early Christians' faith in a Kingdom of God that should in their lifetime break in on this world. No trend of events, however it may negative the prediction, the mythical expression, can annihilate the inward faith which the myth imperfectly embodies.

'Christianity is no myth but a reality' your Editorial affirms. But may it not be both - a reality of encounter with the Divine, an expression mythical in the sense with which Reinhold Niebuhr has familiarized us: mythical as speaking in symbols of ultimate things that cannot be conveyed in the language of science and history?

I do not know whether the belief of which I have been speaking, that the Divine may be encountered within human relationships, will fall under your condemnation as 'a vague sort of Humanitarianism'. I recognise that from the dogmatic standpoint it is vague, since the attempt is abandoned to state, and teach as universal truth, the nature of the Divine. From the point of view of the individual believer, the faith need not be vague, since it may find clearest expression not verbally but through action and suffering of the whole personality.

If one is hurt by the accusation of vagueness directed against one's faith--hurt through the misgiving that the accusation may be true--it is not vagueness in dogmatic expression that one fears, but lest one's faith be indeed vague in the sense of uncertainly held, unequal to the test of great hardship or bitter disappointment. Yet whether or not one's individual faith could endure such testing, there are some who have endured it. The writings of

Arthur Koestler are in my mind as illustrating a humanist faith vague as to verbal definition but defined through hard decisions and the test of suffering.

In his novel, Arrival and Departure, Koestler describes the discovery, by a man who has endured torture, of his own childish motivation, made apparent through psychological analysis. Yet when this man could escape to safety from his life of identification with the oppressed, he finds that from some central core of his being beyond the reach of disillusioning analysis proceeds the decision still to struggle for what he conceives as justice. In Koestler's story of his own experience, told in Scum of the Earth, one seems to recognise, both in Koestler himself and in some of his comrades, similar decisions, witnessing to a faith little articulate but springing from a central core of personality, held there with a certainty indestructible by cruelest pain and disappointment.

In such faith is present, it seems to me, both influence of social perspectives and the individual outlook on ultimate things. At its 'core of being' the human spirit encounters the Divine and all ultimate issues of its mortal station, while the social perspectives and their compromises enter into the loyalties which the spirit's supreme decisions maintain.

Yours sincerely

Maud Bodkin (signed)

## Textual Commentary

Bodkin's journal is written on one hundred and one leaves of water-marked paper in a bound volume approximately 5 1/4 by 8 1/2 inches. A leaf is torn out between pages numbered 69 and 70 by Bodkin (71.24 in this edition). It is probable that another leaf is torn out at the front of the volume because Bodkin's first entry refers to a previous entry.

Bodkin's first complete entry and all subsequent ones except those at 1.10-2.15 begin with the date. Therefore the dates of these entries, written after the entries, have also been put first. The symbol //...// indicates the presence of an illegible word. Square brackets [ ] indicate Bodkin's omission of an ellipsis or of a necessary word. Bodkin put page titles on forty-four of the journal's pages; these appear here at the end of "Manuscript Details."

Three words necessarily hyphenated at the end of lines in this edition appear in the manuscript as follows:

56.21-22	postscript
93.6-7	fellowmen
95.27-28	break-through

Places where the use of a different ink color or of a pencil indicates that Bodkin has altered her original manuscript are noted in "Manuscript Details"; places where she used a different ink color because she was making an entry at a later time are not noted. Lines of poetry have been written out with the customary virgules. Where Bodkin has square brackets instead of the usual parentheses, parentheses have been used and all such occasions



have been noted in "Emendations." All editorial changes made in the manuscript are noted in "Emendations" except for one instance: because Bodkin used the symbol & for and in every instance, each symbol has been written out silently. Because of the small size of her manuscript page, Bodkin's paragraphing has not been observed.

Where Bodkin quotes material but omits quotation marks, quotation marks have been supplied (and all such occasions noted in "Emendations") where the reference indicates that they are necessary. Where Bodkin has inconsistent quotation marks and the reference has not been found, her inconsistent marks have been retained. These occasions occur at

13.25-26	'the powerful institution of the 'Christian community' or church
19.19	polite exclamation' (there is a cancelled quotation mark before <u>polite</u> )
37.1	'fevered
46.25	'deep
56.10	'utmost
68.8	'ruling
70.3	order'
85.9	'irrational
91.27	imperative'

Where Bodkin has inserted words but left the words they obviously were meant to replace uncanceled, the insertions have been accepted as her final intention. These occasions occur at

34.5	<u>unto</u> inserted; <u>to</u> uncanceled; <u>the twelve</u> inserted; <u>his</u> uncanceled
40.6-7	<u>incompatibility</u> inserted; <u>conflict</u> uncanceled
46.14	<u>like</u> (Celia) inserted; <u>with</u> uncanceled
57.3	<u>the gates</u> inserted; <u>that house</u> uncanceled
57.9	<u>the</u> inserted; <u>that</u> uncanceled

At 36.26, though Bodkin is probably quoting poetry, no virgule has been used because the citation could not be found.

Bodkin's unpublished articles and letters here reproduced in the appendix are presented exactly as they appear in typescript.

## Textual Notes

The following list records those occasions where factual errors occur in the manuscript. These occasions are also noted in "Emendations." The correct word, used in this edition, appears to the left of the bracket.

- |       |   |
|-------|---|
| 13.23 | opposing ] resistant  |
| 20.15 | lodgement ] lodgment  |
| 21. 9 | Sarah's ] Susan's   |
| 26.1  | Bultmann ] Here and at 26.2 --Bultman                         |
| 27.11 | Lawrence ] Laurence   |
| 32.2  | perceived ] percieved   |
| 34.9  | Bennett ] Bennet  |
| 35.23 | Davison ] Davidson  |
| 35.27 | natural ] disastrous  |
| 37.7  | will ] must   |
| 38.10 | Bournemouth ] Bourmouth                                       |
| 43.6  | villains ] vilains  |
| 52.5  | Seven-Storey Mountain ] Elected Silence                       |
| 58.7  | man ] men   |
| 63.14 | extension ] extention   |
| 66.10 | Fraser ] Here and at 66.11, 66.16, 66.18, 66.21, 67.5--Frazer |
| 71.18 | Hallett ] Hallet  |

74.17 Jericho ] Jerricho  
89.25 Twelve ] Ten  
90.3 Trollope ] Trollop  
91.25 relationship ] relationships

## Emendations

This list records all substantive and accidental changes introduced into the transcription of the journal. The reading of the present text appears to the left of the bracket. Within an entry, the curved dash (∼) represents the same word that appears before the bracket and is used to record punctuation variants. The inferior caret (^) indicates the absence of punctuation at a given point. An asterisk (\*) indicates that the variant is also noted in "Textual Notes." The words of the manuscript are presented as they appear and the editor's words are italicized.

- 3.1        This abbreviation is used here and at 7.2, 14.16, 25.21, 29.11, 30.20, 73.1, 73.7, 84.19, 84.20, 92.4, 14.16, and 98.2
- 1.10       The Perennial Scope of Philosophy ] 'The Perennial Scope of Philosophy'. This title and all others except those listed below, enclosed in single quotation marks in Bodkin's manuscript, are italicized in this edition. The titles already underlined in the manuscript occur at 1.17, 1.24, 1.25, 3.4, 3.16, 7.6, 12.23, 29.7, 29.19, 34.10, 34.11, 35.6, 35.10, 52.5, 57.27, 58.2, 58.16-17, 67.14, 80.19-20, 80.20, 84.10, 89.25, 90.25, 91.22, 93.13, 94.2, and 96.5
- 1.14       (From ] ^∼
- 1.15       1950). ] 1950^.
- 1.25       (pp. 15-16). ] ^pp^15, 16^.
- 1.25       (The ] ^∼
- 1.26       Spottiswoode). ] ^∼.
- 2.1       'In ] ^∼
- 2.1       twilights / ] ^∼

- 2.1 shaped, / ] ~ ,<sub>A</sub>
- 2.2 born / ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 2.2 made, / ] ~ ,<sub>A</sub>
- 2.3 Judas / ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 2.3 betrayed'. ] ~<sub>A</sub>.
- 2.3 'She ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 2.6 again . . . ' . ] ~ . . .<sub>A A</sub>
- 2.7 'The ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 2.7 Way' ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 2.7 'Friend ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 2.9 track. ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 2.10 on). ] ~ )<sub>A</sub>
- 2.13 done. ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 2.18 'O ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 2.18 this / ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 2.19 Father, / ] ~ ,<sub>A</sub>
- 2.20 think / ~<sub>A</sub>
- 2.20 matters / ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 2.21 not? / ] ~ ?<sub>A</sub>
- 2.22 stood / ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 2.22 of / ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 2.23 (From ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 2.24 Rossetti). ] ~<sub>A A</sub>
- 2.26 leave / ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 2.27 want / ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 3.4 N, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 3.7 is, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 3.8 mind?" ] ~ ?"<sub>A</sub>

- 3.19 (I ] [~
- 3.20 destroyed) ] ~]
- 3.22 Augustine: ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 4.2 Thomson: ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 4.3 is, / ] ~<sub>A</sub> ^
- 4.3 all: ] ~.
- 4.3 fair'? ] ~<sub>A</sub>?
- 4.7 confinement'. ] ~<sub>A</sub>.
- 4.11 labours', ] ~' ^
- 5.10 1 Cor. x. 31). ] 1 Cor. X, 31) Bodkin's capital Roman numeral is written in lower case here and at 5.23
- 5.11 who ] w This abbreviation is used here and at 7.11, 7.14, 77.3, 77.4, 77.6, 85.1, 85.10, and 92.21
- 5.17 though ] tho This abbreviation is used here and at 20.4, 21.2, 38.20, 41.15, 46.5, 48.21, 50.7, 56.7, 61.11, 65.4, 65.21, 69.24, 78.16, 82.21, 82.23, 83.16, 98.21, 99.11, and 100.12
- 5.22 living). ] ~<sub>A</sub>.
- 6.11 Although ] Altho
- 6.12 individual ] indl This abbreviation is used here and at 8.14, 8.18, 11.17, 16.22, 17.17, 19.10, 19.12, 20.26, 22.2, 23.2, 23.27, 24.1, 24.16, 24.26, 25.5, 29.15 (-s), 38.16, 40.5, 49.23 (-s), 54.5, 54.15, 54.18, 54.19, 55.11, 56.9, 57.19, 57.22, 58.6 (-s), 58.21, 61.19, 62.10, 63.20, 65.2, 65.5, 65.18, 65.19, 66.21, 66.22, 66.27, 68.18 (-s), 69.5, 69.23, 69.24, 71.13, 71.16, 71.25, 72.15, 72.19, 73.4, 73.5, 76.2, 76.19 (-s), 76.21 (-s), 78.14-15, 79.5, 79.7, 79.17, 81.5-6, 81.11, 84.5 (-s), 85.3, 90.14, 92.5, 92.6-7, 92.19 (-s), and 98.25
- 7.6 which ] wh This abbreviation is used here and at 7.20, 8.15, 8.21, 10.9, 10.11, 12.15, 12.22, 13.21, 14.18, 15.7, 15.15, 16.7, 16.14, 17.14, 17.19, 18.10, 19.12, 19.14, 21.5, 22.5, 23.26, 23.27, 25.3, 25.25, 27.8, 29.6, 29.15, 30.8, 31.11, 33.3, 35.25, 36.20, 39.10, 39.23, 39.24, 40.15, 45.27, 46.1, 50.12, 50.17, 50.24, 54.10, 54.16, 57.4, 58.1, 58.19, 58.22, 60.8, 60.15, 61.16, 62.8, 62.14, 62.15, 62.19, 62.21, 63.4, 63.12, 63.17, 63.19, 63.24, 63.25 (2), 63.28, 64.1, 64.3, 64.4, 64.6, 64.17, 64.19, 66.16, 69.11, 70.9, 71.1, 71.28, 72.3, 72.5, 72.11, 76.22, 77.1, 77.2, 77.21, 78.4, 78.23, 80.9, 80.17, 80.26, 81.13, 82.25, 83.1(2), 83.11, 83.23,



83.26, 84.5, 84.13, 84.15, 84.22, 85.9, 85.14, 85.20, 86.1, 86.7, 87.20, 88.6, 88.11, 90.17, 93.9, 93.10, 94.24, 95.17, 19.28, 96.15, 97.12, 97.15, 97.17, 97.18 (2), 98.14, and 100.4

7.11 'It ] 'it

8.4 October, 1952, The Hibbert Journal ] Oct. /52 Hibbert Month, year and date are written out here and at 10.21, 18.13, 19.27, 26.1, and 36.17

8.8 should ] shd This abbreviation is used here and at 30.4, 30.10, 30.14, 33.25, 36.6, 36.12, 40.22, 56.11, 56.22, 58.22, 59.8, 60.10, 61.5, 63.18, 73.4, 81.21, and 81.26.

8.12 partially, ] ~<sub>A</sub>

8.22 'spiritual ] ~<sub>A</sub>

8.24 through ] thro This abbreviation is used here and at 9.25, 19.11, 45.16, 54.23, 55.5, 61.21, 61.27, 63.13, 63.15, 69.11, 70.7, 74.25, 78.15, 79.20, 79.21, 83.2, 95.20, and 97.1

8.26 it; ] ~,

8.27 what ] wt This abbreviation is used here and at 9.10, 24.23, 33.23, 40.27, 59.18, 59.24, 61.28, 62.5 (2), 63.6, 72.7, 80.14, 81.4, 85.5, 92.1, and 97.26

9.4 natures, ] ~<sub>A</sub>

9.5 others, ] ~<sub>A</sub>

9.10 fashion, ] ~<sub>A</sub>

9.17 (p. 39). ] ~<sub>A</sub> p. 39 ~<sub>A</sub>

9.19 surfaces. ] ~<sub>A</sub>

9.20 (p. 42); ] ~<sub>A</sub> 42 ~<sub>A</sub>

9.25 it'. ] ~<sub>A</sub>.

10.12 nothing'. ] ~<sub>A</sub> ~<sub>A</sub>

10.14-15 compulsion . . . although ] ~' '~

10.15 grace' (p. 123). ] ~'. 123

10.18 grace' (p. 126). ] ~. 126

10.21 1951), ] ~<sub>A</sub>

- 11.4 with ] wth This abbreviation is used here and at 11.11, 19.5, 27.18, 29.13, 29.25, 33.18, 34.8, 37.2, 37.6, 40.5, 42.21, 46.13, 46.26, 47.14, 47.27, 48.1, 48.19, 53.26, 56.11, 56.23, 57.3, 57.13, 58.2, 58.10, 58.26, 59.7, 59.15, 60.3, 61.21, 62.1, 62.21, 63.16, 63.19, 70.22, 71.13, 71.26, 73.20, 73.27, 77.9, 77.10, 77.13, 77.15, 78.27, 80.9, 81.21, 82.13, 82.18, 82.27, 84.12, 85.6, 86.1, 92.21, 96.21, 97.7, 97.21, 99.1 and 99.16
- 11.19 Leigh, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 12.10 assassin; ] ~,
- 12.15 could ] cd This abbreviation is used here and at 12.16, 14.5, 20.16, 21.17, 21.19, 25.19, 29.12, 30.17, 33.27, 37.15, 40.22, 46.13, 63.9, 66.13, 84.16, 84.22, 88.6, 98.6, 98.22, 99.12, 99.15, 100.24, and 101.12
- 12.20 (or ] [ ~
- 12.21 creatures) ] ~]
- 12.25 mind: ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 13.2 Coleridge's ] C's
- 13.3 (p. 240) ] <sub>A</sub> p<sub>A</sub> 240<sub>A</sub>
- 13.5 (p. 250) ] 250
- 13.6 (p. 296). ] 296
- 13.7 (p. 299). ] 299
- 13.17 discouragement ] discourag<sup>~</sup>t
- 13.20 William ] Wm.
- 13.22 conflict: ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 13.23 opposing ] resistant\*
- 13.26 Psychology of the Unconscious, pp. 76-7 ] (P of U.) p. 76-7
- 14.3 humiliation: ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 14.5 (p. 33). ] 33
- 14.9 replies, 'What ] ~<sub>A</sub> 'what
- 14.10 (p. 61). ] 61
- 14.23 (p. 300). ] <sub>A</sub>p. 300<sub>A</sub>
- 14.25 hearer? ] ~.

- 14.21 penance: ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 14.25 hearer? ] ~.
- 15.5 birdbath, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 15.6 Mariner's ] Mariners
15. 13 'What Happened at Pentecost' ] 'What Happened at Pentecost'
- 15.15 Koinonia ] Koinonia
- 15.17 Acts ] acts
- 15.19 (p. 134). ] 134
- 15.20 Corinthians ] Corinthians
- 15.21 Christ, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 15.22-23 translated: If ] ~<sub>A</sub> if
- 15.25 (p. 139) ] 139
- 16.3 (p. 145) ] p. 145
- 16.5 comprehend ] c--prehend
- 16.8 'whole ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 16.9 (p. 147). ] 147
- 16.11 (p. 147). ] 147
- 16.12 forgiveness?' ] ~?<sub>A</sub>
- 17.4 (p. 49) ] ~<sub>A</sub>p. 49<sub>A</sub>
- 17.7 Jan. 5 ] 5 Jan.
- 17.20 words? ] ~?--
- 18.15 lives', ] ~'<sub>A</sub>
- 18.17 centre-point: / ] ~:<sub>A</sub>
- 18.17 /Not ] ~<sub>A</sub>Not
- 18.18 /But ] ~<sub>A</sub>but
- 18.27 body, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 19.4 crucially / ] ~<sub>A</sub>

- 19.20 abyss'. ] ~<sub>A</sub>.
- 20.4 three ] Three
- 20.6 death'. ] ~',<sub>A</sub>
- 20.15 lodgement ] lodgment\*
- 21.9 Sarah's ] Susan's\*
- 21.10 wonders, 'Was ] ~<sub>A</sub>'was
- 21.23 myself?' / ] ~?'<sub>A</sub>
- 21.26 Richard ] Rich.
- 22.5 history, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 22.15 men-- ] ~,--
- 23.15 self-justification ] ~<sub>A</sub> ~
- 23.25 between ] bet. This abbreviation is used here and at 30.2, 30.23, 33.7, 35.20, 39.15, 39.26, 40.7, 40.8, 66.23, 68.13, 85.12, and 92.20
- 24.3 Mitchison, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 24.3 Hour ] hour
- 24.18 Lorenz' ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 24.26 self-assurance ] ~<sub>A</sub> ~
- 26.1 Bultmann ] Bultman This word is also misspelled at 26.2
- 26.7 death? ] ~.
- 26.15 (p. 22). ] ~<sub>A</sub>p.<sub>A</sub>22<sub>A</sub>.
- 26.16 Joad's ] Joads
- 26.18 'Mind', says Joad, ] ~'<sub>A</sub> ~ ~<sub>A</sub>
- 26.19 (or ] [ ~
- 26.19 reason) ] ~]
- 26.20 (p. 203). ] ~<sub>A</sub>p. 203<sub>A</sub>
- 26.24 definiteness', ] ~<sub>A</sub>,
- 26.27 (p. 19) ] 19
- 27.2 consciousness ] ~ssness This abbreviation is used here and and at 27.12, 57.28, 60.2, 62.8, 62.25, 63.5, 63.16, 64.13, 73.4, 83.24-25, and 85.14

- 27.2 (p. 203). ] 203
- 27.7 (p. 101). ] 101
- 27.9 (p. 194). ] 194
- 27.11 Lawrence ] Laurence\*
- 27.15 (Archetypal Patterns, p. 299). ] A.P.P. 299
- 28.11 environment? ]~.
- 28.24 two-edged ]~<sub>A</sub>~
- 28.24 Weekes' ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 28.25 self-criticism ]~<sub>A</sub>~
- 28.26 Or ] or
- 29.2 unconscious? ] uncoss This abbreviation is used here and at 3
- 29.4 one's ] one
- 29.5 relationships ] relationship
- 29.7 The Midnight Diary ] 'The Midnight Diary'
- 29.10 life, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 29.19 Macbeth's ] Macbeths
- 29.21 imagination', ]~'<sub>A</sub>
- 29.21 religion' ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 29.26 obstructed, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 29.26 labourious, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 30.6 William ] Wm
- 31.1 poetry ]~<sup>x</sup>
- 31.5 mine, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 31.8 (p. 104). ] <sub>A</sub> p. 104<sub>AA</sub>
- 31.14 (p. 190) ] 190
- 31.21-22 'undertook ] <sub>A</sub> ~
- 31.22 world / ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 31.23 soul / ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 31.24 salvation?! ]~?<sub>A</sub>

- 31.26 Tragedy', ] ~',<sup>x</sup>
- 32.2 perceived ] percieved\*
- 32.4 (p. 13) ] , p<sub>A</sub>13<sub>A</sub>
- 32.5 (It ] [ ~
- 32.7 complexity) ] ~]
- 32.10 (p. 12) ] , p<sub>A</sub>12<sub>A</sub>
- 32.11 Fortune's ] Fortunes
- 32.15-16 (p. 16) ] , p<sub>A</sub>16<sub>A</sub>.
- 32.23 because ] bec This abbreviation is used here and at 40.24, 62.17 (2), 62.22, and 63.8
- 32.23 (p. 28). ] 28
- 32.27 (p. 36). ] 36
- 33.1 April ] Ap
- 33.5 'give ] , ~
- 33.6 'gentlemen ] , ~
- 33.11 beauty'. ] ~<sub>A</sub>.
- 33.13 it', ] ~',<sup>x</sup><sub>A</sub>
- 33.18 'Take ] , ~
- 33.19 (p. 33) ] , p<sub>A</sub>33<sub>A</sub>
- 33.19 it', I ] ~<sub>A</sub> ,
- 33.20 'Take ] , ~
- 33.21 knife / ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 33.22 then, / And ] ~ , , and
- 33.25 give? ] ~ .
- 33.27 you? ] ~ .
- 34.6 xviii ] 18
- 34.9 Bennett ] Bennet\*
- 34.10 (E. ] [ ~



- 34.10 phrase) ] ~ ]
- 34.11 (says ] [ ~
- 34.11 Allen) ] ~<sup>x</sup>]
- 34.12 (p. 65) ] <sub>A</sub> p<sub>A</sub> 65<sub>A</sub>
- 34.16 (p. 63) ] <sub>A</sub> p<sub>A</sub> 63<sub>A</sub>
- 34.17 age: ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 34.23 (p. 66) ] 66
- 34.24 novels, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 34.26 whom ] w.
- 34.26 (p. 40) ] 40
- 34.27 says, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 35.3 'It ] <sub>A</sub> ~
- 35.5 (p. 43) 43
- 35.10 Diction ] ~<sup>x</sup>,
- 35.10 Faber, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 35.15 (p. 28) ] <sub>A</sub> p<sub>A</sub> 28<sub>A</sub>
- 35.15 Emerson ] ~<sup>x</sup>
- 35.23 Davison ] Davidson\*
- 35.23 'I ] <sub>A</sub> ~
- 35.23 thrice / ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 35.24 name'. ] ~<sub>A</sub>.
- 35.25 , Barfield says, ] <sub>A</sub> B ~<sub>A</sub>
- 35.25 (ruin's) ] [ ~ ]
- 35.27 swift, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 35.27 natural ] disastrous\*
- 36.2 'Mine ] <sub>A</sub> ~
- 36.3 halls / ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 36.3 walls'. ] ~<sub>A</sub>.
- 36.4 'the ] <sub>A</sub> ~

- 36.5 'Hell ]<sub>Λ</sub>~
- 36.5 Heaven'. ]~<sub>Λ</sub>.
- 36.6 Barfield's ] B's
- 36.9 Maupassant ] M.
- 36.15 April ] Ap
- 36.17 Housman's ] Housmans
- 36.20 'Proud', ] '~' <sub>Λ</sub>
- 36.23 'The ]<sub>Λ</sub>~
- 36.23 Hour' ]~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 37.7 'My ] my
- 37.7 will ] must\*
- 37.8 die'. ]~<sub>Λ</sub>.
- 37.9 April ] Ap
- 37.23 April ] Ap
- 37.25 Cambridge University Press ] Camb. Univ. Press
- 38.2 (p. 241). ]<sub>Λ</sub> p. 241<sub>ΛΛ</sub>
- 38.5 good, ]~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 38.10 Bournemouth ] Bourmouth\*
- 39.1 himself; ]~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 39.1 ever', ]~'.
- 39.2 'Pull, ]~<sub>Λ</sub>'
- 39.2 up, ]~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 39.11 Unconscious ]~<sup>x</sup>
- 39.17 'The ]<sub>Λ</sub>~
- 39.17 God' ]~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 39.21 researches: ]~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 39.26 (p. 223) ] 223
- 40.2 this, ]~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 40.16 (in ] [~
- 40.16 1941) ]~]
- 40.18 Valladares ] Valadares
- 41.1 Marx: ]~<sub>Λ</sub>

- 41.5 further: ] ~ ;
- 41.13 conduct', ] ~ ' <sub>A</sub>
- 41.21 "Within ] <sub>A</sub> ~
- 41.23 back / ] ~ <sub>A</sub>
- 41.23 forces'. ] ~ <sub>A</sub>.
- 41.23 conscious ] coss This abbreviation is used here and at 84.3 and 96.12
- 41.23 feeling; ] ~ <sub>A</sub>
- 42.1 that ] {
- 42.2 so / ] ~ <sub>A</sub>
- 42.2 go, / ] ~ , <sub>A</sub>
- 42.3 whereby / ] ~ <sub>A</sub>
- 42.3 sky, / ] ~ , <sub>A</sub>
- 42.4 strands / ] ~ <sub>A</sub>
- 42.5 decay, ] ~ <sub>A</sub>
- 42.6 I, ] ~ <sub>A</sub>
- 42.7 persons, ] ~ <sub>A</sub>
- 42.12 today's ] todays
- 43.5 type: ] ~ <sub>A</sub>
- 43.6 villains ] villains\*
- 43.8 Freud, ] ~ <sub>A</sub>
- 43.12 New Statesman and Nation ] NS &N
- 44.2 (pp. 244-5) ] 244-5
- 44.16 (p. 204) ] 204
- 45.4 (p. 248) ] 248
- 45.19 (Archetypal Patterns in Poetry) ] AP in P
- 45.19 (p. 209) ] 209
- 45.21 nothing / ] ~ <sub>A</sub>
- 45.26 column' ] ~ <sub>A</sub>
- 45.27 perception, / ] ~ , <sub>A</sub>

- 46.1 experience / ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 46.6 present / ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 46.9 calculation / ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 46.10 been / ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 46.16 can't ] cant
- 46.17 can't ] cant
- 46.19 (p. 320). ] <sub>A</sub>P<sub>A</sub> 320<sub>A</sub> <sub>A</sub>
- 46.24 Emmeline's ] Emmelines
- 47.9 solitude'. ] ~<sub>A</sub>.
- 47.11 only, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 47.16 (p. 145). ] 145
- 47.17 Emmeline's ] Emmelines
- 47.20 (p. 184). ] 184
- 47.20 end: ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 47.23 way. ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 48.7 (p. 326) ]
- 48.8 William ] Wm
- 48.20 story, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 48.21 I-Thou ] I-Thou
- 48.23 music' ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 49.13 self-conscious ] ~<sub>A</sub> ~
- 49.21 perfectibility, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 49.25 beliefs, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 50.10 half-aliveness ] ~<sub>A</sub> ~
- 51.1 Christian ] Xian This abbreviation is used here and at 51.14, 52.12, 61.27, 69.10, 77.2, 80.7 (-s), 80.26, 82.1, 82.3, 82.6, and 84.2
- 51.6 good / ] ~<sub>A</sub>

- 51.8 actions / ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 51.20 (p. 100). ]<sub>A</sub> p<sub>A</sub> 100<sub>A</sub> <sub>A</sub>
- 52.5 The Seven-Storey Mountain ] Elected Silence\*
- 52.6 poems: ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 52.8 (p. 154). ] 154
- 52.10 love, ] ~.
- 52.25 prayer . . . ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 55.25 husband's ] husbands
- 56.26 Christianity ] Xianity This abbreviation is used here and  
and at 69.24, 81.13, and 83.17
- 56.26 Kingdom, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 57.1 Road ] Rd.
- 57.22 past, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 57.23 comrades? ] ~.
- 57.27 Wells's ] Wells
- 58.7 man ] men\*
- 58.13 'In ]<sub>A</sub> ~
- 58.17 Macmillan, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 58.24 quotation, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 59.1 Newman's ] Newman
- 59.3 Their ] their
- 59.5 (p. 7). ]<sub>A</sub> p<sub>A</sub> 7<sub>A</sub>.
- 59.7 It ] it
- 59.14 Eliot's ] Eliots
- 59.17 ,says, 'It ] ~<sub>A</sub> 'it
- 59.26 half-unconscious ] half-uncss
- 60.6 novels: ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 60.12 Kettle, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 60.14 nature, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 60.17 treasure'. ] ~<sub>A</sub>.

- 60.27 observer's ] observers
- 61.6 'Lift ]<sub>A</sub>~
- 61.6 your ] yr
- 61.7 Hearts' ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 62.5 thoughts, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 62.12 (p. 26). ]<sub>A</sub> p. 26<sub>A</sub>.
- 62.18 (p. 27). ]<sub>A</sub> p. 27<sub>A</sub>.
- 62.23 (As ] [ ~
- 62.23 Tyrell's ] Tyrells
- 63.6 authority, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 63.8 He ] he
- 63.13 [p. 401]). ]<sub>A</sub> p. 401<sub>A</sub>)<sub>A</sub>
- 63.14 extension ] extention\*
- 63.16 (pp. 30-1). ] 30-1
- 63.18 (Here ] [ ~
- 63.22 cynical, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 63.23 conclusions). ] ~]
- 63.26 (p. 36) ] 36
- 63.27 (p. 35). ] 35
- 63.27 (Powicke's ] [ ~
- 63.27 occasions) ] ~]
- 63.27 'If ]<sub>A</sub>~
- 64.9 (p. 39). ]<sub>A</sub> p. 39<sub>A</sub>
- 64.14 (p. 40). ] 40
- 64.18 consciously ] cons~~ously~~
- 64.20 (p. 20). ]<sub>A</sub> p. 20<sub>A</sub>
- 64.20 phenomenon" ] ~ "A
- 64.21 phenomenon" (p. 50). ] phenomenon<sub>A</sub>'<sub>A</sub> p 50<sub>A</sub>
- 64.26 (p. 51). ] 51



- 64.27 investigation', ] ~<sub>Λ</sub> Λ
- 65.6 (p. 52). ] 52
- 66.8 'What ] ~<sub>Λ</sub> ~
- 66.8 dross; / ] ~<sub>Λ</sub> Λ
- 66.9 thee; / ] ~<sub>Λ</sub> Λ
- 66.10 heritage. ] ~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 66.10 If ] if
- 66.10 (says ] [ ~
- 66.10 Fraser ] Frazer ] \*This word is also misspelled at 66.11, 66.16, 66.18, 66.21, and 67.5
- 67.10 (p. 70) ] 70
- 68.12 soul', ] ~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 68.12 wrote, ] ~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 68.14 (p. 194). ] 194
- 68.20 Smith, ] ~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 69.2 By ] by
- 69.13 God, ] ~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 69.16 'Dogma ] ~<sub>Λ</sub> ~
- 69.16 Symbol' ] ~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 69.21 (p. 258) ] 258
- 69.28 order, ] ~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 70.1 judgment: ] ~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 70.9 (p. 258). ] 258
- 70.24 1943 ] /43
- 71.1 life: ] ~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 71.3 , 1946, ] ~<sub>Λ</sub> /46 ~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 71.4 1937 ] /36
- 71.4 April 1940, ] Ap /40 ~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 71.6 (p. 174). ] ~<sub>Λ</sub> p174 ~<sub>Λ</sub> ~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 71.8 1937 ] /37

- 71.18 Hallett ] Hallett\*
- 71.23 perspective, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 71.28 p. 158 ] 158
72. 1-2 maintains, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 72.12 April ] Ap
- 72.21 April ] Ap
- 72.25 O'Brien's ] O'Briens
- 72.26 life's ] lifes
- 73.8 present, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 73.17 poetry, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 73.19 dear, / ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 73.20 year' ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 74.12 (pp. 11-12). ] <sub>A</sub> p. 11-12<sub>A</sub>.
- 74.13 saying, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 74.17 Jericho ] Jerricho\*
- 74.20 'When ]<sub>A</sub> ~
- 74.21 up': ] ~<sub>A</sub>:
- 75.6 Christmas ] Xmas
- 75.24 creation, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 76.7 communication ] ~<sub>A</sub>,
- 76.25 Head, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 77.22 wrote, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 77.23 'an ]<sub>A</sub> ~
- 77.24 life', ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 77.25 malevolent ] ~<sup>x</sup>
- 77.25 (pp. 87-8, p. 23) ] <sub>A</sub> pp. 87-8<sub>A</sub> p. 23<sub>A</sub>
- 78.3 wrote, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 78.5 (p. 26) ] <sub>A</sub> p. 26<sub>A</sub>
- 78.7 said, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 78.12 (p. 28) ] <sub>A</sub> p. 28<sub>A</sub>
- 78.12 (p. 29) ] 29

- 78.20 1951 ] /51
- 78.26 (pp. 515-17) ] 515-7
- 80.15 'The ]<sub>A</sub> ~
- 80.19 them'. ] ~<sub>A</sub>.
- 80.19 Wilamowitz, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 80.20 p. 26 ] 26
- 80.21 Oxford, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 80.25 Oldham's ] Oldhams
- 80.26 1954 ] /54
- 81.6 mind, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 82.6 Nov., 1950, p. 432 ] Nov. <sub>A</sub> 1950 <sub>A</sub> p. 432
- 82.11 ,pp. 194-5 ] <sub>A</sub> 194-5
- 82.18 God, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 82.26 (pp. 9-10) ] 9-10
- 83.3 (p. 12) ] <sub>A</sub> p <sub>A</sub> 12<sub>A</sub>
- 83.7 nature, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 83.7 (p. 35) ] <sub>A</sub> p <sub>A</sub> 35<sub>A</sub>
- 83.10 (p. 54). ] 54
- 83.16 significance, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 83.16 (p. 55). ] 55
- 83.18 (p. 53). ] 53
- 83.21 (p. 56) ] 56
- 84.1 (p. 56) ] 56
- 84.8 (p. 58) ] 58
- 84.14 (p. 71). ] 71
- 84.17 (p. 76). ] 76
- 84.18 ; (p. 77). ] 77
- 84.20 experience'; ] ~<sub>A</sub>;
- 84.21 view' (p. 78). ] ~<sub>A</sub> 78

- 85.7 (p. 92) ] 92
- 85.16 (p. 104) ] 104
- 86.3 faith's ] faiths
- 86.13 'Alas ]<sub>A</sub> ~
- 86.13 time; / ] ~<sub>i</sub><sub>A</sub>
- 86.14 distress; / ] ~<sub>i</sub><sub>A</sub>
- 86.14 thought / ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 86.15 less'. ] ~<sub>A</sub> .
- 86.28 'Purpose ]<sub>A</sub> ~
- 87.1 Universities' ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 87.28 trial: ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 88.2 Wulfstan's ] Wulfstans
- 88.6 (p. 145) ]<sub>A</sub> p. 145<sub>A</sub>
- 88.10 (p. 234) ] 234
- 88.12 (p. 326) ] 326
- 88.14 (p. 329) ] 329
- 88.18 answered, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 88.21 'Can ]<sub>A</sub> ~
- 88.22 (p. 355) ] 355
- 89.17 one's ] ones
- 89.20 excitable, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 89.23 him. ] ~ :
- 89.23 'O ]<sub>A</sub> ~
- 89.24 sleep, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 89.25 Twelve- ] Ten \*
- 90.3 Trollope ] Trollop\*
- 90.7 Jan. 1952 ] Jan. /52
- 90.10 self, ] ~<sub>A</sub> .

- 90.10 I, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 90.20 calamity, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 91.2 Mme. ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 91.3 story, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 91.6 slaughtered, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 91.20 (p. 525) ] <sub>A</sub>p<sub>A</sub>525<sub>A</sub> ~
- 91.22 , 1955 ] /55
- 91.23 1954 ] 54
- 91.25 relationship ] relationships\*
- 91.27 (p. 7) ] 7
- 92.4 (p. 154) ] 154
- 92.8 (pp. 164-5) ] 164-5
- 92.9 in ] '~
- 92.10 (p. 164) ] 164
- 92.18 (pp. 171-2) ] 171-2
- 92.22 (p. 117) ] 117
- 92.23 (p. 177) ] 177
- 93.3 according ] acc This abbreviation is used here and at 97.18
- 93.4 incredulous; ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 93.12 1955, ] /55<sub>A</sub>
- 93.29 Quinton's ] Quintons
- 94.2 1955 ] /55
- 94.10 poverty, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 94.10 celibacy, ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 94.12 worry; ] ~<sub>A</sub>
- 95.8 (p. 24) ] <sub>A</sub>p. 24<sub>A</sub>
- 95.13 (p. 25) ] 25

- 95.19 (p. 29) ] 29
- 95.23 (p. 30) ] 30
- 96.4 (p. 38) ] 38
- 96.6 April, ] ~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 96.9 (p. 39) ] 39
- 96.11 reality; ] ~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 96.16 (p. 39) ] 39
- 96.21 yesterday's ] yesterdays
- 96.23 Eliade's ] Eliades
- 97.11 His ] his
- 97.11 'sped ] ~<sub>Λ</sub> ~
- 97.12 self-conceit ] ~<sub>Λ</sub> ~
- 98.8 Shakespeare's ] Shakespeares
- 98.8 one's ] ones
- 98.15 said, ] ~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 99.10 country' ] ~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 99.14 it"" ] ~<sub>Λ</sub> '
- 99.17 pleasure"" ] ~<sub>Λ</sub> Λ
- 99.17 "'However ] " ~<sub>Λ</sub> ~
- 99.21 1956 ] /56
- 100.3 slave, ] ~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 100.3 gladiator, ] ~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 100.16 women: ] ~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 100.26 well; ] ~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 101.1 illustrated. ] ~<sub>Λ</sub>
- 101.7 painful' ] ~<sub>Λ</sub>



### Manuscript Details

This list records all changes made by Bodkin in the text of the journal. The words of the manuscript are presented as they appear and the editor's words are italicized. At the end of this section is a list of the page titles which Bodkin put at the top of forty-four of the journal's pages, and the manuscript details which pertain to them.

- 1.6        ing on shadow cancelled
- 1.10      philosophic bracketed and written above truth
- 2.3        continued written above she
- 3.6        single quotation mark cancelled after up
- 4.21-22   that in my private life inserted
- 4.24      past inserted
- 5.20      the criterion of inserted in pencil while the rest of  
the page is in ink
- 5.21      there is a pencilled parenthesis before It
- 5.24      comes cancelled after Christ and he offers inserted
- 6.3        the f in of is pencilled in
- 6.10      that inserted
- 6.16      comma after worth is pencilled in
- 6.25      comma after America is pencilled in
- 6.26      comma after America is pencilled in
- 7.21-22   or 'perfect union' inserted
- 7.25      two cancelled and unrecoverable words follow ever;  
through the body, vet inserted

- 8.3 thing cancelled after some; personal life inserted
- 8.4-5 Oct. /52 inserted
- 8.15 an s on the end of appear cancelled
- 9.5 finds cancelled after that; can find inserted.  
both cancelled after expression; either inserted
- 10.16 only inserted
- 10.25 in our view inserted
- 11.3 its cancelled after life
- 11.17 actual helper or inserted
- 11.25-27 school of Freud' may be related to infantile rebellion  
against the decrees of a father-God written in blue ink  
while the rest of the page is in black
- 12.4 divine inserted
- 12.5 of the mariner's penance inserted
- 12.6-7 mariner's cancelled before neck; for his offense cancelled  
after neck; of the offender inserted
- 12.23 quotation mark cancelled before Tobias
- 13.2 the cancelled before poem; C's written above poem
- 13.27 deny cancelled after to; assert inserted
- 14.20 & cancelled after repentance
- 14.21 and accepted inserted
- 15.21-22 belonging to and inserted
- 15.24 quotation marks cancelled after atmosphere
- 17.21 instance heavily written over an unrecoverable word
- 17.27-18.1 is an expression of the individual's distinctive power  
inserted
- 18.2 his heavily written over one's
- 18.25 to cancelled after world
- 18.27 to inserted
- 19.3 quotation mark cancelled after bridge

- 19.3      capital C cancelled after the-
- 19.5      for X inserted
- 19.7      for cancelled after enlightenment, (followed by for)
- 19.18     Jewish inserted
- 19.19     quotation mark before polite cancelled
- 19.25     quotation mark cancelled after incarnate
- 19.27     January written above Hibbert
- 20.5      quotation mark before he cancelled
- 20.6      & cancelled after death
- 20.20     these written before ultimate and -se cancelled; ultimate inserted
- 20.22-23 an unreadable symbol appears after apprehending
- 20.23     in view inserted ,
- 20.25     an cancelled after is
- 21.4      that cancelled after self
- 21.15     self inserted
- 21.21     realized inserted
- 22.27     in my book inserted
- 23.5      my own inserted
- 23.5      & cancelled after distress
- 23.5-6    at the impact of ill temper, & inserted
- 23.9      who was cancelled after one
- 23.9      a cancelled after by
- 23.9      s added on habit
- 23.15     and self-justification inserted
- 23.19     realities inserted
- 24.4      both inserted
- 24.4-5    recent inserted

- 24.6      capital T heavily written over a lower case t in Thin
- 24.7      there inserted
- 24.9      the inserted
- 24.10     experienced inserted
- 25.2      as cancelled after diffidence, (followed by as)
- 25.7      e.g. inserted
- 25.12     thinking in inserted
- 25.13     once again inserted
- 26.20     p. 203 inserted
- 26.27     19 inserted
- 27.2      203 inserted
- 27.7      101 inserted
- 27.9      194 inserted
- 28.2      concerning marriage and adultery as inserted
- 28.4      if cancelled after sincere
- 28.12     does cancelled after outlook; is inserted
- 28.27     moral inserted
- 29.7      The Midnight Diary underlined in pencil while rest of the page is in ink
- 29.14     yet inserted
- 29.19     comma cancelled after Macbeth
- 31.2      Men and Books series, Longmans, Green and Company, 1952  
written at bottom of page
- 31.6      statement cancelled after Cohen's
- 31.14     190 inserted
- 31.15     apt inserted
- 31.19-21 the lines of poetry beginning with the words I put no and ending with know it dead are inserted vertically along the left-hand margin
- 31.26-27 Essays and Studies by Members of the English Association, Oxford, vol. VIII, 1922 written at the bottom of the page

- 32.11 buffets written over an unrecoverable word
- 32.18 an s cancelled at the end of Smart
- 32.20 blind giants inserted
- 32.23 28 inserted
- 32.24 the cancelled after energy; so far the inserted
- 32.26 these cancelled after feel; Smart's inserted
- 32.26 something cancelled after is; value inserted
- 32.27 36 inserted
- 33.13 cf. Bonamy Dobrée Clark lectures for 1953 on 'great impersonal themes in English poetry written vertically along the left-hand margin
- 33.20 And heavily written over an unrecoverable word
- 34.3 unbending inserted
- 34.5 unto inserted above to which is not cancelled
- 34.5 the twelve inserted above his which is not cancelled
- 34.6 Luke 18. 31 inserted
- 34.11 in Arnold Bennett (Home and Van Thal Ltd. 1948) written at the bottom of the page
- 34.22 lyric inserted
- 34.23 sometimes cancelled after is; oftener inserted
- 34.25 half apologetic inserted
- 34.26 exhibiting cancelled after is; working out inserted
- 35.10 Faber 1928 written at the bottom of the page
- 35.15 Nature, 'Language' written at the bottom of the page
- 35.27 swift disastrous movement inserted
- 36.5-6 the significance of 'ruin' in inserted
- 36.8 through the calling of the cancelled after shattered; as he calls the inserted
- 36.16-17 by the writer in the Hibbert inserted

- 36.23 soul's inserted
- 38.2 p. 241 inserted
- 38.18 and thoughtfulness inserted
- 38.21 some cancelled after with
- 38.24 quotation mark cancelled after sin
- 38.25 not only to live but inserted
- 39.11 Harvell Press, 1952 written at the bottom of the page
- 39.26 223 inserted
- 40.6 incompatibility inserted
- 40.12 predatory inserted
- 40.19 parenthesis cancelled after Abbé
- 40.23 comma after him is written in blue ink while the rest of the page is in black
- 40.27 in blind integrity inserted in blue ink while the rest of the page is in black
- 41.5 semi-colon after further is in blue ink while the rest of the page is in black
- 41.10 need inserted in blue ink while rest of the page is in black
- 41.13-14 'distilled out of the whole experience of the race' inserted
- 41.14 quotation mark cancelled before those
- 41.17 comma after Hitler inserted in blue ink while the rest of the page is in black
- 42.10 with inserted
- 42.10 ly cancelled on the end of obtrusive
- 42.21 a surly world and with inserted
- 42.22 capital G in God heavily written over a lower case g
- 42.27 cherish cancelled after we; favour inserted
- 43.17 anything cancelled after discover; what inserted
- 43.20 and solitary inserted



- 43.23 an unrecoverable letter cancelled at the end of unawares
- 44.17 an image of cancelled after of
- 44.24 commas after part and hers are in pencil while the rest of the page is in ink
- 44.25 ordinary cancelled after of; overaccustomed inserted
- 45.19 209 inserted
- 46.5 she cancelled after though; Celia inserted
- 46.13-14 With cancelled after anything; Like inserted
- 46.14 like inserted (after and) above with which is not cancelled
- 46-47. 28-1 to a man inserted
- 47.15 and inserted
- 49.20 an unrecoverable word cancelled after life
- 50.22 and Davidson's inserted
- 50.23 his cancelled after and
- 51.1 the means of cancelled after impossible
- 51.1 capital G heavily written over a lower case g in Grace
- 51.2 those cancelled after through
- 51.5 quotation mark cancelled before and after good way
- 51.6 the way inserted
- 51.13 that cancelled after before
- 51.14 by Christian believers inserted
- 51.21 here inserted
- 51.25 reaction cancelled after receives
- 51.27 and use inserted
- 52.4 about cancelled after himself
- 52.9 become cancelled after desire to
- 52.12 monk or devout inserted
- 52.13 of cancelled after effort

- 52.14 responded genuinely to inserted above come under the influence of, around which are parentheses
- 52.18-19 the words beginning with Lavinia warns Peter and ending with his own needs are marked off with a 1 written above Lavinia and & cancelled before Lavinia
- 52.19-21 the words beginning with Edward tries to and ending 'things about yourself' are marked off with &2 written above Edward
- 52.18 picture cancelled after his; image inserted
- 52.20 Peter cancelled after tell; him inserted
- 53.4-5 a record inserted
- 53.10-11 last night and today inserted after continuously
- 53.15 wat cancelled after of
- 53.19 something cancelled after of; untamed inserted
- 53.22 just cancelled after have in pencil while the rest of the page is in black ink
- 53.23 comma after write is in pencil while the rest of the page is in ink
- 53.26 mere visual cancelled after a; distinctive new inserted in pencil while the rest of the page is in ink
- 53.26 somehow cancelled after them in pencil while the rest of the page is in ink
- 54.2 They are inserted
- 54.3-4 hurrying to that focal light where cancelled after eager; rising up willingly from the region where they sleep to offer the full treasury of their meaning in the focal light where inserted
- 54.4-5 conscious inserted
- 54.11 other cancelled after puruse
- 54.14 comma after differences inserted in pencil while the rest of the page is in ink
- 54.16 period after live inserted in pencil while the rest of the page is in ink
- 54.24 or growing point inserted
- 54.25 commas after has and it in blue ink while the rest of the page is in black

- 55.12 has cancelled after life
- 55.13 best cancelled after the; most inserted
- 55.24 to cancelled after as in pencil while rest of the page is in ink
- 56.8 an unrecoverable word cancelled after his; though heavily written over it
- 56.18 quotation marks before and after sunshine days are in blue ink while the rest of the page is in black
- 56.21 Dante and inserted
- 56.27 to my mind marked off and a 1 written above to in pencil while the rest of the page is in ink
- 56.27 so vividly marked off and a 2 written above vividly in pencil while the rest of the page is in ink
- 56.28 the image of cancelled after mind; an image of the town of my birthplace inserted in pencil while the rest of the page is in ink
- 57.2 thinking inserted in pencil while the rest of the page is in ink
- 57.3 the gate inserted in pencil above that house which is not cancelled; the rest of the page is in ink; remembered inserted in pencil
- 57.6 an unrecoverable word cancelled after now
- 57.7 an unrecoverable phrase is inserted above kind of traffic in pencil while the rest of the page is in ink
- 57.9 the inserted above that in pencil above that which is not cancelled; the rest of the page is in ink
- 57.11 comforting inserted
- 57.12 is there cancelled after It; remains while I live inserted in pencil while the rest of the page is in ink
- 57.15 at least in part inserted in pencil while the rest of the page is in ink
- 57.15 and from cancelled after little
- 57.16 life cancelled after of
- 57.16 world cancelled after the; universe inserted
- 58.3 1945 inserted

- 59.10 colon after desire is inserted in pencil while the rest of the page is in ink
- 59.12 -es on the end of does cancelled in pencil while the rest of the page is in ink
- 59.25 square brackets cancelled before of
- 59.26 square brackets cancelled after books
- 60.12-13 Introduction to the English Novel, II, 1953, Hutchinson University Library written at the bottom of the page
- 60.14 the power inserted
- 61.24 'the historical Jesus' is bracketed with a 1 written above historical
- 61.25 'the Christ of eschatology' is bracketed with a 2 written above Christ
- 62.14 an inserted
- 62.20 orally or inserted
- 62.26 a inserted
- 63.6 authority, makes him inserted
- 63.6-8 The Quest of the Historical Jesus (Adam and Charles Black, First edition, 1910, trans. Wolfgang Gomerig) written at the bottom of the page
- 63.9 quotation mark cancelled after Man
- 63.15 quotation mark cancelled after identification
- 64.5 quotation mark cancelled after humanity
- 64.9 selves cancelled after our and self written heavily over it
- 64.11 only inserted
- 64.15 later inserted
- 64.26 the phrase inserted
- 64.26-27 the phrase lying 'without the sphere of historical investigation' inserted
- 65.7 for publication inserted
- 65.24 in inserted in pencil while the rest of the page is in ink

- 66.10-11 The Modern Writer and His World, G. S. Fraser, Derek Verschoye, 1953 written at the bottom of the page
- 66.15 comma cancelled before of by a parenthesis heavily written over it
- 66.16 comma cancelled after instance by a parenthesis heavily written over it
- 66.25 quotation mark cancelled after misunderstandings
- 67.9 un cancelled in unprivileged; less inserted
- 67.13-14 a book inserted
- 67.22-23 that cancelled after archives; the inserted
- 68.9 also inserted
- 68.21 symbol cancelled after the
- 68.23-24 reliability of the inserted
- 69.17 comma after Christ is in blue ink while the rest of the page is in black
- 69.23 comma after faith is in blue ink while the rest of the page is in black
- 69.25 story inserted
- 70.26 His heavily written over This
- 71.8 unrecoverable word cancelled after Ryle's
- 71.11 before him inserted
- 71.15 method partially cancelled after rigorous; argument inserted
- 71.23 in those cancelled after stimulate; in those capable of it inserted
- 72.7-8 it cancelled after that; what I do inserted
- 72.9 the cancelled after limits
- 72.10-11 toward which inserted
- 72.24 comma cancelled after read
- 73.1 Nov. cancelled before 30; Oct. inserted in black ink while the rest of the page is in blue
- 73.8 my mind inserted in black ink while the rest of the page is in blue

- 73.12 semicolon after beautiful is in black ink while the rest of the page is in blue
- 74.7 comma cancelled after other
- 75.18 deep inserted
- 75.22 (supra 39) inserted
- 76.18-19 --perhaps it does inserted
- 76.21 with someone inserted
- 77.5 he inserted in blue ink while the rest of the page is in black
- 77.11 of cancelled after influence
- 77.13 sea- inserted
- 77.25 Uganda in Transformation, (pp. 87-8, p. 23 written at the bottom of the page
- 78.5 quotation mark cancelled after when
- 78.10 'as I have never prayed' inserted
- 78.10 quotation mark cancelled after love
- 79.11 it is inserted
- 79.19 (ξφ) inserted
- 80.1 I contemplate inserted
- 80.9 1955 inserted in pencil while the rest of the page is in ink
- 81.20 of teacher or preacher inserted
- 81.22 or implicit inserted
- 81.24 often inserted
- 82.7 thought cancelled after the; idea inserted
- 83.15 quotation mark cancelled after mind
- 83.16 55 inserted
- 84.1 56 inserted
- 84.7 quotation mark cancelled after recalling



- 84.8 58 inserted
- 84.9 Buddha's Way of Virtue (a version of the inserted
- 84.12 serious inserted
- 85.7 92 inserted
- 85.16 104 inserted
- 85.19-20 and fellowship inserted
- 85.27 to be inserted
- 86.21-21 and, as in the case of the shepherd, those for whom the painful effort is made inserted
- 86.23 an unrecoverable word cancelled after keep; braced inserted
- 87.7 in opposition inserted
- 88.12 having inserted
- 89.8 quotation mark cancelled before the
- 91.12 lower-case g cancelled in God and capital G heavily written over it
- 91.13 that cancelled after anxious
- 91.19 aware inserted
- 91.22 Gollancz, 1955 inserted
- 92.1 realizes and inserted
- 92.2 illegible letters or numbers in parentheses after themselves
- 92.3 the inserted
- 92.13 the cancelled after of; a inserted
- 92.20 respect for inserted
- 92.24 spoke her name as Loma courtesy demanded and inserted
- 93.2 illegible word inserted above individual
- 93.3 the inserted
- 93.18 quotation mark cancelled after life
- 93.26 the cancelled after of; his wife's inserted

- 94.24 of cancelled after part; in inserted
- 95.2 Prof. inserted
- 95.2-3 Selection II, edited C. Hastings and D. Nicholl, Sheed and Ward, 1954 written at the bottom of the page
- 95.7 lies cancelled after space; there is inserted
- 95.25 imperfectly now or at the time of death inserted
- 96.3 or 'indication' inserted
- 96.7 appearing in his novels inserted
- 96.8-9 to that of an exposure inserted
- 97.1 any inserted
- 97.16 that cancelled after assumption
- 97.16-17 that everybody loved him more than themselves; this assumption inserted
- 98.21 unrecoverable word cancelled after though
- 98.26 what inserted
- 99.11 quotation mark cancelled before and
- 99.24 out of the lawn inserted
- 100.7-8 of the gladiators inserted
- 101.6 at the moment inserted

### Bodkin's Page Titles and Page Numbers

This list records the page titles Bodkin wrote for forty-four of the journal's one hundred and eighty-eight pages of text. The first number is a page and line reference to where the title is placed in this edition; the number in brackets is Bodkin's numbering. The (a) indicates the reverse side of a page which Bodkin did not number. Manuscript details are provided for page numbers to indicate that some of them, like some of the titles, were inserted at a time later than that of the entry.

- 1.16 [5] in childhood books tell 'about' the future'
- 12.23 [16a] immemorial intuitions
- 13.15 [17] the sustaining community
- 14.25 [18] intuitions aroused between author and reader
- 15.16 [18a] Anderson Scott on the Fellowship
- 17.7 [20] Naomi Mitchison's Highland Village novel
- 18.12 [21] Margot Adamson's 'Requiem Mass'
- 19.1 [21a] K. Stern on barriers through differing belief
- 19.17 [22] baptism in Naomi Mitchison's novel
- 20.9 [22a] Miller on Browning
- 20.25 [22] Graham Greene [The] End of the Affair
- 22.5 [24] Powicke on the Divine Compassion
- 23.24 [25a] N. Mitchison's poem
- 24.15 [26] Konrad on animal ascendancy
- 25.2 [26a] individual response to scientific truth

- 25.16[27] the tragic pattern as essential Christian experience
- 26.20 [28] Joad on the soul
- 27.26 [29] moral law and the divine persuasion
- 29.3 [30] the probing and contemplative 'I'; The Midnight Diary
- 30.6 [31] 'more or less'
- 30.20 [31a] Cohen on Browning
- 50.9 [48a] unknown modes of being
- 50.20 [49] Empson on cautious judgment; [The] Cocktail Party, 'one good way'
- 51.22 [50] Merton's Sign of Jonas
- 52.12 [50a] self-examination
- 53.1 [51] 'fire of love for souls': Merton
- 53.14 [51a] released water as a symbol
- 53.22 [52] words as helpers
- 58.3 [57] the dying Wells
- 58.16 [57a] Holloway's quotations from Carlyle and Newman's 'real assent
- 59.3 [58] J. H. on G. Eliot
- 59.18 [58a] J. H. on G. Eliot
- 60.5 [59] Conrad's Nostromo images of treasure
- 60.21 [59a] a lesson fossils extending the part in imagination
- 61.8 [60] 'Truth individual'
- 61.20 [60a] sources for my image of Jesus
- 62.7 [61] Bradley: critical history
- 62.25 [61a] The Kingdom of God: what intuition of mine connects with the Kingdom Jesus preached? making him a ruler (Schweitzer)
- 63.14 [62] Bradley: critical history
- 64.4 [62a] Bradley: critical history
- 64.22 [63] Bradley's 'new birth' vs. 'natural growth'

- 65.10 [63a] truth individual and absolute
- 66.12 [64a] the 'true heritage'
- 89.22 [87] images in fiction of the inner life

#### Emendations

All titles of book appearing in Bodkin's page titles have been underlined silently; all abbreviations for and have been written out silently.

- 18.12 [21] through } thro
- 25.16 [27] Christian } Xian
- 29.3 [30] 'I'; ] ~' <sub>A</sub>
- 50.20 [49] judgment: ] ~ <sub>A</sub>
- 50.20 [49] Party, ] ~ <sub>A</sub>
- 52.12 [50a] self-examination ] ~ <sub>A</sub> ~
- 53.1 [51] souls': ] ~' <sub>A</sub>
- 58.16 [57a] Newman's ] Newman
- 62.25 [61a] God: ] ~ <sub>A</sub>
- 64.22 [63] vs. ] v.

#### Manuscript Details

- 12.23 [16a] This title is written in blue ink while the rest of the page is in black, as are the titles at 13.15 [17] and 15.16 [18a]
- 18.12 [21] This title is written in a light black ink while the rest of the page is in dark black
- 30.6 [31] This title is written in black ink while the rest of the page is in blue, as are the titles at 14.25 [18], 50.9 [48a], 50.20 [49], and 53.22 [52]
- 30.20 [31a] This title is written in pencil while the rest of the page is in ink, as are the titles at 58.3[57], 58.16[57a]

59.3 [58], 59.18 [58a], 60.5 [59], 60.21 [59a], 61.8 [60], 61.20 [60a], 62.7 [61], 62.25 [61a], 63.14 [62], 64.4 [62a], 65.10 [63a], and 66.12 [64a].

Manuscript Details for Bodkin's  
Page Numbers

- [38] This number is written in black ink while the rest of the page is in blue, as are the numbers [84], [85], and [87]
- [40] This number is written in blue ink while the rest of the page is in black, as are the numbers [61] through [71], [74], [75], and [76]
- [83] This number is written in pencil while the rest of the page is in ink



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